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
AESCH. AGAM. 304

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The reading *μὴ χαρίζεσθαι* of the codices at Aesch. *Agam.* 304 has been universally rejected, because the sense "not to be lavish with the fire" is not what the context requires. Triclinius' solution, which has won no support, was to adopt the reading *δὴ χαρίζεσθαι* of the Farnese codex. The sense of lines 303-4 would then be, "(the light) arriving at Mt. Aigioplankton pressed on the command (*θεσμὸν*) to be lavish indeed with the fire." *θεσμὸν* would refer to a specific order to create a particularly huge blaze on Aigioplankton. It seems more likely, however, that it refers to the general ordinance (cf. 312, *λαμπαδηφόρων νόμοι*) that the fire be kept moving from point to point. The phrase *θεσμὸν πυρός* can mean only "ordinance of fire," i.e. the general order to keep the fire chain in motion, which the watchers on Aigioplankton would obey by lighting their particular fire. It cannot mean "device of fire," i.e. the fire itself. We should therefore rule out such emendations as Margoliouth's *μηχανήσασθαι* and Wiseler's *μὴ καθίξεσθαι*.

Casaubon took *θεσμὸν* with *πυρός* and proposed *μὴ χρονίξεσθαι*. But *χρονίξεσθαι* here must be middle, and as such it is unparalleled. It could not be passive, since Greek syntax does not admit of a passive infinitive dependent on a verb of commanding or urging (*ᾠτρυνε*). Heath's *μὴ κατίξεσθαι* likewise cannot be passive. Murray adopts it as *medium causativum*, but no parallel can be adduced.

Some editors have resorted to redivision. Both Stanley and Klausen proposed *μῆχαρ ἵξεσθαι*. The Greek must then be strained to extract the meaning, "pressed on the command for the device (*μῆχαρ*) of fire to settle." The notion of settling,



moreover, is alien to the spirit of the entire passage. An improvement would be *μῆχαρ ἴεσθαι*, if *ἴεσθαι* could be forced to function transitively. This problem would be solved by changing *θεσμὸν* to *θερμὸν*, but is unlikely that *θερμὸν* could have been corrupted to the uncommon *θεσμὸν*. A few editors, nevertheless, have been desperate enough to reject *θεσμὸν*, the ultimate confection being that printed by Rose, *ῶτρυν' ἔθ' ἔσμον μὴ χρονίζεσθαι πυρός*, which is vigorous and graphic; *more suo*, but unconvincing mainly because it tampers with *θεσμὸν*.

It is hard to escape Fraenkel's contentions that *θεσμὸν πυρός* is impeccable Greek and should be left inviolate; that the implied object of *ῶτρυνε* is the watchers who are also the subject of *πέμπουσι* in 305; and that in place of *μὴ χαρίζεσθαι* the context desiderates some verb meaning "to obey" or "to heed." It may therefore be worth considering *μὴ παρίεσθαι*, which occurred to me independently but is also reported in Groeneboom's apparatus as a suggestion of Musgrave. The verb *παρίεσθαι* is found in the sense "to neglect" (of *Agam.* 290-91, *ὁ δ' οὔτι μέλλων οὐδ' ἀφρασμόνως ὕπνῳ νικώμενος παρήκεν ἀγγέλλον μέρος*) and the middle *παρίεσθαι* can bear the same meaning (LSJ cites an example from Euripides, and one from Dio Cassius). The conjunction of *παρίεσθαι* with a negative to yield a positive sense is not inimical to Aeschylus' style, and it supplies exactly the meaning the context demands. The comparative rarity of the middle may have given rise to the corruption.

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IAN THOMSON

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SOPHOCLES' *ANTIGONE* 292

In the OCT of Sophocles, lines 289-92 of *Antigone* are as follows:

ἀλλὰ ταῦτα καὶ πάλαι πόλεως
ἄνδρες μόλις φέροντες ἐρροθόνον ἐμοὶ
κρυφῇ, κάρᾳ σείοντες, οὐδ' ὑπὸ ζυγῷ
λόφον δικαίως εἶχον, ὥς στέργειν ἐμέ.

Of the various meanings of *στέργειν* only three would yield tolerable sense in 292: (1) "to love," in the sense of the love a people bears its ruler: LSJ so interprets *στέργειν* in this passage; (2) "to be content with," with no notion of unwilling compliance; (3) "to put up with," implying resignation to an unpleasant necessity, as in Soph. *Trachiniae* 486 (cited by Jebb, who supports this third interpretation).

The first possibility should probably be discounted. Creon in *Antigone* is not the vacillating, somewhat sympathetic figure he was in *Oedipus Tyrannus*. As a tyrant whose conception of justice is force, he is determined to rule as he sees fit. He is concerned not with creating love but with forcing obedience. Similarly, the second possibility is not persuasive; mettlesome beasts do not take kindly to the yoke (cf. scholiast on *λόφον δικαίως εἶχον*: ἡ μεταφορὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποζυγίων τῶν μὴ βουλομένων ὑπὸ τὸν ζυγὸν εἶναι). This leaves the third as the best possibility, and as such it has won most support.

There is, however, another solution which deserves consideration, the more so since it involves not an emendation, but a restoration of the original text of the Laurentianus, our oldest (saec. x) and best manuscript. As Jebb himself noted, at 292 the reading of L is *ὦ*. The *διορθωτής* added a sigma, according to Jebb, "to correct the haplography." Since the reading so produced, *ὥς στέργειν ἐμέ*, makes sense, it has apparently gone unchallenged. The restored reading, *ὥστ' ἔργειν ἐμέ*, can, however, be defended by taking *ἔργειν* (*εἶργειν*) in its general sense "to hinder" (see *εἶργω* in F. Ellendt, *Lexicon Sophocleum*). The meaning "so as to hinder me" suits the mood of anger and

frustration shown by Creon. The spirited citizens who have long been muttering against him in secret, and whom he accuses of bribery in 293-94, are preventing him from doing what he considers necessary.

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EUR. *HEC.* 1035-38

The resemblance of Eur. *Hec.* 1035-38 to Aesch. *Ag.* 1343-46 has apparently not received comment. And yet it may seem close enough to suggest indebtedness:

Aesch. *Ag.* 1343-46

Αγ. ὦμοι, πέπληγμαι καιρίαν πληγὴν ἔσω.
 Χο. σίγα· τίς πληγὴν ἀντεῖ καιρίως οὐτασμένος;
 Αγ. ὦμοι μάλ' αὖθις, δευτέραν πεπληγμένος.
 Χο. τοῦργον εἰργάσθαι δοκεῖ μοι βασιλέως οἰμώγμασιν.

Eur. *Hec.* 1035-38

Πλ. ὦμοι, τυφλοῦμαι φέγγος ὀμμάτων τάλας.
 Χο. ἠκούσας ἀνδρὸς Θρηκὸς οἰωγὴν, φίλαι;
 Πλ. ὦμοι μάλ' αὖθις, τέκνα, δυστήνου σφαγῆς.
 Χο. φίλαι, πέπρακται καὶν' ἔσω δόμων κακά.

1. Victim:

Aesch.	ὦμοι, πέπληγμαι . . .	Eur.	ὦμοι, τυφλοῦμαι . .
	ὦμοι μάλ' αὖθις . . .		ὦμοι μάλ' αὖθις . . .

2. Chorus: The first line of the choral utterance of both Aeschylus and Euripides is a question, the second a statement to the effect that the deed has been done; the cry of the victim off-stage is explicitly referred to:

Aesch.	βασιλέως οἰμώγμασιν	Eur.	ἀνδρὸς Θρηκὸς οἰωγὴν
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3. The similarity between the situations (victim mishandled off-stage; chorus on-stage guessing victim's fate from his cries) cannot be claimed to imply dependence as it is a result of one of the basic conventions of the Greek theater (violent action takes place off-stage) and may, under the circumstances of certain plots, be the inevitable result of these circumstances. But, due to the same convention, scenes depicting similar situations are found also in other plays. The comparison of *Hec.* 1035ff. with *Med.* 1272ff. and *El.* 1163ff. shows that Euripides had more than one way to cope with such situations and adds to the significance of the resemblance of *Hec.* 1035-38 to *Ag.* 1343-46. Moreover, the sequence, in this passage, of the actions making up Hecuba's revenge on Polymestor is contrary to the descrip-

tion in 1160-72, where the children are killed before the eyes of their father prior to his blinding (which is also the order of IV Kings 25.7).

This reverse arrangement¹ seems to be due to the impact of the pattern of Aesch. Ag. 1343-46 and may point to an unusually vivid impression made on Euripides by the Agamemnon of Aeschylus. Such an impression may have been occasioned by a recent production of the Agamemnon. Since the *Hecuba* seems to have been produced in 424 or 425² and Aeschylean tragedies are attested to have been reproduced at the City Dionysia from 426 on,³ the Agamemnon may indeed have been reproduced at the time Euripides was composing the *Hecuba*.

A reproduction of the Oresteia has been tentatively suggested by H. J. Newiger⁴ on the basis of reminiscences from the trilogy in Aristophanes' *Clouds*. If the above interpretation of *Hec.* 1035-38 is accepted, this would strengthen the case for reproduction.

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¹ The reverse order of events in *Hec.* 1035-38 was brought to my attention by Prof. S. G. Daitz.

² See E. B. Ceadel, "Resolved Feet in the Trimeters of Euripides and the Chronology of his Plays," *CQ* 30 (1941) 75.

³ Aristoph. *Ach.* 9, with scholia.

⁴ See H. J. Newiger, "Elektra in Aristophanes' *Volken*," *Hermes* 89 (1961).

THREE WORDS OF ABUSIVE SLANG IN AESCHINES

During his speech "On the Embassy" (2.40) Aeschines claims that Demosthenes, by his disingenuous conduct, revealed to him for the first time the meaning of certain slang terms of abuse whose true import Aeschines had not until then even suspected. The distressing words are *κέρκωψ*, *παιπάλημα*, and *παλίμβολον*, and it is remarked by their Loeb translator, C. D. Adams, that "we are as ignorant of the particular shades of vulgarity and rascality conveyed by these words as Aeschines says he was before his initiation." Ignorant we may be, but the ignorance is perhaps remediable.¹

Let us begin with *κέρκωψ*. It is derived, of course, from *κέρκος* which is a common word for tail whether belonging to a horse, a dog, a fish, or any quadruped whatever.² Hence *κέρκος* is used to describe a tawse, part of a wine-dipper, and the top of a lighted torch.³ In English, as we know, "tail" can be used of the buttocks as well as of the sexual member, be it male or female, and it has a similar range of application in Greek. Hesychius restricts the term to the penis (*ἀνδρεῖον αἰδοῖον*) and this seems to be its meaning in Herodas: *Mime* 5.45. Aristophanes, on the other hand, uses the word during the famous Megarian pig scene in the *Acharnians* to mean the female pudenda.

A: κέρκων οὐκ ἔχει.

B: νέα γάρ ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ δελφακουμένα
ἐξεῖ μεγάλην τε καὶ παχείαν κήρυθράν. (785-87)

¹ Martin and Budé in the Budé edition (1927) translate the words by "grimacier, anguille, caméléon," explaining in a footnote that these are meant to convey to the French reader Aeschines' aim, "qui est de montrer en Démosthène un caractère faux, insaisissable, exagérément opportuniste." That the words should be a good deal stronger and the character much more nefarious I hope the following article will show.

² E.g. Plato *Phaedrus* 254d. Plutarch *Sertorius* 16.3. Aristophanes *Equites* 1031. Aristotle *Hist. Animal.* 6.11 (565b). *De part. animal.* 4.10 (689b). Cf. also Aristophanes *Pax* 1054.

³ Herodas 3.68. Lucian *Lexiphanes* 7. Schol. Euripides *Phoen.* 1257.

She has no "tail" now because she is too young for sexual intercourse, but when she "grows up to pighood"—and Hesychius tells us that *δελφάκιον* also means the female pudenda, so the sense can also be "but when she does become a full-grown woman" — she will have one which is big and thick and red. *Παχεῖα* is a slightly odd adjective but one must bear in mind that the ostensible meaning applies to a pig's tail and the sexual undermeaning would require one simply to understand that the whole prospect was voluptuous. It is also fairly clear that when he describes Mnesilochus' having his *κέρκος* singed in readiness to play the part of a woman he is referring to the behind.⁴ Hence Eubulus' indecent joke about the gods' apparent pleasure in paederastic intercourse.

αὐτοῖς δὲ τοῖς θεοῖσι τὴν κέρκον μόνην
καὶ μηρὸν ὥσπερ παιδερασταῖς θύετε. (fr. 130, K)⁵

Nevertheless, the Septuagint translator of *Proverbs* 26.22 can write "*λόγοι κερκώπων μαλακοί*," meaning the words of tricksters who speak soft words and pretend to be admirers and friends, using *κέρκωψ* as a direct translation of the Hebrew *nirgan* which, as far as I know, has no indecent undertones. This is a sense one finds also in *Com. Adesp.*, 1307 (K): "*ἐλοιδόρον γόητα καὶ κέρκωπα λόγων*," and I can only suggest that the link is to be found in the *Κέρκωπες*, the "tail-" or "bottom-faced" creatures—that is to say monkeys, captured by Heracles and hung from a pole. Our information about them is mostly very late and comes from a variety of sources,⁶ but one does not have to press the point that monkeys, notorious for their thieving ways and meaningless chatter, are sufficient to have given the word *Κέρκωπες* the meaning knaves, robbers, tricksters, liars, and so forth, as Hesychius lists at length. Now, these malefactors captured by Heracles were also called white-arsed (*πύγαργον*), that is to say, cowardly, base, or as we

⁴ *Thesm.* 239. Cf. also *Acharnians* 119-20.

⁵ Since *μηρός*, *sensu obscaeno*, usually refers to the anus [Cf. *Anth. Graec.* 5.3.1-2 (Rufinus); *Ibid.* 12.97.2-3 (Antipater); *Ibid.* 12.247 (Strato); Aristophanes *Aves* 669], *κέρκος* here will mean penis.

⁶ The best account of them, with very full references, is given in Sir James Frazer's Loeb edition (1921) of Apollodorus: 2.6.3, note 3.

might express it, lily-livered, in contrast to the μελάμπυγος Heracles who, of course, was brave and daring.⁷ This very late information is supported by the comic writer Callias of 5/4th centuries B.C. who uses λευκόπρωκτος to mean much the same thing. Bearing this in mind, and both Aristophanes' and Eubulus' indecent plays on κέρκος, I suggest it may not be too far from Aeschines' term to use "arse-licking shyster" to cover the possibilities of sexual innuendo, sycophancy, and underhanded trickery inherent therein.

The second term, παιπάλημα, is distinguished by καλούμενον. Now, the Kerkopes were mythical creatures and the human beings who resembled them gave rise to the myth; but παιπάλη(μα) has a distinct literal sense, and so καλούμενον may be attached to it in order to distinguish that literal sense from the metaphorical. On the other hand, Aeschines is using three curious terms in their specialized slang manner so it is unlikely that καλούμενον can fulfil this function. Rather, it is a nudge to the Greek audience, an indication that a very unusual meaning is to be understood, perhaps to be Englished thus—"παιπάλημα, as one might say," Hesychius gives it as "ποικίλος ἐν κακίᾳ" but this is obviously of little immediate assistance. Once again, the origin takes us far from "gossip" or "evil-doing."

Παιπάλη is finely-ground barley flour, as Hesychius tells us and as we can see from Galen who quotes a medical receipt of Apollonius.⁸ This is also the Scholiast's note on Aristophanes *Birds* 431, but here he has obviously missed the point because fine flour has nothing to do with *Birds* 431, whereas it is part of the action in *Clouds* 260 sq. The natural translation of "τρίμμα, παιπάλημα" in *Birds* is "wit, scheming, craftiness, invention," since this is what the Hoopoe wishes to indicate with regard to Peisthetaerus' speech. Ostensibly, glibness of tongue is what Socrates promises Strepsiades in the *Clouds*, but in this passage

⁷ See in particular Tzetzes *Chil.* 5.74 sq., especially 98, and his *Scholia in Lycophronem* 91. Cf. μελάμπυγος in the sense of brave in Aristophanes *Lysistrata* 803. Lucian *Pseudologistae* 32. The geographical location of Κερκώπων near Μελαμπύγου is therefore, pro sensu obscaeno, interesting.

⁸ Galen *De compositione medicamentorum* 1.1 = Kühn 12.502.

Aristophanes has used the phrase “*τρίμμα, κρόταλον, παιπάλη*” whose fortuitous combination may by some lucky chance give us a clue to the slang meaning of *τὸ καλούμενον παιπάλημα*.

Τρίμμα, as Dover points out in his edition of the play, is derived from *τρίβειν* which means not only to rub but also to masturbate.⁹ *Κρόταλον* is a castanet or split reed which makes a noise when shaken in the hand, and I am going to suggest that this can be an image of the penis and/or testicles. Bizarre as this may appear at first, I am supported by two poets of the Anthology. Rufinus tells us that since he changed his mind about preferring boys to women his quoit has become a rattle (*δίσκος ἔμοι κρόταλον*); in other words his area of sexual pleasure has moved from his anus—the ring through which he was penetrated by his young companions—to his penis, the rattle by which he gives pleasure in a different fashion.¹⁰ Addaeus also invites one to “knock” a handsome fellow while the going is good. His verb, *κροτείσθω*, is obviously sexual slang and must mean to use the penis.¹¹ I submit, therefore, that a similar image in Aristophanes is by no means out of the question. The juxtaposition of those two ideas makes *παιπάλημα* inevitably an image of semen, and lest this be thought another fancy, let me add that I am informed the modern Greek *πασπάλισμα* is capable of bearing the nuance “coitus interruptus.”¹²

It is not difficult to find *παιπάλημα* used elsewhere in similarly ambiguous situations. Aeschro, in the fourth century B.C.,

⁹ See, for example, *Anth. Graec.* 12.13.2 (Strato).

¹⁰ *Anth. Graec.* 5.19.2.

¹¹ *Ibid.* 10.20.1. For further imagery of the penis as a reed, see P. G. Maxwell-Stuart: “Strato and the Musa Puerilis,” *Hermes* 100 (1972) 224.

¹² I am quite aware that Aristophanes’ phrase does not occur in a sexual context, but I am reminded of the English “bugger all” meaning “nothing whatsoever.” “Bugger” has both its literal and metaphorical sense and all I am saying is that were we to come across “bugger all” in an English play we would realize what the phrase meant while also being conscious of its vulgarity because of the inherent connotation of “bugger.” Mutatis mutandis I argue the same for Aristophanes’ phrase. Each word in itself may be harmless enough, but taken together may have conveyed to the Athenian audience the same meaning and the same kind of vulgar nuance as our English slang.

wrote the lament of Philaenis that she had been slandered by the Athenian Polycrates who accused her of lewd and promiscuous behaviour.¹³ The word which describes this particular slander is *παιπάλημα*, and I draw attention to it because of its appearance again in a sexual context. I am also interested by Lucian's *Pseudologistes*, 32. Lucian is savaging a man who was temerarious enough to mock his use of an obsolete epithet and in the course of his invective has a great deal to say about the man's homosexuality. *Μελάμπυγος*, the man with hairs on his backside, that is, a man of heterosexual tastes, has merely to look at this effeminate to reduce him to grovelling fear. "*ὦ παιπάλημα καὶ κίναδος*," says Lucian, a phrase which he repeats in his next sentence: "perhaps you'll find that funny, *παιπάλημα* and *κίναδος*, as if you'd heard a riddle or a conundrum. You're not even familiar with the jargon for what you do!" *Κίναδος* is too like *κίναιδος* for a jeu de mots not to be at least possible; indeed the play may not be necessary, for the manuscripts themselves have *κίναιδος*, a more likely reading under the circumstances than Guyet's emendation, and it is worth noting that *κίναδος* appears very close to *παιπάλημα* in the passage of the *Birds* to which I made earlier reference. I submit, therefore, that one is not being too far-fetched in suggesting that *παιπάλημα* is capable of bearing a sexual undertone, probably involving masturbation and possibly of a homosexual nature. The idea of slander or evil gossip obviously comes from its being a dirty word, from the sense of scattering seed or "spilling the beans," so shall we suggest that "slandorous jerk" can encompass most of these various entendres?¹⁴

Finally, *παλίμβολον* is a much easier word to describe. Hesychius gives his usual jumble: "*ἄδόκιμος, ἀνελεύθερος, ἀκατάλληλος, ἀνόρμοςτος, κ.τ.λ.*," much of which coincides with the modern Greek meaning of inconstant, fickle, shilly-

¹³ Fr. 8.8 = Bergk, *P.L.G.* 2.518.

¹⁴ Notice, too, Lucian refers to jargon as though the words were part of a clique-language. Does this reflect on Aeschines' use of *καλούμενον* to point the audience's attention in the right direction? I have not included any references to *Etym. Magn.* 515 sub *κίρκη* which speaks of "*παιπαλώδεις γυναῖκας*" in connection with witchcraft, but the sense of evil-doing is clear from the context.

shallying, and these in turn are derived from the epithets "third-hand" and "frequently-sold."¹⁵ Παλίμβουλοι is the Scholiast's gloss on Thucydides 3.37.3: "εἰ βέβαιον μηδὲν ἡμῖν καθεστήξει," and this shiftiness, noted by Adamantius as an indication of treachery in dark eyes (1.15; cf. 2.24) naturally leads to the fraudulence and craft of Plutarch's Arab chieftain (*Crassus* 21) and to underhand dealings in trade (Dio Chrysostom 31.37) which in turn breed deceit in men's souls (Plato *Laws* 705a).¹⁶ Finally the word seems to have come to mean a complete reversal, a switch of terms (as in the Scholiast's note on Aristophanes *Clouds* 298), or a change of mind, "un repentir impitoyable," as Waltz and Guillons translate Agathias' "ἀστόργον παλιμβολίης."¹⁷ The meaning in Aeschines' day, however, was probably much closer to "underhand" and "deceitful" and any phrase like *shifty crook* or *cheap twister* would adequately express the Greek.

Why did Aeschines choose these three terms in particular? His main point during this section of his speech is to reveal that Demosthenes suddenly turned over-friendly on the return journey to Athens from Philip's court, professing great admiration of the King, in an effort to mislead Aeschines and the other ambassadors into making damaging confessions of partiality to Philip. Since Aeschines is being charged with lying to the Assembly about Philip's intention, it seems an excellent oratorical device to introduce crude, vulgar criticism of Demosthenes under a guise of being shocked at the way in which his behaviour so neatly illustrated this dubious and indecent terminology—the prurience of the prude prétendu. It is really rather amusing.

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¹⁵ Presumably this is what Nicander means when he writes of a cabbage looking like the soles cobbled on to a second-hand sandal, (fr. 85.6, ed. Gow and Schofield). See also Gow's note ad locum in *C Q* (1951), 106. Cf. also Menander, fr. 445 (K).

¹⁶ Cf. also Aristaenetus *Epistula* 1.28. Agathias *Historicus* 2.6. Pollux 3.28 (132). Eustathius 375.1.

¹⁷ *Anth. Graec.* 5.302.12. Presumably this very late meaning is what has misled some translators into writing of the "reversed" or "inside-out" sandals of Menander and Nicander.

ANTIPATER'S EUPALAMUS: A COMMENT ON
ANTH. GRAEC. 12.97

Εὐπάλαμος ξανθὸν μὲν ἐρεύθεται, ἴσον Ἐρωτι,
 μέσφα ποτὶ Κρητῶν ποιμένα Μηριόνην·
 ἐκ δέ νυ Μηριόνεω Ποδαλείριος οὐκέτ' ἐς Ἡὼ
 νεῖται· ἴδ' ὡς φθονερὰ παγγενέτειρα φύσις.
 εἰ γὰρ τῷ τὰ τ' ἐνερχε τὰ θ' ὑπόθεν ἴσα πέλοιτο,
 ἦν ἂν Ἀχιλλῆος φέρετος Αἰυκλίδεω.

In his Loeb translation Paton confesses that the joke in this epigram is obscure, an admission caused perhaps as much by embarrassment as by a mistake which offers Meriones as a synonym for thighs. Unfortunately it is nothing of the kind; Meriones stands for anus or sphincter and unless this be admitted from the start little or no sense can be made of the poem.

Eupalamus is flushed a ξανθός colour as far as his anus; in other words he has a fine tan. Medical writers used ξανθός to refer both to urine¹ and to blood;² Aristotle called the orange band of the rainbow this shade,³ and Plutarch said it was the colour of a fox;⁴ so we can understand it here to refer to the reddish-brown complexion and tan of a young man, perhaps with fair skin, since this turns red sooner than brown, who has been exposing himself to the sun. Apparently this is attractive — ἴσον Ἐρωτι. As far as I know Eros is not called ξανθός elsewhere, although he is often “golden” like his mother, but Longus does say at one point that Eros’ hair is ξανθός like fire.⁵

It is not until the second line that we realize we are in for a joke. Meriones, “captain of the Cretans,” contains two sources of wit. We know that Cretans were notorious for pederasty,⁶

¹ Aretaeus 2.7.7. Galen *De simpl. med. temp. fac.* 102.13 = Kühn 12.277. Hippocrates *De morbis* 3.6 = Littré 7.124.

² Aretaeus 2.2.16; 4.11.2. Galen *De crisibus* 1.12 = Kühn 9.600.

³ *Meteorologica* 3.4 (375a 7-17).

⁴ *Moralia* (Animine an corporis affectiones sint peiores, 2) 500d.

⁵ *Daphnis and Chloe* 2.4.

⁶ Sextus Empiricus *Pyrrhonism* 3.24 (199). Servius *Comment. ad Aeneid.* 10.325.

so Homer's account of the death of Tecton, slain by Meriones who thrust a spear through his buttock, provides one bawdy allusion.⁷ The other is contained in "Meriones" itself. Paton draws our attention to *μηρός*, but forgets the play on words. Rufinus wrote of the contest between Rhodope, Melita, and Rhodocleia,

τῶν τρισσῶν τίς ἔχει κρείσσονα Μηριόνην,

where the name obviously refers to the vagina,⁸ a pun known also to Aristophanes who makes Euelpides say,

ἀρά γ' οἶσθ' ὅτι
ἐγὼ διαμηρίζοιμι ἂν αὐτὴν ἡδέως⁹

Strato, too, has a desire to treat a boy, Theodorus, as his woman (*ἐταιρόσυννος*) and urges him to "essay Meriones" (*πειρωμέν Μεριόνην*) which is clearly an invitation to sodomy.¹⁰ Meriones, therefore, should be taken here to refer to Eupalamus' anus.

From there (*ἐκ δέ νυ*), Podaleirius no longer returns to the dawn, that is, there is no more flushing red. "From that point onwards" can, anatomically, only bring us to the penis, "lilyfoot" as the name means. *Foot* can be a euphemism for the penis; it appears so in Isaiah: "In that day shall the Lord shave with a razor that is hired the head and hair of the feet," (7.20) and in Deuteronomy: "For the land is not as the land of Egypt, from whence ye came out, where thou sowedst thy seed, and wateredst it with thy foot," (11.10); and *ποδάονα* refers to the penis in an Oracle recorded by Apollodorus (3.15.6).¹¹ Lilies are white, and the pallor of

⁷ *Iliad* 5.65-66.

⁸ *Anth. Graec.* 5.36. 1-2.

⁹ *Aves* 669.

¹⁰ *Anth. Graec.* 12.247. For further interpretation of the poem see P. G. Maxwell-Stuart: "Strato and the Musa Puerilis," *Hermes* 100 (1972) 221. Cf. Eubulus fr. 130 (K).

¹¹ Oedipus who was sexually disturbed was lame in the foot, as his name suggests. We are also told that too much lust induces gout and similar infirmities: (Seneca *Epistula* 24.16, and Celsus *De medicina* 1.9.2). Why should these pieces of folklore come into being unless the feet were associated with sex? The inference, again, is that "foot" symbolized "penis."

Eupalamus' penis contrasts with the attractive reddish-brown tan of the rest of his body. "White" was often an opprobrious adjective implying weak or womanish;¹² Hesychius, sub *λειρός*, significantly gives us the meaning *ὁ ἰσχνός καὶ ἀχρός*, a vivid reminder of another inelegant penis, Automedon's "pars-nip" which hung limp and useless for action.¹³ This poor, pale Podaleirius no longer returns towards the dawn, that is to say it is no longer suffused with blood: he is incapable of managing an erection, and since *λείριος* implies not only white but also weak the notion of impotence is thus reinforced and doubly hinted.¹⁴

So we have another poem about impotence of which there are several in the Anthology,¹⁵ and Antipater has given us a variation on the theme. The poem ends with a sigh. If only Eupalamus could achieve tumescence he would be more excellent than Achilles, the grandson of Aeacus. Why mention Aeacus? He was, if we recall, King of Aegina which had fallen prey to famine and drought: death and disease were everywhere. Aeacus prayed to Zeus for relief and his prayers were answered. He repeatedly kissed the sacred oak, Zeus' own tree, whereupon rain began to fall—a clear image of fellatio.¹⁶ Presumably Antipater wants us to recall the story and connect Eupalamus' present impotence with his potential sexuality. It is an original but not obscure allusion.

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¹² E.g. Aristophanes *Thesmophoriazusae* 191; *Ecclesiazusae* 428. Xenophon *Hellenica* 3.4.19.

¹³ *Anth. Graec.* 11.29.3.

¹⁴ Dawn is not only red but the beginning of a new day. If *ῥοδοδάκτυλος*, the common adjective for Dawn be here implied and understood to mean rosy-toed, as Gow and Page would have it (*The Greek Anthology: Hellenistic Epigrams*, II, [Cambridge 1965] 86) we have another, albeit allusive, reference to the difference between a weak impotent foot/penis and a red/potent one.

¹⁵ As well as Automedon's poem cited above in note 13, see also 12.11; 216 (Strato); 232 (Scythinus), etc.

¹⁶ Ovid *Metamorphoses* 7.631-32. Ovid is the only person to mention the kissing, so the image of fellatio may well be peculiar to him. It is not necessary, however, to an understanding of Antipater. Aeacus' power in bringing fertility to a sterile land is sufficient and obvious enough.

HERACLIDIS LEMBI EXCERPTA POLITIARUM¹

10. (Lacedaemon) λέγεται δὲ (sc. Lyncurgus) καὶ τὴν κρυπτὴν εἰσηγήσασθαι, καθ' ἣν ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐξιόντες ἡμέρας κρύπτονται, τὰς δὲ νύκτας μεθ' ὅπλων [κρύπτονται] καὶ ἀναιροῦσι τῶν Εἰλώτων ὅσους ἂν ἐπιτήδειον ᾖ.

Dilts' text cannot be sound, since the third καὶ reveals that a verb before καὶ ἀναιροῦσι is missing. The second κρύπτονται, which is preserved in the best manuscript V, was felt as a dittography already by the copyists of d g a b, who omit it. This is the way in which N. Cragius (Geneva 1593) and F. W. Schneidewin² treated κρύπτονται, the former suggesting (*in margine* of his edition) ἔρχονται, the latter κατίασιν as the original verb ousted by the dittography κρύπτονται.

However, it is equally possible to take this κρύπτονται as a corruption.³ Thus, I would suggest this reading: τὰς δὲ νύκτας μεθ' ὅπλων (ἐ)κρίπτονται καὶ ἀναιροῦσι κτλ. The young Lacedaemonians hide by day, but by night they spread themselves about with weapons and start killing the Helots.

(a) As for the background, cf. Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 28: οἱ ἄρχοντες — εἰς τὴν χώραν (ἄλλοτ') ἄλλως ἐξέπεμπον (sc. τοὺς νέους), ἔχοντας ἐγχειρίδια καὶ τροφὴν ἀναγκαίαν, ἄλλο δ' οὐδέν· οἱ δὲ μεθ' ἡμέραν μὲν εἰς ἀσυνδήλους διασπειρόμενοι τόπους ἀπέκρυπτον ἑαυτοὺς καὶ ἀνεπαύοντο, νύκτωρ δὲ κατιόντες εἰς τὰς ὁδοὺς τῶν Εἰλώτων τὸν ἀλίσκόμενον ἀπέσφαττον. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀγροὺς ἐπιπορευόμενοι, τοὺς ῥωμαλεωτάτους καὶ κρατίστους αὐτῶν ἀνήρουν.

(b) As for the meaning 'spread themselves about' (ἐκρίπτονται = διασπείρονται), cf. the Septuagint (contemporary with Heraclides Lembus), *Judges* 15.9: καὶ ἀνέβησαν οἱ

¹ Ed. M. R. Dilts (GRB Monographs, 5, Duke U., 1971) = Aristotle, Fr. 611 Rose.

² *Heraclidis Politiarum quae extant*, rec. F. G. Schneidewin (Gottingae 1847).

³ Obviously, so did Adamantius Coray (*Κορυαῖς*) in his edition (Paris 1805), but his conjecture ἐκρήττονται cannot stand criticism.

ἄλλόφυλοι, καὶ παρενέβαλον ἐν Ἰούδα, καὶ ἐξεργήσαν ἐν Λεύει.

27. (Ceos) Ἀρισταῖον δέ φασι μαθεῖν παρὰ μὲν νυμφῶν τὴν τῶν προβάτων καὶ βοῶν ἐπιστήμην, παρὰ δὲ Βρισῶν τὴν μελιττοουργίαν· φθορᾶς δὲ οὕσης φυτῶν καὶ ζώων διὰ τὸ πνεῖν ἐτησίας.

Obviously there is a lacuna after the absolute genitive (marked already by Schneidewin). Thus tentatively read: φθορᾶς δὲ οὕσης φυτῶν καὶ ζώων διὰ τὸ (μὴ add. David Ruhnken) πνεῖν⁴ ἐτησίας, (θύσας Διὶ ἀνεκαλέσατο). Cf. Theophrastus, *De Ventis* 14 (III, p. 99 Wimmer): εἰ δέ ποτ' ἐξέλιπον (sc. οἱ ἐτησίοι) καὶ Ἀρισταῖος αὐτοὺς ἀνεκαλέσατο θύσας τὰς ἐν Κέφ θυσίας τῷ Διί, καθάπερ μυθολογοῦσι, . . . ; Clement, *Strom.* 6.29.4 Πάλιν ἱστοροῦσιν Ἕλληνες ἐκ λειπόντων ποτὲ τῶν ἐτησίων ἀνέμων Ἀρισταῖον ἐν Κέφ θῆσαι Ἰκμαίῳ Διί. πολλὴ γὰρ ἦν φθορά, φλογμῷ διαπιμπραμένων πάντων καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἀναψύχειν τοὺς καρποὺς εἰωθότων ἀνέμων μὴ πνεόντων· (δὲ add. Wilamowitz) ῥαδίως αὐτοὺς ἀνεκαλέσατο.

28. (Ceos) Ἀριστείδης ἐπεμελεῖτο γυναικῶν εὐκοσμίας, καὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ὕδωρ ἔπινον οἱ παῖδες καὶ αἱ κόραι μέχρι γάμου.

Read: καὶ τὸ παλαιὸν (μόνον) ὕδωρ ἔπινον κτλ. ('In old times boys and girls used to drink only water until marriage') and cf. Athenaeus 10.33 (429ab): παρὰ δὲ Μασσαλιήταις ἄλλος νόμος τὰς γυναῖκας ὑδροποτεῖν . . . παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις οὔτε οἰκέτης οἶνον ἔπινεν οὔτε γυνὴ ἐλευθέρᾳ οὔτε τῶν ἐλευθέρων οἱ ἔφηβοι μέχρι τριάκοντα ἐτῶν. Aelian, *V. H.* 2.38.

57. (Tarentum) Ὅτε δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Μεσσηνίοις ἐπολέμουν, γυναῖκες ἀπόντων τούτων παῖδ' αἱ τινὰς ἐγέννησαν, οὓς ἐν ὑποψίαις εἶχον οἱ πατέρες ὥς οὐκ ὄντας αὐτῶν καὶ Παρθενίας ἐκάλουν. οἱ δ' ἡγανάκτουν.

Evidently there is a lacuna after ἡγανάκτουν. Read (tentatively): οἱ δ' ἡγανάκτουν (καὶ ἐξαναστάντες ὤκισαν τὸν Τάραντα), and cf. Aristotle, *Politics* 5.7.2 p. 1306b 27: Μάλιστα δὲ τοῦτο (sc. τὰς στάσεις) συμβαίνει ἀναγκαῖον, ὅταν ἡ τι πλῆθος τῶν πεφρονηματισμένων ὥς ὁμοίων κατ' ἄρετήν, οἶον

⁴ διὰ τὸ λείπειν Schneidewin.

ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι οἱ λεγόμενοι Παρθενίαι . . . , οὓς φωράσαντες ἐπιβουλεύσαντας ἀπέστειλαν Τάραντος οἰκιστάς; Strabo (= Ephorus) 6.3.3 (p. 280) οἱ δὲ Παρθενίαι . . . κτίζουσι τὴν Τάραντα.

59. (Minoa) Μίνωαν τὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ Μακάραν ἐκάλουν πρότερον. ἔπειτα Μίνως ἀκούων Δαίδαλον ἐνταῦθα, μετὰ στόλου παρεγένετο καὶ ἀναβὰς ἐπὶ τὸν Λύκον ποταμὸν τῆς πόλεως ταύτης ἐκυρίευσεν καὶ νικήσας τοὺς βαρβάρους ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ προσωνόμασεν αὐτὴν κτλ.

Read: ἀκούων Δαίδαλον (ᾧ) ἐνταῦθα, and cf. Herodotus 7.170: λέγεται γὰρ Μίνων κατὰ ζήτησιν Δαιδάλου ἀπικόμενον ἐς Σικανίην

V. Rose and M. R. Dilts are right in adopting *παρεγένετο* of V, against *παραγέγονε* of d b. Korais read: *παραγεγονέναι, ἀναβὰς*. But Daedalus is not likely to have come to Sicily *μετὰ στόλου*.

61. (Locri) 'Εὰν ἄλῳ τις κλέπτων, τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐξορύσσεται. Ζαλεύκου υἱὸς ἔάλω, καὶ τῶν Λοκρῶν αὐτὸν ἀφιέντων, οὐχ ὑπέμεινεν, αὐτοῦ δὲ ἕνα καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἕνα ἐξεῖλεν.

κλέπτων is most probably a Christian embellishment for the correct *μοιχός*, suggested by Schneidewin.

Cf. c. 24: Νόμον δέ τινά φασι τὸν βασιλέα Τέννην διαθέσθαι, εἴ τις λάβοι μοιχόν, ἀποκτείνειν τοῦτον πελέκει. ἄλόντος δὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ κτλ.; Aelian, V.H. 13.24: Ζάλευκος, ὁ Λοκρῶν νομοθέτης, προσέταξε τὸν μοιχὸν ἄλόντα ἐκκόπτεσθαι τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς. ὁ δ' αὐτοῦ παῖς ἄλόντος ἐπὶ μοιχείᾳ κτλ.; Valerius Max. 6.5.3: cum filius eius (sc. Zaleuci) adulteri crimine damnatus secundum ius ab ipso constitutum utroque oculo carere deberet, etc.

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ἩΜΕΡΑ ἈΠΟΦΡΑΣ

Lucian, irascible and always quick to challenge an opponent, was in the midst of a holiday walk with friends when he chanced upon Timarchos, a rival sophist.¹ He greeted the unexpected appearance of Timarchos with these words to one of his friends: "It is time for us to avoid this ill-met sight, (a man) who, having appeared, may well make this most pleasant day ἀποφράς." To this the hapless Timarchos retorted rhetorically, "Ἀποφράς, τί δὲ τοῦτό ἐστι; καρπός τις ἢ βοτάνη τις ἢ σκεῦος;" Timarchos' reply, and his further admission that he had never heard the word, laid him open to one of the most bitter and abusive invectives in the history of scholarly disputation. Lucian felt that his knowledge of Attic Greek had been challenged, and consequently devoted the entire treatise entitled *Pseudologistes* to a systematic and mock-tragic debasement of the learning and of the morals of his rival.²

The central issue which precipitated this fierce attack was the question of the meaning and proper usage of the adjective ἀποφράς. The discussion of this question reappears in a somewhat sporadic manner throughout the *Pseudologistes*. It is disturbing to find in this treatise that the Atticist Lucian has in fact failed to understand the proper Attic meaning of the adjective ἀποφράς. Lucian (*Pseud.* 12) defines ἡμέρα ἀποφράς as follows: ὅταν μήτε αἱ ἀρχαὶ χρηματίζωσι μήτε εἰσαγώγιμοι αἱ δίκαι ὧσι μήτε τὰ ἱερὰ ἱερόνργηται μήθ' ὅλως τι τῶν αἰσίων τελεῖται. At least two elements of this definition are faulty, for we know from other sources (to be discussed *infra*) that in Athens legal cases dealing with homicide were judged on ἡμέραι ἀποφράδες, and that at least one day of religious rites in

¹ Whether either Lucian or Timarchos deserves the title "sophist" is questionable. See G. Bowersock, *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire* (Oxford 1969) 114-16. Lucian's occasional references to Timarchos as a "sophist" are all sarcastic. The only possible exception is *Pseud.* 8.

² This treatise is a vivid demonstration of the extremes to which professional quarrels between sophists could reach. For a general discussion of such quarrels, see Bowersock, 89-100.

Athens, the Plynteria, was apparently an *ἡμέρα ἀποφράς*. These errors must not be viewed as minor oversights by Lucian, because these two elements form the very essence of the *ἡμέραι ἀποφράδες* in Athens of the classical period.

Lucian has defined not an *ἡμέρα ἀποφράς*, but a *dies ater*. The characteristic features of Roman *dies atri* were (1) that *legis actiones* were forbidden, (2) that they were unlucky and that therefore no project should be initiated on them, and (3) that no rites of either public or private cult were to be practiced on them.³ Lucian's definition of *ἡμέρα ἀποφράς* suits perfectly the Roman *dies ater*, but contradicts the nature of the Athenian *ἡμέρα ἀποφράς*. There are two other indications in the *Pseudologistes* that Lucian is confusing Athenian and Roman religious practices: he once terms the Roman Kalends the Noumenia (*Pseud.* 8), and secondly, and more importantly, he states that one reason for making a day *ἀποφράς* was that a major military defeat had once occurred on this day (*Pseud.* 12-13). There is no evidence that the Athenians made a day *ἀποφράς* for such a reason, but it is a well-attested practice of the Romans.⁴

Lucian has clearly used *ἡμέρα ἀποφράς* as a translation of the Roman *dies ater*. Modern scholars, unfortunately, have failed to realize that when writers such as Lucian use the term *ἀποφράς* they may be referring to Roman practices. As a result scholars have attributed to the Attic *ἡμέραι ἀποφράδες* all the features of the *dies nefasti* and *dies atri* as described by late sources. This is clearly reflected in the most commonly proposed definition of *ἀποφράς*: "*nefastus*, a day on which neither legal nor legislative assemblies could be held."⁵ Such a defini-

³ For an excellent discussion of the *dies atri*, the *dies religiosi*, and the *dies nefasti* see A. K. Michels, *The Calendar of the Roman Republic* (Princeton 1967) 61-68. The proper relationship between these days is somewhat complex, and in the empire even the Romans themselves often failed to distinguish properly between them (Michels, 62).

⁴ Michels, 63.

⁵ P. Stengel, *RE* Vol. II (1895), cols. 174-75; H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Heidelberg 1960) Vol. I, p. 125; P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue Grecque* (Paris 1968) Vol. I, p. 99; and by implication, W. S. Ferguson, *Hesperia* (1948) p. 134. This confusion can be traced back as far as F. Passow, *Handwörterbuch der griechischen Sprache* (Leipzig 1841), s.v. *ἀποφράς*.

tion is based solely upon Roman conceptions of the calendar, and, in reference to classical Athens, is wrong. P. Stengel (*RE* Vol. II [1895], cols. 174-75) in his full discussion of ἀποφράς failed to distinguish between the later meaning of ἀποφράς as *nefastus* or *ater*, and the earlier, specifically Athenian, meaning of the word. As a result he has included in his description of the *ἡμέραι ἀποφράδες* the fact that the Athenian Boule did not meet on the day of the Kronia, that the Ekklesia did not meet on the day of the Thesmophoria, and that the Athenians smeared their houses with pitch on the day of the Choes. These features, like several others detailed by Stengel, have no place in a discussion of the Attic *ἡμέραι ἀποφράδες*. Stengel has included them because he mistakenly identified ἀποφράς with *nefastus* and *ater*, and then erroneously applied the concept of *dies nefastus* and *dies ater* to the evidence concerning Athenian religious practices.

It is the purpose of this study to determine the character of the Athenian *ἡμέραι ἀποφράδες*, and to strip from them all the spurious features which have been given to them by those who have confused them with the *dies atri* and the *dies nefasti*. To do this, we must begin with a survey of the uses of ἀποφράς in the classical period.

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Lucian's bold challenge to his rival to name just one ancient author who did *not* use the adjective ἀποφράς (*Pseud.* 15) has a fine rhetorical effect, especially following his haughty refusal to name *all* those who had used the word. But this challenge is quickly deflated when we find that only three uses of the word are attested from the classical period. The adjective is found in the *Laws* of Plato, in a fragment of Lysias, and in a fragment of Eupolis. By no account is the word as ubiquitous as Lucian would have us believe.

The Athenian in *Laws* 800C-E deplors the choruses which defile the days of sacrifice by presenting gloomy and sad productions intended to move audiences to tears. He proposes that, if such presentations are necessary at all, they should be given *ὁπόταν ἡμέραι μὴ καθαραὶ τινες ἀλλὰ ἀποφράδες ὦσιν*. From this it is clear that an essential feature of the *ἡμέραι ἀποφράδες* is that they were *μὴ καθαραί*. They are contrasted to the sacrificial days which were *καθαραί*. This alone is sufficient to distinguish them from the *dies nefasti*, which included

festival days of all types and which were characterized only by the fact that the praetor was "not to speak" law on them.⁶

Lysias (fragment 53, from Athenaios 12.551F) describes a group of young men who established for themselves the name Kakodaimonistai, because they banqueted on one of the *ἡμέραι ἀποφράδες* (μία *ἡμέραν ταξάμενοι τῶν ἀποφράδων*). The *ἡμέραι ἀποφράδες* to which he is referring must be monthly, because the Noumeniastai, to whom he contrasts the young men, banqueted on the first day of each month, and such monthly banqueting fraternities were common.⁷ And thus from this fragment we may conclude that at least two and perhaps more *ἡμέραι ἀποφράδες* occurred regularly each month.

Eupolis' use of *ἀποφράς* shows an extended and metaphorical usage analogous to the later extension of the use of *nefastus*;⁸

συνέτυχεν ἐξιόντι μοι
ἄνθρωπος ἀποφράς καὶ βλέπων ἀπιστίαν.

Edmond's translation (*Fragments of Attic Comedy*, Vol. I, p. 419), "a man accurst," has nicely captured the adjective's basic antithesis to *καθαρός*.⁹

We may summarize the findings from these three passages as follows: *ἡμέραι ἀποφράδες* were distinct from the "pure" festival days, and at least two occurred each month. The adjective also could be given the metaphorical meaning "impure" in reference to a person. We must now examine the later evidence concerning the word, always taking care to avoid confusion with *dies nefasti* and *dies atri*.

Plutarch used *ἀποφράς* more frequently than any other author, and, considering the time and place of his writing, one must be particularly wary of Roman contamination. Plutarch

⁶ Michels, 66.

⁷ G. M. Calhoun, *Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation* (Austin, Texas 1913) 32-33.

⁸ E.g. Plautus, *Poen.* 584, *nam istorum nullus nefastus*. See also Michels, 62.

⁹ Lucian, if he had known this fragment of Eupolis, could have used it as conclusive proof that he had correctly used *ἀποφράς* in reference to an individual. As it was, he was forced to use three general examples, two of which miss the mark entirely (*Pseud.* 16).

twice used the word to describe days on which cult activities were forbidden:

Alexander 14

(Alexander) βουλόμενος δὲ τῷ θεῷ χρῆσασθαι περὶ τῆς
στρατείας, ἦλθεν εἰς Δελφούς, καὶ κατὰ τύχην ἡμερῶν
ἀποφράδων οὐσῶν, ἐν αἷς οὐ νενόμισται θεμιστεύειν

De E apud Delphos 20

Φοῖβον δὲ δῆπου τὸ καθαρὸν καὶ ἄγνόν οἱ παλαιοὶ
πᾶν ὠνόμαζον, ὥς ἔτι Θετταλοὶ τοὺς ἱερέας ἐν ταῖς
ἀποφράσιν ἡμέραις αὐτοὺς ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ἕξω διατρίβοντας,
οἶμαι, "φοῖβονομεῖσθαι" λέγουσιν.

The characteristic feature of the *ἡμέραι ἀποφράδες* in these two passages is that they were days of cult inactivity. Such cult inactivity is characteristic of the *dies atri*, not of the Attic *ἡμέραι ἀποφράδες*. In addition, Plutarch's use of this word in reference to the Delphians and Thessalians is suspect, because Lucian (*Pseud.* 12), if he can be trusted here, claims that the word is uniquely Attic. The same criticism might be leveled against Plutarch's use of *ἀποφράς* in *Cam.* 19, where he introduces several examples of lucky and unlucky days and months among the Greeks, Romans, and barbarians. His discussion there betrays throughout a conception of *ἡμέραι ἀποφράδες* which is sometimes very general and sometimes specifically Roman. Plutarch's description of gates as *ἀποφράδες καὶ σκυθρωπαί* (*de Curiositate* 6) shows a transferred use of *ἀποφράς* similar to Lucian's use of the adjective in reference to Timarchos. His discussion of these gates in *Quaest. Rom.* 27 indicates that he has in mind Roman, and not Greek, concepts.

One occurrence of the adjective in Plutarch is particularly important, because it labels Thargelion 25, the day of the Plynteria, as an *ἡμέρα ἀποφράς*, a view which has been echoed by all modern scholars:¹⁰

Plutarch Alc. 34

ἡ γὰρ ἡμέρα κατέπλευσεν, ἐδράτο τὰ Πλυντήρια τῇ θεῷ. δρῶσι δὲ τὰ
ὄργια Πραξιεργίδαι Θαργηλιῶνος ἑκτη φθίνοντος ἀπόρροητα, τόν τε
κόσμον ἀφελόντες καὶ τὸ ἔδος κατακαλύψαντες. ὅθεν ἐν ταῖς μάλιστα
τῶν ἀποφράδων τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην ἄπρακτον Ἀθηναῖοι νομίζουσιν.

¹⁰ E.g. A. Mommsen, *Feste der Stadt Athen* (Leipzig 1898) 491, and L. Deubner, *Attische Feste* (Berlin 1932) 21.

It is important to note that the passage which formed the source for Plutarch's account here, Xenophon *Hell.* 1.4.12, also stresses the fact that no one undertakes any serious business on the day of the Plynteria ('Αθηναίων γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ οὐδενὸς σπουδαίου ἔργου τολμήσαι ἂν ἄψασθαι). But Xenophon, an Athenian, nowhere terms the day ἀποφράς. One may suspect that Plutarch, noting that the day was characterized by inactivity, added the label ἀποφράς as it was familiar to him, viz. it was for him a *dies ater*.

One piece of evidence does, however, give some credence to Plutarch's claim that the day of the Plynteria was ἀποφράς. Pollux's statement (8.141), though based on a false etymology, may be correct: περισχοινίσαι τὰ ἱερὰ ἔλεγον ἐν ταῖς ἀποφράσι τὸ ἀποφράζειν, οἷον Πλυντηρίοις καὶ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἡμέραις. There are no signs here of contamination with Roman practices, and the weight of this evidence would lead us to conclude that Thargelion 25, the day of the Plynteria, was in fact an Athenian ἡμέρα ἀποφράς. Plutarch's designation of it as such may have been, more than anything else, a lucky coincidence.¹¹

The citation for ἡμέραι ἀποφράδες in the *Etymologicum Magnum* (131.13) refers to specifically Athenian practices, and shows no contamination with Roman conceptions:

ἀποφράδες· ἀποφράδας ἔλεγον οἱ Ἀττικοὶ τὰς ἀπηγορευμένους ἡμέρας, ἃς ὑπελάμβανον χεῖρους εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων· ἃς δὴ καὶ ἐπεικάδας καλοῦσι φθίνοντος τοῦ μηνός, τετράδα, τρίτην, δευτέραν. ἢ τὰς ἡμέρας ἐν αἷς τὰς φονικὰς δίκας ἐδίκαζον.

According to this definition the ἡμέραι ἀποφράδες have the following three characteristics: (1) they were assumed to be worse than the other days, (2) they included the twenty-seventh, twenty-eighth, and twenty-ninth days of each month, and (3) they were the days on which the Athenians judged homicide cases. The first point is essentially correct, for it has been established that ἡμέραι ἀποφράδες were "impure." The second point, that the twenty-seventh, twenty-eighth, and

¹¹ It should be noted here that the day of the Choes in the Anthesteria should not be termed ἀποφράς. Besides the general considerations raised by F. Jacoby (*FGH Hist IIIb Suppl.*, Vol. I, p. 365), there is no ancient source which terms it specifically ἀποφράς.

twenty-ninth days of each month were *ἡμέραι ἀποφράδες* raises problems, however. M. P. Nilsson¹² assumes from this that the twenty-seventh, twenty-eighth, and twenty-ninth days of each and every month were *ἀποφράδες*. But it is inconceivable that the major day of the Panathenaia (Hekatombaion 28) and the day of the Theogamia (Gamelion 27) were "impure." This can be explained, I believe, by reference to the third characteristic, i.e. that *ἡμέραι ἀποφράδες* were the days on which the Athenians judged homicide cases. The two statements (*ἀς δὴ καὶ . . . δευτέραν*, and *ἥ . . . ἐδίκαζον*), I propose, stem from two sources which discussed the same subject, viz. the days on which the Areopagos council judged homicide cases.¹³ One source stated that the days on which the Areopagos council judged homicide cases were *ἀποφράδες*. A second source enumerated the specific days on which the Areopagos council could judge such cases, i.e. the twenty-seventh, twenty-eighth, and twenty-ninth days of a month. That these were the meeting days of the Areopagos council for this purpose is established by Pollux 8.117, *Ἄρειος πάγος . . . καθ' ἑκάστον δὲ μῆνα τριῶν ἡμερῶν ἐδίκαζον ἐφεξῆς, τετάρτη φθίνοντος, τρίτη, δευτέρα*.¹⁴ The compiler of the *Etym. Magn.*, however, reversed the proper sequence of these two statements, and thereby gave the impression that the twenty-seventh, twenty-eighth, and twenty-ninth days of the month were always *ἀποφράδες*.

If the above interpretation of the *Etym. Magn.* citation is correct, the following two conclusions should be drawn: a day on which the Areopagos council judged a homicide case was *ἀποφράς*, a belief that is consistent with Greek religious practices;¹⁵ and, secondly, the Areopagos council could judge such cases only on the twenty-seventh, twenty-eighth, and twenty-ninth days of a month.

¹² M. P. Nilsson, *Die Entstehung und religiöse Bedeutung des griechischen Kalenders*² (Lund 1962) 42.

¹³ For the specific jurisdiction of the Areopagos council in homicide cases, see G. Busolt, *Griechische Staatskunde*³ (Munich 1926) 1020, note 4.

¹⁴ Compare the scholion to Aeschines 1.188.

¹⁵ See E. Rohde, *Psyche*⁸ (translated by W. B. Hillis [New York 1966]) 174-82 and notes.

The Areopagos council would meet, of course, only when cases arose. A day would be *ἀποφοράς* only if the court were in session. If the court met only on one or two days, only these one or two days would be *ἀποφοράς*.¹⁶ The court obviously would not be held on days of major festivals such as the Panathenaia. The conclusion then is that these days were not *ἀποφοράδες per se*. If, however, the Areopagos court were trying a case on one of these days, then that day became *ἀποφοράς*.

We have thus established two types of Attic *ἡμέραι ἀποφοράδες*, the annual one of the Plynteria, and the monthly ones on which the Areopagos council judged homicide cases. In both cases the days were clearly *οὐ καθαραί*, for the one entailed the purification of Athena's garments, the other the purification of the state from the pollution of murder.

The question of whether or not the monthly *ἡμέραι ἀποφοράδες* were days of inactivity for the Athenian legislative assemblies is difficult to decide. The numerous meetings of the Ekklesia attested for the twenty-seventh, twenty-eighth, and twenty-ninth days¹⁷ of the month would suggest that legislative assemblies did meet. But the strong possibility remains that on the specific days of these meetings the Areopagos council was not judging homicide cases, and thus the days were not *ἀποφοράδες*. In general Greek religious scruples concerning the pollution of murder would lead one to expect them not to hold assemblies when this pollution was about, especially when such assemblies were held almost within earshot of the Areopagos. Such inactivity of the Athenian Ekklesia and Boule may be reflected in the phrase *τὰς ἀπηγορευμένας ἡμέρας* in *Etym.*

¹⁶ Apparently the Areopagos council met frequently enough to provide a regular monthly banqueting day for the Kakodaimonistai. See discussion of Lysias, fragment 53 *supra*.

¹⁷ Meetings of the Ekklesia are attested on these days as follows: for the twenty-seventh day, *Hesperia* (1946) pp. 201-13, no. 41, lines 76-78; *IG II²* 849, lines 1-4; Demosthenes 19.60. For the twenty-eighth day, *Hesperia* (1957) pp. 63-66, no. 17, lines 1-4. For the twenty-ninth day, *Hesperia* (1932) pp. 45-56, lines 1-5; *Hesperia* (1935) pp. 562-65, no. 40, lines 1-5; *Hesperia* (1935) pp. 525-30, no. 39, lines 2-7; *IG II²* 674, lines 1-2; *Hesperia* (1936) pp. 414-16, no. 12, lines 2-7; *IG II²* 953, lines 1-4; *IG II²* 483, lines 1-8; *Hesperia* (1940) pp. 126-33, no. 26, lines 1-4; *IG II²* 850, lines 1-3; *IG II²* 892, lines 1-5; Aeschines 3.27; *Hesperia* (1963) p. 4, lines 1-7.

Magn. 131.13 and in the general inactivity attested for the Plynteria.

There is an outward similarity between the *dies atri* and the *ἡμέραι ἀποφράδες*. Both had an “impure” quality, and both may have been characterized by inactivity of legislative bodies. It was this outward similarity which led Lucian and Plutarch, as well as modern scholars, simply to identify the *ἡμέραι ἀποφράδες* with the *dies atri*, and thus to burden them with many features not their own.

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MARCUS AURELIUS 4.23 AND ORPHIC HYMN 10

Πᾶν μοι συναρμόζει, ὃ σοὶ εὐάρμοστόν ἐστιν, ὃ κόσμε· οὐδέν μοι πρόωρον οὐδὲ ὄψιμον, ὃ σοὶ εὐκαιρον. πᾶν μοι καρπός, ὃ φέρουσιν αἱ σαὶ ὦραι, ὃ φύσις· ἐκ σοῦ πάντα, ἐν σοὶ πάντα, εἰς σέ πάντα. ἐκεῖνος μὲν φησιν· 'ὦ πόλι φίλη Κέκροπος' (Aristophanes fr. 110)· σὺ δὲ οὐκ ἐρεῖς· 'ὦ πόλι φίλη Διός';

(1) No doubt, a hymnic solemnity is breathing throughout the passage. First, the *epiclesis*: 'Oh World-order!'; 'Oh Nature!'; 'Oh beloved City of Zeus!'. Second, the hymnic repetition of 'you' is present too: σοὶ . . . σοὶ . . . αἱ σαὶ . . . σοῦ . . . σοὶ . . . σέ . . . Third, in addition to the Aristophanic reference, there is a clear allusion to the Homeric-Heraclitean adage about 'the Seasons which bring all things' (ὥρας, αἱ πάντα φέρουσι, Heraclitus fr. 100 Diels-Kranz = fr. 64 Marcovich). Cf. Plut. *Quaest. Plat.* 1007 E; *De defectu orac.* 416 A; *Cypria* fr. 4.3 Allen; *Odyssey* 9.131; Xenoph. *Anab.* 1.4.10; *Cyneg.* 5.34; Ael. Aristid. *Orat.* 32.25; 26.11; 44.16 Keil; Iulian. *Orat.* 2.101 C; A. G. 9.51; Marc. Aur. 9.3; Verg. *Ecl.* 9.51.

(2) If this is true, then I would like to suggest that Marcus is here quoting a hexameter line from a lost Stoic hymn to *Physis* as well:

Ὡ Φύσις, ἐκ σοῦ πάντ', ἐν σοὶ πάντ', εἰς σέ (τε) πάντα.

There are three close parallels. The first is Mesomedes' hymn to *Physis* (1.1), which is addressed as 'Ἀρχὰ καὶ πάντων γέννα, / πρεσβίστα Κόσμον μᾶτερ'.¹ The second is in the long magic papyrus from Paris (*Suppl. Gr.* 574), where Φύσις παμμήτωρ is addressed as ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος εἶ (IV. 2836 Preisendanz).²

(3) But the closest parallel seems to be Orphic hymn 10 (ed.

¹ Ed. K. Horna, in *SB Wien* 207.1 (1928) = J. U. Powell, *Coll. Alex.* 197. Cf. K. Keyssner, *Gottesvorstellung und Lebensauffassung im griechischen Hymnus* (Würzburger Studien zur Altertumswissenschaft, 2) Stuttgart 1932, 15 f.

² K. Preisendanz, *Pap. Gr. Magicae*, I (Berlin 1928) 162.

W. Quandt). Here Mother Nature is addressed as Ὡ Φύσι, παμμήτειρα θεά (1) and as ἀτελής τε τελευτή (8). Unfortunately, line 28 of the hymn is corrupt; it reads:

πάντα † σοι εἰσὶ τὰ πάντα · † σὺ γὰρ μούνη τάδε τεύχεις.

G. Hermann's conjecture (1805): πάντα σὺ ἔσσι · τὰ πάντα σὺ γὰρ κτλ. could convince nobody. I think Marcus' line can help us to heal the Orphic line. Obviously, the first πάντα is superfluous (possibly a marginal gloss on τάδε). Thus read:

[πάντα] (ἐν) σοι εἰσὶ τὰ πάντα · σὺ γὰρ μούνη τάδε τεύχεις.

A. S. L. Farquharson compared Marcus' line with St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans (11:36): ὅτι ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα . . .

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ORACULUM CHALDAICUM 159 DES PLACES

... βίηι ὅτι σῶμα λιπόντων
 ψυχὰι (ἀρηϊφᾶτοι) καθαρώτεραι (ἢ ἐπὶ νούσοις).

(1) M. L. West (CR, N.S. 18 [1968] 257f.) and É. des Places (Budé, 1971) have restored the line using Schol. in Arrian. *Epictet.* 4.7.27 p. 422 Schenkl² (= Heracliti fr. 96 b Marcovich; 22 B 136 D.=K.), which reads:

ψυχὰι ἀρηϊφᾶτοι καθαρώτεραι ἢ ἐνὶ νούσοις.

They translate: "That of the ones forced from the body, souls slain in battle are purer than those in disease" (West). "... Que, frappées par Arès, plus pures sont les âmes de ceux qui sous la violence ont quitté le corps que (s'ils étaient morts) de maladie" (des Places).

(2) I find the supplement ἀρηϊφᾶτοι redundant after the βίηι used in the same sentence. Now, the better class of Psellus' manuscripts (where the oracle is preserved): L N p, have ἀνθρώπων ψυχὰι (against only ψυχὰι of the inferior class: P v), and I think this is the right reading:

... βίηι ὅτι σῶμα λιπόντων
 ἀνθρώπων ψυχὰι καθαρώτεραι (ἢ ἐνὶ νούσοις).

(3) This goes well with Psellus' *Exegesis* (P.G. 122, p. 1141 BC = p. 179 des Places): (a) π ἄ ν τ α βίαιον θάνατον ἐπαινεῖ (sc. ὁ Χαλδαῖος). This proves that Psellus did not have ἀρηϊφᾶτοι in the text he comments on. And (b): αἱ δὲ (sc. ψυχὰι) ἐν νόσοις... ἀπολιποῦσαι τὸν βίον... shows that Psellus did have ἢ ἐνὶ νούσοις in his text (as West too was inclined to believe).

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PSEUDO-ELIAS ON HERACLITUS

There are four extant commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge*: by Ammonius (+ c.520),¹ by Elias,² by David,³ and by Pseudo-Elias or Pseudo-David,⁴ which I shall call *Anonymus*. While editing the fourth commentary L. G. Westerink expressed his feeling that *Anonymus* seems to be a different person from either Elias or David (pp. xv f.).⁵

I think Westerink was right, and I shall try to prove it here on a topic treated by all four commentators. The topic is: 'why the ancient authors are obscure?', and it seems to have escaped the attention of the scholars.

(1) Ammonius (p. 38.14 B.) adduces three reasons why the young students of his days hesitate to read ancient authors. The reasons are: (a) their verbosity (as, e.g. in the works of Galen); (b) the obscurity of expression (as, e.g. in Aristotle's *On Interpretation*); (c) the depth of the thoughts (as, e.g. in Aristotle's *Second Analytics*):

Τρία εἰσὶ τὰ ὀκνηροτέρους ποιοῦντα τοὺς νέους πρὸς τὸ ἐντυγχάνειν τοῖς τῶν παλαιῶν συγγράμμασι· τὸ μῆκος τῶν λεγομένων, ὡς τὰ Γαλήνεια, τὸ ἀσαφὲς τῆς λέξεως, ὡς τὸ περὶ Ἑρμηνείας, τὸ βάθος τῶν νοημάτων, ὡς ἡ Ἀποδεικτική.⁶

(2) Elias (p. 41.30 B.) takes over from Ammonius the phrase about the young students: *τρεῖς γὰρ τρόποι εἰσὶν ἀσαφείας, δι' οὓς ἀποκνοῦσιν οἱ νέοι τοῖς βιβλίοις ἐντυγχάνειν*. But he adds Proclus to Galen, as examples of verbosity (a), Hippocratic treatises to Aristotle, as examples of verbal obscurity (b). What is more important, he dismisses *Second Analytics* as example of

¹ Ed. A. Busse, *Comm. in Aristot. Graeca*, 4.3 (Berlin 1891).

² Ed. A. Busse, *CAG* 18.1 (1900).

³ Ed. A. Busse, *CAG* 18.2 (1904).

⁴ Ed. L. G. Westerink, *Pseudo-Elias (Pseudo-David), Lectures on Porphyry's Isagoge* (Amsterdam 1967).

⁵ Cf. also Westerink, in *Mnemosyne* (1961) 126-33.

⁶ Cf. Ammonius, *In Aristot. Categ.* (*CAG* 4.4, 1895), p. 15.1 Busse ἄχρι τῶν Δευτέρων ἀναλυτικῶν, τουτέστι τῶν Ἀποδεικτικῶν.

the depth of thought (c), substituting for it the example of the obscure Heraclitean sayings:

ἡ γὰρ διὰ τὸ σκοτεινὸν καὶ ὑποβρύχιον τῶν νοημάτων, ὡς τὰ Ἑρακλείτεια (διὸ καὶ τις τὰ Ἑρακλείτεια ἔφη βαθέος δεῖσθαι κολυμβητοῦ), ἢ διὰ τὸ ἐξηπλωμένον τῆς φράσεως, ὡς χαλινου δεῖσθαι, οἷον τὰ Γαλήνεια καὶ τὰ Πρόκλεια, ἢ διὰ τὸ ἀπενστενωμένον τῆς φράσεως, ὡς τὰ Ἀριστοτελικά καὶ τὰ Ἱπποκράτεια.

Now, I think it is not difficult to see why Elias has substituted Heraclitus for the second example from Aristotle. His eye was caught by the words τὸ βάθος τῶν νοημάτων in Ammonius' text. This reminded him of the adage attributed to Socrates about the hidden, deep meaning of Heraclitean gnomes (τὸ . . . ὑποβρύχιον τῶν νοημάτων), which he took over most probably from Diogenes Laërtius (2.22; 9.12): Δηλίου γέ τινος δεῖται κολυμβητοῦ. This becomes clear from Elias' wording: βαθέος δεῖσθαι κολυμβητοῦ.

(3) In his turn, David (p. 105.10 B.) easily realized that *verbal* redundancy (a) and *verbal* obscurity (b) make one common case as against depth of thought or meaning (c) (notice twice τῆς φράσεως in Elias' text for a and b): That is why David gives the division: (c) against (a¹) and (a²). Moreover, he takes over from Elias the example of Heraclitus, but at the same time follows Ammonius in mentioning only Galen as example of verbosity (thus dismissing Proclus; cf. the word τὸ μῆκος in both Ammonius and David). David also follows Elias in repeating the example of Aristotle in general for the obscurity of expression, but he substitutes Aristogenes, the surgeon of Thasus,⁷ for Hippocrates. Finally, he adds the name of Plato to that of Heraclitus as examples of the depth of thought:

γίνεται τοίνυν ἡ ἀσάφεια ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν θεωρημάτων. καὶ ἀπὸ μὲν θεωρημάτων, ὡς ἔχει τὰ Ἑρακλείτεια· ταῦτα γὰρ βαθέα καὶ δεινὰ ὑπάρχει (περὶ γὰρ τῶν συγγραμμάτων Ἑρακλείτων εἴρηται δεῖσθαι βαθέος κολυμβητοῦ). ἀπὸ δὲ λέξεως γίνεται διττῶς ἡ ἀσάφεια· ἢ γὰρ διὰ τὸ μῆκος τῆς φράσεως γίνεται ἀσάφεια, ὡς ἔχει τὰ Γαλήνεια . . . , ἢ διὰ τὴν ποιότητα τῆς λέξεως, ὡς ἔχει τὰ Ἀριστογένεια . . . Πλάτωνός τε

⁷ Cf. Suda, s.v. Aristogenes 3910 Adler.

καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους. τούτων γὰρ ὁ μὲν εἰς τὴν ἀσάφειαν διὰ τῶν φράσεων ποιεῖν ἐπετήδευσεν, ὁ δὲ ἕτερος διὰ τῶν θεωρημάτων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ Ἀριστοτελικά θεωρήματα εὐχερῆ εἰσιν, ἡ δὲ φράσις δύσκολος.

(4) Finally, *Anonymus* (c. 28.26-29·Westerink) differs considerably from the rest of the commentators. On one hand, he takes over from David the subdivision of the verbal lack of clarity into *ποσὸν* and *ποιόν*. On the other, he adds Proclus to Galen, taking it from Elias.⁸ But, what is much more important, *Anonymus* shifts Heraclitus from the category (c), ‘depth of meaning’, into that of (b) or *ποιόν* (‘obscurity of expression’), and he dismisses the example of Aristotle (and Plato) altogether, substituting for them that of ‘the theological treatises’:

γίνεται δὲ ἡ ἀσάφεια γενικῶς μὲν κατὰ δύο τρόπους, ἐκ τῆς λέξεως καὶ ἐκ τῆς διανοίας. καὶ ἐκ τῆς λέξεως διχῶς, ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν αὐτῆς ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν. καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν μὲν γίνεται ἀσάφεια ὅταν πλατεῖς καὶ ἀπέραντοι ὑπάρχωσιν οἱ λόγοι· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἀσαφῆ εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα συγγράμματα, ὥσπερ τοῦ Γαληνοῦ· καὶ (γὰρ) οὗτος ὀλίγα διὰ πολλῶν συνέγραψεν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Πρόκλος. κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποιόν, ὡς ὅταν τις ξένους καὶ περισκελέσει χρῆσται ῥήμασιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος. ἔγραψεν, ὅστις διὰ τοῦτο σκοτεινὸς ἐπεκλήθη, ἐπειδὴ ξένους τισὶν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἐχρήσατο ῥήμασιν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς διανοίας γίνεται ἀσάφεια ὅταν ὑψηλοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι καὶ δυσβάτοις κεχρηταί τις, ὥσπερ εἰσὶν οἱ θεολογικοὶ λόγοι.

(5) To sum up, the examples of the three kinds of obscurity (a), (b), (c), as given by all four commentators of Porphyry, can be seen in the following synopsis:

Obscurity case	Ammonius	Elias	David	<i>Anonymus</i>
(a)	1. Galen	2. Galen; Proclus	2. Galen	1. Galen; Proclus
(b)	2. Aristotle, <i>De interpret.</i>	3. Aristotle; Hippocrates	3. Aristotle; Aristogenes	2. Heraclitus
(c)	3. Aristotle, <i>Anal. Post.</i>	1. Heraclitus	1. Heraclitus; Plato	3. Theological treatises

Now we can draw two conclusions. First, the changes introduced by *Anonymus* (Heraclitus; Theology) are too drastic to

⁸ Cf. Westerink, p. xiii.

allow us to identify him either with Elias or with David: he must be a different person. And second, from the above synopsis it becomes clear that Elias is dependent on Ammonius; that David is dependent on both Ammonius and Elias; finally, that *Anonymus* is using both Elias and David, while feeling free to improvise.

(6) We may ask now: why did *Anonymus* feel it necessary to change the existing pattern? My answer is: to adapt the examples better to his own system. In the preceding chapter (27.24-25) he has just stated that the 'powerful' or 'bombastic' style suits best *physical* treatises, while the 'low-key' style fits rather *theological* writings. Now, he knew well that Heraclitus was a *φυσιολόγος par excellence*. That is why he felt it necessary to move him to the category of the authors using strange, bombastic expressions:

(27.24-25) *τρεῖς τοίνυν εἰσὶ χαρακτῆρες, ἄδρός, ταπεινός, μέσος. ἄδρός δὲ χαρακτήρ ἐστιν ὁ κομπηραῖς μὲν λέξεσι κεκαρυκευμένος, εὐλήπτον δὲ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων· ὥπερ κέχρηται ἐν τῇ φυσιολογίᾳ. ταπεινός δὲ ἐστιν ὁ ὑψηλὰ διαλεγόμενος εὐλήπτοις ῥήμασιν· ὥπερ κέχρηται ἐν τῇ θεολογίᾳ. μέσος δὲ ἐστιν ὁ μήτε κομπηραῖς λέξεσι συγκείμενος μήτε δυνσδιάγνωστον ἔχων τὸν νοῦν· ὥπερ κέχρηται ἐν τοῖς λογικοῖς λόγοις.*

(28.60) *“Τῶν μὲν βαθυτέρων ἀπεχόμενος ζητημάτων”*.⁹ *ἐνταῦθα ἐκβάλλει τὴν ἀσάφειαν τὴν κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἥτις ἐπὶ θεολογίας λέγεται.*

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⁹ Porphyry, *Isagoge*, p. 1.8 Busse (CAG 4.1, 1887).

COLLUTHUS' DESCRIPTION OF A WATERSPOUT:
AN EXAMPLE OF LATE EPIC
LITERARY TECHNIQUE

In *CQ* (1967) 87ff.¹ I have shown that Apollonius Rhodius, a poet often imitated and echoed by Colluthus, elegantly describes a waterspout at *Arg.* II, 169ff. It is not surprising to see that a description of the same phenomenon occurs in Colluthus, 201ff.

ἄρτι μὲν Ἰδαίων ὀρέων ἡλλάξατο πόντον
καὶ λεχέων ἐπίκουρον ἐφεσπομένην Ἀφροδίτην
πολλάκις ἀκταίοισιν ἱλασκόμενος θυέεσσιν
ἔπλεεν Ἑλλήσποντον ἐπ' εὐρέα νῶτα τιθήνης.
τῷ δὲ πολυτλήτων σημήια φαίνεται μόχθων
κνανή μὲν ὕπερθεν ἀναθρόσκουσα θάλασσα
οὐρανὸν ὀρφναίων ἐλίκων ἐζώσατο δεσμῷ
ἧ δ' ἄρ' ἀμικθαλόεντος ἄπ' ἥερος δμβρον λείσα,
ἐκλύσθη δέ τε πόντος ἐρεσσομένων ἐρετάν.

The passage has been so badly mangled by Livrea (cf. *JHS* [1969] 152), that an analysis of it may prove useful. Livrea could not understand Colluthus' present participle *ἱλασκόμενος* (line 203) and thought that it should be altered into the aorist *ἱλασσάμενος* on the grounds that the present participle cannot express anteriority: in reality, as Livrea does not know, the present participle "bei Vorzeitigkeit" is, of all things, an epic feature, which ancient critics recognized in Homer and which post-Homeric poets employed.² *Τιθήνης* (line 204) means "sea": Livrea claims to have found the "corretta inter-

¹ Cf. now *Zu Sprachgebrauch, Technik und Text des Apollonios Rhodios*, (Amsterdam 1972) 16ff., with further literature, especially Hall, *JHS* (1969) 57ff.

² Cf. *JHS* (1969) 152, and the already quoted *Zu Sprachgebrauch*, p. 9ff. It may be added that Orsini (on whose edition of Colluthus published in the Budé Series, 1972, cf. my review in *Class. Rev.* 1974, p. 129ff.) makes (ad loc.) the same mistake as Livrea: he maintains that it is necessary to alter the mss. reading (which he strangely calls "la conjecture" [sic]) *ἱλασκόμενος* into *ἱλασσάμενος* on the grounds that "les supplications" had been made "*avant que Pâris ne prit la mer*" (italics mine): in other words, Orsini does not know that the present participle "bei Vorzeitigkeit" is a typical epic ingredient.

pretazione" of this word, forgetting that such interpretation was fully arrived at by Schaefer-Lennep³. Now to the waterspout. Livrea sees two difficulties in the passage under discussion, neither of which exists. First of all, he objects to the mss. reading *θάλασσα* (line 206), stating that "*θάλασσα* darebbe in Colluto l'unico caso di trisillabo proparossitono in fine di verso". It will never be repeated often enough that, to put it with Timpanaro, *Maia* (1967) 408, "*l'emendatio metri causa va sempre praticata con cautela*": this methodological principle is all the more obvious in an author like Colluthus, who is certainly not averse to employing metrical *unica*. For instance, in line 221 we find *παρ' εἰαμενάς*, which, as indeed none other than Livrea himself admits, without batting an eyelid or altering the text, "*é l'unico caso colluteo di parola ossitona prima dell'eftemimera*". In the same way, Livrea accepts *ἀρωγόν* in line 175, which is "*in Colluto l'unico caso di amfibraco ossitono in fine di verso*". If an "*unico caso*" of a metrical feature involving accentuation is allowed in lines 221 and 175, why not allow an "*unico caso*" of a metrical feature involving accentuation in line 206? Livrea's procedure is arbitrary and self-contradictory.⁴

The second difficulty alleged by Livrea was first seen by Hermann, who objected to the fact that, in Colluthus' description of the phenomenon under discussion, "*mare assurgere dicitur et caelum tortis nubibus cingere*". Volkmann, following on in Hermann's steps, proclaimed that such an idea was "*vesani hominis*" (quoted by Livrea, *ad loc.*). It is patent that neither Hermann nor Volkmann had ever seen a waterspout — a typically mediterranean phenomenon:⁵ if they had seen one, they would have praised Colluthus' descriptive accuracy, instead of scoffing at the poet's words. Colluthus says that the sea moves

³ Cf. *JHS* (1969) 152.

⁴ The mss. reading *θάλασσα* was therefore rightly maintained by Weinberger, in his edition of Colluthus. Livrea (*ad loc.*), who complains about Weinberger ("*la lezione manoscritta che Weinberger si ostina a mantenere definendola 'sachlich'*"), has not understood Weinberger's German: what the latter wrote (*Wien. Stud.* 1901, p. 232) is that the mss. reading *θάλασσα* seemed to him "*sachlich bedenklich*", because, as Volkmann had stated, the sea could not be described as "*super* insurgents".

⁵ Cf. Hall, *art. cit.*, p. 57, n. 6.

upwards, i.e. *rises* (ἀναθρόσκειν) and joins the sky (ἐξώσατο δεσμῶ) by means of dark spirals (ὀρφναίων ἐλίκων δεσμῶ). Now, this is precisely the "movimento *ascensionale e rotatorio*" which is typical of a waterspout:⁶ the sea water "rises to meet"⁷ the spiral-shaped cloud which descends towards it, and when the sea water has, by *rising*, connected with the spiral-shaped cloud, the sea has effectively joined the sky, in that the fully formed spiral-shaped waterspout "stretches" from the surface of the sea up to the clouds.⁸ Apollonius Rhodius (2.169ff.) clearly states, in his description of the waterspout, that the sea water ascends to the sky: Colluthus, in his own description of the same phenomenon, is even more precise than Apollonius, because by adding ἐλίκων to ἀναθρόσκειν, he specifies that the movement is not only "ascensionale" but also "rotatorio".

That Colluthus' passage in question contains the poet's description of a waterspout was already perceived by Letronne:⁹ he correctly saw that Colluthus' ἐλίκων¹⁰ designates "une trombe de mer"¹¹, but had difficulty in fully accounting for

⁶ *Encicl. Ital.*, s.v. *Trombe*; cf. also *Der grosse Brockhaus*¹⁶, s.v. *Trombe*, with accurate discussion of "Drehsinn" and "Wirbelgeschwindigkeit" of a waterspout, and with a good photo. The waterspout is described as an "eddy cloud with an upward spiral movement" in *The New Scientist* 1973, p. 665. On the "rotational speeds" and the "rising motions" of waterspouts cf. *New Scientist*, *ibid.*

⁷ Hall, art. cit., p. 57.

⁸ Cf. Hall, art. cit., p. 59, with plate VI, 2.; *CQ* 1967) 88, note 4. Cf. *New Scientist*, loc. cit.: the "vortex", as soon as it has "matured enough to sweep up water", creates a "vortex column" when the "cloud funnel" and the rising sea water "connect up".

⁹ Quoted in *Colluthus: L'enlèvement d'Hélène*, par A. S. Julien (Paris 1823) 113f.

¹⁰ He realized that Colluthus' ἐλίκων denotes the spiral-shaped column constituting the waterspout. Livrea asserts that this is "certamente" (*sic*) not possible, because "tale interpretazione presupporrebbe (*sic*) θάλασσα al verso 206". The fact is that θάλασσα, in line 206, is the mss. reading and is not a conjecture by Letronne! Livrea's objecting to Colluthus' θάλασσα is devoid of any foundation, as I have already underlined, whence it follows that his objecting to Letronne's explanation of ἐλίκων is ungrounded.

¹¹ In Greek meteorological literature, the term ἐλιξ is used of a waterspout: cf. lastly Hall, art. cit., p. 57. Colluthus' ἐλίκων either is a poetic plural (he often employs such plurals) denoting one waterspout, or it denotes a plurality of

Colluthus' description, because he visualized the waterspout as not yet fully formed, i.e. as still consisting of "un nuage" which "sous la forme d'un cône renversé descend sur la surface des eaux", whilst "la mer . . . semble vouloir s'élever dans les airs, en formant une masse pyramidale tronquée". In reality, as I have just explained, a *fully formed* waterspout, stretching as it does from the sea-surface to the sky, corresponds precisely to Colluthus' description.

We can see that Colluthus has been extremely precise. Waterspouts are accompanied by "zampilli", because much of the sea water sucked upwards by the tube of air falls down all around the waterspout.¹² Colluthus does not fail to mention this detail in line 208:

ἡ δ' ἄρ' ἀμιχθαλόεντος ἀπ' ἡέρος ὄμβρον ἰεῖσα

This line needs a particular discussion, textual and explanatory. Julien (op. cit., ad loc.) correctly understood that here ἡ δέ¹³ "se rapporte au θάλασσα des vers précédents", and that Colluthus is accurately describing the process of "zampilli" which I have just mentioned: "le poète veut dire que la mer, après avoir élevé ses flots jusqu'au ciel, s'affaisse sur elle-même, et ramène du haut des airs [ἀμιχθαλόεντος ἀπ' ἡέρος ὄμβρον ἰεῖσα] les masses d'eau qu'elle y avait portées". The participle ἰεῖσα (or its variant ἀνεῖσα) caused, however, difficulties to the critics: some destroyed Colluthus' ἡ δέ, others changed the participle into an indicative (ἀνῆκε, ἀνίει: cf. Weinberger's apparatus), others postulated a lacuna. The text, in reality, is perfectly sound, because the participle is here used by Colluthus instead of a *verbum finitum*: this is an epic feature which is quite common in the genre, from Homer down to Musaeus

waterspouts. For the photograph of "a group of waterspouts" cf. *New Scientist*, loc. cit.; cf. also Keller, *Antike Tierwelt*, vol. II, p. 291, fig. 107 (waterspouts and tornadoes are the same phenomenon, cf. Hall, art. cit. p. 58).

¹² *Encicl. Ital.*, loc. cit.; on the "rain shower" accompanying the waterspout cf. *New Scientist*, loc. cit.

¹³ It may be added that Colluthus' ἡ δ' ἄρ in line 208 is paralleled by οἱ δ' ἄρα (same *sedes*) in line 99. Whether Colluthus spelt ἄρ' ἀμιχθαλόεντος ἀπ' ἡέρος (cf. Callim. fr. 18, 8 Pf. ἀμιχθαλόεσσαν ἀπ' ἡέρα) or ἄρα μιχθαλόεντος (Colluthus' mss. hesitate; cf. Antim. fr. 141 Wyss: μιχθαλόεσσα) is of course impossible to say.

and the Orphic *Argonautica*.¹⁴ Livrea, not being conversant with this epic feature, destroys Colluthus' ἡ δέ, disfiguring it into ὑγρόν: moreover, having destroyed Colluthus' θάλασσα and transmuted it into καλύπτρη, he is now compelled to take Colluthus' ἀναθρώσκουσα as denoting a downwards movement (of the cloud, καλύπτρη, descending "dall'alto"!). To crown it all, Livrea, since ἀνέμων μένος ὑγρόν ἀέντων is a common epic formula, replaces Colluthus' λείσα (an impeccably Homeric and epic form: cf. e.g. *Od.* 12.192, *Hymn. Merc.* 114, *Hymn.* 27.18; *Ap. Rhod.*, *Argon.* 4.731) by αἶσα, and reads καλύπτρη . . . ὑγρόν ἀμιχθαλέοντος ἀπ' ἡέρος δμβρον αἶσα. He has thus created a miraculous cloud (his καλύπτρη means "densa coltre delle νεφέλαι", as he says ad loc.), which not only goes down "dall'alto" in spite of the fact that the poet says ἀναθρώσκουσα, but also produces wondrous meteorological phenomena: the cloud (not a wind!) can blow (αἶσα) damp rain from the air (ἀμιχθαλέοντος ἀπ' ἡέρος)¹⁵. Livrea himself is aware that his cloud performs, in the Greek that he has created, impossible feats, because he translates his own Greek "un nembo . . . risolvendosi (αἶσα!) in copiosa pioggia nella (ἀπό!) aria fosca".

Finally, a couple of words about line 209. We have already seen that Hermann was wrong in dogmatically scoffing at Colluthus' ascending sea: we shall now see another piece of un-

¹⁴ Cf. *JHS* (1969) 145 (on Musaeus 286, 299), and especially the already quoted *Zu Sprachgebrauch*, p. 30f.; cf. also Düntzer, *De Zenodoti studiis homericis*, (Göttingen 1848) 80 ("participii pro indicativo positi . . . exempla") and Friedlaender, *Aristonici Περὶ σημείων Ἰλιάδος reliquiae*, p. 14 ("participium pro verbo positum", "participium pro indicativo"). Another participle instead of a *verbum finitum* is employed by Colluthus in line 363 (ἀνακλίνουσα): the passage has been correctly understood by Ludwig (as indicated by Livrea ad loc.), only it must be added that there is no lacuna after 363, because ἀνακλίνουσα is the equivalent of a *verbum finitum*. The two instances of "pendens participium" (λείσα 208, ἀνακλίνουσα 363) were already noted by D'Orville (*Colluthi Raptus Helenae*, ed. Schaefer-Lennep [Leipzig 1825] 38), although he did not know that this is a typically epic feature.

¹⁵ Αἶσα is trebly unfortunate: first, only winds, not clouds, can blow; secondly, ἀημι, when used transitively, means "breathe out of oneself" (Aesch., fr. 267 M.), whereas Livrea compels the cloud to breathe rain out of the air; thirdly, a cloud could well emit rain from itself, but not from the air.

grounded Hermannian dogmatism, once more supinely followed by Livrea. Hermann (quoted by Livrea ad loc.) curtly proclaimed that Colluthus "non potuit . . . scribere" $\delta\epsilon\tau\epsilon$, but Schneider (*De Dionys. Perieg. arte metr. et gramm.*, [Diss. Leipzig 1882, p. 31]) has shown that $\delta\epsilon\tau\epsilon$ is frequently attested in late epic and occurs also in one of the "Nonniani", Christodor. 53. Therefore Weinberger rightly retained the mss. reading $\delta\epsilon\tau\epsilon$ in Colluthus' line. Livrea first contends that $\delta\epsilon\tau\epsilon$ must be altered in Christodorus' line, and then asserts that $\delta\epsilon\tau\epsilon$ cannot be retained in Colluthus' line, because it is never attested "presso i Nonniani", although it is used in Homer as well as in Hellenistic and late Epic. His assertion is doubly arbitrary: first of all, since Colluthus is known to have employed non-Nonnian particles (cf. Weinberger, *Wien. Stud.* 1896, p. 155), there is no reason why he should not have used $\delta\epsilon\tau\epsilon$ here, even if it were never attested in the "Nonniani" (cf. Weinberger, *ibid.* p. 146); secondly, the fact is that $\delta\epsilon\tau\epsilon$ is attested not only in Colluthus' line, but also in Christodorus'. The employment of synonyms ($\theta\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha\sigma\sigma\alpha$ in line 206, $\pi\acute{o}\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$ in line 209) by Colluthus is in itself a typical feature of Epic (cf. *CR* [1971] 355). Indeed, we can be more specific: the two synonyms in point are very skillfully employed by the poet. Weinberger (*Wien. Stud.* 1896, p. 146) wondered whether Colluthus might have wanted clumsily to imitate passages of Homer such as *Il.* 2.609f., in which $\theta\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha\sigma\sigma\alpha$ and $\pi\acute{o}\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$ are used contiguously. Now that we have explained Colluthus' lines, we can understand that the two synonyms are used by him not in "müssig" (Weinberger, *ibid.*) imitation of Homer, but with extreme dexterity: in Colluthus' passage, $\theta\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha\sigma\sigma\alpha$ denotes the sea "als Weltelement"¹⁶ involved in the meteorological phenomenon described by the poet, whereas $\pi\acute{o}\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$ denotes the sea as "offene Fläche"¹⁷ across which the $\acute{\epsilon}\rho\acute{\epsilon}\tau\alpha\iota$ are sailing. Colluthus could not have reproduced more appositely and elegantly the Homeric practice of carefully distinguishing between, and placing next to each other, the two words $\theta\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha\sigma\sigma\alpha$ and $\pi\acute{o}\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$ ¹⁸

¹⁶ Cf. Capelle, *Wört. Hom.*, s.v. $\theta\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha\sigma\sigma\alpha$.

¹⁷ Cf. Capelle, *op. cit.*, s.v. $\pi\acute{o}\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$.

¹⁸ On the Homeric practice cf. Ebeling, *Lex. Hom.*, s.v. $\theta\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha\sigma\sigma\alpha$, a.

I hope this note has contributed to show how very accurate and felicitous Colluthus' employment of diction is, and to demonstrate that inability to understand the poet's words must not be mistaken for licence to mutilate them. In Reiske's time it was fashionable to decry late epic poets as clumsy, crude and uncouth:¹⁹ we now know that they were consummate artists, who continued the tradition of Hellenistic poetry.²⁰

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¹⁹ Cf. e.g. Weinberger, *Wien. Stud.* (1896) p. 146, n. 63.

²⁰ The best on this point has been written by T. Gelzer, in *Mus. Helv.* (1968) 30: Nonnian poets who wrote epyllia (such as Musaeus or Colluthus) operate "durchaus in der Tradition der gelehrten alexandrinischen Dichtung". Cf. also Venzke, *Die Orph. Argon.*, [Diss. Berlin 1941] who has adequately illustrated "die geschickte Variationstechnik" displayed by the author of the Orphic *Argonautica*, an author who one century ago was airily dismissed as an "indoctus homo" (Venzke, *op. cit.*, 48, 109). On Colluthus as a "poète savant" who wrote for "des lecteurs érudits", skilfully applied the canons of *imitatio*, *variatio*, *oppositio in imitando* and knew how to achieve humorous effects of a scholarly nature cf. lastly Orsini, *op. cit.*, p. XXXIff., who closely follows what I have indicated in *JHS* (1969) 149ff.

THE ENDING OF TERENCE'S *ADELPHOE* AND THE MENANDRIAN ORIGINAL

From the numerous problems which are involved in the question of the relationship of the ending of Terence's *Adelphoe* to that of Menander's *Ἀδελφοὶ β'* two major ones may be extracted. First, there is the inconsistency between the monologue of Demea (855-81) and what he says at 986ff. At the end of his monologue Demea gives the distinct impression that he will attempt in all seriousness to adopt his brother Micio's generous and indulgent attitude to their two sons, but at 986ff. he states that he has acted in the way he has (i.e. from line 882 up to this point) only to show the falseness and weakness of Micio's methods of upbringing. The lines at the end of the monologue certainly suggest a trial period but not as short a one as it turns out to be. The second problem, though connected with the first, is more important and concerns the interpretation of the play as a whole. After Demea has explained the reasons for his sudden change of behaviour he offers Aeschinus the choice of remaining in the care of Micio, his uncle and adoptive father, or of returning to Demea, his natural father. Aeschinus chooses Demea, who thus appears to emerge as the better of the fathers. Several scholars have felt that this 'victory' of Demea does not harmonize with the earlier part of the comedy, in which Demea has been the comic butt and in which, they believe, Micio has been portrayed as the ideal father.

In recent years much has been written on these and related problems. The purpose of this article is to give further support to the case of those who have argued that the ending of Terence's play makes good dramatic sense and that the Roman dramatist has for the most part followed the Menandrian original.¹ Among works opposed to this viewpoint the impor-

¹ Of recent works see H. Tränkle, "Micio und Demea in den terenzischen Adelphen," *Mus. Helv.* 29 (1972) 241-55; E. Fantham, "*Hautontimorumenos* and *Adelphoe*: A Study of Fatherhood in Terence and Menander," *Latomus* 30 (1971) 969-98, esp. 991ff. W. R. Johnson, "Micio and the Perils of Perfection,"

tant detailed study of the play by Otto Rieth, published twenty years after his death, is preeminent and has won approval from several scholars.² Much of the discussion in his book is acute and valuable but his major thesis is, I believe, erroneous and the first part of this article will attempt to refute Rieth's arguments on his own ground.

Rieth interpreted the Menandrian play as a *pièce à thèse* in which 'Micio' represented the Peripatetic ideal of a father. There is no doubt that Micio expresses sentiments which are very similar to those which can be found in the works of Aristotle. This is especially apparent in the opening monologue of the play. Here Micio states his belief that it is better to restrain a child's conduct by nourishing a sense of shame and by being generous than by instilling fear in him:

pudore et liberalitate liberos
retinere satius esse credo quam metu. (57-58)

Micio finds fault with his brother Demea for thinking that his authority is all the stronger for being based on compulsion. His

Cal. Stud. Class. Ant. 1 (1968) 171-86, finds "the violence [of the denouement] and the final equilibrium it creates aesthetically and psychologically sound" but does not commit himself on the question of whether Terence has adhered closely to the Menandrian original at the end of the play. See also R. W. Carrubba, "The Rationale of Demea in Terence's *Adelphoe*," *Dioniso* 42 (1968) 16-26. Others have felt that the ending of the two plays was substantially the same, though on rather different grounds from those given by the scholars named above: cf. A. Thierfelder, "Knemon - Demea - Micio," *Menandrea: Miscellanea Philologica* (Univ. Genoa 1960) 107-12; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Menander: Das Schiedsgericht* (Berlin 1925) 136ff.; H. Haffter, "Terenz und seine künstlerische Eigenart," *Mus. Helv.* 10 (1953) 89 (= *Terenz und seine künstlerische Eigenart* [Darmstadt 1966] 37).

² O. Rieth, *Die Kunst Menanders in den 'Adelphen' des Terenz* (Hildesheim 1964), hereafter cited as Rieth. The work was favorably reviewed or referred to by F. H. Sandbach, *CR* 16 (1966) 47f.; W. Ludwig *GRBS* 9 (1968) 177; E. Lefèvre, *Die Expositionstechnik in den Komödien des Terenz* (Darmstadt 1969) 40. K. Büchner, *Studien zur römischen Literatur*, VIII (Wiesbaden 1970) 1-20, agreed with Rieth's interpretation of 'Micio' in the Menandrian original but went much further than Rieth with respect to the extent of the changes made by Terence at the end of the play. W. G. Arnott, in his review of Rieth's book, *Gnomon* 37 (1965) 255-63, praised the "persuasive brilliance" with which Rieth argued his theory of the ending of the Menandrian play, though admitted that Rieth may have been completely wrong.

own belief is that a person who performs good actions because of the threat and fear of punishment refrains from wrongdoing only so long as he believes that his actions will be discovered. Micio stresses therefore the importance of *amicitia* in the relationship between father and son; a son whom kindness binds close to his father is eager to return it and will behave in the same way, whether or not his parent is present. Micio sums up his belief thus:

hoc patriumst, potius consuefacere filium
sua sponte recte facere quam alieno metu (74-75)

and goes on to draw the distinction between a *pater* and a *dominus*, apparently identifying himself with the former and Demea with the latter.

In his discussion of the monologue Rieth (pp. 19f.) pointed to similarities in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In the third book, on the subject of *πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία* Aristotle says that those who perform an action out of fear and compulsion and not through a sense of shame or a desire for *τὸ καλόν* are not truly *ἀνδρεῖοι*.³ For the distinction between *pater* and *dominus* Rieth referred to the eighth book (1160b 22ff.) where the philosopher discusses the difference between a *βασιλεύς* and a *τύραννος* and refers to familial relationships for exemplification. The *βασιλεύς*, who has the welfare of his subjects at heart is like a father: *ἡ μὲν γὰρ πατρὸς πρὸς υἱεῖς κοινωνία βασιλείας ἔχει σχῆμα· τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῷ πατρὶ μέλει*. Among the Persians, however, the rule of the father is *τυραννική*, for they treat their sons like slaves. Aristotle then continues: *τυραννική δὲ καὶ ἡ δεσπότης πρὸς δούλους· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ δεσπότης συμφέρον ἐν αὐτῇ πράττεται*. These links with the thought underlying Micio's monologue are strikingly clear. Some caution, however, is needed. As Rieth himself recognized (p. 20) the question arises of whether Micio puts his theory into practice.

It may be noted, first of all, that Micio's motives are not

³ E.N. 1116a 27ff.: (ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία) δι' ἄρετὴν γίνεται· δι' αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὀρεξίν (τιμῆς γάρ) καὶ φυγὴν ὀνειδούς, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος, τάξει δ' ἂν τις καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀναγκαζομένους εἰς ταῦτό· χείρους δ' ὅσων οὐ δι' αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ φεύγοντες οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηρόν. ἀναγκάζουσι γὰρ οἱ κύριοι . . .

purely unselfish. The love for his adopted son is the most important feature in his life and he takes pains to see that the love is reciprocated:

habui amavi pro meo;
in eo me oblecto, solum id est carum mihi.
ille ut item contra me habeat facio sedulo. (48-50)

But when he immediately proceeds to say *do praetermitto, non necesse habeo omnia / pro meo iure agere*, the inference is that his generosity and indulgence are prompted by fear that strictness may turn his son against him.⁴ Demea on the other hand can hardly be found guilty of putting popularity above the moral welfare either of Aeschinus or Ctesipho. A more important objection to Rieth's interpretation is that while he stressed the links between Micio's views and those of the Peripatetics he gave scant attention to the common ground which is shared by Demea and the philosophers. Aristotle states that no form of goodness of character is produced in us by nature.⁵ While nature gives us the senses of sight and hearing for us to use immediately, we have to *acquire* the different forms of goodness by engaging in certain activities in the same way that we have to play the lyre before we can become good lyre-players.⁶ It is extremely important, therefore, that we be 'habituated' this way or that from our youth.⁷ The reasons for the importance of

⁴ Rieth, p. 26, n. 52, tried to overcome the damage done by these lines to his view of 'Micio' by suggesting that Terence has "den Ausgruck vergrößert" in line 50. (He does not mention the connexion of thought between lines 50 and 51.) But the only reason for such a suggestion seems to be that this section clashes with Rieth's conception of 'Micio' as the ideal father in the Peripatetic mould.

⁵ E.N. 1103a 18ff.: καὶ δὴλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται . . . οὐτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκῶσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειοῦμενοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους.

⁶ E.N. 1103a 26ff.: ἔτι ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται, τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων κομιζόμεθα, ὥστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν (ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, οὐ χρησάμενοι ἔσχομεν)· τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί.

⁷ E.N. 1103b 23ff.: οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως ἐκ νέων ἐθλίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.



habituation in young men is that a man's character is formed early in life and does not materially change thereafter.⁸ It is essential, therefore, that young men receive guidance from their elders whose advice and beliefs have validity in that older men have the eye of experience and 'see aright'.⁹ Now Demea's methods, though more strict and prescriptive than Micio's, can be seen to agree with the emphasis which Aristotle places on habituation:

nil praetermitto; consuefacio; denique
 inspicere, tamquam in speculum, in vitas omnium
 iubeo atque ex aliis sumere exemplum sibi:
 "hoc facito" . . . "hoc fugito" . . .
 "hoc laudist" . . . "hoc vitio datur." (414-18)

Both fathers then have points in common with the Peripatetic view of how children should be brought up.¹⁰ The reasoned approach and the philosophical basis of Micio's method do not of themselves justify the belief that the ending of Terence's play in which Micio comes off worse was essentially different from

⁸ See the views of Theophrastus on *παιδεία*, as reported by Stobaeus, II, p. 240 (Wachsmuth). There we are told that if a youth falls into bad ways it is almost impossible for him to be brought back to the right path: *καὶ μὴν καὶ πολλῶν γ' ἐπισφαλεστέρα τῆς διαιρέσεως ἡ ἐκτροπὴ τῷ μὴ τὴν ὀρθὴν βαδίζοντι· καὶ γὰρ αἱ βλάβαι μεγάλαι καὶ ἡ ἀναστροφή χαλεπή, μᾶλλον δὲ σχεδὸν ἀδύνατος· οὔτε γὰρ ὁ χρόνος δίδωσιν ἐξουσίαν μεταθέσεως, οὔθ' ἡ φύσις δύναται μεταμανθάνειν τὸ βέλτιον ὅταν ἐντραφῇ τοῖς χειροσιν, ἀλλὰ προαιρεῖται μὲν καὶ ἑτέρα γε προκρίνει βελτίω, καταξή δ' ὅμως ἐν τοῖς εἰωθόσιν.* See P. Steinmetz, "Der Zweck der Charaktere Theophrasts," *Ann. Univ. Sarav.*, Philosophie, VIII (1959) 209-46, esp. 230ff, and K. Gaiser in Rieth, p. 149, n. 17, to whom I am indebted for this reference.

⁹ Cf. Arist. *E.N.* 1143b 11ff.: *ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἢ φρονίμων ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι καὶ δόξαις οὐχ ἥττον τῶν ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὅμμα ὁρῶσιν ὁρθῶς.*

¹⁰ Rieth, pp. 17f., made much of the mocking of Demea's methods by Syrus when the latter applies them to his supervision of the kitchen slaves (419ff.). This showed, he believed, what the dramatist thought about Demea's methods. In his discussion of the end of the play, however, Rieth shifted his ground somewhat. Although he thought that Terence was fairly faithful to his original in the last few scenes of the play (with the principal exception of Demea's final speech), his view (p. 120) was that Menander's audience laughed more at 'Demea' than at 'Micio'. But is it really justifiable to say that in Menander 'Demea' brought nothing to pass that would not have been done without him?

that of Menander. We are dealing with a comedy and not a philosophical tract. One cannot discover the message of the play in isolation from other aspects of the comedy — the events, the plot structure and the characterization.¹¹

The flaws in Micio's character which make him ripe for a fall have been pointed out by others and not too much needs to be added. He is pretentious, patronizing and, like Demea, supremely self-confident in the correctness of his method of upbringing. Particularly revealing are the lines he speaks to Hegio at 592ff.:

ego in hac re nil reperio quam ob rem lauder tanto opere,
 Hegio:
 meum officium facio, quod peccatum a nobis ortumst
 corripio.
 nisi si me in illo credidisti esse hominum numero qui
 ita putant,
 sibi fieri iniuriam ultro si quam fecere ipsi expostules,
 et ultro accusant.

Micio, however, has already acted like those men whom he describes in 594-96 and from whom he disassociates himself. In the first confrontation with Demea (81ff.) he wrests the initiative from his brother by meeting charge with countercharge (cf. 98f., 101ff.). Although the peremptory and patronizing manner in which he deals with Demea in this scene is explained in the following monologue (141-54),¹² it is true to say that Micio

¹¹ This point is well made by Büchner, *op. cit.* (supra, note 2).

¹² The monologue at 141-54 is important in this respect since it recovers for Micio some of the sympathy of the audience which he has lost in the preceding scene. The casual way in which he shrugs off the latest escapade of Aeschinus is not to his credit, even if the Greek audience knew at this point in the play (from a prologue) the true circumstances of the *raptio*. The monologue shows that his reaction to the *raptio* was prompted by his knowledge of Demea's nature and concealed some anxiety and doubts of his own. A neat balance in the audience's attitude to the two brothers is achieved at the end of the monologue. The thesis of Lefèvre, *op. cit.* (supra, note 2) 39ff., that the monologue is a Terentian addition, is not convincing. I cannot see that there is any contradiction between Aeschinus' having said that he wished to marry (150f.) and the fact that he has not told Micio of his liaison with Pamphila (629f.; cf. 690ff.). Lefèvre's acceptance of Rieth's interpretation of the Menandrian play leads him to regard 149f. (*quam hic non amavit meretricem? aut cui non dedit / aliquid?*) as inconsistent with the portrayal of Aeschinus in Menander and therefore written by Terence

engages our sympathy less as the play progresses. In this respect the agreement which the two brothers reach at 129ff., that each will confine himself to the son in his care, is of importance. Although the agreement is initiated by Micio, it is he who first breaks it when he gives the money for Ctesipho's *psaltria* in full knowledge of the facts (cf. 364ff.). When Demea discovers Ctesipho in Micio's house, he raises, with ample justification, this point:

quor nunc apud te potat? quor recipis meum?
 quor emis amicam, Micio? numqui minus
 mihi idem ius aequomst esse quod mecumst tibi?
 quando ego tuom non curo, ne cura meum. (799-802)

Micio's sophistic defense (*communia esse amicorum inter se omnia*, 804) is hardly convincing.¹³ Another less attractive side of Micio is the practical joker's streak of cruelty that we find in him. He decides to have some fun with Aeschinus and makes up the story that a Milesian has come to claim his rights as the nearest male relative to the hand of Pamphila. His motive may be in part to test Aeschinus, but there is also the element of *bon chat bon rat* (*quor non ludo hunc aliquantisper? melius est, / quandoquidem hoc numquam mihi ipse voluit credere*, 639-40). In a later scene (719-62) he allows Demea to believe that Aeschinus will have wife and *meretrix* in the same house. Micio seems to take pleasure in the discomfiture of others and of Demea in particular.¹⁴ These characteristics of Micio and these features of the plot structure seem to set the scene splendidly for the tables to be turned on Micio at the end of the play when a deceit is practiced on him by Demea and his own words and philosophy are used against him.

I should now like to suggest that a particular detail of the ending of the play, the successful attempt of Demea to woo back Aeschinus, is also prepared for in an earlier part of the play, in

to prepare for Micio's defeat at the end of the play. Such conduct, however, seems to be part of the *ὑποκείμενα* of the Menandrian play and to be one of the causes of the dispute between the two brothers (cf. 61, 86f.). Or does one excize such lines as these from the Greek original as well?

¹³ Tränkle, op. cit. (supra, note 1) 246f., stresses this point.

¹⁴ See Johnson, op. cit. (supra, note 1) 177, n. 12.

the scene which immediately precedes the crucial monologue of Demea at 855ff. In this scene Demea now knows the true circumstances concerning the *psaltria*. After Micio has answered his brother's objections to his interference in Demea's and Ctesipho's affairs, he goes on to offer his own resources for the sons to use. He believes that the qualities of the two sons are such that they will turn out as the fathers wish:

video [eos] sapere intellegere, in loco
vereri, inter se amare: scire est liberum
ingenium atque animum: quovis illos tu die
redducas, at enim metuas ne ab re sint tamen
omissiores paullo. (827-31)

The words *quovis . . . paullo* are normally interpreted as follows: "One can bring them back to the straight and narrow anytime one likes. But one may be afraid that despite this they will be a little too careless as far as money is concerned." I suggest that a period should be placed after *animum* (829) and that the words should be translated "Take them back any day you like. But you would be afraid that despite their good character they would be a little too careless as far as money is concerned." In short, Micio is here issuing to Demea a challenge which he is confident he will not accept. He is repeating the gambit which he used successfully at the beginning of the play:

verum, Demea,
curemus aequam uterque partem: tu alterum,
ego item alterum; nam ambos curare propemodum
repscere illumst quem dedisti. (129-32)

On this second occasion, however, the ploy rebounds on him, since at the end of the play Demea does exactly this, and that too with Aeschinus' acquiescence.

By the usual interpretation the subject of both *redducas* and *metuas* is the 'ideal' second person. Indeed it is difficult to find examples of the 'may' – potential and 'can' – potential in early Latin without such a subject.¹⁵ Yet it is equally difficult not to

¹⁵ See S. A. Handford, *The Latin Subjunctive* (London 1947), 107ff. For the few instances of the 'can' – potential without the 'ideal' second person subject see p. 107, n. 2.

believe that the subject of *metuas* is Demea. Micio continues by saying that such a fear is erroneous and springs from *senectus*, while the whole clause *at enim metuas . . . paullo* recalls the beginning of Micio's lecture to Demea when he brought up the latter's concern over the money which the sons spend:

principio, si id te mordet, sumptum filii
quem faciunt . . . (807f.)

The context suggests that Micio is referring specifically to Demea as the subject of *metuas* in 830 and that consequently the subjunctive expresses simple potentiality.¹⁶ If, however, the subject of *metuas* is Demea, it seems odd that the pronominal subject of *redducas* is expressed (when it could be readily understood after *scire est*),¹⁷ while it is omitted with *metuas* when there is a change of subject. It is most likely that the subject of both *redducas* and *metuas* is Demea. The metaphorical sense of *redducas* (= *redducas in viam*)¹⁸ is less appropriate, however, if Demea is the subject ("You, Demea, can bring them to heel . . ."), quite apart from the question of whether the 'can' – potential is possible without the 'ideal' subject. Another weakness in the usual sense given to *redducas* was pointed out by Madvig¹⁹ as a factor in support of emending *scire est* to *siris*: "id quod sequitur [quovis . . . redducas] non recte dicitur, nisi praecedat significatio libertatis concessae et usurpatae, quae non inest in hoc 'scias liberum ingenium atque animum'." Madvig may have overestimated the difficulty in seeing a metaphorical sense in *redducas*, but certainly the way in which the audience took the verb, whether metaphorically or literally (with the subjunctive being jussive), would seem to have depended primarily on the delivery of these lines by the actor — on the intonation or on the point at which the actor paused.

¹⁶ Handford, op. cit. (supra, note 15) 111, n. 2, states that the interpretation of *metuas* as a 'may' – potential is not very natural if Demea is the subject.

¹⁷ Cf. Verg. *Aen.* 8.675ff.: *in medio classis aeratas, Actia bella, /cernere erat totumque instructo Marte videres / fervere Leucaten.*

¹⁸ Cf. Plaut. *Pseud.* 668: *suo viatico redduxit me usque ex errore in viam*; Ter. *And.* 190: *dehinc postulo sive aequomst te oro, Dave, ut redeat iam in viam.*

¹⁹ J. N. Madvig, *Adversaria critica ad scriptores graecos et latinos* (Hauniae 1871-1884), II, 21f.

Two objections against the interpretation of *redducas* and *metuas* offered here may be raised. The first concerns the use of the plural *illos* as the object of *redducas*. Strictly speaking, the object of the verb should be Aeschinus alone, since Ctesipho, although at this moment in Micio's house, is still under the authority of Demea. There is no doubt that there is an illogicality here, but not one that excludes the possibility of my interpretation. A comparable example of plural for singular can be found in the next scene where Demea is comparing how the two fathers are regarded by the sons:

illum ut vivat optant, meam autem mortem expectant scilicet.
ita eos meo labore eductos maxumo hic fecit suos
paullo sumptu . . . (874-76)

Demea speaks of his two sons in 875-76 but he can hardly say that Aeschinus has been *suo labore eductus*, since he was adopted by Micio when he was quite young (*eduxi a parvulo*, 48). Nor can Demea logically say with respect to Aeschinus that Micio has won him over *paullo sumptu*. It is the extravagant generosity of Micio that Demea sees as the cause of Aeschinus' behavior (*domus sumptuosa; adulescens luxu perditus*, 760; cf. 61ff.). The words *paullo sumptu* must refer to the twenty *minae* which Micio gave for the *psaltria*. Demea is thinking in line 875 of Ctesipho alone but uses the plural pronoun.

The other objection is the abruptness of Micio's challenge. But if Terence has translated this scene quite closely from his original (and I can see no reason to doubt this), it would not have been so abrupt in the Menandrian play as it is in the Latin adaptation. Micio tells of the circumstances which led up to the adoption at 806ff.:

ausculta paucis nisi molestumst, Demea,
principio, si id te mordet, sumptum filii
quem faciunt, quaeso hoc facito tecum cogites.
tu illos duo olim pro re tolerabas tua,
quod satis putabas tua bona ambobus fore,
et me tum uxorem credidisti scilicet
ducturum.

Aeschinus had been adopted because Demea did not think that his estate would be sufficient for two sons and because Micio

had not married and therefore had no direct heir of his own. Micio continues:

eandem illam rationem antiquam optine:
 conserva, quaere, parce, fac quam plurimum
 illis relinquo, gloriam tu istam optine.
 mea, quae praeter spem evenere, utantur sine.
 de summa nil decedet, quod hinc accesserit
 id de lucro putato esse omne.

The words *eandem illam rationem antiquam optine* refer to the immediately preceding lines and specifically to Demea's belief that his estate would be sufficient for two sons (810). Micio now offers to meet all the expenses of the youths. Nothing more than this seems to be implied in the Latin play. The Greek audience, however, would have taken rather more from the speech of 'Micio' at 809ff. By Roman law the *paterfamilias* could dispose of his estate after death by making a will and naming as many persons heirs as he wished.²⁰ By the strict letter of Attic law, however, it was forbidden for a father who had legitimate sons of the age of majority to dispose of his property by a will. His estate fell automatically to his son or sons (who were all co-heirs). The situation in the Menandrian play, as a Greek audience would have understood it, is that 'Ctesipho' is the *sole* heir of 'Demea' and that 'Aeschinus' is the sole heir of 'Micio'. After adoption by 'Micio' 'Aeschinus' was no longer co-heir with 'Ctesipho' of his natural father's estate.²¹ If, therefore, 'Micio' told 'Demea' at this point in the Greek play to see to it that he

²⁰ See F. Schulz, *Classical Roman Law* (Oxford 1951) 205ff.; J. A. Crook, *Law and Life of Rome* (London 1967) 121.

²¹ See A. R. W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens. The Family and Property* (Oxford 1968) 151ff. If we exclude those exceptions which are not relevant to the situation in our play, e.g. the leaving of bequests to a wife or daughter, Harrison adduces two cases which seem to suggest that 'Demea' may have been able to leave some of his estate to 'Aeschinus'. First, Konon left more than half the value of his estate away from his sons (Lys. 19.39ff.). Secondly, Pasion made a will although he had two sons (Dem. 36. 34f.; 45. 28). W. K. Lacey, *The Family in Classical Greece* (London 1968) 131ff., showed, however, that in neither case was the law broken. Konon was disposing of property outside Attica, while 'Pasion's right to make a will on his death-bed rested on the fact that he had a minor son to whom he wanted to appoint a guardian.' For the effects of adoption on the question of succession see Harrison, 93ff.

leave as much as possible for the *sons* (plural), the audience would have inferred that 'Micio' is offering to cancel the adoption and return 'Aeschinus' to 'Demea' as co-heir with 'Ctesipho' of his estate.²² Thus in the section of the Greek play to which lines 829-31 are the counterpart the challenge would not have been so abrupt as it is in the Terentian adaptation. The probable reason for the abruptness in the Roman play is that Terence did not realize the difference between Attic and Roman law in this respect.

The position we have reached is that lines 829-31, if taken by themselves, can be interpreted as a challenge issued by Micio to Demea to take both sons back into his care and that such an interpretation, which on linguistic grounds is as valid as, if not superior to, the one currently held, is confirmed by lines 809ff., when these are 'translated' into an Attic context. The evidence points to the conclusion that there was preparation in the Menandrian play at this point for an ending similar to the one found in Terence, where Demea offers Aeschinus the choice between the two fathers and Aeschinus chooses Demea.

This leads on to the other problem mentioned at the beginning of this article — the inconsistency between Demea's monologue (855-81) and his answer to Micio's query about the reasons for his sudden generosity (986-88):

ut id ostenderem, quod te isti facilem et festivom putant,
id non fieri ex vera vita neque adeo ex aequo et bono,
sed ex adsentando indulgendo et largiendo, Micio.

Contrast these lines with the last five lines of the monologue:

age age nunciam experiamur contra ecquid ego possiem
blande dicere aut benigne facere, quando hoc provocat.
ego quoque a meis me amari et magni pendi postulo:
si id fit dando atque obsequendo, non posteriores feram.
deerit: id mea minime refert qui sum natu maximus. (877-81)

The distinct impression from these lines is that Demea will give Micio's methods a trial and that the testing period will be much longer than it turns out to be. This is conveyed in particular by

²² Demea uses the plural at 868-69: *heia autem, dum studeo illis ut quam plurimum facerem* . . . For my argument one must suppose that the plural *illis* is an addition of Terence.

deerit in 881. The implication is that the shortage of money will arise from Demea's attempts to surpass his brother in generosity and indulgence. One might have expected from this that the end of the play would be taken up with examples of Demea's sudden largesse. As it is, almost all of the expenses are incurred by Micio, though instigated by Demea. This aspect of the succeeding scenes is in itself consistent with Demea's words at 986-88.

From what we know of Greek New Comedy it would be strange for a dramatist to mislead his audience in this way in a monologue, one of the purposes of which is that a character may reveal his reflections on and reaction to a situation. The audience takes what is expressed in the monologue to express the sincere feelings and thoughts of the speaker. Where a character intends to practice a deceit on another he would normally reveal this beforehand so that the audience would be able to understand the action.²³ Now in the scenes which follow the monologue it becomes quite clear that revenge is an important motive in Demea's actions and that he is attempting to teach Micio a lesson. This is shown by the asides. After gleefully stating that the breaching of the wall will cause Micio expense he concludes with a reference to the twenty *minae* which his brother paid out for the *psaltria*:

iube nunciam
dinumeret ille Babylo viginti minas. (914-15)

When he has persuaded Micio to marry Sostrata, he searches for something else to do (*quid ego dicam? hoc confit quod volo*, 946). Again he comes up with a proposal which will cost Micio money: Hegio should be given the usufruct of a fairly sizeable piece of land. Later, Demea's aside at 958 (*suo sibi gladio hunc iugulo*) shows his delight in scoring over his brother and in the way he has done so. In tone and content these asides are quite consistent with what Demea says at 986-88; they are not consistent with the final five lines of the monologue. There is no indication, however, in the scenes following the monologue that Demea's purpose has changed. On the basis of our knowledge

²³ See W. Schadewaldt, *Monolog und Selbstgespräch* (Berlin 1926) 28ff.; id., *Hermes* 66 (1931) 12; Rieth, p. 112.


of Greek New Comedy the tentative conclusion must be that Terence has deviated in some way from the Menandrian monologue. The speech itself must therefore be examined to see if any aspect of it might support this conclusion.

It opens with a sentiment of a general nature — that time and circumstances lead one to reject what one has held most important. Demea then applies this adage to himself:

nam ego vitam duram quam vixi usque adhuc
iam decurso spatio omitto (859-60)

The reason is that he has discovered *facilitate nil esse homini melius neque clementia* (861). It is important to be clear about exactly what Demea is saying here. By the *vita dura* he means a life devoted to toil, the purpose of which is to accumulate as large a patrimony as possible (cf. 868-69; 813ff.). Demea draws a contrast between the external and the internal, between what *might be* indicative of character and character-attributes, thereby revealing that he views *facilitas* and *clementia* as qualities which are quite alien to a man who has lived the *vita dura*. This contrast suggests that Demea sees *facilitas* and *clementia* as the 'social graces'. In the next section, where the two brothers are compared to exemplify the truth of Demea's initial statement, the first contrast between the *vita dura* and *facilitas / clementia* is developed into a contrast between Demea's *vita dura* and the life of *otium* and *convivia* led by Micio. Since Demea chose to lead his kind of life for the benefit of his sons, a further comparison is made between the family responsibilities of Demea and the totally selfish (to Demea's way of thinking, of course) life style of Micio. The difference between the two brothers may be set out as shown on the next page.

The features in the description of Micio are picked up in a chiasitic order. In 866-69 there is nothing that corresponds to the content of 864, but the implication is that Demea does not have the *clementia* and *facilitas*. The main point to note is that Demea is here saying that Micio has won *universal* affection because of *facilitas* and *clementia* while Demea has acquired the reputation of being *agrestis*, *saevos*, *tristis*, etc. because of his *vita dura*. Demea is *not* saying that these epithets are correctly applied to him. He is describing how he is regarded by



others.²⁴ It is the failure to recognize the force of *ille* in 866 that has led to many of the difficulties in discussion of the monologue.²⁵ If it is believed that Demea is giving a true picture of himself in 866, it is tempting to link this self-portrayal with his decision to drop the *vita dura* and to believe that Demea is going to change not only his way of life but also his 'character'. But before line 877 Demea says nothing which suggests such a drastic change. At 870 Demea turns from considering how differently he and Micio are viewed by the general populace to a description, in a series of antitheses, of how the same difference can be seen in the attitude of the two sons to the older men:

²⁴ Eugraphius understood this section of the speech in this manner: *dimittit vitam praeteritam propterea, quia nihil melius clementia et facilitate esse cognovit, quippe cum frater in otio duxerit vitam, in conviviis, ab omnibus laudetur, omnium famam iustam honestatemque mereatur, contra hic severus, tristis, agrestis, parvus, truculentus et tenax esse dicatur* (ad. 855).

²⁵ For a similar use of *ille* cf. Plaut. *Pers.* 594: *vide sis, ego ille doctus leno paene in foveam decidi*. Rieth, p. 107, analyzed lines 862-70 (. . . *odium*) in terms of a parallel structure (ABCABC). His analysis, where 866-68 (. . . *alia cura*) balances 863-64, ignores the force of *ille*. Moreover, by taking *nunc exacta aetate* . . . *odium* to balance *omnes bene dicunt, amant* he severs *ille alter sine labore patria potitur commoda* (871) from its obvious partner.

nunc exacta aetate hoc fructi pro labore ab eis fero,
 odium; ille alter sine labore patria potitur commoda.
 illum amant, me fugitant; illi credunt consilia omnia,
 illum diligunt, apud illum sunt ambo, ego desertus sum;
 illum ut vivat optant, meam autem mortem expectant scilicet.
 ita eos meo labore eductos maxumo hic fecit suos
 paullo sumptu: miseriam omnem ego capio, hic potitur gaudia.

(870-76)

There is nothing to suggest that the reasons for the sons' aversion to Demea is other than that given for Demea's lack of popularity with his fellow citizens. He does not blame (and this is surprising considering the importance given to the different methods of upbringing in the play) the strictness of his pedagogical methods for the hostility of his sons. Indeed he makes no explicit mention of his own beliefs and methods, although certainly comparison is implied in his description of Micio. At the same time, however, the way in which he regards the *facilitas* and *clementia* of his brother is quite consistent with what he says to Micio at 986-88.

At this point comparison with *Dyskolos* is instructive. There, Knemon's *δυσκολία* and misanthropy are obstacles to the happy resolution of the love interest. Menander uses the action of Gorgias in saving the old man when he has fallen into the well as the catalyst which causes Knemon to take stock of himself. In the crucial speech (708ff.) Knemon admits that he was wrong to believe that he could be completely self-sufficient and that no one was capable of showing kindness to another. He therefore adopts Gorgias and entrusts him with finding a husband for his daughter. Half of his land he gives as dowry, the other half he gives to Gorgias. Knemon still wishes to be left alone, however, and the donations of his estate and the loss of responsibility for his daughter allow him to retreat further from contact with society, although now he and his wife will live together again. There is no question of a change of character and the manner in which Knemon clings to the beliefs underlying his way of life attests to Menander's realistic portrayal of character. In *Adelphoe* the catalyst for Demea is the apparent transfer of Ctesipho's affections to Micio. This does not, however, prompt Demea to consider whether he has been too strict in his upbringing-

ing. It raises instead the much wider question of why everyone dislikes him. He answers this question in terms of his complete devotion to work and to accumulating money. The only decision which he comes to in 855-76 is to abandon the *vita dura*. We can infer that instead of devoting himself to work and increasing the patrimony Demea is going to spend more of his time helping his son and enjoying his companionship.²⁶

From this analysis of the speech and the strange absence of any comment by Demea on his own pedagogical methods there emerges a solution to the inconsistency between the end of the monologue and Demea's words at 986ff. Terence has omitted that part of the Menandrian monologue in which 'Demea' defended his method of rearing 'Ctesipho' as being superior to that of 'Micio' and which occurred immediately before what corresponded to line 877 of the Roman play. After such a defence the first two lines of the final section of the monologue could be faithful renderings of what was in the Greek play, since the Greek audience would then have realized that the speaker's attempt to beat 'Micio' at his own game was a response to his brother's plea in the preceding scene (*da te hodie mihi; / exporge frontem*, 838-39; *hodie modo hilarum te face*, 842). The content of lines 879-80 may have been in the Greek original of this play as a sarcastic jibe at the motives of 'Micio', evoking what he had said in the opening monologue (50-51). Only line 881 seems completely out of place in the Menandrian play at this point and has either been added by Terence²⁷ or moved from an earlier place in the monologue where 'Demea' decided to give up the *vita dura*.²⁸

This procedure postulated for Terence would be quite consis-

²⁶ Demea has learned by experience the truth of Sostratos' words at Men. *Dysk.* 811-12: πολλῶν δὲ κρείττον ἐστὶν ἐμφανὲς φίλος / ἢ πλοῦτος ἀφανής, ὃν σὺ κατορύξας ἔχεις. See E. W. Handley, *The Dyskolos of Menander* (London 1965) ad loc.

²⁷ So Tränkle, op. cit. (supra, note 1) 249, n. 27.

²⁸ In such a context 'Demea' would be saying that no more capital would be accruing to the estate. Rieth, p. 115, suggested that Men. *Ad. fr.* 12 Koerte (τί πολλὰ τηρεῖν πολλὰ δεῖ δεδοικότε;) was the model of 881, but the difference in content between the two lines is considerable.

tent with the dramatist's known predilection for exploiting surprise and for creating uncertainty in the minds of the spectators, and thus for making them share in, rather than observe, the reaction of the characters in the play.²⁹ For at least some part of the final section of the play the audience, like Syrus and Micio, have doubts about the sincerity of Demea.

The view that the "message" of the Terentian play is the same as that of his model as far as modes of upbringing are concerned has, it is hoped, been supported by what has been said in this article. Both fathers have defects in the way they have brought up their sons. Micio's theory of education is for the most part excellent, but he has used it to excuse excessive generosity and indulgence. Demea, on the other hand, is strict and betrays no philosophical basis for his methods. His flaw, however, is not so much his strictness, as his failure to develop the necessary bonds of trust and friendship between father and son because of his preoccupation with accumulating as large a patrimony as possible. This defect is remedied by his decision to abandon the *vita dura*. Demea's victory at the end indicates that in terms of the particular circumstances and characters portrayed in the play his strictness is preferable to Micio's methods.

In conclusion we may turn again to the educational and ethical views of the Peripatetics. Aristotle stresses the danger of putting theory in place of practice. It is impossible, he says, for anyone to become *σπουδαῖος* without doing *τὰ σώφρονα* or *τὰ δίκαια*. Many people, however, take refuge in the theory of goodness and think that they will in this way be *ἀγαθοί*.

²⁹ In particular, the omission of the expository prologue gives greater scope for creating surprise and heightening suspense. See G. E. Duckworth, *The Nature of Roman Comedy. A Study in Popular Entertainment* (Princeton 1952) 223ff. Lefèvre, op. cit. (supra, note 2) 16, pp. 103ff., stresses Terence's desire to avoid the undramatic form of such prologues as the main factor in abandoning them rather than the wish to exploit surprise and suspense. His argument is that Terence gives, by other means, the necessary information in the *early* part of the plays. W. Ludwig, *Gnomon* 44 (1972) 826f., points out, however, that there is still uncertainty in the minds of the Roman audience about the 'truth' of what they learn.

They are like sick persons who listen carefully to what the doctor tells them but carry out none of the instructions given.³⁰ Sentiments similar to those may well have been in Menander's mind when he created 'Micio' and 'Ἀδελφοὶ β' :

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³⁰ E.N. 1105b 9ff.: εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδείς ἄν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε γίνεσθαι ἀγαθός. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὅμοιόν τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς κάμνουσιν, οἱ τῶν ἱατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δ' οὐδὲν τῶν προσταττομένων.

ADNUO AND ABNUO IN OVID *TRISTIA* 5.10.41-42

The passage is an old *locus caliginosus* and has inspired many conjectures. S. G. Owen's editio Oxoniensis¹ reads:

utque fit, in me aliquid ficti, dicentibus illis
abnuerim quotiens annuerimque, putant

with five variant readings in the apparatus.

G. Luck² conjectured: *insanum . . . me . . . putant*, and we shall revert to it later on.

The elegy *Tristia* 5.10 was written after three years of exile, and it appears from the preceding lines (*Tr.* 5.10.37-38) that the poet had at that time only limited possibilities of communication with the Tomitans:

barbarus hic ego sum, qui non intellegor ulli,
et rident stolidi verba Latina Getae.

The evolution of linguistic communication between Ovid and the "barbarians" has been exposed by H. S. Gehman³ and more recently by E. Lozovan.⁴

The lines *Tr.* 5.10.41-42 consequently reflect a period when verbal communication did not yet work and the poet had to make himself understood *per gestum* (*Tr.* 5.10.36). It is here, in the *gestus*, that the solution of the difficulty should be sought.

The gesture language of the hands presumed by Quintilian⁵ to be *omnium hominum communis sermo* was and is as non-universal as the movements of the head, considered by the same author as *noti et communes omnibus*.⁶

Head motions are interpreted differently (and even contrarily)

¹ P. Ovidi Nasonis Tristium libri quinque . . . Oxonii 1969 (OCT).

² G. Luck, *P. Ovidius Naso, Tristia, herausgegeben, übersetzt und erklärt*, Band I, Text und Übersetzung (Heidelberg 1967).

³ Ovid's experience with languages at Tomi, *CJ* 11 (1915-16) 50-55.

⁴ "Ovide et le bilinguisme," in *Ovidiana, Recherches sur Ovide* (Paris 1958) 396-403.

⁵ *Inst. Or.*, 11.3.87.

⁶ *Ibid.* 11.3.71.

by different peoples, as has been demonstrated by J. Vendryès⁷ and with greater emphasis by R. L. Birdwhistell.⁸

It is well known that the ambiguous interpretation of the nodding and shaking of the head confuses up to this day the traveller and the tourist.

Out of a great number of relevant examples I mention only two, one from Greece⁹ and the other from Bulgaria.¹⁰

The French *hocher la tête* is likewise equivocal, so much so that recent lexicographers like Robert¹¹ register totally opposite definitions and examples.

⁷ "Langage oral et langage par gestes," *Journal de psychologie normale et pathologique* (1950) 23: "Les mouvements de la tête pour exprimer l'acquiescement ou le refus sont d'un usage quasi universel, mais on sait qu'ils varient suivant les pays; pour dire "non" on fait mouvoir la tête tantôt de droite à gauche, tantôt de bas en haut. Il faut être prévenu du sens de ces gestes."

⁸ *Kinesics and Context. Essays on body-motion* (London 1971) 81: "Insofar as we know, there is no body motion or gesture that can be regarded as a universal symbol. That is, we have been unable to discover any single facial expression, stance, or body position which conveys an identical meaning in all societies."

⁹ Simone de Beauvoir, *La force de l'âge* (Paris 1960) 312, [in Athens-Piraeus]: "Quand on demandait à un commerçant une denrée qu'il ne possédait pas, un journal qui n'était pas encore arrivé, son visage exprimait le dédain et la consternation; il hochait la tête, dans une mimique qui en France signifie *oui* (italics by Beauvoir! F. H.), et qui reflétait tout le malheur du monde."

¹⁰ Paul Jordan, *Mit Kompass und Karte durch den Balkan* (Stuttgart, ca. 1930), 32-33.: Mit der Sprache und den Gebärden der Leute hatten wir die merkwürdigsten Erlebnisse, während wir in Bulgarien waren. So war es uns nicht bekannt, daß die Völker da unten, wenn sie "ja" meinen, den Kopf schütteln, bei "nein" dagegen nicken, welche Tatsache uns natürlich anfangs manche Verwunderung bereitete. Allerdings kam es auch den Leuten ihrerseits sonderbar vor, wenn wir zum Beispiel in einem Laden fragten, ob wir dort eine bestimmte Sache kaufen könnten, und auf das Kopfschütteln des Mannes hin dann den Laden wieder verliessen. Merkwürdig erging es auch Ernst, als er auf die Fremdenpolizei musste, um uns abzumelden . . . Dort ging ein Woinik (Soldat) als Posten mit seinem Gewehr auf und ab, und diesen fragte Ernst nun nach dem Passbüro. "Dole!" sagte der Mann . . . Ernst ging zur linken Treppe. "Tuka (hier)?" fragte er den Posten. Der schüttelte den Kopf. Also ging Ernst nun zur rechten Treppe und fragte wieder "Tuka?" worauf der Soldat heftig nickte. Als Ernst dann aber hinunterzusteigen begann, kam er hinterher und schleppte ihn wieder nach links . . . Die beiden haben sich gegenseitig für verrückt gehalten, bis Ernst dann später erfuhr, dass es mit dem Nicken und Schütteln des Kopfes dort unten umgekehrt ist als bei uns.

¹¹ P. Robert, *Dictionnaire alphabétique et analogique de la langue française*

One can therefore realize an everyday scene between the Roman poet and the *piscatores Ponticae regionis* (Owen)¹²; the gestures of the Roman do not correspond to those of the Tomitans. On the contrary: when he *adnuit* ('fit un signe d'assentiment',¹³ 'nodded yes',¹⁴ 'nickte',¹⁵), the natives interpreted it as *abnuit* ('fit un geste de dénégation',¹³ 'nodded no',¹⁴ 'schüttelte den Kopf'¹⁵), and *vice versa*.

It seems obvious that thus misunderstandings, even mistrust and suspicions inevitably occur, and it can be concluded from *utque fit* that such reciprocal misunderstandings were by no means infrequent, at least during the first years of the *relegatio*.

For that reason the conjecture *insanum* propounded by Luck¹⁶ appears quite plausible:

Utque fit, insanum me aliquid dicentibus illis
abnuerim quotiens adnuerimque, putant.

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(Paris 1960) s.v. hocher: hocher la tête, la secouer (de haut en bas, ou de droite à gauche). Pour Littré, hocher la tête c'est "la secouer en signe de désapprobation". Pour Acad. c'est "marquer en levant subitement la tête en haut qu'on désapprouve quelque chose" . . . Beaucoup d'exemples littéraires contredisent ces définitions.

¹² op. cit. p. xi.

¹³ J. André, *Ovide, Tristes, Texte établi et traduit* (Paris 1968 [CB]).

¹⁴ A. L. Wheeler, *Ovid with an English translation, Tristia, Ex Ponto*. (London 1959 [LCL]).

¹⁵ G. Luck, op. cit. p. 211.

¹⁶ Ibid. p. 210.

LATIN *SĪDUS*, *SĪDERA*

A. Scherer in his careful account (*Gestirnnamen bei den idg. Völkern*, 1953, 34) remarks: "Das Fehlen des \bar{u} in *sīdus* beruht wohl auf ursprachlichem Schwund, Sommer 225." The relevant passage of Sommer (*Handbuch* 224-25) lumps together for this supposed cluster-loss of \bar{u} in the proto-language phenomena which I believe are essentially different.¹

It seems to me that we must return to a modified version of Walde's conditioned development of $*s\bar{u}$, at any rate in initial position. Perhaps the clearest example we have is *sī*, Osc. *svai*, Umbr. *sve*; it is scarcely plausible to divorce these syntactically identical words. Sommer (224) considers a loss of \bar{u} in the proto-language. Poultney (*The Bronze Tables of Iguvium*, [1959] 111 §109j) considers the Oscan-Umbrian forms as derived from $*swo-$, a variant of $*so-$. The Oscan-Umbrian forms are clearly descended from $*s\bar{u}ai$; in view of the syntax this is best viewed as a locative in origin, and it is surely an old feminine. I therefore derive Lat. *sī* (: *seu* < $*sei-ue$), and also *sī-c*, OLat. *seice*, from an old masculine/neuter locative $*suei$; on thematic *-e-i* see my article, "Locative Singular in *-ei*" *IF* 75 (1971) 104-5. On the basis of the argument in this article I regard the thematic loc. sg. *-ei* in Oscan (*mútnikeí tereí*, *eíseí*, *tereí*) as all the more confirmed as an archaic conservatism. Therefore no loc. sg. in ablauting $*-oi$ can reasonably be assumed for Oscan-Umbrian. For this reason, without entering into the balance of a very complex question, I cannot accept Poultney's suggestion (*AJP* 90 [1969] 156) that *svai* (and Umbr. *sve*) reflects the *o*-grade of the loc. sg.; hence I continue to regard it as a feminine.

If *sērius* is to be related to Goth. *swērs* then we must posit an earlier $*s\bar{u}ērios$. Similarly *sībilus*, if related to Goth. *swiglon*, must be $*s\bar{u}īb-$ or $*s\bar{u}eīb-$.

The best example, however, within its total morphological

¹ I have dealt at length with the word for '6' in the forthcoming studies in honour of Archibald A. Hill.

framework is surely *sīdus*. As Scherer points out (34), we find within Latin a good cognate form, in *o*-grade, in *sūdus* and *sūdum*. These latter are easily accounted for as from **sūoido-*,² which is readily put in relation with Lith. *svidùs* 'shiny' and *svidù svidėti* (see Fraenkel Lit. etym. Wb. 952), and Av. *xʷaēna-* presumably < **xʷaēd-na-*. I therefore cannot agree with Ernout-Meillet³ 1101: "Même si l'on arrive à en montrer la possibilité phonétique, le rapprochement avec le groupe de lit. *svidù*, *svidėti* 'briller' est sans grand intérêt. Terme technique dont l'étymologie est incertaine." Instead, I would insist that *sīdus* when derived from **sueid(h)os sueid(h)es-os*³ is just what we might expect both phonetically and morphologically. An *s*-stem is of course basically expected to be in *e*-grade; Meillet and Vendryes, *Traité de grammaire comparée*, (1924) 373 §591. Such nouns were also closely related to thematic nouns of action (Meillet-Vendryes §554), even though this morphology and derivational relation were not too well preserved in Latin. Thus we may view the set of relations:

Lith. <i>svidėti</i>	< <i>*suid (h) -ē</i>	γί-γν-ομαι, <i>gignō</i>	ῥέω	κλέπτω
Lat. <i>sīdus</i>	< <i>*sueid (h) -es</i>	= <i>γένος, genus</i>	= ῥέος	= κλέπος
Lat. <i>sūdus</i>	< <i>*sūoid (h) -o-</i>	γόνος	ῥόος, ῥοή	κλοπός κλοπή
	<i>λέχομαι</i>	<i>tegō</i>		
	= <i>λέχος</i>	= <i>τέγος</i> , OIr. <i>tech tige</i>		
	<i>λόχος, λοχός</i>	<i>toga</i> , OE <i>þæc</i> , Welsh <i>to</i>		

We have, then, at bottom a verbal root **sueid (h)* - 'shine'.

It now seems tolerably clear what the fate of initial **sū* - was in Latin. Before *ā* (also *ǣ*?) *sū* was preserved (*suāuis*, *suādeō*, perhaps *suāsum*). Before **ē* the **sū* rounded the vowel to *o* (*soror*, *socrus*, *somnus*). Then before *o* (i.e. rounded vowel)⁴

² Surely preferable to the forced derivation from **suz-do-* to Av. *huškō* Lith. *saūsas* 'dry', accepted by Ernout-Meillet³ 1170.

³ Despite De Vries, Altnord. etym. Wb.² (1962) 569, and Pokorny IEW 1042, there is no clear direct connexion with our root for ON *svida* 'verbrennen, etc.' < **sweip-* < **sueit-* (apparent). However, if OE *switol* 'clear' is cognate, as looks reasonable, the shape of the root is then settled as **sueid-*. We may then understand its poor survival under competition of 'sweat'. It is quite possible, as Poultney points out to me, that **sueit-* and **sueid-* were earlier related as extensions of a simpler root, say **suei-*.

⁴ **sū* of course did not occur before *u*.

the * μ was absorbed (*soror*, *socrus*, *somnus*, and *sūdor* < **suoid*-). Thus I derive OLat. *sō-c*, beside *sī-c* (see above), not with Ernout from **so-* but from **suō-ke*.

Finally, I would now claim that before front non-low (and tense; and diphthongal?) vocalism the original * μ has been absorbed (*sī*, *sīdus*, probably *sērius*, perhaps *sībilus*). It would be phonetically most plausible to suppose that * μ after *s* before front tense (or high) vowel assimilated in articulation to [ū]. This articulation may well have come to be simultaneous with the sibilant, * [s^w]. At last, this weakened rounding effect would have become phonetically faint, and non-distinctive. Any remaining front glide would have been attributed to the following vowel.

In both cases of absorption of * μ (before *o* and before front tense vowels) the development resulted because of coarticulation with *s*; when μ stood alone in absolute initial it was not so absorbed. The later development of *du-* to *b-* shows a similar absorption of the labialization by the stop element through simultaneous articulation. At the time in question, presumably *f* did not bear the same relation to *s* as *b* did to *d*.

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MANIUS ACILIUS GLABRIO AND THE AUDACISSIMI

Twenty years ago, in this journal,¹ I tried to show that a straightforward interpretation of Cicero's words regarding the mysterious *lex Acilia repetundarum*, combined with prosopographical investigation, points to the conclusion that that law does indeed (as has so often been claimed, but almost as often denied) belong to the legislation sponsored by C. Gracchus and is in fact identical with the famous *Lex Repetundarum* of the Bembo tablets. Much has been written on these matters since, and some of my views regarding C. Gracchus' *repetundae* legislation, as there propounded, could no longer be defended today, at least in the form in which I then held them. It is not my purpose here to state any views on the actual legislation of C. Gracchus; it is merely to re-examine Cicero's reference to the *lex Acilia*, which has recently been misinterpreted in an important article, and to correct the error there made and, at the same time, a related error of which I myself was guilty. In view of the importance of Cicero's reference to the *lex Acilia*—the only one we have to it under that name—and of the importance of the law that (I still believe) transferred the *quaestio repetundarum* to the *equites* (in some sense of that much-discussed word), it is surprising that a misunderstanding of that reference appears to have gone unchallenged for so long. At least that gives its author a chance to make amends.

In a carefully argued article² A. N. Sherwin-White demolished a recent attempt to revive Carcopino's unfortunate suggestion that the *Lex Repetundarum* of the Bembo tablets is identical with the law on that subject reported in our literary sources as passed by C. Servilius Glaucia, and firmly reclaimed it for the Gracchan legislation. In the course of establishing this, the principal point of his article, he stressed the importance of Cicero's reference to the law of M' Acilius Glabrio, which "is the earliest description of any of these [laws], and should not be

¹ *AJP* 75 (1954) 374-84.

² *JRS* 62 (1972) 83-99.

minimized". However, since that law as such was not directly relevant to his thesis, he did not discuss it, or the views that have been advanced regarding it, in any detail, but contented himself with an *obiter dictum* in a footnote.³ In this—rather oddly, in view of the fact that his article was concerned to refute the revival of Carcopino's theory regarding the *Lex Repetundarum*—he expressed full support of an equally perverse suggestion which he ascribed to that scholar regarding the *lex Acilia*: "Since *I in Verr.* [51] clearly implies that it was an anti-radical measure 'ad resistendum hominibus audacissimis' (as Carcopino rightly noted), sponsored by the instigators of the laws of Caepio and the younger Livius Drusus, it has no place in this discussion." He gives no reference to Carcopino's statement, and I have not been able to find it; indeed, Carcopino's comments on the *lex Acilia* in his two principal treatments are arbitrary and inconsistent, but do not discuss that phrase of Cicero's or its possible implications.⁴ However, it is Sherwin-White's own statement, in what will be a standard discussion, that is bound to be repeated and may become orthodox opinion. In view of the high quality of the article as a whole, it should not be left to exercise the deleterious influence of a casual error in a major work.

³ op. cit. 86, n. 14, from which the following quotation in the text is also taken.

⁴ The statement is not in what appear to be the most probable places: *Autour des Gracques* (1928) and G. Bloch – J. Carcopino, *Histoire romaine* II (1929), with the relevant chapter by Carcopino. In the former work, Carcopino, basing his argument on a supposed *lex Rubria Acilia* (which rests on a misinterpretation exposed by Tibiletti: see *AJP* 75 [1954] 374), arbitrarily inserted that (or another?) *lex Rubria Acilia* into a gap in the text of the *Lex Repetundarum* (op. cit. 222f.), to arrive at three *repetundae* laws, all voted one after the other in the course of 123 B. C. The *lex Acilia* is described (p. 218) as passed at a time when the star of senatorial government was already fading and as certainly directed against it [senatorial government, presumably]. The supposed *lex Rubria Acilia*, coming after C. Gracchus' law, is said (p. 224) to show its sponsors as asserting their independence and "creating a kind of third party", as against both C. Gracchus and the Senate. In the *Histoire romaine* (248) the *lex Acilia* is passed at the instigation of C. Gracchus, as a compromise presumed acceptable to the Senate, and the supposed *lex Rubria Acilia* (250f.) as an amendment to C. Gracchus' law, acceptable to him and resulting in a partial reconciliation of the Senate with him. These fantasies are the only relevant discussions I have been able to find. In *Autour des Gracques* the name is always "M. Acilius".

First, the sponsorship of the *lex Acilia*. No evidence is given for the assertion that it was sponsored by the "instigators" of the laws of Q. Caepio and the younger M. Drusus—a view that, on a literal interpretation, would certainly exclude any date as early as that of C. Gracchus. It should be firmly stated that no such evidence exists. As has often been pointed out, the sum of the evidence on the *lex Acilia* consists of two references in the *Verrines* (1 *Verr.* 51 and 2 *Verr.* 1.26) and the scholia on those passages—and the scholia, as Balsdon pointed out long ago,⁵ are not very good. Any implication (such as the casual reader might get out of the remark quoted) that the "instigators" of the law are named, or at least alluded to, in those sources, would be totally erroneous. If a case for such a view is to be taken seriously, it will have to be argued, and argued just as carefully as the case for the Gracchan connection often has been. Carcopino, cited by Sherwin-White, certainly presents no such arguments, any more than Sherwin-White himself does.

This suggestion, then, needs no refutation until it has at least been supported by evidence. More serious is the description of the *lex Acilia* as anti-radical, since here the alleged evidence—part of one of our two Cicero references—is in fact supplied, and the interpretation, isolated from its context as the phrase here is, might even seem plausible. It must therefore be fully discussed.

Who, in fact, are the *homines audacissimi* here alluded to? In my interpretation of the passage twenty years ago, I suggested that the phrase must be read in the context of the political attitude Cicero is here adopting. My answer was that it must refer to those who opposed the introduction of the *seuerissimi iudices* on which Cicero compliments the elder Acilius and the *optima iudicia* which resulted. Since these are, in the context, "equestrian" jurors and courts (and this has never been contested), their opponents must, in the light of what we know of late second-century history, be "optimate" supporters of senatorial juries, such as those who later supported Q. Caepio and the younger M. Drusus, those known *patroni senatus*.⁶ This

⁵ *PBSR* NS 1 (1938) 108ff. (summed up 113).

⁶ The actual phrase in Cicero, *Mil.* 16 (Drusus); *Val. Max.* 6, 9, 13 (Caepio).

argument, ignored by Sherwin-White, still seems to me more cogent than his own suggestion about "radicals", unsupported by any argument. And, of course, it leads in precisely the opposite direction.

But although supported by what then seemed to me sound argument, it now seems to me based on a fundamental misunderstanding of Cicero's sequence of ideas—a misunderstanding shared by Sherwin-White and (in fact) by all others who, to my knowledge, have commented on the passage. To make this clear, I must quote it in full (1 *Verr* 51ff):

fac tibi paternae legis Aciliae ueniat in mentem, qua lege populus Romanus de pecuniis repetundis optimis iudiciis seuerissimisque iudicibus [for the identity of these 'seuerissimi iudices' see *ibid.* 38] usus est. circumstant te summae auctoritates, quae te obliuisci laudis domesticae non sinant, quae te noctes diesque commoneant fortissimum tibi patrem, sapientissimum auum, grauissimum socerum fuisse. quare si Glabronis patris uim et acrimoniam ceperis ad resistendum hominibus audacissimis, si aui Scaeuolae prudentiam ad prospiciendas insidias quae tuae atque horum famae comparantur, si soceri Scauri constantiam, ut ne quis te de uera et certa possit sententia demouere, intelleget populus Romanus . . . nocenti reo magnitudinem pecuniae plus habuisse momenti ad suspicionem criminis quam ad rationem salutis.

The praetor is reminded of three *exempla domestica* of different virtues: the *uis et acrimonia* of his father, described as *fortissimus*; the *prudentia* of his maternal grandfather Scaeuola,⁷ described as *sapientissimus*; the *constantia* of his father-in-law, the great *princeps senatus* M. Scaurus, described as *grauissimus*. The threefold parallelism is carefully kept up throughout. It naturally follows that it is also to be presumed in the three final constructions that follow each of those qualities:

⁷ Cicero gives no indication (as, of course, he did not need to do for his audience) which of the Scaeuolae of the late second century is meant. Pseudo-Asconius (221 St.) informs us it was P. Scaeuola, *cos.* 133. He does not acquaint us with the source for this statement, which, like so much in the scholia that is not actually taken from Cicero himself, may be pure guesswork. Münzer (*RE*, s.v. 'Mucius', no. 26) makes out a persuasive case for Q. Scaeuola the Augur.

ad resistendum . . . ; ad prospiciendas insidias . . . ; ut ne quis . . . possit . . . demouere. (The last of them changes to a final clause to provide proper weight at the end of the *tricolon*, reinforced by a rich *clausula*.) It was this obvious clue to Cicero's thought that I inexcusably missed. Once it is recognized, it follows that the three final constructions have nothing directly to do with any particular actions performed by Glabrio's suggested models: the last one (*ut ne quis . . . demouere*) quite clearly must refer to action to be taken by Glabrio himself; the second, on a moment's inspection, explicitly does the same (. . . *quae tuae . . . famae comparantur*); and it is now quite evident that the first (*ad resistendum hominibus audacissimis*) must be parallel to the other two and also refer to the praetor's own prospective action, not to anything done by his father. In other words: in each of the three *domestica exempla*, Cicero is calling on Glabrio to apply (*ceperis*) the virtue shown (in general) by the model concerned, in the particular circumstances confronting him at the trial of Verres. My original suggestion referring to the circumstances of the passing of the *lex Acilia*, though more suited to the whole background of the argument of the *prima actio* than Sherwin-White's casual remark, turns out to have been equally mistaken in failing to pay proper attention to the structure of Cicero's sentence.

It follows that we need no longer search (unsuccessfully) for *insidiae* putatively avoided by Q. Scaevola;⁸ and that the *homines audacissimi* are no mere historical characters, but very much alive and active at the time of the trial. We must next consider who they are: even though it is now clear that the *lex Acilia* is by no means characterized as an "anti-radical measure", are these present enemies what Sherwin-White would call "radicals"?

For this we need to look closely at Cicero's use of the word

⁸ As I did in the article cited above. Neither of the Scaevolae (P. or Q. the Augur), in fact, can be shown to have successfully guarded against such danger, as far as our record goes, and this has in the past made the interpretation of this passage difficult. On the other hand, the *prudentia* (as such) of those great lawyers was clearly proverbial and paradigmatic.

audax and the related *audacia* and *audacter*.⁹ They are by no means rare in the *Verrines*. Out of 80 examples of *audax* collected by Merguet from the speeches, 16 occur in the *Verrines*; for *audacter* the figures are 5 out of 18, and for *audacia* 52 out of about 190—a total of more than a quarter of the recorded instances of this word group can be found in the *Verrines*. In view of this, it should be easy to arrive at a picture of Cicero's use of these words in these speeches that depends on more than intuition.

Cicero uses the words with extreme rhetorical care and skill, not merely as vague insults. Practically all the instances (there are over 70 of them altogether, as we have seen, so that it cannot be mere chance) apply to Verres himself or his associates, directly or by clear implication. I can find only four instances where the existence of other *audaces*, outside that small circle, is even admitted: in 3.176, 206, 208, and 4.7 other *audaces* are referred to, but in all but the last instance Verres and his crew are included in a class reference. There is thus only a single use of any word in this group completely excluding Verres. There is no doubt that the jury is to have the image of Verres and his associates as the only examples of *audacia* indelibly impressed on it. Cicero's care in the use of these words is shown by the remarkable fact that but a single instance (sec. 6) occurs in the 73 sections of the *Diuinatio*: many terms of strong invective are used, and it cannot be chance that this family is so rare; they must even then have been kept in store by the orator, for the time (confidently looked forward to) when they could be used to obtain the effect he wanted. By the time we reach section 7 of the *prima actio*, we have already had four instances. And throughout, an almost infinite variety of parallel terms is conjured up. The word *audacia* (much the most frequently used of the three) provides the best example, though some of the corresponding terms occur in the relatively few instances of the adjective and adverb. *Audacia* is used by itself only about ten times. On all other occasions of its use it is accompanied by one or more of a dazzling series of other "compliments". I have

⁹ Merguet, *Lexikon zu den Reden des Cicero*, I (1877) provides the evidence, though the arrangement of instances is not such as to make this kind of investigation easy.

collected the following: *amentia, auaritia, crudelitas, cupiditas, furor, importunitas, improbitas, impudentia, iniuria, libido, luxuria, nequitia, os, perfidia, scelus, stultitia, superbia, uis*. The climax comes in 5.189, in the last sentence of the last speech against Verres: "*si eius omnia sunt inaudita et singularia facinora sceleris, audaciae, perfidiae, libidinis, auaritiae, crudelitatis.*"

Even brief analysis of Cicero's artistry and care in the use of the words *audacia*, *audacter* and *audax* confirms what we have been able to deduce from the structure of the sentence of exhortation addressed to the presiding praetor: the *homines audacissimi* are no historical *exempla*—they are Verres and his associates. It is they who must be met with the fortitude shown by the elder Acilius, just as it is they whose *insidiae* are threatening the good name of the praetor and the whole court. And not only that court: the whole Senate was in danger. "*Totus ordo paucorum improbitate et audacia premitur et urgetur infamia iudiciorum*" (1 Verr. 36), as Cicero puts it at the end of his challenge to Hortensius. That *audacia* of the men protecting Verres is shown in their confidence that senatorial courts and their presidents can be corrupted, provided one has enough money; as it is put in the second *actio*, right at the start (1.20): in one hour Cicero succeeded "*ut . . . reo audaci pecunioso profuso perdito spem iudici corrumpendi praeciderem.*" And in his final peroration he announces (5.183) his determination to fight, if he should (fictitiously, we remember) lose his case, "*si qui sunt qui in hoc reo aut potentes aut audaces aut artifices ad corrumpendum iudicium uelint esse.*"

Audacia was, of course, the characteristic of outrageous crime. In the *Pro Sex. Roscio* Cicero applies it fairly generally to criminal dispositions (e.g. 55, 85; and cf. 75 on the genesis of crime and 38, 62, 68 for the prerequisites of parricide), and it is the special quality of the "bad" Roscii (14 *et passim*). It is not yet used with the skill of the *Verrines*. It is by no means limited to the immediate opponents (as we have already seen), yet it is not extended from them to include the whole of their circle: a distinction between them and both the actual prosecutor Erucius and the instigator Chrysogonus is carefully established (35f.: Chrysogonus is charged with *potentia*, never with *audacia*) and later reaffirmed (122). Cicero incidentally tells us

that the word was a commonplace on the lips of prosecutors (12: “*qua uociferatione in ceteris iudiciis accusatores uti consueuerunt, ea nos hoc tempore utimur qui causam dicimus . . . ut quam fortissime hominibus audacissimis resistatis*”), using words closely recalling his invocation to M’ Acilius Glabrio: not only the resistance to *homines audacissimi*, but the fortitude required for this, which we met as the virtue of Acilius the elder, recommended to his son for imitation. (Cf. also 36.) He claims it as an innovation due to the nature of his case—which indeed is to a large extent a “prosecution” directed against the “bad” Roscii and, more cautiously, against Chrysogonus—that he is using such pleas in a defence. That this was largely rhetorical artifice is clear from the *Pro Quinctio*, in which *audacia* and its relatives already occur several times (56, 79, 81, 88, 94) in attacks on his client’s enemies. As must have happened so many times where we no longer have the evidence, we can here see how Cicero took a commonplace of contemporary technique and fashioned it (in the *Verrines*) into a highly personal and powerfully effective instrument.

It is not for us here to follow the path by which *audacia* became a political term of abuse—that meaning of “radicals” which Sherwin-White erroneously appears to ascribe to it from the start, and in connection with the *lex Acilia*.¹⁰ Let it suffice to say that it is simply the path by which political extremism, and by the end of Cicero’s life even political opposition, becomes assimilated in his oratorical technique, and to a large extent in his own mind, to that criminal tendency originally denoted by “*audacia*”. We must conclude with a final glance at the *lex Acilia*: now that we have eliminated a new error and an older one in the interpretation of the passage of Cicero that is one of our two chief sources, where does that leave us?

I would suggest that it still leaves us very much where we were before. Except for the deletion of Acilius’ supposed opposition to those who tried to fight his law from the “optimates” side, nothing in my argument of twenty years ago is affected. It

¹⁰ The evidence is not satisfactorily collected in J. Hellegouarc’h, *Le vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la république*, Paris 1963, (Publications de la Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines de l’Université de Lille, 11). See index, s. vv. “*audacia*”, “*audax*”. On a related topic, see also W. K. Lacey, “*Boni atque Improbi*”, *G & R*, NS 17 (1970) 3ff.

is still obvious that the *lex Acilia* precedes the law of Glaucia and that it introduced (though not necessarily for the first time) "equestrian" juries, which, in the *Verrines*, Cicero praises as incorruptible. Since we know of no law between that of C. Gracchus (as we think of it), identical (as Sherwin-White has again shown) with the *Lex Repetundarum*, and that of Glaucia around twenty years later, which can have been in a position to introduce such juries, it still follows that the *lex Acilia* should be identical with the law (or, if we believe in two, with the final law) of C. Gracchus. It still follows that prosopographical considerations converge to make that date plausible for the elder Acilius' tribunate, and that the attested case of the *lex Rubria* on the foundation of Carthage demonstrates that (as might have been expected) the legislation of C. Gracchus was the work of more hands than his, though under the direction of his mind. All these points still seem to follow from the considerations I set out in this journal. What we have lost is the explanation for Cicero's ascription of not only *uis* and *acrimonia* (the sole occurrence of that word in his speeches) to Acilius, which could be vague tributes (possibly based on no factual knowledge whatsoever) to his success in passing his law, but of *fortitudo*—a far more specific virtue, which one cannot easily imagine Cicero as merely making up for the occasion. Of course, we now have no clue for answering that question; though the simplest suggestion—and far from implausible, in the light of what we know of the history of that age—is that there was some violent opposition to the passing of the law, which Acilius (and, no doubt, C. Gracchus) successfully resisted. Which would bring us back, more or less, to where my misinterpretation inadvertently and mistakenly left us. We might, however, conclude by calling attention to what Carcopino noted:¹¹ that M' Acilius Glabrio the younger could well do with the admonition he received from Cicero. In *Brutus* 239 we learn that his *socors natura negligensque* held him back. It was as well, in view of the pressures besetting his court in 70 B.C., to remind him of his father's *uis*, *acrimonia* and *fortitudo*.

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¹¹ *Autour des Gracques* 220.

REVIEWS

KARL DEICHGRÄBER. Der letzte Gesang der Ilias. Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1972. Pp. 128.

Deichgräber seeks to demonstrate that *Iliad* 24 is the proper ending of the poem, and that it has come down to us just as its author, Homer, composed it in the last half of the 8th century B.C. At length but without difficulty he disposes of Lachmann's argument that 24 is a tasteless amplification of Priam's first, passionate impulse to approach Achilles portrayed in 22.412-28; but his most interesting idea is less successfully defended. It is that before the Homeric poems were divided into books according to the letters of the Greek alphabet, they were divided into songs, each suitable for an evening's entertainment and each with its own title. *Iliad* 24, *Ἐκτορος λύτρα*, is such a song. It has its own unity and, with 804 lines, is of manageable length. Deichgräber imagines it being sung exactly as Demodocus sings "The Song of the Wooden Horse" in *Odyssey* 8. After a brief introduction, "beginning from the god," the singer sings precisely the words which have come down to us with the exception of the first three, *Αὐτο δ' ἄγων*.

The evidence for such an earlier articulation of the poems is the citation of parts of them by rubrics such as Herodotus' *ἐν Ἰλιάδι . . . ἐν Διομήδεος ἀριστείῃ* (2.116). Since these rubrics in D.'s opinion correspond quite well with the titles of the individual books which have come down in our MSS, he believes that they must be the titles of the original songs. It is unfortunate that he does not lay before us the details of this evidence. From the other side, his attempt to show that in the *Odyssey* Demodocus refers to his songs by title seems to me to fail. It is hard to believe in *φιλότης Ἄρεος καὶ Ἀφροδίτης* or *ἵππου δουρατέου κόσμος* as titles, or to accept *φαῖνε δ' αἰοδήν* as meaning "announced his title" (6). On the contrary, everything we know about early Greek literature suggests that titles in our sense were not used. Without believing in these titles we can all cheerfully admit that the Homeric poems must have been performed in installments, and that *Iliad* 24 would make a good single performance. We can admit, too, that performance in installments would mitigate inconsistencies and obviate "perfunctory" transitions like *Αὐτο δ' ἄγων*, to which Wilamowitz objected; but I doubt whether unitarians need to have it proved to them that 24 is the proper end of the *Iliad*, and whether analysts will find their doubts removed merely by looking at the poems as artistic unities made up of unusually independent parts.

Deichgräber recognizes that Achilles is reconciled with Priam through becoming aware that man is "the eternally sorrowing creature" (109); but I wish he had not said that this has nothing to do with Achilles' consciousness of his early death. He quite rightly points out

that Achilles gains his insight through his sympathy with Priam and Peleus, but he should add that the tragedy of Peleus, which Achilles feels, is precisely Achilles' early death. At the end of the poem Achilles sees what is happening to himself, as well as to Priam and Peleus, from a parent's point of view. Niobe is the paradigm: the gods kill all our children. This fact, furthermore, and not a personality problem, is the ultimate cause of Achilles' rage.

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F. W. WALBANK. Polybius. Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1972.
Pp. 210. (*Sather Classical Lectures*, 42) \$8.50.

One of the values of the Sather Lecture series is the opportunity it affords the eminent scholar to make a general statement on his specialized subject or author. Walbank, whose commentary on Polybius is one of the monuments of recent scholarship, has taken good advantage of his opportunity to present us with an excellent overview of Polybius and his history in relation to his own world and to the historiographical tradition of antiquity. The book is arranged much as the lectures into six chapters. The first discusses Polybius' own experiences, how they contributed to the form of the history and what is known of the history of their publication. The second places Polybius in the framework of the traditions of ancient historiography. The third chapter discusses and defines the concept of "*πραγματική ιστορία*." Chapter four analyzes Polybius' chronological scheme and discusses the nature of book 34 and his knowledge of geography in general. Book 6 is the subject of the fifth chapter; these pages should constitute a definitive analysis of this difficult book. In the last chapter Walbank deals with the question of Polybius' feelings about Rome. He sees a definite change after 151 B.C. when Polybius became an active participant once again in Mediterranean politics.

This short sketch of the contents hardly does justice to Walbank's book. From it emerges a Polybius who is real, in fact almost a personality. Walbank has lived with Polybius for so long and so intimately that he is able to bring him alive, so to speak, and Polybius emerges as a human being with a distinct personality, a man of integrity, high purpose, self-assured, a bit pompous and somewhat of an intellectual crab.

Most importantly through his analysis of Polybius' mind, Walbank has provided an examination of the Hellenistic mind of which Polybius is the most extensive and the premier example. Polybius' concept of history, theories of government and political action are well brought out throughout the book. The limitations become clear, too. Polybius'

most striking failure is the gap between theory and practice. The only discernible flaw in this book is that it seems to stress failures (e.g. in causation, knowledge of geography and in intemperance of attack on fellow historians) without bringing out clearly his strengths which, of course, Walbank knows well.

I complained in a review of an earlier Sather volume that the foot-notes had been made inaccessible tucked at the back of the volume, and while I doubt my words were decisive, it is still pleasant to have the notes — a mine of information in themselves — readily at hand, at the bottom of each page.

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JEAN-MARC FRÉCAUT. *L'esprit et l'humour chez Ovide*. Grenoble, Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1972. Pp. 404. Fr. 60.00.

It is symptomatic of the state of Ovidian scholarship and criticism that some of the most essential aspects of his poetry, such as wit and humor, have been given short shrift amid the preoccupation with "the German Aufbau" (F. Bömer's phrase), genre questions, and the like. True enough, humor generally does not become funnier when it is being discussed (cf. the comments of Caesar Strabo in Cic. *De Or.* 2.217), and that may be the charitable explanation why English-speaking Ovidian scholars have disproved E. de St. Denis' dictum that "toujours les Anglais revendiqueront trois monopoles: ceux de la mer, de la moralité et de l'humour." One must be grateful, therefore, to Professor Frécaut for filling the gap. His book has its shortcomings, but it is an important and useful contribution which the serious and the humorous — and would there were more of the latter! — student of Ovid will find very valuable, if only for reference purposes. In the short space of this review, I cannot possibly touch on all the important aspects of Frécaut's study but will merely highlight a few that I have found most significant both objectively and for my own interests.

Frécaut's book is a methodical "anatomy" of the subject and, like Gaul, divided into three parts: (1) the methods used to effect wit and humor (such as verbal humor, comparisons, paraphrases, allusions, interventions of the poet in the narrative, pp. 25-171); (2) a discussion of Ovid's individual works under the aspect of *esprit* and *humour* (pp. 173-328); (3) aspects of Ovid's personality (selective; pp. 329-67). The whole is comprehensive without being exhausting. That, and Frécaut's thorough command of non-French bibliography help to make his book superior to the studies of Haury and Taladoire on the humor of Cicero and Plautus. But the legacy of the catalog approach to the subject is

equally obvious and the quantification of the material supersedes its interpretation. One example of a humorous device follows the other, often accompanied by a translation and minimal comment. Or, perhaps more seriously, one quotation from Ovid often succeeds the other without any discussion of the passage in its context and of its effect on that context.

The result often is an only superficial appreciation of Ovid's humor. This is true especially of Frécaut's discussion of the similes and literary allusions. On pp. 63-64, e.g. his discussion of the comparison of Mercury to a kite (*Met.* 2.714-21) consists of balancing Rand's observation that the simile is not reverent by pointing to the subsequent comparison of Herse to the Morning Star and the Moon Goddess (2.722-25). The interpretive *summa* is: "De la terre où gisent des entrailles sanglantes convoitées par un milan nous montons vertigineusement au milieu des étoiles" (64). Virtually everything of significance is overlooked here, especially the clever humorous design. Unlike many other similes, this one uses the same setting as the situation to which it is compared. We have witnessed a sacrificial procession (2.711-13), and kites naturally are attracted to sacrifices. But the situation is inverted: the sacrificants become the sacrifice in the simile, an inversion that is underlined by *sacra* in line 718 recalling the *sacra* of line 713. Furthermore, the play on *ales* (714) and *alis* (719) suggests that the simile is by no means inappropriate for Mercury: he had some wings already, so why not compare him to a bird? An additional element of humor is that Ovid dwells on the animalization of the *deus* by drawing out the description of his kite-like flight and by emphasizing, through the repetition of *avidus* in lines 719 and 720, that visceral greed, rather than sublime love, drives Mercury onward. The subhuman debasement of Mercury's appetites is accentuated by the contrasting simile for Herse which elevates her not once, but twice into the sphere of the gods. This simile is the playful counterpoint to the first: while the god gives in to his animalistic instincts, the girl appears godlike. Similarly, to give only one more example that stands for many, Ovid's parodistic utilization of Odysseus' speech to Nausicaa (*Od.* 6.149ff.) in the story of Salmacis (*Met.* 4.320-28) would have repaid closer scrutiny. Frécaut's discussion of it (119) takes into account neither its many subtle nuances nor the more broadly humorous inversion of the Homeric situation.

On the other hand, Frécaut counteracts the weaknesses inherent in his methodology by regularly summing up the vital perspectives. On many occasions, his judgment about crucial issues is sound and perceptive. The variety of Ovid's humor and *esprit* is a mark of the complexity of the poet (329); the simple labels that are often pinned on Ovid are inadequate (330); even in exile, Ovid practices "le refus du tragique" (345-51); Ovid's borrowings from the *Aeneid* do not amount to caricature or systematic desecration (245); and there are good observations

on the variety of transitional devices in the *Fasti* (273-75), to mention only a few examples. But Frécaut also repeats many conventional *topoi* of Ovidian scholarship which do not stand up to scrutiny. To him, metamorphosis is still the principal subject of the *Metamorphoses* and therefore he devotes much discussion to the humor employed in metamorphosis descriptions (260-68). He waffles on the question whether the *Metamorphoses* can be categorized as an epic (240-41; cf. p. 329: "le poème épique d'un type inédit"). Above all, the larger perspective is missing, especially for the *Metamorphoses*: is the *perpetua festivitas* (Cic. *De Or.* 2.219) literary or temperamental? Was there any other way to revive myth on a large scale? Was Ovid's treatment, in all his poetry, of the earlier conventions and tradition *sub specie ludi* — and one misses a reference to Huizinga in the otherwise very complete review of modern theories on *esprit* and humor on pp. 9ff.—a way of maintaining his independence?

An index of Ovidian passages and a very detailed table of contents offer some consolation for those of us who wish our Italian and Gallic brethren were in the habit of supplying a general index, even if it means that they would have to read their books all over again.

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DAVID VESSEY. *Statius and the Thebaid*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973. viii + 358. \$23.50.

The Neronian and Flavian epic poets, Lucan, Statius, Valerius Flaccus, and Silius Italicus have all attracted an impressive amount of scholarly attention. Textual research has proceeded on even stronger ground for all but Silius; new and instructive editions have appeared or will shortly appear for the other three.

I like this book very much and believe that it will become the standard literary reference work on Statius. This is not a narrow piece aimed at the *Thebaid* only, but rather it has a more ambitious goal: to fix Statius in the history of epic writing and in the history of Latin literature. Vessey's task is not an easy one. Well aware that Statius exerted a broad influence on later writers, and convinced that the *Thebaid* has real merit, Vessey presents his material with almost missionary zeal. This is not to say, however, that Vessey does not consider Statius a lesser literary figure than Vergil.

In the first of eight chapters Vessey discusses the relationship of Vergil's epic to the Augustan order and that of Statius' to Domitian. In his defense of Statius, Vessey does not shy from the problem of the poet's servility to Domitian, but meets it head-on: no excuses are

offered for Statius' lack of backbone; Vessey proposes to consider all of Statius' work as under this cloud: "His poetry reflects and reproduces the oppressive spirit of Domitian's court (13) . . . a violent and vindictive despotism, ready to entrap and to destroy the unwary and the outspoken. This potential menace, which must have affected, at least subconsciously, all those close to the seat of power, may be seen reflected in the brutal savagery which dominates so much of the *Thebaid*" (36). The gross flattery of Domitian is perhaps the barb most frequently hurled at Statius. In the second chapter Vessey looks carefully at the *ars* (not *ingenium*) of Statius, and, by injecting much personal material from the poet's *Silvae*, by considering his friends and patrons, by analyzing his style from selected poems (*Silvae* 3.4; 5.3), he concludes that Statius merits more attention than he has received. One of the most revealing parts of the first two chapters is Vessey's attempt to place Statius in the camp of the "mannerists" and to differentiate it from that of the "classicists": "It is not improper to say that Statius attempted to fuse two opposing literary traditions: Virgil on the one hand, Ovid, Seneca and Lucan on the other. The result is a mannered epic, in total contrast to the classicism of Quintilian, Valerius and, to a lesser extent, Silius."

Chapters three to eight deal with the *Thebaid* itself, what it is and what it is not, how it fits in the tradition of earlier epics, and what is new. Vergil sought to chronicle the rise of Rome; Statius writes of the fall of Thebes in an "epic of emotion." Vessey also does not avoid the charge that the *Thebaid* is too episodic and lacks internal coherence. In carefully chosen examples he points out that the cohesive unity of the epic does not rest on central figures or on a hero, but rather on a theme. Heroes were out of place, anyway, in Domitian's world. Perhaps it is closer to Vessey's view to say that he sees the cohesive force or efficient motif of the *Thebaid* not as a theme, but as a philosophy, that is Stoicism. Statius' whole world, as well as that of mythical Thebes, is guided and directed by the Stoic Jupiter. The *Thebaid* is not held to be a didactic epic, but a literary exposition of the concept of Stoic *fatum*, which rules all men.

Though Vessey argues powerfully for his interpretation of Statius' Stoic beliefs, I am not wholly convinced, and indeed (standing back from Vessey's particular points) find it difficult to read the *Thebaid* as an epic of Stoic inspiration.

Vessey has brought to the study of Statius a solid background in late epic, the works of Quintilian, Seneca, and Martial. His arguments for the special architecture of the *Thebaid* and its resultant internal unity are convincing and nicely put forward. Though he feels Statius is clearly a second-rate poet when compared to Vergil, Vessey enthusiastically directs his readers to the merits of Statius, and explains why he thinks they are merits. We cannot ask more.

G. KARL GALINSKY. *The Herakles Theme*. Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1972. Pp. xvi + 317; 16 pls. \$15.00.

Galinsky aims "to survey, in both descriptive and interpretive terms, the most significant adaptations of Herakles" (xi). Eight chapters lead us systematically past the Greek and Roman portraits of the hero; three more provide generous coverage of Herakles' *Nachleben* in the Middle Ages, Renaissance and following centuries. There is a Summary ("Epilogue"), an Appendix containing the *Hercule* of E. Verhaeren (1910), a Bibliography and General Index.

In Homer, Herakles is a brutish ruffian who dares to violate the laws of guest-friendship and to strike the gods. In Hesiod, he is a moral force. G. reminds us that the most significant legends are the most viable: each representation of Herakles must be treated in its own terms, even as the individual writers who handled the theme fashioned it anew for their own needs. Thus Bacchylides marks an important new stage — one which Vergil was to find congenial: a compassionate Herakles weeps with Meleager, yet urges upon him the inescapable necessity of action for men doomed to die (Achilles and Priam in *Iliad* 24). Pindar stands between Hesiod and Aeschylus in his view of Herakles as a warrior for *nomos*, for order in the world.

The author has an excellent chapter on the tragic Herakles. His pages on the *Trachiniae*, which he admits will provoke challenge, stress the ways in which Sophocles inverts myth to paint Herakles as a monster of excess. Man, left to do as he pleases, grows corrupt and transgresses *Dikē*, for which Zeus punishes him. In this way Sophocles has composed a rebuttal against the Sophists. G.'s discussion of the *Philoctetes* is a good one to set beside that of Knox: not only is the problem of innate character, of one's heritage, important for Neoptolemus, but no less for Philoctetes himself, who places his identification with Herakles before his descent from Poias. At the last of the play, Herakles makes clear Philoctetes' true kinship by addressing him as "Son of Poias." By this argument, G. allows us to appreciate once again how perverted Philoctetes' loneliness has become: Philoctetes is *not* of the same *physis* as the hero; therefore, his fancy that his isolation from men contains a kind of heroism cannot succeed. Herakles stands apart from men by virtue of his nature; Philoctetes is meant to rejoin the human society of which he was born.

Euripides' *Herakles* is examined as the forerunner of our modern myth of man. Herakles is no longer a mighty hero or a demi-god, but a toiling *man*, who, maimed in spirit, must endure. Many of Hemingway's figures embody this vision, and we may see it working at the conclusion of the *Oedipus Tyrannus*, where suicide — a frequent way out in Sophocles' earlier extant plays — now appears too simplistic, too false to the agony of those Athenians who saw their city crumble, but who survived to face the future. Herakles' appearances

on the comic stage vastly outnumber his tragic roles. G. infers that this may be an indication of the extent to which the hero was held in seriousness. Both dimensions were Herakles', and the *Alcestis* is unique in effecting their integration: Herakles is set against Admetus as a "natural man" whose earthy and humorous ways make a philosophic point — the king's concern for social forms distract him from understanding what it means to be alive, a human being upon this earth.

Aristophanes was the first classical author to identify himself with Herakles (parabasis of the *Wasps*); G.'s study of Hölderlin later in the book in just such a light is most sympathetic. Prodicus' famous "Choice of Herakles" introduced yet another way to handle the theme — as an abstract lesson of self-perfection and its reward. Farther on, G. shows how medieval writers exploited this interpretation. G. is good on Apollonius, in whose verses Herakles' archaic heroism illumines the opportunism of Jason. On Theocritus 13, G. deserves applause for his tidy observation that the concluding verses of the *Idyll* symmetrically oppose the opening lines: at the beginning Theocritus writes that even the immortal Herakles suffered the pangs of love which all humans know; at the end a *deified* Hylas leaves a very ordinary Herakles who now is just one "of the boys" (119). A reversal as effective as anything in Latin love elegy.

G.'s work on Hercules in the *Aeneid* expands his earlier study of the Hercules-Cacus episode (*AJP* 87 [1966] 18-51) and gathers together additional allusions so that, beginning with a scrutiny of the proem of the epic, he is able to demonstrate a continuous arrangement of references which equate Aeneas with Hercules. *Ingens* (Aeneas sitting in Charon's boat; Aeneas lowering his head to enter the *casa Romuli* on the Palatine) derives from Apollonius' conception of the huge Herakles virtually sinking the Argo by his weight; and 6.806, matches 10.468-69: in both, fathers (Anchises, Jupiter) exhort sons (Aeneas, Hercules). I would add the echoes (*mensae, advena, adire*) which link Aeneas in 10.516-17, with Hercules in 10.460. And it may be that Dido's apparently inept inquiry about "the horses of Diomedes" in 1.752, does not so much look back at Aeneas' embarrassment in *Iliad* 5.263, as it points toward to the eighth labor of Hercules. G. emphasizes the Hercules-motif as allusion to the deification of Augustus. It was in the air, no doubt; but I would argue that the poet was even more interested in conveying ambiguity regarding the two sides of Hercules-Augustus, the maddened murderer or the *columen rerum*. This seems to me to be the implication of Vergil's purposeful alteration of chronological order (noted by G., in his *AJP* paper) which sets against the snake-like strangler of Cacus the infant Hercules whose destiny is to kill snakes, not be like them. (cf. W. R. Nethercut, *CJ* 67 [1971-1972] 123-43).

The chapter on Seneca's two Hercules plays is excellent. G. carefully shows how the assumptions of the *H. furens* are recapitulated and transformed by the *H. Oetaeus*. In the first, Hercules is obsessed with

conquering the world, with laying hands on Death. The *H. Oetaeus* (which, by G.'s account, ought to be Senecan) shows the hero with inner peace and the satisfaction that he has shaped his own life, that he has indeed been preparing himself for death by every action he has taken. The first play pictures a search; the second, discovery. One is led to remember Ezra Pound's *Women of Trachis* (1954), discussed impressively by G., in which Herakles comes to see the *coherence* of everything he has shaped and recognizes, in this moment, himself as a creator in unity.

Space does not allow anything like a just resumé of the wealth of adaptations the author analyzes in the last part of his book. Chapter 9 alone ("*Exemplar Virtutis*") cites forty-four different works from the Middle Ages to the present century, from England, America, Spain, France, Italy, Germany and Switzerland. Of special interest are the studies of Spencer's *Faerie Queen*, Le Fèvre's *Recueil des Hystoires de Troyes* (which shows Herakles as a medieval knight, trained in courtly ways, with an insatiable appetite for astronomy!), and of Goethe, Hölderlin, Browning, Pound, and MacLeish. In each case, G. has contributed sensible observations which enrich our appreciation of the literature he has brought before us.

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D. A. RUSSELL and M. WINTERBOTTOM, eds. *Ancient Literary Criticism. The Principal Texts in New Translations*. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1972. Pp. xvi + 607. \$24.00.

It is a pleasure to use this book. The editors, whose distinctions need no review, have assembled in new translations a very wide selection of texts bearing on literary criticism. Russell has been responsible in general for the Greek texts, Winterbottom for the Latin. They have been assisted excellently by T. F. Higham (the contest in the *Frogs*), M. E. Hubbard (the Aristotle chapter), and D. C. Innes (Demetrius, *On Style*). The selections range from the expected (all the standard works are represented extensively) to the refreshingly less so (e.g., the whole of Plato's *Ion*, a good part of Dionysius' *Demosthenes*, shorter bits from Dio Chrysostom, Plutarch, Lucian, Aulus Gellius, Philostratus, Aristides Quintilianus, Aelius Aristides, Hermogenes, and the rhetorician Menander). Each translation, preceded by a brief introduction and accompanied by notes, is meticulously accurate and, almost without exception, brisk and flowing. There are three helpful indices ("Greek and Latin Terms," "Proper Names," "General"), and the notes themselves have fre-

quent cross-references which properly indicate the continuity in theme and attitude that marks ancient literary criticism. Particularly in evidence are such features as: the fact that for the ancients literary criticism virtually meant analysis of oratory or rhetorical elements in poetry; the dilemma whether literature may aim at pleasure as well as instruction; the debate over the perfect oratorical style and model (Demosthenes usually receiving the laurels); the fear, even among those who sought to deny it, of a decline of eloquence.

Amidst much praise some minor quibbles will not, I hope, appear invidious. A few of the shorter selections, especially when they handle difficult technical material, seem too short to give a true flavor of the whole work from which they come (e.g., the pages from Aristides Quintilianus on male and female styles). One or two pieces might have been ignored altogether (e.g. the passage from *Laws* 2.655c-656a on real and assumed tastes and *De optimo genere oratorum* which is given in full, even though Winterbottom's introduction labels it inferior and perhaps spurious). Conversely, a selection from *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and, perhaps even more, some samples of scholia as a form of literary criticism would have been welcome. It is a failing that, with a general audience in mind, the notes often refer to Greek orations by number rather than title: Demosthenes 18 will not usually identify a quotation as from *On the Crown* for a nonclassicist interested in the history of criticism. There are a minimal number of misprints. One which will cause confusion occurs on p. 19, where at v. 959 of *Frogs* the change of speaker from Aeschylus to Euripides has been omitted. Finally, since Russell and Winterbottom not only have specified their own contributions but also differ noticeably in the fullness of their introductions and notes, let me indicate my own preference for Russell's formula as providing just the right degree of detail, while Winterbottom, particularly in his introductions, frequently carries brevity too far.

This is a volume which fills a real need and in which both the translations and the factual information can be approached with absolute confidence. The standards of ancient criticism, as the book demonstrates, remain puzzling. If *On Sublimity* (admirably rendered by Russell) and Tacitus' *Dialogus* (equally well done by Winterbottom) are impressive in their grandeur and elegance, we also confront analysis such as that of Dio Chrysostom on the *Philoctetes* of the three tragedians, where one wonders uneasily if Dio is as shallow on the lost plays of Aeschylus and Euripides as he is on Sophocles. Ancient criticism is at once a glory and an embarrassment.

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- E. A. LOWE, ed., *Codices Latini Antiquiores*, Supplement. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971. Pp. xi + 84; 46 pl. in-fol.—Part II: Great Britain and Ireland. 2nd ed. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972. Pp. xxi + 60; 43 pl. in-fol.

The second harvest of C.L.A., published two years after the author's death, has still been read by him in proof except for the indices. The volume contains, in two consecutive alphabets of libraries (why?), about 150 specimens of Latin handwriting before A.D. 800 (with generous allowance for borderline cases) that became known too late for inclusion in their proper places. They are mostly fragments; nearly one half of the items are papyri from ancient Egypt. Although there is a great variety of texts, both pagan and Christian, they are of greater interest for the study of palaeography than of literature. The papyri, in particular, offer numerous specimens of early hands, from capital to cursive; at the other end of the spectrum, we get a substantial selection of early Caroline hands such as the 'proto-Maurdrannus' of Bibl. nat. n.a.l.2389. (S. 1752). The few Irish items include the Dublin 'Bog Book', six waxed tablets with Psalms 30 to 32 in early (saec. VII) minuscule (S. 1684) and the twelve surviving folios of *Jordanes' Getica*, saec. VIII², now in the State Archives, Palermo (S. 1741). Northumbria is ideally represented by the fragmentary BM Cotton Tib.A.XIV of Bede's *Historia Ecclesiastica* (S. 1703), written probably in Bede's own scriptorium of Wearmouth-Jarrow about saec. VIII med. There is a mere sprinkling of other scripts and 'types' (Rhaetian, Luxeuil, Visigothic, etc.). A palaeographical rarity is the papyrus fragment of St. Paul's *Ad Ephesios* in Rustic Capitals — the 'pagan' hand *par excellence* — of saec. IV-V at Florence (S. 1694).

A volume devoted mainly to fragments cannot be expected to yield many palaeographical dates. There is, as a matter of fact, not a single authenticated date; there are even very few approximate datings. On the other hand, many papyri have been dated more accurately on papyrological grounds recently. In particular, the much discussed Livy epitome (**208), divided between the British Museum and the Laurentiana in Florence, can now be assigned to saec. III¹, and thus forms a new milestone in the history of early Latin script.

The discovery in the State Archives of Marburg of an early fifth-century fragment of Cyprian (S. 1728) in uncials closely resembling those of Codex Bobbiensis (*k*), has prompted Lowe to assemble and interpret the evidence of an African school of calligraphy (Introduction, pp. vii-x, with seven plates). Lowe makes a strong case for the early development of both uncial and half-uncial script in Africa. The Basilican Hilary, written by an African exile in Sardinia before 509/10, is more advanced palaeographically than the Sulpicius Severus of 517, written at Verona by Ursicinus. In his African group Lowe includes Codex Palatinus (*e*) of the Old Latin Gospels, the purple Gospels of

Trent, which formerly (C.L.A. II, p. 17; IV.437) he had considered to be 'of North Italian or African origin'. I feel that the options might have been left open; among Lowe's 'African group' 'Trent' is somehow the odd man out.

The volume is concluded by a selected supplementary bibliography for C.L.A. I-XI, a more detailed one for the Supplement, and three indices (the first and third by R.A.B. Mynors) — of authors, manuscripts and provenances — to the complete series.

All volumes of C.L.A. except the last one having been out of print for some time, the demand for a re-issue of Volume II has been particularly keen. Lowe planned a revised, up-to-date edition of it, and when he died in 1969 he left a great number of corrections and additions which he had assembled towards this purpose. These are the fruit of much of his own later work as well as of the work of others. They have been most competently worked into the text by his latest research assistant, Dr. Virginia Brown, now Professor at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto.

The volume opens with a brief preface by Lowe, in which he outlines the purpose and method of this re-issue, and makes his gracious acknowledgements to fellow-scholars. The original Introduction has remained unchanged. At the end of the volume there is a list of additional British and Irish items described in other volumes of C.L.A., and one of changed locations (mainly Philipps and Merton items now in the U.S.A.). The original bibliography has been reprinted; it is followed by a supplementary bibliography — a very convenient arrangement. Of the ca. 170 items over one half, marked with an asterisk, contain additions or changes. Apart from cross-references to later C.L.A. volumes, these consist mainly of additional fragments of MSS listed; reconsiderations of *Schriftheimat* or date; corrections or additions to descriptive detail.

In the matter of localization, Lowe tends to be more specific or outspoken than before (e.g. 171, BM Add. 24144 etc.: 'origin without doubt Italy'); For Codex Bezae (140): 'a near-East centre is most likely'. Several manuscripts of North or North-east France are now, with B. Bischoff, *Mittelalterl. Studien* I.20ff., attributed to Chelles; Us-serianus Primus (r¹) of Dublin is now claimed for the Irish homeland, not for Bobbio (cf. Bischoff, *ibid.* I.180). For the Book of Kells (274), he quotes a communication by Professor T. J. Brown, attributing it to 'an Insular centre as yet unidentified, but subject to Northumbrian influence' (see now the latter's 'Northumbria and the Book of Kells' in *Anglo-Saxon England* I, 1972, pp. 219ff.)

Lowe's revised dates are, on the whole, by at least one generation earlier than those of the original edition (some twenty-five instances). Changes in the opposite direction are much rarer; the most conspicuous one, à propos 276 and 277 (Book of Moling and the St. John fragments found in its shrine), substitutes saec. VIII² and VIII/IX

respectively for saec. VII ex.; Lowe no longer thinks the identification of Mulling in the colophon with St. Moling (d.696) is palaeographically likely.

In accordance with Lowe's intention, the volume is dedicated to the memory of W. M. Lindsay, that pioneer of Insular palaeography.

C.L.A.II² will prove to be an indispensable research tool. When are we to have similar revisions of the other volumes?

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LABRAUNDA: SWEDISH EXCAVATIONS AND RESEARCHES, III: THE GREEK INSCRIPTIONS, PARTS 1 AND 2 by Jonas Crampa. Lund, Gleerup, 1969 and 1972. Pp. 147 and 225. Plates 7 and 31. Plans. (Skrifter utgivna av Svenska Institutet i Athen, 4^o, V, III, 1 and 2)

The Swedish excavations at Labraunda in Caria have made important architectural and epigraphical discoveries at the sanctuary of Zeus Labraundos in the territory of ancient Mylasa. Nine of the inscriptions were given preliminary publication by Jonas Crampa in an appendix to Alfred Westholm's *The Architecture of the Hieron*, which was *Labraunda I*, Part 2 (1963). Then in 1969 and 1973 appeared the two epigraphical fascicles in a final publication which is remarkable among other things for the splendid indexes accompanying each fascicle. The reviewer, who knows what it is to make an index, congratulates the editor on this labor which will help all others including his critics.

The fascicle with the first twelve inscriptions, documents of the third century B.C. though some in late copies, will interest those who study the interaction of Seleucid, Ptolemaic and Antigonid policies, for it is built around Seleucus II's *strategos* Olympichus, whose epistles to Mylasa and whose honors constitute a large part of the collection. The area had recently been Ptolemaic, but Seleucus II gave Mylasa its independence and Olympichus was expected to carry out policy. There are also epistles of Philip V, one of them to Mylasa, new, and one to Olympichus.

The fascicle with Nos. 13-133 contains the rest. Though the architectural remains according to Westholm go back to the sixth century, the Greek inscriptions begin with Hecatomnus (391-377 B.C.) and Mausolus (377-353 B.C.). The proxyeny degree for the Cnossians which begins [Ἦ]δοξε Μανσώλλωι καὶ [Ἀγτε]μοί[ηι] may well become famous. There are important architectural inscriptions of the fourth century B.C. and of the first two centuries after Christ, and there are dedications from the same and the Severan Period. The second and first

centuries B.C. are at least represented, notably by a catalogue of estates belonging to Zeus Osogoa, but the fourth has provided two community decrees, namely a grant of citizenship by the Plataseis to a Coan (No. 42, where the emendation [ἐγκτ] ἡσ(εως) is unnecessary) and a decree of the Chrysaoreis in honor of a Ptolemaic financial official (No. 43, where the reading $\omega\nu[\alpha\iota]\kappa\epsilon\iota\omega\nu$ in line 7 looks wrong). Nos. 56 and 60, which have lost their headings but preserve considerable text, are identified with probability as decrees of Mylasa from the Roman Period.

Many Americans with an interest in Roman Athens will look up No. 66, in which a *grammatikos* named Ti. Claudius Anteros is honored by more than one city including Athens for his teaching. Crampa dates the inscription correctly after 127 (better 126/7), because the Council is of Five Hundred, though he did not check with D. J. Geagan, *The Athenian Constitution after Sulla* (*Hesperia* Suppl. 12). Incidentally, Crampa, who shows an admirable familiarity with the literature on Asia Minor, has rather slighted the *editio minor* of the Attic corpus; he cites *IG* II² 2959 on p. 171 as III 731, II² 3232 on p. 178 as III 434, II² 4210 on p. 135 as *OGIS* 587, II² 3415 on p. 37 from *JHS* 6 (1885). Nevertheless he has presented the Anteros inscription clearly, but line 4 should probably be indented to read $\delta\delta\eta\mu[\alpha\varsigma]\nu\tau\omega\nu\alpha\theta\eta\nu\alpha\iota\omega\nu$, because the formula reads either δ (Attic) or $\tau\omega\nu$, not both.

Crampa is very conscientious and his readings are almost always obviously correct. In No. 56, line 2, however, where Crampa edits $\kappa\alpha\theta'$ $\delta\epsilon\tau\iota$, the stonecutter was inscribing $\kappa\alpha\theta\acute{o}\tau\iota$ but spoiled the surface after the omicron.

Crampa's faults should be mentioned. He is too wordy and overloads the commentary with unimportant details and speculation. He occasionally restores too much. For instance, $\kappa\alpha\iota\mid\sigma\acute{o}\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\omega$ in No. 47, line 4 is surely wrong; overbold restorations occur in No. 34. The English is good throughout part 1 and most of part 2, but chapter 11 "Zeus Labraundos and the Activity at Labraunda," which summarizes the evidence, has not been revised and so lacks elegance and even clarity.

But the virtues of the edition so easily outweigh these objections that Crampa and the Swedish Institute at Athens deserve congratulation. The texts are illustrated and presented completely with full commentary. Crampa has consulted profitably the works of Louis Robert. The printing is perfect. Historical essays on the liberation of Mylasa, on the dynast Olympichus, on Ptolemy the son and co-regent of Ptolemy II Philadelphus, on Sophron governor of Ephesus, on the Macedonian activity in Caria, and on Mylasa down to the Peace of Apamea are included in part 1. Essays on the priesthood appear in part 2.

In brief, the shrine of Zeus Labraundos is said to have been founded by the Mylasans and to have served all Carians. A local hereditary priest, Korris, and his syngeneis administered the sanctuary in 240

B.C., but an annual (elective) priesthood from a wide circle of Mylans replaced the hereditary office around 100 B.C. Christianity triumphed in the third century after Christ.

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JAMES H. OLIVER

G. E. M. DE STE. CROIX. *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*. London, Duckworth, 1972. Pp. XII + 444, £6.75.

This is an iconoclastic book by a scholar whose articles on the popularity of the Athenian Empire and the Constitution of the Five Thousand at Athens have stirred up lively debates. No doubt this work will do the same. Its main purpose is to deny that Athens was the aggressor in the Peloponnesian War. The immediate responsibility for the war belongs to Sparta and her allies, especially Corinth. The ultimate blame is more difficult to assign, but it certainly does not rest with Pericles or Athens. According to Ste. Croix he aimed at preserving peace; inflexibility at the last moment was unavoidable. Sparta, though normally a conservative power, was compelled to break the peace because of her unique position in regard to her Helots: "she was the one Greek State which held in a degrading servile status a very large number of fellow-Greeks." Thus she could not allow the growth of Athenian power with which the Athenians "could threaten herself or even her allies." (291) The Spartans could not permit even the threat of an invasion of Sparta because of the Helot danger. For this reason they were compelled to yield to the threat of Corinthian secession in 432.

This view is certainly preferable to the opinion, untenable, though many still hold it, that Athens was an aggressive, expansionist state even in the 430's and that the responsibility for the war is chiefly hers. But it is equally one-sided. To support this view it is necessary to show that the Spartans were consistently unwilling to accept the Athenian Empire and always seeking an opportunity to destroy it and also that the Athenians were guiltless of provocation. The evidence sustains neither of these theses. Ste. Croix, to be sure, shows that at least some people in Sparta had been suspicious of Athens from the end of the Persian War. He makes the point that the Spartans must have voted for war against Athens during the Samian Crisis of 440, only to be checked by the Corinthians. He is probably right in believing that "by the summer of 432 something like a majority of Spartans had already made up their minds to attack Athens. . . ." (291). But he ignores that in the interim the Spartans even worked to avoid war. Thucydides (1.28) makes it plain that the Spartans supported Corcyra's bid to arbitrate the dispute with Corinth. Ste. Croix himself concedes that at least one of the embassies sent by the Spartans to Athens in 432/431 sincerely

aimed at compromise and peace. (142 and 322-23). These facts show that we must at least explain how it happened that Sparta was converted from a peaceful policy before the Battle of Leucimne to a decision for war in 432.

Most scholars have sought an answer in three actions taken by Athens: the alliance with Corcyra which led to the alienation of Corinth, the ultimatum to and siege of Potidaea which deepened Corinthian hostility, and the Megarian Decree which seems to most scholars to have threatened Spartan prestige in her own alliance. Ste. Croix argues that in all cases Athens had the legal right to act as she did, and he is right. What he does not consider is how such actions may have looked to the Spartans. Though Athens had the right to make a treaty with neutral Corcyra, it could not have seemed a friendly act for her to do so while Corcyra was at war with Corinth, an ally of Sparta. Though Potidaea was a subject ally in the Athenian Empire she was also a Corinthian colony, and to the Spartans it may have seemed tyrannical for the Athenians to order the Potidaeans to tear down their seaward walls and cease receiving annual magistrates from Corinth.

Ste. Croix carries his legalistic approach to history furthest in his treatment of the Megarian Decree. He presents a rogues' gallery of all those who have misinterpreted the decree — some forty scholars from Adcock to Zimmern, that is, everyone who has written about it — and scolds them all: "Surely, before making assumptions about what the effects of the decree must have been, one ought to examine the sources very carefully to find out *exactly what the decree said and meant*. (Author's italics.) Yet I can find not a single scholar who has even tried to do this — a sad indication of the general slovenliness of modern scholarship in this field." (225) He is right that no one has been able to establish the precise wording of the decree and that few have attempted it. There is an excellent reason for this: we do not know enough. The decree is reported in three separate places by Thucydides with minor variations. Plutarch gives another variant in *Pericles* 29.4, and Aristophanes offers a parody in the *Acharnians*. Each serious report is slightly different and none can qualify as authoritative, yet Ste. Croix assumes he knows just what the decree said and bases his interpretation on the narrowest reading of the assumed text.

In his view the decree barred the Megarians (not the Megarian state) from the harbors of the Athenian Empire (not from the Empire) but probably not from the Piraeus, and from the Agora in Athens which is not to be understood as the Athenian market place but as the civic center. This reading is supported by complicated linguistic and historical arguments. It then serves as the foundation for a unique understanding of the purpose of the decree. It was passed, we are told, in response to a Megarian religious violation, the cultivation of Athenian sacred land. Ste. Croix considers it possible "that the Megarian action was a deliberate provocation, instigated perhaps by Corinth — with, I would

add, the encouragement of those Spartans who already desired war with Athens." (255) The Athenians, according to Ste. Croix, responded with the "reasonable and courteous" decree mentioned by Plutarch but not by Thucydides. After that came the exclusion decree mentioned by Thucydides: "it was intended above all to humiliate the Megarians and impose indignity and inconvenience (and perhaps, as a secondary consideration, some financial blow) upon them. . . . In passing it the Athenians were not thinking in economic terms at all — or, for that matter, in strategic terms." (256) As a matter of fact, Ste. Croix sees no diplomatic function for the decree either. For him it is merely a response to a religious violation and not very important. This, we are told, "is exactly the way it is presented by Thucydides. . . ." (257).

There is no space here to discuss the linguistic arguments in favor of Ste. Croix's reading of the decree. Suffice it to say that few readers will believe that a decree that forbade the Megarians to use *τοῖς λιμέσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχῇ μηδὲ τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἀγορᾷ*. (Thuc. 1.139.1), or in Plutarch's version *πάσης μὲν ἀγορᾶς πάντων δὲ λιμένων ὧν Ἀθηναῖοι κρατοῦσι* (Pericles 29.4) was not aimed at preventing access to the Empire and its commercial resources. Ste. Croix argues that the decree would have had little effect on 'Megarian State', and that "This is the most decisive argument, from which there is no escape." (253) The notion of a separation in the fifth century between 'the Megarian State' and a reasonable number of Megarian merchants, especially in oligarchical Megara, seems anachronistic, to say the least. If the decree hurt Megarian merchants it was certain to have political and diplomatic consequences. We need not believe that the decree would have brought Megara to her knees; it was intended to do her citizens economic harm. Ste. Croix's argument responds to the view, little held now, that the decree was meant as an act of war, or as a way of forcing Megara out of the Peloponnesian League. It has no force against the view that the decree was meant as a warning and therefore did not intend to do enormous economic damage.

Ste. Croix's picture of the diplomatic and political situation is even less credible than his interpretation of the language of the decree. With most scholars he accepts 432 as the date for the decree, yet his account divorces it from the increasingly tense situation in which it was passed. Athens had fought a battle against Corcyra, allies of Sparta were pressing the Spartans to make war on Athens, and at that moment Pericles and the Athenians take an unprecedented action against Sparta's Megarian allies. We are to believe, if we follow Ste. Croix, that at this moment a great statesman would support a decree intended only to humiliate an offensive neighbor as a result of a religious violation, that this decree was not part of a diplomatic maneuver, that he held to it even when it became a matter of war or peace, even though it never had any diplomatic significance. We are to believe this as well as

that Pericles wanted peace and that he was, as Thucydides portrays him, a great statesman.

Ste. Croix concludes "the picture I have drawn is thoroughly based on the evidence of our most reliable sources, Thucydides above all, and that anyone who dislikes that picture had better begin by trying to discredit Thucydides, if he can." (290) This is a remarkable statement from a scholar who once said, "The news columns in Thucydides, so to speak, contradict the editorial Thucydides, and the editor himself does not always speak with the same voice." (*Historia* III [1954-55] p. 3) The earlier statement has had a profound affect on many of us, and it is surprising to find Ste. Croix now recommending a return to simple idolatry. However, he does not follow his own advice. The picture he has painted cannot be derived from Thucydides. A critical part of his theory is the "reasonable and courteous" decree which may be compatible with Thucydides' account but appears only in Plutarch. Even then Ste. Croix is compelled to reverse Plutarch's order of the decrees. Finally the suggestion that the Megarian provocation was instigated by the Corinthians is found in no source. If Thucydides knew that the Megarian Decree came about in the way described by Ste. Croix he was either incompetent or deceitful. The likelihood remains that the Megarian Decree had and was meant to have diplomatic importance. A careful reading of Thucydides shows that he knew this.

My remarks should not obscure the book's great value. Ste. Croix's erudition is enormous, and he enlightens many important questions. His text and the forty-seven appendices treat a variety of subjects ranging from historiography to the political views of Aristophanes, the constitution of the Peloponnesian League and many others, always with learning and ingenuity.

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DONALD KAGAN

M. T. W. ARNHEIM. *The Senatorial Aristocracy in the Later Roman Empire*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972. Pp. 246. \$18.00.

Arnheim is the first scholar to make extensive use of the prosopographical data assembled by the late A. H. M. Jones et al. over the past decade and published in volume I of *The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire* (1971). The importance of PLRE for later Roman studies is amply demonstrated in the last three chapters of his book, which trace the lineage of the 4th century noble families and the connection between land-holding and appointment to high public office. These chapters usefully supplement the work of Jones, Chastagnol, and others and will serve as a model for future investigations based on the PLRE data.

Throughout his analysis of political and social developments A. D. 284-395 Arnheim properly distinguishes between the influence of the Senate and the influence of individual senators. While "the Senate [during the Principate] was a mere cipher, happy to humour the emperor's every whim" (30), individual senators — especially the nobles or senatorial aristocrats — monopolized high offices and maintained an *esprit de corps* not matched by other social groups. Their monopoly was destroyed, however, by Diocletian (the "Hammer of the Aristocracy"), who reduced the number of posts open to senators and installed equestrians in the newly divided provinces. Under the Tetrarchy only the proconsulships of Africa and Asia, the governorships of Syria, Italy, and Greece, the urban prefecture, and the "entirely ornamental ordinary consulate" (43) were open to senators.

As the *Fasti* indicate, Constantine reversed the Tetrarchic pattern and appointed many members of the senatorial aristocracy to high office (they did not, however, regain their monopoly of these offices). Arnheim's processing of the evidence of this senatorial revival is impeccable, but his interpretation of Constantine's motives is not convincing. In his view, Constantine's decision to impose a new tax on senators (the *collatio glebalis*) and his pro-Christian sympathies made "it necessary to reconcile this ardently pagan aristocracy by means of state appointments" (49f., 72f.). That Constantine attempted to secure senatorial support is undeniable. But was he forced to do so, as Arnheim asserts, because his Christian leanings threatened to alienate the aristocrats?

To understand Constantine's relationship with the Senate, and with the senators, one must take account of the realities of political life in 312. When Constantine entered Rome following his defeat of Maxentius he needed the support of the senators, since they alone could legitimize his seizure of the purple at the Milvian Bridge. Naturally, since he was "an eminently practical man of affairs" (51), Constantine was prepared to reward those who offered support. Evidence that he early on succeeded in winning over the senators, perhaps through political favors, is found in the pages of contemporary panegyrists and in the Arch dedicated in 315 (a monument sponsored by the Senate). Moreover, when the war with Licinius in the East resumed in the 320's, the senators (and consequently Italy) remained loyal to Constantine.

In my judgment, Constantine's appointment of senatorial aristocrats was a measure of political prudence, necessitated by his search for legitimacy and the continuing struggle with rivals, rather than an effort to placate a hostile faction. Nothing suggests that the aristocrats opposed Constantine on political, much less religious, grounds. Indeed, during his reign the senators seem to have been less concerned with the emperor's religious tastes than with his ability to protect and enlarge their holdings and privileges.

Arnheim expresses surprise (75f.) that Constantine's sons continued their father's pro-senatorial "policy" while at the same time they were

openly hostile to paganism. But was this not the Constantinian pattern? According to the *vita*, Constantine himself legislated against pagan practices and plundered pagan sanctuaries. We may assume that neither Constantine nor his sons wished to provoke the pagans unnecessarily, but it does not follow that they feared the nobles. The emperors after all could call upon the army to suppress any insurrection inspired by the senators. Nor were the senators anxious to challenge the emperor. Even the great pagan senator Symmachus, in a passage quoted by Arnheim (75), praised Constantius' religious policies.

Valentinian's conflict with the senatorial aristocracy, of course, is well documented. During his reign "the number of nobles in high state posts plummets to the lowest point since the accession of Constantine" (95). Nonetheless, Arnheim argues that Valentinian could not ignore senatorial claims indefinitely and was attempting to conciliate the noble families when he appointed Probus, the leader of the Anicii, as pretorian prefect in Illyricum in 364. Valentinian, he suggests, gave Probus a free hand in Illyricum, the emperor's native territory, and even failed to act against Probus when he learned "late in his reign . . . of his prefect's oppressive regime". Unfortunately, the facts do not support Arnheim's interpretation of this episode.

Probus was appointed to the prefecture in 368 when Vulcacius Rufinus, who had served in the post for 3 years, died in office. That Valentinian chose Probus for this important assignment is not surprising. The Anician leader may not have been "an attractive character or an exemplary administrator", but he had at least served briefly in 364 as pretorian prefect in Illyricum and thus was the most experienced man available for the job. Probus' administration, however, was oppressive — especially in fiscal matters — and in time his victims appealed to the emperor for relief. According to Ammianus Marcellinus (30.5.9-10), Valentinian learned of Probus' misconduct in summer 375 when Iphicles, an Epirote envoy, met with the emperor in Carnuntum. Valentinian was enraged: *in immensum excanduit, urente irarum nutrimenta tunc officiorum magistro Leone (pro nefas!) ipso quoque praefecturam . . . affectante*. Ammianus certainly does not suggest (30.5.7) that Valentinian was afraid to act against Probus: *parsurus tamen fortasse Pannoniis, si haec ante ingemiscenda compendia comperisset, quae nimium sero tali didicit casu*. But in summer 375 Valentinian was not in a position to take immediate action. At that time he was preparing for a major campaign against the Sarmatae and Quadi, a campaign that continued until his death a few months later (17 November 375). While it may be true that Valentinian, unlike Diocletian, "did not . . . turn senatorial rank into a political cul-de-sac" (98), nothing in Ammianus' account indicates that fear of the aristocracy's influence led Valentinian to appoint Probus to high office or to hesitate to remove him once his misdeeds were known.

Arnheim is so convinced of the nobles' influence that he considers

(p.7, repeated verbatim p. 171) the aristocracy "essentially a centrifugal force, which helped to undermine the position of the imperial administration from within, while war and invasion threatened it from the outside." Here, then, we have yet another explanation of the decline of the Roman Empire in the West! Unfortunately, Arnheim has not marshalled the evidence to support this arresting hypothesis. Since the military apparatus remained in the hands of the emperors and their commanders during the 4th century, the aristocrats certainly did not threaten the emperors militarily. Almost all of the aristocratic vicars and prefects, in fact, were stationed in Italy, Spain, and Africa — which were not heavily-garrisoned provinces. The impotence of the aristocracy was decisively demonstrated in the 390's when Theodosius I crushed the revolt of Eugenius.

Arnheim's failure to mention this critical encounter reveals a flaw in his concept of fourth-century politics. By focusing exclusively on the activities of the aristocrats in Rome he has underrated the role of the army in politics and has virtually ignored the increasing prominence of "barbarians" within the imperial court (see p. 8f.). Without some analysis of non-aristocratic groups, Arnheim's rather ambitious hypotheses cannot be properly assessed. As it is, the book produces new data which historians will welcome, but it must be used with great caution.

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M. I. FINLEY. *The Ancient Economy*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973. Pp. 222. \$8.95, Paperback \$2.95. (Sather Classical Lectures, 43)

The efforts of historians to explain the economic life of classical antiquity have, until recently, proceeded in the main from ideas of behaviour derived from the complex development of economic theory which has increasingly dominated modern society since the eighteenth century. In the published version of the 1972 Sather lectures Professor Finley presents the case, persuasively and with enormous range, against such approaches on the grounds that the concepts inherent in modern economic doctrines — "labour, production, capital, investment, income, circulation, demand, entrepreneur, utility" — were completely alien to ancient thought. Antiquity, in fact, never produced any conception of 'the economy.' The economic behaviour of the ancient world can only be understood through terms germane to itself; thus, apart from the opening (programmatic) and concluding chapters, the titles of the original lectures consist of a series of dualities which

reflect this need — "Orders and Status," "Masters and Slaves," "Landlords and Peasants," "Town and Country." The book is then not an economic history but rather an attempt based, as one would expect from Finley as an associate of K. Polanyi, on sociological methods and comparison with later economies, to illustrate how ancient economic behaviour can and should be understood. The answer lies in the social and political organization of antiquity and the prevailing morality therein.

A start is made from the conceptual distinctions implicit in the definition of the ancient *oikonomikos*, regulation of the household, and a definition of the modern economy as "an enormous conglomeration of interdependent markets." In consequence, little evidence is available which can be subjected to modern methods of economic scrutiny. The overriding relationship of economic activity to social categorisation at the upper and lower reaches of society is illustrated by dispensing with the tripartite notion of social hierarchy (slave, serf, and free) and substituting instead a model which allows for a more varied stratification, what Finley calls "a spectrum of statuses and orders." In this way, for instance, the position of helots and clients, of the Inferiors and *nobiles* can be determined more accurately. Finley stresses that elitist groups were far from averse to the acquisition of wealth, not least for the pursuit of political careers, for leisure and independence, but that they were prevented by moral restraints inherent in their rank from fulfilling essential functions in commerce, industry, and management. Instead, devoting themselves to occupations more consistent with high social pedigree, such as politics and the law, they existed as the economic parasites of less elevated groups which provided actual economic services. Conversely, slavery on the grand-scale appeared when previous methods of providing labour, for instance debt-bondage, proved inadequate for demand. Its disappearance was the result of social change, the widening gap between rich and poor and the depression of the peasantry into the colonate of the late Roman Empire. Yet even at the high-point of the servile system free labour did not disappear, and the legal distinction between slave and free labourer did not alter the fact that both might fill identical roles under similar conditions without competition.

The land was all important to the ancient economy. The majority of people lived off the land. Wealth was expressed predominantly in terms of land ownership, which lent moral respectability to the acquisition of wealth. But the ethic of the wealthy was not economically productive in the modern sense and investment was not guided by systematic policy. Windfall sales were the usual means of acquisition and there was no such thing as a real-estate market. Moreover, the trend always was for estates to accumulate in the hands of the rich with an accompanying depression of the peasantry and an absence of technological advance dependent upon the social system of ownership. The

relationship between town and country depends on the narrower question of how cities paid for their imports, the solution to which revolves around the variation of four factors: the degree to which a city could support itself from its own hinterland, the availability of special resources, particularly precious metals, the extent of trade and tourism, and the amount of local revenue derived from the land and empire. Industry is seen to have been only a marginal factor.

In the final chapter, "The State and the Economy," Finley faces the problem of defining 'the state.' In view of the varied political structures devised throughout antiquity the only useful common denominator for analysis is the absolute authority of all units. A distinction is urged between economic policy, which did not exist, and the economic consequences of political actions, which did. Concepts such as "commercial or capitalist exploitation" never appeared as primary goals and the nearest the ancients came to policy based on economics was from the basis of "the satisfaction of material wants."

This synopsis is of necessity selective in presenting the number of Finley's views and theories. But it should be enough to indicate the directions of current investigations into ancient economic subjects and to show that future research will have to take this work into account, especially so since many established doctrines are demolished along the way. This does not mean, however, that every proposition can be accepted. Perhaps the major weakness of the book is the search for generalizations from widely varying situations. The attempts to define basic terms such as 'the state' (above) and 'the city' are two such cases. The author justifies in the first chapter his study of the ancient economy not only because of the geographical and climatic unity of the ancient world, but also from "the fact that in its final centuries the ancient world was a single political unit" which had a "common cultural-psychological framework." This approach imposes a fundamentally static outlook on the whole work and is altogether too vague a justification. Presumably the "final centuries" are those of the Roman Empire, but if so, is the unitary conception valid for the earlier centuries of classical history? The bewildering phrase "common cultural-psychological framework" is never explained, not least in terms of chronology. Hence there is no attention to the effects of the differences in scale between governmental systems, nor of differing political ideologies on the ancient economy at any time.

Many of the theories proposed are provocative. The statement that "there were no commercial or commercially inspired wars . . . at any time in antiquity" will not commend itself in every quarter, and the reaffirmation by Fraser (*Ptolemaic Alexandria*, 1972, p. 3) that the foundation of Alexandria was at least in part the result of commercial motives would be hard to square with Finley teaching. The important point, however, is that the theories cannot be ignored.

Much of the material is repeated or adapted from the author's previ-

ous writings, but many of the originals appeared in non-classical journals so the book at least performs the service of convenience. Since the work originated as a set of lectures much remains of a glossy nature that might have been better omitted in the published form. One wonders if recourse to such worthies as Francis Hutcheson and Count Pietro Verri is really necessary to establish the point that economics is a discipline of relatively recent origin. Also, the argumentation is often tortuous; clarity is not the hallmark of Finley's style. In the end, however, with the ground cleared, in the sense that Finley shows what the ancient economy was not, one can only look forward to the future development of some of the more challenging and vital suggestions of this book.

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J. J. POLLITT. *Art and Experience in Classical Greece*. London-New York, Cambridge University Press, 1972. Pp. 205, ill. 87. Cloth-bound \$10.95, paperback \$4.95.

The author of this charming study views art as the expression of cultural experience and introduces the monuments of the Greeks in the context of their political and literary-philosophical history. Such an attempt to distill the *Zeitgeist* from a historical period is by its nature subjective. J. J. Pollitt possesses a rare combination of learning and perception and his views are always thought-provoking.

As the constants of Greek art Pollitt sees, rightly I believe, a proclivity to abstraction and a search for the generic behind the specific, with the interest in the individual gradually overtaking the preoccupation with the type. The correlation, however, of the different phases of this development to historical events and philosophical attainments is not always patent. One can readily accept Pollitt's view of the birth of a specifically Hellenic art in the perilous Archaic age as springing from a search for order, an attempt to relieve the anxiety of existence by fitting experience into an orderly conceptual framework, a cosmos (the "Milesian attitude" 5), hence geometric pottery and the ageless rigidity of *kouroi* and *kourai*. The author sums up the spirit of the Early Classical Age as a state of tension between new-found confidence in dominion and uneasiness at the thought of man's power over his fate. Exactly how this spirit and the historical events which produced it caused the first break-away from the impassivity of Archaic art is a question posed (9) but not answered; it is, in fact, unanswerable.

It becomes impossible to hold on to notions of historical necessity in the development of the fine arts when the agony of the Peloponnesian

war produces the virtuoso but vapid "wind-blown" style of the friezes of the Nike temple and dainty preciousness in vase paintings such as those by the Meidias painter (Pollitt aptly speaks of "refuge in gesture" 115, 125). Finally, as the author observes, the end of Athenian ascendancy in 404 brought a more fundamental change in sculpture than the total eclipse of Greek political power in 323: through the latter event a certain continuity in aesthetic approach can be observed. It proves even harder to press drama into a linear track of historical development. While there can be little argument that *The Trojan Women* is an angry manifesto against Athenian brutality in war (114), the mysteries of *The Bacchae* seem to reach deeper levels than those stirred by circumstance.

Pollitt inevitably touches upon his specialty, the ancient critical terminology of the fine arts, on which he wrote an outstanding dissertation (Un. Microfilms 64/3129; a book on the subject is in preparation). A number of problematic terms are ably discussed. I will here dwell only on the notion of *ἦθος* in art, because the author refers to it frequently (43-54; 63; 143, 147) and because I have divergent ideas on the subject. The concept of *ἦθος* in the dramatic and representational arts appears at about the same time as the mimesis doctrine and, from Aristotle on, is conventionally coupled with *πάθος* (emotion). Pollitt defines the technical term *ἦθος* as "'character', as formed by inheritance, habit and self-discipline" (43) or "what kind of man the hero basically is" (50). Despite his misgivings about Pfohl's (and others') interpretation of the term as "loftiness or nobility of character" (45 n. 9), Pollitt associates it especially with the halcyon nobility of classical creations: "... a calm, contemplative mien in which their *ἦθος* was revealed" (on Polygnotus, 44); "... the noble and serious *ἦθος* of the Early Classical style", 63. Such a static concept is, in my view, alien to early Greek critical thought which developed from notions of action and enactment and not around graphic representation. The correct interpretation of the term, I believe, is that of Otto Jahn who held it to mean individual disposition as expressed in dramatic action. ("Es bezeichnet den Zustand der Seele insofern er die Grundlage der Handlung ist . . ." Sitzungsberichte Leipzig 1850, 180).

Jahn's theory explains why Pliny render *ἦθος* in Latin as *sensus hominis* or "the feelings of a person" (HN 35.98; Pollitt, 44, renders Pliny's *sensus* as "characters"); why in the late rhetorical tradition (Quint 6.2,8) *ἦθος* is considered a weaker form of *πάθος*; and why Zeuxis whom Aristotle (*Poet.* 6.15) considers as lacking in *ἦθος*, yet is praised by Pliny (HN 35.63) for conveying the "very character" (*mores*, perhaps the good character) of Penelope.

Pollitt is at his best in capturing the spirit of individual works or artists. His comparison of the West and East pediments of the Temple of Aphaia on Aegina, spanning the transition to Early Classical, is most enlightening; his sub-chapter on the Parthenon (71-105) is a model of

profound perception simply expressed. (It may serve as a measure of our ignorance of Greek artistic aims that we do not know the purpose of Iktinos' famous "optical adjustments" 74-78.)

The layout is excellent. The illustrations are all in black and white, no doubt to keep the price at its modest level (We applaud the simultaneous release of a paperback edition.) This little gem of a book, while professing to aim mainly at the general reader, has much, probably more, to offer to the professional student of classical antiquity.

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L. EDELSTEIN AND I. G. KIDD. *Posidonius, Volume I: The Fragments*. Cambridge, University Press, 1972. Pp. liv + 336. \$35.00 (*Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries*, 13)

This new edition of the fragments of Posidonius will indeed be "indispensable" (as claimed by the "blurb" on the jacket) not only to "specialists in Posidonian studies," but to anyone who wishes to inquire into late Greek and Roman philosophy, science, and history. It replaces the collection of Posidonian texts published by Bake in 1810. Although it surpasses its predecessor in many ways, it is surprisingly close to Bake in the actual choice of passages, as the strict canons of selection employed by Edelstein and Kidd have stripped away the accumulated deposits of extraneous matter that so encumbered Posidonian studies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Fragments in this new edition that were either overlooked by Bake or not yet available in 1810 are fewer than one would expect. They include, for example, only two papyrus texts and only one inscription. Some of the added fragments, however, are of considerable importance. One, from Apollonius Dyscolus (F 45), is our only source for Posidonius' work *On Conjunctions* (*Περὶ συνδέσεων*). Another, from Galen's *Institutio Logica* (F 191), tells us something about Posidonius' treatment of relational syllogisms. The Posidonian fragments published by Jacoby in *FGH* are also included; they constitute more than a third of the total. But Jacoby too had found very few passages that were not already known to Bake.

Kidd explains in his Preface that after Edelstein's death in 1965 he undertook to complete Edelstein's edition of the fragments of Posidonius. He has done a magnificent job. The citations are generous, intelligently arranged, and well provided with critical notes. They are divided into three parts: Part I, Testimonia (T 1-T 115); Part II, Fragments and Titles of Named Books (F 1-F 86); and Part III, Fragments not Assigned to Books (F 87-F 293). There are four Indices: Index of

Sources, Greek Word and Subject Index, Latin Word Index, and Index of Proper Names. A Concordance with Jacoby completes the volume. Of the supplementary items, the Greek Word and Subject Index will be especially useful. It fills forty-eight pages (265-312), and it identifies by an asterisk the occurrences of words that can be assigned with reasonable assurance to the actual writings of Posidonius. Kidd promises also a volume of commentary, which may well appear before this review is printed.

It is always possible to find imperfections in a work of this scope and complexity. I found no major defect, and I know of no fragment that Edelstein and Kidd have overlooked. Some lesser matters deserve to be mentioned.

P. 54. The remedy that Kidd applies to the first three lines of Fragment 35 (from Galen, *Quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequantur*) is at best a makeshift. Galen seems to be saying, "If we do not have another power in us allied to virtue rather than to pleasure, which is stronger than the nature that leads us to pleasure, in that case too we would all be vicious . . ." Perhaps this sense could be got by reading *ῥηκνωμένην* (*πρὸς*) *ἀρετὴν* *μᾶλλον* *ἡδονῆς* in place of the corrupt *οἰκνωμένην* *ἡδονῇ* *μᾶλλον* *ἀρετὴν* *μᾶλλον* *ἡδονῆς*, and following the manuscripts for the rest. (The correction *ῥηκνωμένην* should be credited to Daremberg rather than to Müller.) But one would expect *ῥηκνωμένην* *ἀρετὴν* *μᾶλλον* *ἢ* *πρὸς* *ἡδονήν*. A new edition of this work is badly needed.

Pp. 88 and 242. Fragments 73 and 277b, on the eating habits of the Germans, are closely similar in words and content. There should be a cross reference, and in the Greek index the words occurring in both should be indexed for both.

P. 106. Fragment 105, from Seneca *Ep.* 113.28, is given the heading "Fortuna" and placed under "Physics." It would be better to put it with the ethical fragments, as Bake did, since the approach to fortune here is not in terms of an analysis of causation but a concern for security.

Pp. 133, 298, and 311. Fragment 139, from Diog. Laert. 7.157, assigns to Zeno, Antipater, and Posidonius the view that the soul is *πνεῦμα ἐνθερμον*. This passage is entered in the Greek index under *ψυχή*, but not under either of the other terms. It should at least be added to the entries under *πνεῦμα*.

Critical notes to Diogenes Laertius. Kidd states in his Preface that he used a collation of Diog. Laert. made by P. V. d. Mühl, which V. d. Mühl had sent to Edelstein. A comparison of Kidd's apparatus with that of H. S. Long forces one to the conclusion that these two authorities sometimes disagree in their reports of manuscript readings. For example, in the note to F 9.2 (p. 41), Kidd's report is *ς' P; ις' B; om. F.* Long reports: "*ἔκτω* scripsit Huebnerus, cf. § 145: *ις'* codd." In the note to F 87.4 (p. 95), Kidd says that F has *τῇ*, with BP; Long says

that F has τῷ. Again, on F 287.2 (p. 253), Kidd reads ἐμπλεόντων, assigning it to BPF and indicating that Long's συμπλεόντων has no manuscript authority. In the first line of F 1 (p. 39), Kidd prints <διὰ>, assigning the supplement to Bake, whereas Long says that διὰ is the reading of B and P. In the text of F 8.3 (p. 41), Kidd has ἐν ε' τοῦ Φυσικοῦ λόγου, whereas Long prints ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ τοῦ Φυσικοῦ λόγου. Whom is one to believe? Surely it is not safe to assume that Long is in every case the less accurate.

Critical notes to Galen, *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*. As Kidd states in his Preface, his critical notes to this work are based in large part on information supplied to him by this reviewer. I must therefore take the blame for any mistakes that they contain. In particular, on p. 53, the note to F 34.22 should be deleted, as a reexamination discloses that the reading of H is συγγνώμη, not συγγνώμην.

Words omitted. Comparison of Kidd's citations with standard editions indicates that occasionally a word has dropped out of a Greek or Latin text. Thus in T 30 (p. 10), for "aequum cum" read "aequum est cum." In T 48 (p. 15), add ἐστὶ before Ποσειδώνιος. In T 64.2 (p. 20), add τῶν before παθῶν. In F 63.1 (p. 83), add ὁ before ὁμώνυμος. In F 164.12 (p. 146), add τοῦ before Χρυσίππου. In F 164.103 (p. 149), add τινὰ after ἄλλον. In F 165.35 (p. 151), add τοῦτο before λαβῶν. And in F 273.22 (p. 238), add ἀνθρώπων after δεισιδαιμόνων.

Inconsistencies. Sometimes, when the same passage is quoted twice, under both Testimonia and Fragments, or in two separate fragments, the two versions are not quite the same, e.g. T 88 and F 277.9-15; T 91.6 and F 151.6; F 7.1 and p. 107.1-2.

Conjectures and emendations. There are errors in the ascription of readings in the notes to F 35.2 (see above), F 165.67 (for "Arnim" read "Müller"), F 166.1 (for "Müller" read "Kühn"), and F 195.25 (for "Friedlein" read "Bake").

Typographical errors. F 52.4 (p. 77): for μακρὸν read μακρὰν. F 74, heading (p. 88): for "346 D" read "246 D". F 101, note (p. 104): for "Dox. Gr. 202.22 ff." read "Dox. Gr. 292.22 ff." F. 229.37 (p. 207): there is an extra accent on ὑπόσκιον. F 237.2 (p. 211): for χουφότερα read κουφοτέρα.

The Greek Word and Subject Index does not contain all the words that can be plausibly assigned to Posidonius himself. To those mentioned earlier in this review can be added ἀνώνυμος (F 264); ἐκλαμψις, ἐλλάμπω, and λάμπω (F121); and in the Latin word index, lux (F 120). To the Concordance with Jacoby should be added: F 87a (Jacoby); F 233 (Edelstein-Kidd).

PHILLIP DE LACY

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VERA FREDERIKA VANDERLIP. *The Four Greek Hymns of Isidorus and the Cult of Isis*. Toronto, A. M. Hakkert Ltd., 1972. Pp. xvi + 108; 15 pls. (*American Studies in Papyrology*, 12)

In 1935, when an expedition led by the late Achille Vogliano of the then Reale Università di Milano excavated Medinet Madi in the Fayum, perhaps the most interesting discovery was a collection of Greek hymns by a certain Isidorus. The poems were inscribed on two stone piers in a forecourt at the south end of a temple-precinct, and at the top of each pier was found a dedicatory inscription, in duplicate, to Isis-Hermouthis and her consort Sokonopis. Since the dedication was made on behalf of Ptolemy IX Soter II it served, when combined with evidence in the hymns themselves, to establish for these a probable date between 88 B.C., when that ruler returned from exile, and 80, the year of his death. The piers were soon removed to the Greco-Roman museum in Alexandria, and in 1963 a visiting scholar reported that they had become "largely illegible" because the surface of the stone had so greatly deteriorated.

Hymns I and III are in hexameters, II and IV in elegiac couplets. Hymns I-III are aretalogies celebrating the goddess' powers as ruler of heaven and earth, the rivers, the winds, and the sun, and recounting the blessings which she bestows upon righteous mortals — wealth, gladness, length of life, justice and morality, the arts, and the cereal grains. She succors prisoners, invalids, exiles, navigators, the childless; she causes that annual miracle, the rising of the Nile; and in the month of Pachon she is honored by a thanksgiving festival at which she receives a tithe of the year's produce. Her *synnaoi* are her husband Sokonopis, the Agathos Daimon, and her son Anchoes, identified with Helios. She herself is identified with Agathe Tyche, Deo or Demeter, Artemis, the Meter Theon, Rhea, Hestia, the Syrian Astarte and Nanaia, and the Lycian Leto. Hymn IV praises the original founder of the temple, the local hero-god Porramanres (one of the Pharaohs, possibly Amenemhet III of the XIIth Dynasty), who had become a legendary figure: it was believed that he had owned a pet crow which served him as a letter carrier and that he had miraculously "navigated on the desert by wheels and sail" — a reminiscence of a *carrus navalis*.

The poet, whether "Isidorus" was his real name or a cult-name, must have been a priest of the temple. For that place and time he was a cultivated man. He seems to have read Homer, Hesiod, and the Homeric and Orphic hymns, and he fashioned cantos that can be read with some enjoyment, though he had a poor ear for rhythm and an imperfect control of Greek (for example, the phrase *κόσμον ἄπαν* at III, 26 reveals a surprising gender). He somewhat fancied himself as an apostle to the Greeks and, though he was propagandizing for the monarch, he leaves an impression of sincere piety. Possibly Isis had answered his prayer for fatherhood (II, 29-34).

It is a pleasure to have learned this and much more from Dr. Vanderlip's study. She would have made a useful contribution if she had merely reprinted the facsimiles of the stones with transcriptions and a bibliography, but she has generously added translations, line-by-line commentaries, and chapters in which she reviews the findings of the excavators in their bearing upon the date of the poems and discusses the spread of the cult and the goddess' characterization in these and other early Greek hymns and aretalogies. She writes with a warm sympathy for her chosen subject, and her work has benefited from the advice of specialists — A. E. Samuel for Ptolemaic dating; R. Merckelbach for Isiac literature, and M. Weber for Egyptian names.

When so many sources are quoted and so much critical literature is cited it is not easy to see everything into print impeccably but, even so, it would have been well to spend more time on the proofs. Greek words are unaccented or wrongly accented (pp. 18, 19, 22, 24, 25, 27, 29, etc.), and words in various languages are slightly misspelled (pp. xi-xiii, xvi, 15, 26, 32, 46, 50, 51, 53, 54, 59, 60, 66-68, etc.). The editorial style is a bit eccentric: "App." for Apuleius (pp. xi, 92, etc.); "*ibid.*" for "*idem*" (p. xvi); and the genitive (!) "*Schicksals*" as an abbreviation for *Untersuchungen zur Rolle des Schicksals* (pp. xiii, 33, etc.). The English might have been retouched: "fortuitous" for "fortunate" (p. vii); "effect" for "affect" (p. 90); "meld" for "combine" (p. 96). B. van Groningen's dissertation of 1921 appears twice in the bibliography (pp. xii, xiv). "Theos Megalos" (p. 9) is sad. In IV, 16 (p. 63) *τάς* should be *τάδ'* and in line 29 *παταπὸν* should be *ποταπὸν*.

The notes call attention to some but by no means all of the metrical anomalies. Worthy of comment is the unique hypermetric verse *εὐείλατος ἐμοί τε γείνον, λύπης μ' ἀνάπανσον ἀπάσης* (I, 36). If this were a text transmitted in the usual way one would probably not hesitate to emend: *εὐίλατός τε γενοῦ κτλ.* Could it be that the stonecutter inserted the damaging pronoun through inattention or misplaced zeal?*

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* I am aware that one false quantity would remain, but Isidorus was capable of that. Of course the alternative remedy would be to delete *ἀπάσης* instead.

(Continued from Inside Front Cover)


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HYSTERON PROTERON IN THE HOMERIC STYLE

It is well known that the tense of *κατάχειτ'* in *Odyssey* 10.532 is inexplicable in its context of instructions for the future, and can only be explained as secondary to its correct appearance in the narrative at 11.45.¹ Thus in some sense Circe's instructions are derived from their fulfillment in the following book. M. D. Reeve² has recently pointed out similar evidence in *Iliad* 9, in the speech of Agamemnon detailing the compensation he is willing to offer to Achilles, compared with Odysseus' speech reporting the offer. Concentrating particularly on

9.134 ἡ θέμις ἀνθρώπων πέλει, ἀνδρῶν ἡδὲ γυναικῶν
9.276 ἡ θέμις ἐστίν, ἄναξ, ἥ τ' ἀνδρῶν ἢ τε γυναικῶν,

he shows that the second line is primary, and the first a variant on it, rather than the other way round. Mr. Reeve draws from this the conclusion that either Odysseus' speech was originally composed for a version of the Embassy which did not contain Agamemnon's speech, or the *Iliad* poet composed with the aid of writing (presumably because he could then work on his epic in any order, like Virgil).

Here is another passage where the wording in the earlier instance of a repeated sequence of lines can most easily be explained as derived from the wording in the later instance:

7.337-40 ποτὶ δ' αὐτὸν δειμομεν ὦκα
 πύργους ὑψηλοῦς, εἴλαο νηῶν τε καὶ αὐτῶν.
 ἐν δ' αὐτοῖσι πύλας ποιήσομεν εὖ ἀραρυίας,
 ὄφρα δι' αὐτῶν ἱππηλασίῃ ὁδὸς εἴη.

¹ D. L. Page, *The Homeric Odyssey*, 29-30, with notes 11 and 12; references to Page's predecessors may be found in Reeve's article (note 2 below).

² "Two notes on *Iliad* 9," in *CQ* 22 (1972) 1-2.

7.436-39

ποτὶ δ' αὐτὸν τεῖχος ἔδειμαν
 πύργους θ' ὑψηλοῦς, εἶλαρ νηῶν τε καὶ αὐτῶν.
 ἐν δ' αὐτοῖσι πύλας ἐνεποίηον ἐὺ ἀραρυίας,
 ὄφρα δι' αὐτάων ἱππηλασίῃ ὁδὸς εἴη.

In 338, πύργους has to stand for the wall *and* its ramparts. We also have the rather flat ὦκα filling up the previous line. In 436, on the other hand, the essential wall is specifically mentioned. The change is evidently caused by the change of mood from ἔδειμαν to δέιμομεν. In 340, the optative εἴη is inexplicable,³ or at least has to be explained as a striking example of Homer's greater flexibility in the use of the optative, unless we accept that it is perfectly in order in historic sequence at 439, and merely repeated in 340.

This makes three certain cases of priority of the second of a pair of passages. The analytical conclusion that the earlier speech in each case is a post-Homeric interpolation (which is Page's view on *Odyssey* 10, and seems to be Reeve's preferred answer on *Iliad* 9) becomes more improbable with each additional example. The answer must rather lie somewhere within the easily misunderstood conditions of the production of oral poetry.

We expect what comes first in a story to have been composed first; and we may (like Mr. Reeve) assume that this is even more true of an orally composed story. But we are surely wrong if we think that the *Iliad* is the record of a single extempore creative effort. Even if illiterate, the poet did not start from scratch every time he stood up.⁴ Much of his material would be repeated over and over again to different audiences, with some fluidity of detail, but fair stability of outline.

Repetition of lines and sequences of lines was part of oral technique. In repeated sequences, variations of phraseology would normally only be required if the person changed, or the time changed—both regularly happening when a message is given and later repeated, or instructions are given and later carried out. In the semi-fluid state of the poet's repertoire, it is

³ Leaf (in his second edition) and Van Leeuwen even print Hermann's conjectural subjunctive εἴη, to get away from the difficulty.

⁴ See Douglas Young, "Never blotted a line?" *Arion* (1967) 279-324.

not so very surprising that it should occasionally happen that the second of two parallel passages contains the primary phrases, and that they either appear modified (7. 337-38, 9.134) or (due to formulaic conservatism)⁵ are left unmodified (7.340, *Od.* 10.532) in the first passage.

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⁵ It is perhaps unnecessary to give examples of minor inconsistencies in Homer caused by the pressure of formulaic diction. An amusing case is 12.306.

OLYMPIAN 6: 'ΑΛΙΒΑΤΟΝ AND ΙΑΜΟΣ' EMERGENCE INTO LIGHT

At *Ol.* 6.64 Pindar uses the adjective ἀλίβατον to describe the hill of Kronos where Iamos receives his gift of prophecy from Apollo: ἔκοντο δ' ὑψηλοῖο πέτρῳ ἀλίβατον Κρονίου. 'Αλίβατον is a hapax in Pindar translated by Slater simply as "steep."¹ *LSJ* suggests the same translation and is equally uncertain of its etymology or precise meaning. Some of the suggested roots have been λείβω, ἀλίβας,² ἄλιψ, λέπας, λείπω, βᾶίνω, and ἥλιος or ἄελιος.³ The scholiasts to Pindar are also unclear as to its meaning and offer two suggestions: ἀλίβατον is either a description of a place on which it is ἀλιτεῖν to tread because of its height, or a place on which the rising ἥλιος first steps.⁴ It seems likely that Pindar regarded ἥλιος and βᾶίνω as the etymology of ἀλίβατον for the following reasons:

1. Simply translating ἀλίβατον as another word for ὑψηλήν, as the scholiasts suggest, results in a line that is static and redundant.⁵

2. Pindar elsewhere in the odes associates the sun with Zeus, and also, more specifically, with the hill of Kronos.

3. A meaning such as "sun-trod" would indicate a transition in this passage from earth, to water, then sky, a pattern which would not be inconsistent with Pindar. We see similar, though not identical, patterns in many other odes, including *Ol.* 1, *Pyth.* 9, and *Ol.* 13.

In Homer ἡλίβατος is always an epithet of πέτρῃ, and in

¹ W. J. Slater, ed., *Lexicon to Pindar* (Berlin 1969) 28.

² D. B. Monro, *Homer Iliad* (Oxford 1964) II, 300.

³ Cf. W. B. Stanford, *The Odyssey of Homer* (New York 1967) I, 357.

⁴ A. B. Drachmann, *Scholia Vetera in Pindari Carmina* (Leipzig 1903) 109b.

⁵ In his discussion of paronomasia, Bury points out that the rarity of a word is of advantage to the poet in conveying undermeanings. To gloss ἀλίβατον with ὑψηλήν is to ignore the likelihood that this is a verbal clue of some sort to the meaning of the passage. J. B. Bury, "Paronomasia in Pindar," *Hermathena* 6 (1886-88) 193.

Hesiod it is usually used in the same way,⁶ but the variety of contexts in the two authors suggests no single etymology dominating the many conjectured. It occurs once in comedy, in a chorus of the *Birds* describing the throne of Zeus (1732), and in tragedy it always occurs in the chorus.⁷ Barrett points out that its etymology is uncertain, but that "its borrowers evidently understood it as 'high,' or 'sheer.'"⁸ In *Ol.* 6 *ὕψηλοιο* adequately describes the height of the hill of Kronos. While it is possible to regard *ἀλίβατον* merely as a redundant epithet, translated as "high," the result of such a translation is a rather one-dimensional, colorless line in terms of poetic imagery.⁹ In that case Iamos would simply travel from the depths (of the Alpheus where he had descended) to the heights (of Kronion); the journey would be described in terms notably lacking the tonal nuances which are attached to the description of the Alpheus scene (*νυκτὸς ὑπαίθριος* v. 61). While there is no rule in Pindar that every line must be equally descriptive and connotative, there is some evidence that Pindar used *ἀλίβατον* here to enrich his texture, not with a synonym for *ὕψηλόν*, but with a word that for him had associations with *ἥλιος*, the sun.

In general, *helios* is associated with fair fortune in Pindar,¹⁰ and it can be further argued that *helios* is associated with Zeus more than any other god in the odes,¹¹ or is often seen in

⁶ With the exception of *Th.* 483, where *ἡλίβατος* describes the cave where Earth hides Zeus.

⁷ N.b. *Hipp.* 732, in which *ἡλίβατος* describes the secret hollows of the mountain "steeps" and is followed by a reference to Eridanos, the place where Phaethon, son of Helios, crashed to earth when he attempted to drive Helios' chariot.

⁸ W. S. Barrett, *Euripides Hippolytos* (Oxford 1964) 299f.

⁹ Cf. Hes. *Th.* 786: 'the waters of the Styx flow down *ἐκ πέτρης* . . . *ἡλιβάτοιο ὕψηλῃς*.

¹⁰ Cf. *Ol.* 1.5, *Ol.* 13.37. The association is made between *helios* and victory in the games. In *Fr.* 114.1 (Bo) and *Ol.* 2.62 the good are described as having the sun after death as their fair fortune.

¹¹ For direct association with Zeus cf. *Ol.* 1ff. where the transition is from water, to gold, to victory in games, to *helios*, to the Olympian festival, to Zeus. *Isthm.* 5.1ff. follows a similar pattern, moving from *helios*, to gold, to victory in games, and ultimately to Zeus.

connection with the *Διὸς παῖς*, gold.¹² It would not be inappropriate to Pindar, therefore, for Zeus' hill to be "helios-trod."¹³ We have two other descriptions of the hill of Kronos in Pindar, and both seem to associate it with the sun. The only other epithet for the hill besides *ἄλιβατον* and *ὕψηλοιο* is *εὐδείελον* in *Ol.* 1.111, a word meaning something like "conspicuously bright."¹⁴ As for a description of the hill of Kronos, we are on firmer ground in *Ol.* 3, where we have a detailed account of the topography of this area within the story of Herakles' founding of the festival and contests at Olympia. Pindar tells us the place was originally *γυμνός*, and in thrall-dom to the harsh rays of helios (*ὀξεῖαις ἀγλαῖς ἄλλου*). So Herakles travelled to the land of the Hyperboreans for the lovely olive trees which he would plant near the race course as a tribute to Zeus (vv. 23-33).¹⁵

¹² Fr. 209.1 (Bo). Cf. *Pyth.* 4.144: *σθένος ἀελίου χρύσεον λεύσσομεν*, and *Isthm.* 5.1ff. It is obvious that the inverse does not follow. Gold has many associations in Pindar, including the Iamos passage, where Hebe is *χρυσόστεφάνοιο*.

¹³ Prof. Cedric Whitman has pointed out to me another interesting connection between Zeus, mountaintops, and Helios. He notes that the topmost part of any hill, no matter whose, was dedicated to Zeus. The altar of *Ζεὺς Πολιεὺς* on the Athenian Acropolis would be one example (see J. Travlos, *Pictorial Dictionary of Ancient Athens* (1971) p. 91, fig. 118, and p. 218, fig. 281). In many parts of Greece there are chapels situated on high outcrops of rock which are dedicated to St. Elias. They bear this title not so much for Elijah's sake, but rather, because of a resemblance of the words *Ἡλίας* and *Ἥλιος*, which sound quite similar in the genitive in modern Greek. (J. C. Lawson, *Modern Greek Folklore and Ancient Greek Religion* [Reprint, New York 1964] 44f.)

¹⁴ It is interesting to note that *ἄλιβατος* appears in *Od.* v 196 within a description to Odysseus of the familiar landmarks of Ithaka. A common epithet of Ithaka in Homer is, of course, *εὐδείελον*.

¹⁵ Although Pindar confines this description, strictly speaking, to the *κᾶπος* and *βᾶσσαι* of Olympia, offering an etiological explanation for the olive trees which were growing there, the hill of Kronos is not necessarily excluded from the description. Pindar is speaking of the entire precinct at Olympia (s.v. Slater). The *κᾶπος γυμνός*, which if taken literally would be a contradiction in terms, is simply a plot of land dear to the god (Gildersleeve, *Pindar: the Olympian and Pythian Odes* [New York 1890] ad loc.). Pindar is giving a general description of Olympia as being deserted and barren until Herakles founds the games, and he is associating the area with Helios.

This "history" of the topography at Olympia, composed four, or at most, eight, years before *Ol. 6*,¹⁶ provides the explanation for Pindar's usage of ἀλίβατον. He is very careful to set the chronology of events in the Iamos passage: Iamos receives his gift of prophecy on the hill of Kronos *before* Herakles institutes the games,¹⁷ therefore, we may assume, before the trees were planted, when Olympia was still a barren, unprotected place. With this interpretation of ἀλίβατον, Iamos' moment of attainment of his destined honor is complemented in terms of physical phenomena by his emergence from the dark streams of the Alpheus (νυκτὸς ὑπαίθριος v.61) into the intense light on the heights of the "mountain."¹⁸

Here, then, Iamos' transition from childhood obscurity to manly achievement and fame is given concreteness in the corresponding geographical transition from earth to water to sky. There is nothing unique in this. His story corresponds to the general pattern of heroic development in myth, namely, that of birth in obscurity, youth in isolation, emergence and attainment. Iamos has matured close to the earth: abandoned by his mother and isolated from human society until adolescence, he is nursed by two serpents. In the moments immediately preceding his realization of his destiny, he enters a comparably transitory environment as he steps into the middle of the Alpheus under cover of darkness to gain assistance from Poseidon and Apollo. But the final stage of manhood, or rather, herohood, occurs only after he arrives at "lofty" Kron-

¹⁶ *Ol. 3* is generally dated 476. Bowra dates *Ol. 6* to 472, but Boeckh, Farnell, Fennell, Gaspar and Wilamowitz take it to be 468, and Finley places it at either date. Whether *Ol. 6* came four or eight years after *Ol. 3*, we would expect Pindar's conception of Olympia's history to have remained fairly consistent, especially since this appears to be his own account. See Farnell I, p. 19f.

¹⁷ vv. 67-71: εὖ ἂν δὲ θρασυμάχανος ἔλθωνι Ἡρακλῆς . . . πατρὶ ἑορτάν τε κτίσῃ πλειστόμβροτον τεθμόν τε μέγιστον ἀέθλων, / Ζηνὸς ἐπ' ἀκροτάτῳ βωμῷ τότε αὖ χρηστήριον θέσθαι κέλευσεν.

¹⁸ We cannot take this story so literally that we would find it necessary to calculate how long it would take a hero to walk in the dead of night, behind a voice, from the Alpheus to the hill of Kronos in order to arrive at daybreak. Pindar often juxtaposes day and night: cf. Fr. 209.1 (Bo), *Ol. 2.62*, *Pyth. 4.130*, and *Pyth. 1.22*.

ion and *there* receives his gift of prophecy (ἐνθα οἱ ὤπασε
θήσανυρόν διδύμον μαντοσύνας vv. 65f.).

In Pindar, it is not at all inconsistent for this final moment to be brilliant and close to the realms of the sky, as ἀλῖβατον/ἥλιος would suggest. There are a number of parallel descriptions in Pindar which employ the same imagery.¹⁹ Wilamowitz draws the parallel between the Iamos passage and the scene in *Ol.* 1.71 where Pelops approaches the sea in the dead of night to call on Poseidon, but confines the similarities to this point only.²⁰ If we assume as correct the scholiasts' suggestion that ἀλῖβατον is to be connected with helios, the parallel does not break down, but rather, can be further extended. The achievement of heroic stature is for Pelops, like Iamos, a moment both lofty and brilliant in which he receives a golden chariot with winged horses (*Ol.* 1.87). After Herakles founds the festival at Olympia Iamos retains his exalted position by having a shrine of divination on the "highest altar of Zeus" (*Ol.* 6.70). Here again success is complemented with proximity to the sky, while the clarity of attainment is repeated at v. 73: Iamos and his descendants tread a φανερόν ὁδόν.

Iamos' nocturnal transition from youth to hero finds parallel again in *Ol.* 13, where Athēna appears to Bellerophon in a dream to confer on him the instruments for achieving his destined heroism. The event again takes place at night (v. 70 ἐν ὄρεφνᾳ), but at the moment Pallas brings the bridle, Bellerophon's dream turns immediately to the reality of day (ἐξ ὀνείρου δ' ἀντίκα' ἦν ὑπᾶρ vv. 66-67). The tokens of his attainment of destiny are both brilliant and serve to connect him with the heavens: he is given the golden reins which will conquer the winged horse, Pegasus (v. 65 χρυσάμπυκα χαλινόν and 78 δαμασίφρονα χρυσόν, ἵππον πετρόεντ' 86).

¹⁹ For a more detailed discussion of these passages and their parallels, see J. H. Finley, Jr., *Pindar and Aeschylus* (Cambridge, Mass., 1955) 106ff.

²⁰ U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Pindaros* (Berlin 1932) 309. Wilamowitz' only comment on ἀλῖβατον is that the bright "mountain" is inaccurate and extraneous for a "bushy hill," and in so doing fails to recognize other aspects of the description besides topographical accuracy. His conclusion is an example of how the "historisch-empirisch" approach to Pindar sometimes passes over the nuances of poetic imagery.

In the Cyrene myth, *Pythian* 9, the maiden, like Iamos, spends her youth far from society and close to nature as she hunts in the wild hills and woods (vv. 18-25). A sea voyage in company with Apollo to Libya marks her transition from mortal maiden to consort of the god. The moment of consummation and Cyrene's consequent attainment of heroic stature is quite brilliant: Libya's halls are twice described by the poet as being "golden."²¹ A shorter version of the tale appears at the beginning of the same ode (vv. 5-8), combining some of the same symbolism which was attached to the longer story: Apollo carries off the "huntress maiden" from the isolation of the "windswept folds of Pelion" to make her queen of Libya, but here journey and attainment are coincident: the brilliant imagery connected with the moment of union in the longer version (*θαλάμῳ δὲ μίγεν/ἐν πολυχρύσῳ Λιβύας* 68f.) is here attached to the voyage (*ἔνεγκέ τε χρυσέῳ. . . δίφρῳ* v. 6), and the consummation of their union is omitted. Only the result of Cyrene's attainment of heroic status, her subsequent queen-ship over Libya, is told.

In one final parallel to the imagery of the Iamos passage, *Isthmian* 7 displays an interesting manipulation of the same cosmological elements, creating a rather phenomenologically ambiguous situation. Zeus appears on earth at Amphitryon's portals, and begets Herakles in the dead of night (*μεσονύκτιον*) in the form of a snowfall of gold.¹² We have the darkness of night and the fluidity of the shower accompanying Alcmena's transformation, along with the familiar brilliance of attainment at once expressed in the gold. Transition, attainment, and its consequences are combined into a single moment.

Although it is possible to find many passages where Pindar associates a moment of achievement with light and/or the heavens, (and these are by no means restricted to the heroes), it is not necessary to confine oneself to passages outside of

²¹ v. 56: . . . *Λιβύα δέξεται εὐκλέα νύμφαν δώμασιν ἐν χρυσέοις πρόφρων*, and 68f.: *κεῖνο κείν' ἄμαρ διαίτασεν' θαλάμῳ δὲ μίγεν/ ἐν πολυχρύσῳ Λιβύας*. Cf. *Nem.* 10.88f. where the immortal half of Polydeuces' life is likewise spent in the golden halls of heaven: *ἤμισιν δ' οὐρανοῦ ἐν χρυσέοις δόμοισιν*.

²² This is, of course, a transference of events from the Danaë legend: cf. *Pythian* 12.17.

Olympian 6 for evidence that Pindar intended to associate helios with ἀλίβατον. Such an association, analogous in imagery to other parts of the Iamos story, is the culmination of several contrasts made between dark and light.

The two phenomena are juxtaposed as Evadne, having cast aside her purple and yellow girdle and her silver pitcher, enters the dark blue thicket, and Iamos in the same thicket is born ἐξ φάος (v. 44). Iamos' remaining hidden in the rushes yet showered with the violets' rays offers another such contrast. The final contrast between dark and light would then coincide with Iamos' fulfillment of his identity as he goes from the dark streams of the Alpheus to the bright "mountain" of Kronos.

There is another reason for accepting the scholiasts' second interpretation of ἀλίβατον. Pindar frequently plays with puns in the odes, but in this passage he seems unusually aware of etymology, and skillfully combines the verbal and visual throughout the passage. He makes a formal attempt at a derivation for Iamos' name from ἴον, violet, but there is also the play at v. 47 on the word ἰός, the harmless venom of honey with which the two serpents nurture the babe.²³ Even if Pindar did not seriously regard ἥλιος as the etymology of ἀλίβατον, he does seem to be suggesting this verbal pun to his audience as an additional enhancement of the already rich imagery surrounding the rest of the passage.

If we connect ἀλίβατον and helios, even as a simple verbal play, then the final episode in Iamos' development on the brilliant heights of Kronion becomes as detailed and complete as the other two stages of his growth, and thus forms, both poetically and phenomenologically, the perfect complement and culmination to the silver pitcher, the pathless wilderness, the violets' showers of purple and gold, and the dark depths of the river Alpheus.

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²³ Finley, 115.

AN EMENDATION IN HEROTODUS 7.9.β.2

Mardonius, having described the foolish tactics of the Greeks, comments on the correct way to fight:

εἰ δὲ πάντως ἔδεε πολεμέειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐξευρίσκειν
χρῆν τῇ ἐκάτεροί εἰσι δυσχειρωτότατοι καὶ ταύτῃ πειρᾶν.

The obvious translation is: "But if they absolutely must fight with one another, they ought to find out where each is most difficult to conquer and attack there." This is, of course, nonsense. We do not attack where a foe is strongest, but where he is weakest.

Godley translates (Loeb ed., III. p. 315): "Or if needs must that they war against each other, they should discover each where his strongest defense lies, and there make his essay." If "making your essay where your strongest defense lies" means anything, which we doubt, it is probably meant to be a more literal version of Rawlinson: "Or, at the worst, if they needs must fight, they ought to post themselves as strongly as possible, and so try their quarrels."

This, we contend, is elegant obfuscation. ταύτῃ πειρᾶν means "attack there" and, further, there is an easier solution than dancing a minuet around the meaning of sound and simple Greek. This is by reading εὐχειρωτότατοι (Kopff), i.e. "find out where each is weakest, most easily conquered, and attack there."¹

This makes sense and, of more importance to the scholar, we can show that the Greeks knew that it was sense. Stobaeus quotes the following from Euripides' *Temenos* (fr. 743 N²):

τὸ δὲ στρατηγεῖν τοῦτ' ἐγὼ κρίνω, καλῶς
γῶναι τὸν ἐχθρὸν ἢ μάλισθ' ἁλώσιμος.

τοῦ δὲ Dobree τὸ δ'εὖ Nauck ἢ Gesner εἰ codd.

¹ My sources for polar errors include (Pindar) Douglas Young, "Some Types of Scribal Errors in Manuscripts of Pindar," *GRBS* 6(1965) 267 = *Pindaros und Bakchylides* (Darmstadt 1970) 119; (Aristotle) F. W. Hall, *A Companion to Classical Texts* (Oxford 1913) 188-89; (Germanicus) A. E. Housman, *CR* 14 (1900) 31 = *The Classical Papers of A. E. Housman* (Cambridge 1973) II, p. 503 and see on Cicero, *Aratea* 187-88, *CR* 14(1900) 31, n. 1 and *CR* 16(1902) 102 = *Classical Papers*, II pp. 503, n. 1 and 551; (Shakespeare) Leon Kellner, *Restoring Shakespeare* (London 1925) 164-66.

This is precisely the advice given Cyrus by his father (Xen., *Cyr.* 1.6.36.):

ἐν ᾧ δ' ἂν τοὺς πολεμίους αἰσθάνῃ εὐχειρωτοτάτους
γιγνομένους, ἐν τούτῳ μάλιστα ἐπιτίθεσθαι.

In fact, it reads like a re-phrasing of the Herodotus passage.

The Olynthians taught a Spartan force what this means in practice when they lured their hapless foe across a river, thereby separating them from their main force in Xen. *HG* 5.3.4:

ἐνθα δὴ οἱ Ὀλύνθιοι ἱππεῖς, ἡνίκα ἔτι εὐχείρωτοι αὐτοῖς
ἐδόκουν εἶναι οἱ διαβεβηκότες, ἀναστρέψαντες ἐμβάλλονσιν
αὐτοῖς, καὶ αὐτὸν τε ἀπέκτειναν τὸν Τλημονίδα καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων πλείους ἢ ἑκατόν.

Another relevant parallel comes from the messenger speech in Aeschylus' *Persae* 451, where Xerxes posts soldiers on a small island before the battle of Salamis:

ἐνταῦθα πέμπει τούσδ' ὅπως, ὅτ' ἐκ νεῶν
φθαρέντες ἐχθροὶ νῆσον ἐκσφρῶϊατο,
κτείνοιεν εὐχείρωτον Ἑλλήνων στρατόν.

This passage might have been in Herodotus' mind when he penned the sentence we are concerned with. (Incidentally, *ἐκάτερος* in the plural means "each", not "both"; cf. *Hdt.* 3.12.1).

Some examples for "polar error":

Sophocles, *Antigone* 980

πατρός L ματρὸς cett.

Pindar, *Pythian* 6.23

δὲ V μὲν cett.

Aristotle, *Poetics* 1455^a 14

Ὀδυσσεὶ τῷ ψευδαγγέλῳ codd.

evangelistae illius sancti (= ὁσίῳ or ἱερωῶ εὐαγγελιστῇ) Arabic translation.

Germanicus, *Aratea* 246-47

Piscis, qui respicit auras

Threicias, dextram Andromedae cernantur ad ulnam.

dextram] laevam Maybaum astra Housman cernetur Grotius

The parallels are as follows:

Aratus 246-47

Ἀνδρομέδης δέ τοι ὦμος ἀριστερός Ἰχθύος ἔστω
σῆμα βορειοτέρου

Eudoxus apud Hipparchum 1.2.13

ἢ Ἀνδρομέδα, τὸν μὲν ἀριστερὸν ὦμον ἔχουσα τῶν Ἰχθύων ὑπὲρ
τοῦ πρὸς βορρᾶν.

Cicero 18

Andromedae laevo ex umero

Avienus 557 sqq.

ex umero Andromedae laevo . . .
. . . ulnae nam proximus iste sinistrae.

So Maybaum conjectured “*laevam*”. Housman, however, objected, “hard as it is to believe that Germanicus wrote *dextram* when he meant *laevam*, it is harder still to imagine how a copyist could write *laevam* when *dextram* stared him in the face.” Leon Kellner answers Housman’s objection in the following words: “This phenomenon is accounted for by that well-known slip which in accordance with the psychological “laws of association” subconsciously pronounces the very antipodes of what is uppermost in the mind. As “day and night,” “rich and poor,” “young and old” are heard so often together, the mention of one naturally brings up the other in the mind.”

Kellner cites the following examples from Shakespeare.

King Lear, 5.3.170

The gods are just, and of our pleasant *virtues*
Make instruments to plague us.

virtues Q vices F

Richard II, 1.1.186

Cousin, throw *up* your gage.

up Qq down F

1.3.140

You, cousin Hereford, upon pain of *life*

life Qq death F

This last example is reminiscent of Euripides, *Hercules* 1351.

ἐγκατεθήσω Θάνατον

Θάνατον LP *βίον* Wilamowitz et Wecklein

Here, however, the MS reading could come from memory contamination of *Andromache* 262,

ἐγκατερεῖς δὴ Θάνατον.

“Gentlewoman (women)” replace “gentleman (men)” at *Henry IV*, Part II, Epilogue 23 and *Taming of the Shrew*, 4.5.67.

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THE VOTE OF ATHENA¹

The vote of the jury in Aeschylus' *Eumenides*, which results in Orestes' acquittal, is explicitly said to be a tie (753, 795), but it has long been disputed whether Athena's vote for acquittal produces the tie or breaks the tie in favor of Orestes. The former view was argued at length by Hermann and is now generally accepted by German scholars;² the latter position was vigorously defended by K. O. Müller and has been commonly followed by English-speaking scholars.³ I am convinced that Hermann's view is the correct one, and I offer the following arguments in support of it. None of them will be wholly new, but my hope is that a clear delineation of all aspects of the problem may finally lay Müller's interpretation to rest.

Let us begin with the text. Athena decides to convene the new Areopagus to hear Orestes' case because, as she says (470-72), "the matter is rather large if a mortal thinks to decide it, nor is it right (*θέμις*) for me to judge a case of homicide." Neither in these words nor in any of the later references to the jury⁴ is there any indication whether or not Athena as presiding officer will vote with the court when she instructs them (709) to "take up a voting-pebble and judge the case."⁵ The

¹ For criticism and advice concerning this paper I am grateful to the late Douglas Young, with whom I both conversed and corresponded on the matter. A version of the paper was read at the annual meeting of the American Philological Association in St. Louis, December 30, 1973.

² G. Hermann, *Aeschyli Tragoediae* II, 623-29 and *Opuscula* VI.2, 189-99. See also, e.g. Wilamowitz, *Aischylos-Interpretationen*, 183-85; Lesky, *Die tragische Dichtung der Hellenen*³, 130 n. 95; and Groeneboom, commentary on *Eumenides*, pp. 201-2.

³ K. O. Müller, *Dissertations on the Eumenides of Aeschylus*² (Eng. tr., Cambridge 1853) 149-50 and 215-19. See also, e.g. Verrall, *The Eumenides of Aeschylus*, xxv-xxx and notes ad loc.; G. Thomson, *The Oresteia*² II, 220-21; and Lloyd-Jones, *The Eumenides by Aeschylus*, 58. Kitto (*Poiesis*, 19-20) is an exception to this division.

⁴ Cf. 487-88, 601, 614-15, 629-30.

⁵ We can not assume, as Groeneboom does (above, note 2), either that the later historical custom that the archon basileus voted with the Areopagites (cf.

audience would probably expect an acquittal, but they would have as yet no clue how this acquittal would be achieved.

The voting begins immediately after Athena's instructions. During it the chorus and Apollo alternately speak ten couplets (711-30), and the chorus then adds a final triplet (731-33) just before Athena reveals her own decision. Now it has seemed likely to most critics (though it is not strictly necessary) that the ten couplets and the triplet are directly related to the votes of the jury, and if this is so, then the passage implies that precisely eleven human jurors vote before Athena: ten votes coincide with the ten couplets and the eleventh is accompanied by a triplet in order to leave time for Athena to step forward before she speaks. Other scenarios are possible, but this is certainly the most likely.⁶

After the human jurors have voted, Athena declares (734-35) that she will cast the final vote for Orestes:

ἐμὸν τόδ' ἔργον, λισθίαν κρῖναι δίκην·
ψῆφον δ' Ὀρέστη τήνδ' ἐγὼ προσθήσομαι.

By τήνδε ψῆφον Athena indicates a specific voting-pebble, and she must either be pointing to it or, more likely, holding the pebble in her hand. Athena does not indicate precisely when she will cast her vote, but she states unconditionally her intention to vote (that is, not merely in case of a tie) and gives no indication that her vote is in any way different from the votes of the human jurors.

After stating her intention Athena next gives the reason for

Pollux 8.90) was also the rule in Aeschylus' time, or that if it was, Aeschylus necessarily imitated this practice in *Eumenides*. But this factor may add additional weight to my arguments.

⁶ Douglas Young assumes dramatic silences after both 731 and 733 and writes, "one can easily have 2 judges voting in the time of that triplet, which is equivalent to at least 4 lines. Or none." This is certainly correct, and it is also possible that there were eleven pairs of human jurors, but the point is why does Aeschylus give the Furies these three extra lines? The triplet destroys the equal balance which has thus far been maintained between the two sides and has the effect of providing a small counterweight to Athena's words which follow immediately, and such a situation makes sense only if there are eleven human jurors. On this point Kitto (above, note 3) presents an oversimplified case, but his amusing remarks are nonetheless worth reading.

her vote, that she favors the male (736-40), and she then adds (741), "and Orestes wins even if (the case) is decided with equal votes" (*νικᾷ δ' Ὀρέστης κἄν ἰσόψηφος κριθῇ*). Although this statement might express the consequence of Athena's vote (but in that case one would expect a stronger connective than *δέ*), it more likely indicates an additional piece of information: Athena has decided to vote for Orestes and she now adds that a tie vote will result in acquittal (as was customary—see below).

Finally Athena asks that the votes be counted (742-43), and after some brief remarks by the other actors (744-51) she announces that Orestes is acquitted because the votes are tied (752-53):

*ἀνὴρ ὃδ' ἐκπέφενγεν αἵματος δίκην·
ἴσον γάρ ἐστι τᾶρίθμημα τῶν πάλων.*⁷

There is not the slightest suggestion here that Athena's vote is not included in this *ἴσον ἀρίθμημα*, nor is there any such suggestion when she later assures the Furies that the verdict was tied (*ἰσόψηφος δίκη*, 795). Throughout the scene the language consistently implies that Athena physically⁸ casts her vote and that this vote is tallied with the others to produce the tie. The language of 734-53 thus supports the implication of the preceding dialogue (711-33) that eleven human jurors vote before Athena.

This conclusion can be further supported by considering how the scene could have been staged, for if Athena's vote were not included in the tie verdict, there would be no way to make this clear to the audience.⁹ There is no point at which she

⁷ The use of *πάλος* in 742 and again in 753 instead of *ψηφος* is of no significance for this discussion. Both words refer to the voting-pebbles themselves, and it is virtually certain that *πάλος* is used in these two cases *metri gratia*, since in both cases its position at the end of the line requires a short penult (cf. *Eum.* 32).

⁸ For some critics (e.g. Thomson) the assumption that Athena's vote is merely symbolic supplies the explanation why it is not counted with the others. But Athena's vote may be symbolic and yet it is still a vote, it still counts for Orestes in the real trial, and thus it must at some time be cast and counted in the real total of votes.

⁹ The audience could hardly be expected to count the number of human jurors as they voted.

can physically cast a vote into the urn¹⁰ without having it tallied together with the others,¹¹ and if she does not actually cast a vote but merely indicates somehow that her vote counts for Orestes, then the audience would necessarily be left in doubt about the matter.¹² If, on the other hand, Athena's vote is to be tallied with the others, then she simply holds up her pebble in 735 (*τήνδε ψῆφον*) and then puts it in the urn.¹³ When the urns are then emptied and the pebbles counted, there would be no doubt at all about the status of her vote. Such staging is by far the simplest and would easily clarify any possible ambiguity in the spoken text.¹⁴

These considerations of staging thus provide a third argu-

¹⁰ Normally in the fifth century two urns were used in balloting, one for the votes for conviction and one for those for acquittal; see Boegehold, "Toward a Study of Athenian Voting Procedure," *Hesperia* 32 (1963) 366-74. It is thus likely that there were two urns on stage in *Eumenides*. The later representations of this scene (see below, note 14) all show only one urn on a table, though in several a second urn lies on its side on the ground below the table.

¹¹ If Athena announced first that the votes were equal and secondly that Orestes was acquitted, then she might possibly cast her vote between these two statements. But the wording of 752-53 does not allow this.

¹² The fullest attempt I have found to imagine the staging of this interpretation is Paley's in his note on 704 (= 734; *The Tragedies of Aeschylus*³ p. 624): "Pallas does not at this point drop her ballot into one or the other of the urns; indeed she could not do this without leaving the stage and approaching the thymele. It is even doubtful if she holds up any material vote to the eyes of the spectators, though *τήνδε* favours the supposition. Her object is to ascertain first how the judges have voted, in order that she may in no way interfere with their judicial functions. Only, should the votes prove equal, she announces her intention of adding hers in favour of the culprit; that is, of declaring him acquitted. And this she does *verbally* at v. 722 [= 752], and without giving any actual vote either before or after the counting of the ballots." To this I would answer, (a) we do not know where in the theater the urns were placed, but if the previous jurors could cast their votes, there is no reason why Athena could not; (b) if "her object is to ascertain *first* how the judges voted," why does she not wait until their votes are counted before making her pronouncement? (c) she gives no indication whatever that she will vote "only should the votes prove equal" or that she will cast her vote in any way differently from the others; and (d) nothing in 752-53 indicates that she is casting a vote, "verbally" or otherwise.

¹³ Athena must cast her vote before 742. The most likely time is after 740.

¹⁴ It is worth noting that a painting of the scene by Timanthes (third quarter of the fifth century), which can be reconstructed from later copies, portrayed

ment for Hermann's view of the scene, and these arguments might be sufficient were it not for certain passages in later Greek authors which have misled some scholars.¹⁵ Much of this later testimony is ambiguous; that which is not supports both sides.¹⁶ There are for instance two ambiguous references to Orestes' acquittal in Euripides' *Iphigenia Taurica*: first Orestes says (965-66) that Pallas "reckoned equal votes with her arm" (ἴσας . . . ψήφους διηρίθμησε . . . ὠλένη), and later (1470-71) Athena says that she saved Orestes by "deciding the equal votes" (ψήφους ἴσας κρίνασα). The only explicit statement that in Orestes' trial Athena's vote was added to an equal division to produce acquittal is in Aelius Aristides (2, p 20-21D),¹⁷ and against this we have two passages in Lucian (*Pisc.* 21, *Harm.* 3) where the vote of Athena is called upon to produce a tie and thus save the defendant. We can only conclude from this that the ancient tradition about the vote of Athena is of no help in elucidating the scene in *Eumenides*.¹⁸

In particular we must not be misled by the fact that Euripides (*IT* 1471-72, *El.* 1265-60) treats Orestes' trial (however Athena's vote was counted) as the mythical precedent for the well-attested historical practice of acquitting a defendant

Athena with her hand directly over the mouth of the urn, indicating that she does indeed cast her vote; see German Hafner, *Iudicium Orestis* (Winkelmanprogramm 113, [Berlin 1958]). To the extent that this is evidence for the performance of *Eumenides*, it supports the simple staging for which I argue. (I am indebted to Professor E. L. Brown for bringing Hafner's monograph to my attention.)

¹⁵ See for instance Thomson (above, note 3).

¹⁶ In addition to the passages cited below, the Parian Marble (A25 according to Jacoby, *FGH* IIb, p. 996) and Apollodorus (*Epi.* 6.25) merely state that Orestes was acquitted with equal votes, and of two scholia to Aristides' *Panathenaicus*, which follow the tradition that Orestes was tried by the twelve gods (cf. Demosthenes 23.66), one (108.10) says Athena cast the twelfth vote and the other (108.7) that she cast the thirteenth.

¹⁷ Cf. Julian (*Or.* 3.114d), who states that "the vote of Athena" is added to those of the defendant if the votes of the jury are equal.

¹⁸ Particularly frustrating is the ambiguity of the scholiast at 735 (= 738 Wecklein): ἐγὼ προσθήσω τὴν ἐσχάτην ψήφον, ἣ ὅτι, ἂν (ἥ, ὅταν Hermann) ἴσαι γένωνται, νικᾷ ὁ κατηγορούμενος. Even if we accept Hermann's emendation, which is by no means certain, it is still ambiguous whether ἴσαι designates the votes with or without Athena's.

with a tie vote.¹⁹ Euripides was fond of linking mythical events to historical practices, but except for Aristides (*loc. cit.*) no other ancient discussion of this historical practice (see above, note 19) mentions Orestes' trial. And clearly there is no suggestion anywhere in *Eumenides* that Orestes' acquittal will set a precedent.

It is not known exactly when or how this legal practice arose, but it is likely to have originated not long after the founding of the Areopagus in the seventh century or earlier. Unlike other courts the Areopagus in classical times contained no specific number of jurors, for it was composed of all living former archons and the number of jurors would thus vary continually.²⁰ From the beginning there must occasionally have been tie votes in this body when an even number of jurors voted, and for such situations the Athenians must surely have devised a rule. Thus by 458 B.C. it was probably a firmly established practice that an equal vote in the Areopagus resulted in acquittal.

In view of this it would surprise no one in the audience to hear Athena announce that Orestes would be acquitted even if the votes are equal, nor would such a statement of common practice require any defense or justification. And Athena's reason for voting for Orestes applies only to this particular case and has nothing to do with the principle that an equal vote means acquittal. She simply announces that she will vote for Orestes, gives her reason for this vote, and then reminds the audience that Orestes will win even if the votes are equal. Her mention of this custom is dramatically effective for it prepares the audience to expect the tie which does in fact result, but it does not establish any precedent nor does it make her vote

¹⁹ To my knowledge the earliest statement (other than in Euripides) of the rule that equal votes produce an acquittal is in Antiphon, *De Caede Herodis* 51. There is a long discussion of the reasons for the rule in [Aristotle] *Problems* 29.13.

²⁰ Cf. Wilamowitz (above, note 2), 184. The scholiast on 743 (= 746 Wecklein) gives the number of Areopagites as 31, which was the size of the Areopagus in later Roman times; see Busolt-Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde*, 936.

qualitatively different from the others, although it is of course more important dramatically.

I have argued then that the text of *Eumenides* suggests that eleven jurors vote before Athena speaks in 735, that her vote is tallied with those of the other jurors to produce an equal division, and that a simple stage action could make this process perfectly clear to the audience. Moreover our historical knowledge of the Areopagus also supports this conclusion. Now if virtually all the evidence supports this one view, how is it, one might ask, that many scholars have accepted the opposite view? The reason is perhaps most clearly revealed by Sidgwick's comments in his note on this passage (*italics his*): "At first sight it would appear that Athena votes (1.735), that the votes are counted (1.742), and that *with Athena's* the votes are equal. But this would make the court an odd number: the majority of the judges *against* Orestes; and Athena interfering to turn a majority into a minority:—all of which are very unlikely, and spoil the impressive symbolism of the vote of the goddess . . . the human justice is *divided* . . . it is the goddess who gives the casting vote . . . when earthly *ψῆφοι* are equal *there is an unseen and divine vote for mercy.*"

In fact it seems to me not at all unlikely that the court contained an odd number of human jurors (as the historical Areopagus must have done on occasion), or that the majority of human jurors vote against Orestes (considering the weakness of his legal case and their fear of the Furies), or that Athena interferes to make the power of Zeus triumph (cf. 621, 797-99). Rather Sidgwick's real concern is for the "impressive symbolism" which he sees in the scene, and it is likely that a similar concern has affected the views of other scholars. This is not the place for a full interpretation of the scene, but I believe the symbolism can be just as impressive and the meaning just as elevated if we yield to the overwhelming weight of the evidence and accept Athena's vote as producing the tie verdict and thus acquitting Orestes.

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Ἰσμήνη: τί δ', ὦ ταλαῖφρον, εἰ τάδ' ἐν τούτοις, ἐγὼ
λύουσ' ἂν εἴθ' ἄπτοῦσα προσθείμην πλέον;

40 εἴθ' ἄπτοῦσα Porson: ἢ θάπτοῦσα LA rec:
ἢ 'φάπτοῦσα Σ⁹⁰ (φ ex θ facto)

I give 11.39-40 as in Pearson's Oxford Text. Whether editors have printed λύουσ' ἂν ἢ 'φάπτοῦσα (Schneidewin, 1854; Wolff-Bellermann, 1885; Jebb, 1900) or have accepted Porson's conjecture (Bruhn, 1904; G. Müller, 1967), they have customarily explained the passage along the same basic lines: Ismene's reference to "loosing or tying" is a metaphorical expression of her helplessness. It has been likened to such antithetical expressions as οὔτε πάσῃων οὔτε δρῶν (Eur. *Bacch.* 801) and τί δρῶν ἢ τί λέγων (Aesch. *P.V.* 660); all but Jebb have summoned to its defense *Aias* 1317: εἰ μὴ ξυνάψων ἀλλὰ συλλύσων πάρει. They see Ismene as saying, "If things are in this condition, poor sister, what could I contribute (but Müller: what could I gain) in any conceivable way?"¹

It seems odd that Ismene, upon hearing Kreon's edict, should respond in proverbial terms of loosing or tying. If she merely wanted to indicate her helplessness, such an unusual expression would hardly be the first to come to mind. The alleged proverb is in itself difficult and lacks the direct simplicity of the phrases cited above. Jebb is only guessing when he says (p. 16), "We may suppose that some such phrase as οὔτε λύων οὔτε ἄπτων . . . was familiar as = 'by no possible means.' " Nor is the *Aias* passage valid as a *testimonium*, for there the participles ξυνάψων and συλλύσων are not proverbial. They are deliberately chosen from the metaphor of a knot and refer to the entangled quarrel between Teukros and Agamemnon which is

¹ It is generally agreed, and rightly so, that Ismene is not consciously referring to breaking (λύουσα) or preserving (ἄπτοῦσα) the decree; at this stage such a notion is premature. Witness her amazement in 1.44 when Antigone announces her intention to bury the corpse: ἢ γὰρ νοεῖς θάπτειν. . . .

currently in progress. But in 1.40 of the *Antigone* there is as yet no quarrel, no knot to tie or untie; certainly Ismene is aware of none.

The ensuing dialogue, however, reveals what Ismene is aware of: she can think of nothing but the edict. When Antigone mentions burying Polyneikes, she reacts with shock, since burial is ἀπόρρητον πόλει (1.44); and when Antigone stands firm, all Ismene can say is, ὦ σχετλία, Κρέοντος ἀντειρηκότος (1.47). In 1.39 as well Ismene has the decree on her mind: εἰ τάδ' ἐν τούτοις. How odd then that she should suddenly lapse into the expression λύουσ' ἂν εἴθ' ἄπτουσα. The MSS reading, λύουσ' ἂν ἢ θάπτουσα,² suggests no such lapse but indicates a concern for the issue at hand: burial. In view of Ismene's preoccupation with the decree, it is strange that, of the two elements in the MSS reading, θάπτουσα has traditionally been the suspected one. Hermann alone regarded it as genuine.³

But, besides the burial, there is another issue at hand. Kreon's decree over Polyneikes' corpse forbids two acts: τὸ μὴ / τάφῳ καλύψαι μηδὲ κωκυῖσαι τινα (11.27-28). Mourning the body is as strongly prohibited as burying it.⁴ In keeping with the dual nature of the edict and with Ismene's reaction, I propose to keep the ἢ θάπτουσα of the MSS and to emend λύουσ' to κλαίουσ'. The emended line would then read:

κλαίουσ' ἂν ἢ θάπτουσα προσθείμην πλέον;

With such a change, we remove the difficulty posed by "loosing or tying" and in its stead have a direct reference to the edict. The phrase κλαίουσ' ἂν ἢ θάπτουσα underlines the issues at hand, directly echoing εἴαν δ' ἄκλαυτον, ἄταφον of 1.29.

² This reading is indefensible. The ἢ implies a contrast between the two participles. Even if we extend λύουσ' to mean, "breaking the law," θάπτουσα would be identical, not antithetical, to λύουσ'.

³ Hermann conjectured λούουσ' (for λούουσ') ἂν ἢ θάπτουσα: "by washing or burying." Ellendt, in his *Lexicon Sophocleum*, is inclined to accept this. There are two occurrences of λούειν in the play (11.901, 1201), but by 1.40 nothing has been said to make Ismene think of washing Polyneikes' body.

⁴ When Kreon himself announces the decree, he forbids both actions: μήτε κτερίζειν μήτε κωκυῖσαι τινα (1.204).

Ismene's response to the edict, as I would read it, is, "If things are in this condition, poor sister, what would I gain by mourning or burying (our brother)?"

In proposing this emendation I do not see Ismene as planning to break the decree. That would be inconsistent with her surprise at Antigone's plans to break it (1.44). She is merely contemplating the edict. After hearing eighteen lines of bad news it is only natural that Ismene now pause and reflect upon what is at stake, not that she frantically and metaphorically ask what she can do to help. Indeed, when Antigone does ask for help (1.41), Ismene does not reply with an enthusiastic, "Yes," but asks, "In what sort of venture? What in the world are you thinking of?" Although Antigone has yet made no mention of breaking the law, Ismene still does not offer her coöperation. I therefore agree with Müller in taking the middle force of *προσθελίμην* as, "What would I get for myself," and not as, "What could I for my part do." Indeed, Müller's interpretation is in keeping with the usual middle force of this verb,⁵ whereas the other translation is based on an unprecedented use of *προστίθεσθαι*.⁶ Since Kreon is emphatic in his decree (11.34-35) and since death by public stoning is the penalty (1.36), Ismene sees no way out. What would she gain by mourning or burying her brother, in view of the severity of the decree (*εἰ τάδ' ἐν τούτοις*)?

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⁵ With *acc. rei* (here, *τί*): "to add to oneself," "to place near oneself," "to take upon oneself." E.g. *Tr.* 1224, *O.T.* 1460; *Aesch. Per.* 531; *Eur. Heracl.* 146, *Andr.* 396; *Thuc.* 1.78, 1.44. Only twice (*Hdt.* 4.65; 7.229) does it mean "to bring upon" others, and in each case the sense is hostile (*πόλεμον; μῆνιν*).

⁶ Nowhere do we find *προστίθεσθαι* to mean, "to contribute," in a helpful sense, except perhaps in the idiom *ψῆφον προστίθεσθαι* (e.g. *Aesch. Eum.* 735) and in the unique *χάριν προστίθεσθαι* (*O.C.* 767), a periphrasis for *ἐπιχαρίζεσθαι*. Dindorf's *Thesaurus* defines *πλέον προστίθεσθαι* as "*Proficere*." But, as there are no other occurrences of this expression, the definition is derived from this very passage, in an attempt to render *πλέον πρ.* compatible with the curious *λύουσ' ἂν ἢ φάπτονσα*.

NEOPTOLEMOS' STORY IN THE *PHILOCTETES*

Although its rehearsal and recitation take almost four hundred lines, Neoptolemos' story has not received the attention it merits. Not only is it a crucial part of the action but also it provides an outline of the action that follows up to the epiphany of Herakles in the exodos. Since the story is a lie, the action is based on a false premise and the appearance of the god is necessary to establish a true order both in terms of received mythology, if such a thing exists, and in terms of the play's thematic economy.

Neoptolemos' story has usually been ignored, except for minor disputes over the precise degree of falsity it contains.¹ B. M. W. Knox, however, has questioned its content more closely: "The lies Neoptolemos proceeds to tell present him as a sort of spurious Achilles. . . . Achilles was deprived of his prize by Agamemnon; Neoptolemos claims that the Atridae denied him his father's armor. Achilles withdrew from the battle and threatened to sail home to Phthia; Neoptolemos claims he has withdrawn from the battle and is on his way home to Scyros (240). And when Philoctetes asks him why he is angry with the Atridae, he speaks with a mock-Achillean fury."²

Ingenious as it is, this interpretation is probably wrong. Although the parallelism between Neoptolemos and Achilles is certainly present, it is an ingredient *of* the story rather than the organizing force behind it: both the ambassadors and the army view Neoptolemos as the new Achilles.³ Also Sophocles pre-

¹ See W. M. Calder III, "Sophoclean Apologia: *Philoctetes*," *GRBS* 12 (1971) for the bibliography and an extreme position: "the entire speech from start to finish is one lie" (159). The following works will be cited by author's name only: B. M. W. Knox, *The Heroic Temper* (Berkeley 1964); E. Schlesinger, "Die Intrige im Aufbau von Sophokles' Philoktetes," *RhM* 111 (1968) 97-156; J.-U. Schmidt, *Sophokles: Philoktetes* (Heidelberg 1973); W. Steidle, *Studien zum antiken Drama* (Munich 1968); O. Taplin, "Significant Actions in Sophocles' *Philoctetes*," *GRBS* 12 (1971) 25-44; and C. H. Whitman, *Sophocles* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951).

² Knox 123 followed by Schlesinger 126, Steidle 176.

³ Schmidt notes (83) that "die Vorstellung von N'direkter Nachfolge in der führenden Rolle seines Vaters vor Troia . . . wird vielmehr von N selbständig

sents us with no part of the Achillean story as outlined by Knox that could be compared with Neoptolemos'.⁴ On the contrary, almost all of the elements of Neoptolemos' story find some reflection in the present action and, strikingly, in the same order as narrated.

Spurred to action by Philoctetes' lengthy self-description (254ff.), Neoptolemos recites his story with an amplitude of detail worthy of an arch-deceiver. Odysseus' eight line kernel in the prologue (57ff.) is expanded to forty-eight lines, although not particularly along the lines that Odysseus had indicated ("say the worst you can about me" 64f.). Neoptolemos' infusion of corroborative detail certainly adds verisimilitude to the story; more striking is the correspondence between it and Philoctetes' situation during the play. Both are opposed to fighting at Troy because of their hatred of the Atreidai and Odysseus.⁵ Both are asked by a two-man embassy to come to Troy and are told that they alone can capture it (347, 611f.).⁶ Both want to see their fathers (351, 492) and to sail quickly (348f., 533ff.). Both have encounters with Odysseus: he takes

in seinen Bericht getragen, auf jeden Fall von ihm zum beherrschenden Motiv der gesamten Einführung gemacht (343-59)."

⁴ A more fitting parallel would be Ajax; Philoctetes' first question is why Ajax was not mentioned (410f.). The relevance of Achilles' story to the play has often been suggested but is usually said to apply to Philoctetes not Neoptolemos: M. Pohlenz, *Die griechische Tragödie* (Göttingen 1954²) 325-26; C. M. Bowra, *Sophoclean Tragedy* (Oxford 1944) 293; and, most recently and apparently independently, Schlesinger 103ff. and C. R. Beye, "Sophocles' *Philoctetes* and the Homeric Embassy," *TAPA* 101 (1970) 63-75. Whitman discusses the parallelism mainly to point out the differences (182); as I will argue, the truth seems to be more that Neoptolemos and Philoctetes are like each other than that one of them is like Achilles.

⁵ "Hate-words" are used only by Philoctetes except in 59 and 510, both of which refer to Neoptolemos' feigned hatred of the Atreidai.

⁶ The two-man embassy for Philoctetes is both a fact (Odysseus and Neoptolemos) and one of the trader's fictions (Odysseus and Diomedes, whose reluctance parallels Neoptolemos'). It is the latter that makes the parallelism between Philoctetes and Neoptolemos clear, as was, no doubt, Odysseus' intention. The word *πέγγμα*, which is not found elsewhere in Sophocles, occurs twice in Neoptolemos' speech and once in the trader's and finally in Neoptolemos' last (truthful) plea to Philoctetes. First Neoptolemos is the one who should take the citadel (347, 353), then Philoctetes (611) and finally both of them together (1334).

the arms that rightfully belong to them; he argues with them; and finally he is reviled by them.⁷ They are both ready to go home in the end.⁸

The order of elements is the same in the story and plot as well. Neoptolemos tells first of the embassy, then of the debate with Odysseus concerning the arms, and finally about sailing home. Similarly, after the rehearsal and recital of the story, the trader appears with his news of an embassy very like that of the story and with the message that only Philoctetes will take Troy.⁹ After Philoctetes' attack, which does not fit the pattern and to which we will return, comes Neoptolemos' confession and Odysseus' appearance from nearby, just as in the story (974ff., cf. 371), and the realization that it is he who has taken the arms (979, 376). An argument concerning the arms follows in both play and story, ending with Odysseus harshly berated (1019ff., cf. 374).¹⁰ Then a curious thing happens: the scene is repeated, in reverse. Neoptolemos leads in Odysseus and returns the bow; Odysseus again leaps out of hiding and runs away.¹¹ One might expect this to disrupt the story pattern,¹²

⁷ Repeated use of *δπλα* for both Philoctetes' bow and the arms of Achilles stresses the identification (the first two uses, 62 and 78, have the same metrical shape and sound). Fourteen of the twenty-two occurrences of the word in Sophocles are found in this play and over half of these are concentrated in Neoptolemos' false story (362, 365, 376) and the first encounter with Odysseus (973, 979, 1056, 1064, 1108).

⁸ Such detailed parallelism between Neoptolemos and Philoctetes can hardly have been Odysseus' original intent. He said only that Neoptolemos should use tricky words to rob Philoctetes. After Philoctetes' lengthy story about himself, Neoptolemos indeed sees a closer connection between the two of them, but in the most general terms: both of them have had bad dealings with the Atreidai and Odysseus. Also, the applicability of the pattern to Philoctetes becomes clear only in the course of the play.

⁹ Like Neoptolemos, the trader on first facing Philoctetes pretends not to recognize him and is hesitant to tell his story. Both are heading home and just happened to land on Lemnos.

¹⁰ In both cases the result is honor for Odysseus (380f., 1061f.). At this point Neoptolemos' speech becomes strikingly dramatic: "Man hört nicht mehr einen Bericht, man sieht geradezu eine Szene vor sich, man hört Rede und Gegenrede!" (K. Alt, "Schicksal und *ΦΥΣΙΣ* im Philoktet des Sophokles," *Hermes* 89 [1961] 151).

¹¹ So Steidle 185, Taplin 28.

¹² Taplin (36, cf. Knox 135) calls 1222ff. "a reversal and refutation of the prologue."

but the final scene shows an outspoken Philoctetes determined to return home just as Neoptolemos' story ends with his outspoken departure for home.¹³ The connection between the two is made explicit by Philoctetes when he argues that Neoptolemos should make good his promise to take him home since the Atreidai dishonored him by stealing Achilles' arms (1364ff.).¹⁴

Philoctetes' decision to return home, therefore, is wrong not only because that is not the way the myth goes (so e.g. Knox 117) but also because it is based on an insufficient model for action: Philoctetes' attack has no place in the story while the return of the bow nullifies the story's applicability. More basically, the story is insufficient because it is a lie, and those parts of the action that harmonize with it are thereby suspect. They are suspect for other reasons too. The trader enters and announces an embassy coming for Philoctetes, but we know that he is merely Odysseus' mouthpiece and that the message is another one of Odysseus' stories. When Odysseus springs out, his threatened abandonment of Philoctetes is marked as false both by his immediately preceding prevention of Philoctetes' suicide and by the now clear requirements of the oracle.¹⁵ Philoctetes' demand to return home is itself predicated on the false story of Neoptolemos.¹⁶ Since the story is a lie and since it does not really fit the circumstances, the audience should read-

¹³ *θρασύνεσθαι* 1387 recalls *θρασυστομῶν* 380; both occur only once in Sophocles.

¹⁴ Neoptolemos has not actually promised to take Philoctetes home: as Odysseus notes, Neoptolemos is under no oath at the beginning (72) and Philoctetes asks for no oath (811) but a handshake and not that he take Philoctetes home but only that he not desert him. Ultimately, however, Neoptolemos does put himself under oath first that he will return the bow, as he does immediately (1289), and then that he is speaking the truth about Philoctetes' future at Troy (1324, the only times that Neoptolemos mentions Zeus except for the conventional exclamation of 908).

¹⁵ On the gradual clarification of the oracle see most recently D. Seale "The Element of Surprise in Sophocles' *Philoctetes*," *BICS* 19 (1972).

¹⁶ The usual assumption is that the story has an underlying truth (Whitman 177, Taplin 33). This has been expanded by Schmidt, who I find has already noted some of the parallels between story and plot (but not their sequence). He contends, however, that the false story is proved true by events rather than the other way around: "Die innere Wahrscheinlichkeit dieses erfundenen Ge-

ily assent in the *deus ex machina* which reverses Philoctetes' decision.¹⁷

The insufficiency of the story is confirmed by the peculiar nature of the *deus*. Herakles does not simply tell Philoctetes what to do; he provides another story, his own, as a model for action, and his presence provides visual confirmation of its veracity (1420). There is a further reason for the immediate acquiescence of Philoctetes, which has so bothered critics: Philoctetes has already been acting out the story of Herakles himself. His attack matches that of Herakles. He says this

schehens war im Spielverlauf durch das Auftreten und die 'Entlarvung' des Od (974ff.) bestätigt worden. So zeigen sich hier erst die eigentlichen Folgen eines Truges, der sich fast unentwirrbar im Gewande der Wahrheit gab und sich zumal auf der Grundlage einer potentiellen Wirklichkeit entfaltete. Damit erweist sich Ph gerade nicht als der Betörte, den Falsches trügt, sondern als der Erkennende, der sich nun an jenes Wahre hält, das auch im Schein noch sichtbar wurde" (p. 235).

¹⁷ Most scholars do not, as the continuing vitality of a multiplicity of solutions attests. G. Norwood (*Greek Tragedy* [London 1920]) long ago gave four possible interpretations of the *deus* (163f.): (a) "Euripidean influence" (which I take as R. C. Jebb's "only a divine message could bend the will of Philoctetes" *Philoctetes* [Cambridge 1890] xxvii); (b) "Heracles is personified conscience;" (c) concession to legend; and (d) paradigm of selflessness. Subsequent statements have added little and can easily be categorized under these headings: (a) H. Lloyd-Jones ("Tycho von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf on the Dramatic Technique of Sophocles" *CQ* 22 [1972] 228), H. Musurillo (*Light and Darkness* [Leiden 1967] 116 n. 1), G. Perotta (*Sofocle* [Messina 1935] 466), A. J. Podlecki ("The Power of the Word in Sophocles' *Philoctetes*" *GRBS* 7 [1966] 245), D. B. Robinson ("Topics in Sophocles' *Philoctetes*," *CQ* 19 [1969] 53f.), Schlesinger 119, Schmidt 245, A. Spira (*Untersuchungen zum Deus ex Machina bei Sophokles und Euripides* [Kallmünz 1960] 27), H. Weinstock (*Sophokles* [Wuppertal 1948³] 122); (b) Bowra (above n. 4) 302, H. Erbse ("Neoptolemos und Philoktet bei Sophokles" *Hermes* 94 [1966] 200), T. B. L. Webster (*Sophocles Philoctetes* [Cambridge 1970] ad 1409); (c) S. M. Adams (Sophocles the Playwright [Toronto 1957] 159), Beye (above n. 4) 74, Calder (above n. 1) 169, H. D. F. Kitto (*Form and Meaning in Drama* [London 1956] 136f.), I. M. Linforth (*Philoctetes: the Play and the Man*, *UCPCP* 15 [1956] 151ff., Robinson 55, Webster ad 1409); (d) Alt (above n. 10) 172f., Erbse 200f., A. Lesky (*Die tragische Dichtung der Hellenen* [Göttingen 1972³] 247), Knox 139f., Pohlenz (above n. 4) 332, K. Reinhardt (*Sophokles* [Frankfurt am Main 1947³] 200), Steidle 19f., Taplin 39, Weinstock 125. Whitman's view is quite different: "The appearance of Heracles symbolizes the heroic essence at liberty to act in the service of itself and its friend; it is the epiphany of arete" (p. 188).

explicitly at one point when, praying for death by fire, he recalls Herakles' burning on Oeta (799ff.) and earlier he had hinted at the parallel when he handed over the bow to Neoptolemos and prayed that it not be a burden as it was to him and Herakles before (777f., cf. 670).¹⁸ Thus it is perfectly understandable that Philoctetes sees the point of Herakles' story; in fact, Herakles does not even bother to tell it.¹⁹ The parallelism between the two of them is so clear that Herakles does not need to recount his own reward, either, as a model for Philoctetes but can narrate Philoctetes' future reward directly. Only at the end of his speech does he make it clear that Philoctetes is following in his footsteps: "I will send Asklepios to Troy to heal your sickness, for it is necessary that it be captured a second time by my bow" (1437ff.).

One should note, finally, that the two stories interlock exactly in the plot. The two actions that nullify Neoptolemos' story are connected: the attack creates in Neoptolemos a true bond with Philoctetes which ultimately causes him to return the bow and at the same moment ruin both Odysseus' plan and the story pattern. Philoctetes' attack, therefore, begins an action that runs counter to the story pattern. It is precisely in this attack that Philoctetes resembles Herakles, and it is on the basis of this *πρόνος* that Herakles can predict Philoctetes' future reward at Troy. Thus the counter-action is completed only

¹⁸ Earlier Philoctetes had said that he alone had suffered so much (536f.), and the chorus at the beginning of its only stasimon could supply only Ixion as a very poor parallel (676ff.). However it ends its song recalling Herakles' burning on Oeta, which not only prepares for and defines Philoctetes' imminent attack but also provides a counter-example to Ixion. Herakles has been kept in mind by repeated mention of Oeta as Philoctetes' home. According to H. C. Avery ("Heracles, Philoctetes, Neoptolemos" *Hermes* 93 [1965] 291): "it seems very likely that Sophocles was the first to change Philoctetes' homeland and set him in a country closely identified with Heracles." What Avery does not note is that the references to Oeta stop immediately before Philoctetes' attack and reappear only when Herakles is on-stage (453, 479, 490, 664, 729, 1430 cf. the Trachinian ridge of 491).

¹⁹ "One expects a recital of the labours of Herakles as in the *Trachiniae* and *Hercules Furens*, but the point is the analogy with Philoctetes" (Webster, above n. 17, ad 1418).

by the appearance of Herakles himself; the play is incomplete without the *deus ex machina*.

Neoptolemos' story, then, plays a part commensurate with the emphasis it receives in the first third of the play. It defines much of the play's action and because it is a lie that action is suspect. Philoctetes' decision is wrong and the appearance of Herakles sets him right by providing a true model both of the past and for the future.

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HIATUS AND ITS PURPOSES IN ATTIC ORATORY

When Greek authors permit hiatus, modern readers are inclined to think it must be because they are less fastidious or less careful than Isocrates, or else that they wish to give an impression of negligence, to show that their concern is with their argument and not with stylistic refinement. Isocrates not only avoided hiatus, he laid down the rule that it should be avoided.¹ While earlier prose writers had been less particular, not all later writers observed his rule. Demosthenes, so we are told, observed it less strictly in his more mature public orations than in his private orations;² in later times some of Plutarch's contemporaries seem to have paid little attention to it, but it seems that Greek writers in imperial times varied very greatly in the respect that they showed for it.³ Anyone who chooses his vocabulary carefully and shows some ingenuity in arranging the word order can avoid it; and when the word order varies between one family of manuscripts and another and there is no agreement about which manuscript has greater authority, editors may find it hard to decide whether the reading which avoids hiatus is preferable to that which admits it. In some works editors have tried to reduce the occurrence of hiatus not only by preferring the *varia lectio* which avoids it, but by emending the text, when a simple change in the order of words can eliminate it.⁴

¹ Isocrates, *τέχνη*, Fr. 1 (*Isocratis Orationes*, ed. Benseler-Blass, H. 275). Cf. J. W. H. Atkins, *Literary Criticism in Antiquity* (Cambridge 1934) I. 130.

² In his Teubner edition of Demosthenes Blass was prepared to emend the text in order to avoid hiatus, following in the footsteps of G. E. Benseler, *De Hiatu in Oratoribus Graecis et Historicis Graecis* (Freiburg 1841). Subsequent editors have been more inclined to trust the manuscript tradition.

³ Eduard Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa*, I. 361, noted that hiatus was quite common in authors of the Second Sophistic, but a recent article by M. D. Reeve, "Hiatus in the Greek Novelists," *CQ* 21 (1971) 514-39, shows that the novelists consistently avoided it except in situations where it seems to have been recognized as legitimate, e.g. at the end of a phrase and after words like *καί* and *μή*.

⁴ The numerous passages in Plutarch's *Moralia* where Benseler tried to eliminate it can be found by consulting the *apparatus criticus* in the Loeb or

Generally modern critics have been content to notice how carefully a Greek orator avoids hiatus, instead of asking why he admits it and what use he makes of it.⁵ Since hiatus presents difficulty for a speaker, as for a singer, and since it is not very difficult for a writer who is master of his language to avoid it, it is curious that so few critics have asked why it is often admitted by certain authors. Even in verse, critics are not often confident in explaining what effect is intended when the conventional rules seem to be flouted.⁶ But it must surely be assumed that some particular effect was intended, and the same assumption is justified for oratory as for poetry.

Fortunately for the investigator the instances of apparently deliberate hiatus (when it could easily have been avoided) are much more frequent in oratory than in poetry. An attempt will therefore be made in this article to suggest the purposes of Attic orators (especially Demosthenes) in presenting themselves or their clients with sentences in which hiatus occurs. Speeches are intended for delivery, not for private reading, and although the text that we have represents a revised version that may differ in many details from the original spoken version, it must be supposed that the final written form given to it by the orator was one which he would have been willing to use himself. Students and teachers of oratory, who practiced or demonstrated the delivery of famous speeches like the *Meidias*

Teubner editions, e.g. 460A, 467E, 855C, 857F, 858D, 918B, 1109C, 1112E, 1122D. A similar editorial practice might greatly reduce the occurrence of hiatus in Lucian; there are, for examples, several places in the opening sections of *The Cock*, where one might be tempted to change the word order. Lucian seems not to have attracted the attention of Benseler or any of the hiatus-hunters listed in the bibliographical note in Reeve's article (see preceding note).

⁵ Cf. e.g. W. Wyse, *The Speeches of Isaeus* (Cambridge 1904, repr. 1967) 178-79, who suggests that 'Isaeus, a practical man, exerted himself to give Isocratean polish only when he was paid for it, and had plenty of time at his disposal.' He does not accept Benseler's conclusion that Isaeus avoided hiatus more carefully in his later speeches than in his earlier ones.

⁶ For example, editors of Theocritus have compiled careful statistics of the occurrence of hiatus at different places in the line, but offer few confident explanations of the poet's purpose in instances like 15.33 (where many editors prefer an emendation).

or the *First Philippic*, must have considered themselves obliged to follow the written text exactly.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in his essay on Demosthenes, describes the effect created by hiatus in an oration and the demands that it makes on an orator. He points out that when a word ends in a vowel and the next begins with one, there must be "a distinct interval of time" separating the two. And if the gap is bridged by the insertion of a semivowel, there will be a "distinct silence" (ἀξιόλογος σιωπή) between the two vowels.⁷ The use of hiatus and the consequent breaks or "stops" between words he regards as characteristic of the "austere archaic harmony," which is concerned with τὸ σεμνόν rather than τὸ κομψόν. The "smooth" harmony, on the other hand, aims at a continuous flow of sound. He considers Thucydides a representative of the austere, Isocrates of the smooth harmony, while Demosthenes is said to use a "mixed" harmony, varying his style of writing to suit the needs of the moment. He characterizes the different harmonies in similar terms in *De Compositione Verborum* (22-24). He never sug-

⁷ Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 38. ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἦν χρόνον τινὰ μέσον ἀμφοῖν ἀξιόλογον ἀπολαμβάνεσθαι δεικνύται γὰρ ὑπὸ τε μουσικῶν καὶ μετρικῶν ὁ διὰ μέσου τῶν φωνηέντων χρόνος παρεμβολῇ γραμμάτων ἡμφώνων ἀναπληροῦσθαι δυνάμενος. τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐγίγνετο μὴ σιωπῆς τινος ἀξιόλογου διεργούσης τὰ φωνήεντα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων.

It is customary to say that a diphthong followed by a vowel was not counted as hiatus, that the *i* or *v* of the diphthong was pronounced as a semivowel, *i* or *y*. Cf. E. Schwyzer, *Griech. Gramm.*, I.399, W. S. Allen, *Vox Graeca* (Cambridge 1968) 91. None the less even this kind of hiatus was avoided by Isocrates, and in Attic tragedy and comedy the alternative of crasis or synizesis seems to have been regularly preferred. Thus in Aristophanes *Nub.* 7 the text has

ὄτ' οὐδὲ κολάσ' ἔξεστί μοι τοὺς οἰκέτας,

not οὐδὲ κολάσαι ἔστι. Whatever the conventions of the epic may have been at different periods, prose writers who strove to avoid hiatus evidently refused to accept the licence granted by the grammarians. In this article, therefore, no distinction will be made between hiatus after a diphthong and after a long vowel. It will be recognized, however, that certain combinations like ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι and πολλῇ ἀνοίᾳ ("simply y-idiotic") were easily pronounced, and also that a fair number of conventional phrases that contained hiatus were accepted without demur by all but the most pedantic purists. So also were words with internal hiatus, where the rules of contraction did not apply.

gests that hiatus is undesirable in itself or a mark of careless writing. It is an important part of the austere harmony, but he points out that it requires considerable skill on the speaker's part if "disagreeable cacophony" is to be avoided.⁸

The demands that hiatus makes of a speaker in a modern language are familiar enough. An English speaker sometimes inadvertently inserts an *r* ("no law *r*-against it") or, like a Greek, a semivowel ("totally *y*-absurd," "no *w*-evidence"); unlike the Greeks he has not the additional resource of legitimate elision and crasis. But if he is careful to observe a real hiatus in the middle of a sentence in formal declamation, he must make a break between the words — "totally — absurd," "no—evidence."⁹

The Greek writers who took particular trouble to avoid hiatus were not content with avoiding it in the middle of a clause. Isocrates forbade it not only at a comma or colon but even at the end of a period. Writers of iambic trimeter, in comedy as well as tragedy, do not admit hiatus even at the end of a period, unless the period coincides with the end of a verse. At the end of the verse, however, they admit it constantly, even in places where modern editions have no punctuation mark at all. Some scholars are content to regard this practice as the result of a purely metrical convention, which was designed to preserve the unity of the verse. But one need not read far to discover that this hiatus occurs only when it is appropriate to mark a short break between one verse and the next; and it sometimes has the effect of underlining the next word or phrase, as when the Ghost of Polydorus announces the entry of Hecuba:

περᾶ γὰρ ἤδ' ὑπὸ σκηνῆς πόδα
'Αγαμέμνονος

(Eur. *Hec.* 53-54)

⁸ Ibid. πολλῆς δέ τινος ἐνταῦθα δεῖ τῆς τεχνήσεως, ἵνα μὴ κακόφωνοι μηδὲ ἀηδεῖς μηδὲ ἄλλην τινὰ ὄχλησιν ἐπενεγκόμεναι ταῖς ἀκοαῖς λάθωσιν αἱ τοιαῦται συζυγίαι, ἀλλ' ἐπανθῇ τις αὐταῖς χροῦς ἀρχαιοπινῆς καὶ χάρις ἀβίαστος.

⁹ Some speakers will mark the hiatus by an (inaudible) laryngeal or glottal stop between the vowels, which certainly occupies an "interval of time", during which the speaker has a sense of semi-strangulation.

or Philoctetes asks about Thersites,

καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτό γε
ἀναξίου μὲν φωτὸς ἐξερήσομαι

(Soph. *Phil.* 438-39)¹⁰

Evidently orators and actors, whether they spoke in prose or verse, were conscious of hiatus wherever it occurred, whether at comma or colon or within a clause, and it does not describe the practice of Demosthenes accurately if one notices that hiatus within the clause is comparatively infrequent and fails to notice how very common it is at comma, colon, and period.¹¹ Hiatus at the end of a clause does not create the same problem for a speaker as when it occurs within a clause, and at the end of a sentence it offers no problem at all, if there is no hurry and the speaker may not only break the continuity but pause to take breath. In the middle of a sentence, however, he cannot as a rule take breath at a hiatus, because more time is needed to take breath at a hiatus than when there is no hiatus—a longer

¹⁰ There are some good examples in Aeschylus' *Eumenides*:

χθόνα
ἀνήμερον τιθέντες ἡμερωμένην (13-14),
ὄρῳ δ' ἐπ' ὀμφαλῷ μὲν ἄνδρα θεομυσῇ
ἔδραν ἔχοντα προστροπῆαιον (40-41),

and best of all:

ἄνασσ' Ἀθάνα, Λοξίου κελεύμασιν
ἦκω, δέχον δὲ πρηνεμένῳς ἀλάστορα,
οὐ προστροπῆαιον, οὐδ' ἀφοίβαντον χέρα,
ἀλλ' ἀμβλὺν ἤδη (235-38)

The hiatus in the second and third lines mark a clear break, but it would be wrong to omit the final *nu* in *κελεύμασιν*, since no break is wanted before *ἦκω*.

Modern writers on Greek metre show a strange lack of curiosity about this use of hiatus in iambic trimeter. For some further remarks see my study of "Catalexis and Anceps in Pindar," *GRBS* 15 (1974) 171-91.

¹¹ Paul Maas was evidently thinking only about hiatus within the clause when he wrote: "Plato as he grew older restricted hiatus more and more to prepositives; Demosthenes hardly allowed it in any other word," *Greek Metre*, English trans., (Oxford 1962) § 141. This statement is accepted as accurate by W. S. Allen, *Vox Graeca*, 91. Cf. also W. B. Stanford, *The Sound of Greek* (Berkeley 1967) 58: "Demosthenes used it occasionally, but with restraint." Such statements cannot stand if hiatus at comma and colon is to be counted as hiatus.

interval than is generally acceptable at a comma.¹² It should follow that when an orator's text shows hiatus at the end of a clause, he is indicating either a short break (without breath) or a considerably longer break (with breath). Examples will show that, except at the end of a sentence, the first alternative is more commonly intended.

For example in *On the Crown* 33: οὕτω δ' ἦν ὁ Φίλιππος ἐν φόβῳ καὶ πολλῇ ἀγωνίᾳ, μὴ καὶ ταῦτα προειληφότος αὐτοῦ, εἰ πρὸ τοῦ τοὺς Φωκέας ἀπολέσθαι ψηφίσαισθε βοηθεῖν, ἐκφύγοι τὰ πράγματα' αὐτόν, ὥστε μισθοῦται τὸν κατάπτυστον τουτονί, οὐκέτι κοινῇ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων πρέσβειων The hiatus πολλῇ ἀγωνίᾳ could easily be bridged by a semivowel, and the orator cannot make any break or pause until he reaches τουτονί, where he can take breath before οὐκέτι if he finds it necessary. He cannot make any but the briefest break after αὐτοῦ before the if-clause that follows. Demosthenes frequently has hiatus before this kind of if-clause,¹³ where only the briefest break demanded by the hiatus is appropriate, if the tension is to be maintained.

Another good example is the following passage from *On the Embassy* (165-66): ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ἂν μᾶλλον ἄνθρωποι πάνθ' ὑπὲρ Φιλίππου πράττοντες ἐξελεγχθεῖεν, ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ἡνίκα μὲν σπεύδειν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἔδει καθήμενοι, ὅτε δ' οὐδὲ βαδίζειν προσῆκε πρὶν ἔλθειν τὸν κήρυκα ἐπειγόμενοι; δν τοίνυν χρόνον ἤμεν ἐκεῖ καὶ καθήμεθ' ἐν Πέλλῃ, σκέψασθε τί πράττειν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν προείλετο. ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους ἀνασώζειν καὶ ζητεῖν καὶ παρ' ἑμμαντοῦ τε χρήματ' ἀναλίσκειν καὶ Φίλιππον ἀξιοῦν, ὃν ἡμῖν ἐδίδου ξενίων, τούτους λύσασθαι · οὗτος δέ κτλ. This passage was certainly intended to be spoken fast, but with so many examples of hiatus it is far from "smooth." It would have been possible to elide the final vowel of κήρυκα, but modern editors have left it in, and if the orator intended hiatus, it causes a brief break, almost a jolt, which puts tremendous emphasis on

¹² The difference in the time needed to take breath when there is no hiatus—"on the road (breath) as I came here,"—and when there is hiatus—"by the sea (breath) as I was walking"—can hardly be denied.

¹³ Cf. e.g. 18.13,145; 19.33,40; 36.8.

ἐπειγόμενοι and underlines the contrast with καθηήμενοι. Only a short break is permissible after καθηήμενοι and λύσασθαι, though a longer pause (for breath) can be taken after ἐπειγόμενοι and προείλετο.¹⁴ This is an excellent example of a passage that owes much of its effect to hiatus.

Dionysius is quite definite that hiatus was one of the features of the austere harmony which contributed to the effect of τὸ σεμνόν, dignity or solemnity, making the audience understand that here was something really serious for them to think about. The analysis of passages from Thucydides and Demosthenes that Dionysius offers is not very convincing, and it may be worth while to look for ourselves; if we find notable instances of hiatus in passages where the quality of τὸ σεμνόν is recognizable, we must ask whether the break between words that hiatus produces is appropriate to the speaker's argument and try to understand his purpose in creating this effect.

It seems entirely proper to begin with the ἐσπέρα μὲν γὰρ ἦν passage, which is universally admired. It is a solemn and serious part of the speech. Demosthenes is trying to show the gravity of the crisis that faced Athens and how he himself met the challenge that it presented and steered the Athenians into the right policy of joint action with Thebes. The first two sentences (18.169), which describe the arrival of the news, run smoothly without any hiatus, making fast delivery possible, like rapid narrative in other places.¹⁵ But the transition to the next morning is marked by a slower pace with hiatus: τῇ δ' ὕστεραίᾳ, ἅμα τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, οἱ μὲν πρωτάνεις. . . . In similar style a modern speaker might say: "But next morning—early—as soon as it was light—a meeting was summoned." The change of pace gives a special air of solemnity to the gathering on the Pnyx, an unusually large one, with everyone ready and seated before the members of the Boule make their entrance.

¹⁴ Cf. 19.126-27, certainly intended to be spoken fast, with only very brief breaks at the hiatus before οὐτε and οὐτε. Also 19.185, which describes the familiar delays that are inevitable in a democratic government.

¹⁵ E.g. 18.43-45; 19.259-62. In 19.17-19 the smooth narrative is interrupted by one hiatus before a parenthetical participial phrase, and terminates climactically: εἶπε δὲ τοιοῦτους λόγους καὶ τηλικαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτ' ἔχοντας ἀγαθὰ, ὥσθ' ἅπαντας ὑμᾶς λαβὼν ᾔχετο. Cf. also 19.121-23, which changes in character as narrative gives way to argument.

The narrative continues, without hiatus, describing how the herald asks, Who wishes to speak? And no one responds. Then follows the comment: *καίτοι εἰ μὲν τοὺς σωθῆναι τὴν πόλιν βουλομένους παρελθεῖν ἔδει, πάντες ἂν ὑμεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀθηναῖοι ἀναστάντες ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμ' ἐβαδίζετε. πάντες γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι σωθῆναι αὐτὴν ἐβούλεσθε* (171).

Each instance of hiatus sets off the word which precedes or follows it. First the isolated *καίτοι* ("and yet"). Phrases like *οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀθηναῖοι* hardly count as hiatus, but a break before *Ἀθηναῖοι* can be made if the orator wishes ("and the rest of you, every Athenian citizen"), but it is the break before *ἀναστάντες* that is significant, giving special life to the word ("you would have leapt to your feet"). Finally *σωθῆναι αὐτήν*, two words that one would expect not to be separated by hiatus; the separation can be a deliberate attempt to increase the solemnity of the occasion.¹⁶

The different groups that might have come forward are listed, separated by hiatus: *εἰ δε τοὺς πλουσιωτάτους, οἱ τριακόσιοι · εἰ δὲ τοὺς ἀμφοτέρω. . .*¹⁷ Then the comment: *ἀλλ', ὥς ἔοικεν, ἐκεῖνος ὁ καιρὸς καὶ ἡ ἡμέρα 'κείνη οὐ μόνον εὖνον καὶ πλούσιον ἄνδρ' ἐκάλει, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρηκολοῦν — θηκότα τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς* (172). The orator will have to take special care in saying *ἡ ἡμέρα 'κείνη οὐ*, with an *ἀξιόλογος σιωπή* before the *οὐ*. There will be a similar abrupt, but very short break before *ἀλλά*,¹⁸ but no noticeable intake of breath,

¹⁶ Cf. the hiatus before *ἀναστὰς ὁ βουλόμενος* in 19.117. Demosthenes often has *ἀναστὰς* or *ἀναστάντες* without preceding hiatus, but evidently spoken with emphasis, as most notably in 18.10 (cf. Aesch. 2.48, 127). It is often first word in a clause, 3.18; 19.13, 15, 23, 35, 45, 57, or otherwise underlined, with *πρῶτος* 4.1, with *εὐθύς* 8.52; 10.55, with *ἤδη* 8.74. Contemporary taste may find it hard to take Benseler seriously, when he proposes (*De Hiato* 95) to delete *οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀθηναῖοι* and *πάντες γὰρ οἶδ'* *ὅτι σωθῆναι αὐτὴν ἐβούλοντο* as interpolations and thus to eliminate the hiatus.

¹⁷ It may have been a recognized rhetorical device to use hiatus to mark the distinction between alternatives, whether "if this . . . if that" alternatives, as here and in 18.4, 10, or with *ἢ*, as in 18.107; 19.203, or negative alternatives with *οὔτε* or *οὐδέ*, as in 18.93, 107, 112, and 19.126 (cf. note 14 above). Hiatus before all words beginning with *οὐ-* is in any case very common (more than twenty instances in the first half of *On the Crown*).

¹⁸ Hiatus before *ἀλλά* (whether at comma, colon, or period) is very common, cf. 18.6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 21, 28, 40, 47, 70, 76, 82, 88, 95, 112, 113, 129, 138, 145.

no relaxation of the intensity. Finally (173) ἐφάνην τοίνυν οὗτος ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐγώ. The momentary hesitation before ἐγώ is absolutely right.¹⁹ Indeed it is interesting to notice how often the word ἐγώ (which a wise orator uses sparingly) is preceded and sometimes also followed by hiatus,²⁰ so as to set it off, as when an English speaker says "myself."

Another undeniably solemn passage in *On the Crown* is 95-105, where the Athenians are reminded of the example set by their ancestors. Demosthenes begins with one of those long sentences which he occasionally writes for himself demanding perfect breath control. He makes things even more difficult for himself by four instances of hiatus: ἐποίησατο, εἰ (rightly so printed by editors, without elision, because it must be clear that this is third person middle, not ἐποιήσατε); after the parenthesis before ἀλλά;²¹ after τῷ before the if-clause;²² and after χρήσασθαι before the formal main clause of the sentence is reached.

Demosthenes does not overtax his powers; the next sentence has no hiatus, but several examples of elision, and in 97 the hiatus after διδόναι marks an appropriate break, but creates no technical difficulty. It is only in 101 that hiatus between the cola becomes frequent. This is when Demosthenes starts asking a series of short questions, with hiatus between each question; this is quite a common device of his; he likes to turn on his adversary or his audience and fire a series of questions at them, some of which he answers, some not; and they are commonly marked off from one another, question from question or question from answer, by hiatus.²³

¹⁹ Henri Weil, *Plaidoyers politiques de Démosthène* (Paris 1893), note ad loc., remarks: "L'hiatus ajoute à l'effet, et Benseler n'aurait dû en être choqué." But neither Weil nor other admirers of this passage have pointed out how many instances of hiatus it contains.

²⁰ For hiatus before or after ἐγώ, ἐμοί, ἐμέ (non-enclitic forms) cf. 18.18, 40, 51, 114, 122, 180, 191, 193, 194.

²¹ Hiatus before or after (sometimes before and after) a parenthesis is quite common in Demosthenes, as a means of indicating the necessary change of tone after a short break. Some good examples are: (1) Before a parenthesis: 18.18; 19.94, 264. (b) After: 18.21, 197; 19.113, 150. (c) Before and after: 19.158, 330.

²² For hiatus when a parenthesis occurs between the article and the infinitive cf. 19.44, 94, 164.

²³ E.g. 18.28, 128; 19.184-85, 294.

Similar exploitation of hiatus can be found in other solemn and emotionally charged passages in *On the Crown*, for example in 201-5, but others are completely free from it, like the famous *μὰ τοὺς Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων* (208-10). It is also important to notice the absence of hiatus in abusive insulting passages, like 18.129-30, where Demosthenes claims to be describing the life led by Aeschines' parents, his father working as a slave in a school while his mother officiated in disreputable religious ceremonies. The same explanation applies to both passages. They call for quick delivery, which is often appropriate in an outburst that appeals to the emotions (whether to pride or prejudice) rather than to reason. A speaker who is making scurrilous accusations without evidence to support them will not give the jury much time to think nor will a speaker who is trying to stir up enthusiasm or patriotic sentiment or anger. Hiatus will slow down the delivery.²⁴

We might expect, therefore, that the variation between faster and slower tempo in Demosthenes would be marked by the absence or presence of hiatus. And we find that narrative often continues smoothly and swiftly until hiatus marks a turning point and introduces some protest or comment. A notable example is in *On the Crown* 149-52. Aeschines, says Demosthenes, has contrived to get himself appointed as *pylagoros*, so that he can take part in the Amphictyonic meeting at Delphi *καὶ τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων χειροτονησάντων αὐτὸν ἀνερχήθη. ὥς δὲ τὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀξίωμα λαβὼν ἀφίκετο. . . .* The hiatus after *ἀνερχήθη* marks the turning point after which everything is going to start happening quickly. Aeschines arrives in Delphi as the representative of Athens, makes a speech complaining of the Locrians of Amphissa, whom he accuses of encroaching on the Sacred Plain, stirs up the Amphictyons and takes them on a tour of inspection. The narrative is interrupted by hiatus

²⁴ There is hiatus in the first sentence of 130, when he interrupts the description. Other examples of unsupported accusation without hiatus are easy to find. For example 19.174-76 (*Φιλίππῳ, ὅτι* hardly counts, because hiatus before *ὅτι* is very common in all the orators). Some notable examples, as might be expected, can be found in *Against Meidias* and *Against Androtion*, e.g. 21.86-88; 22.47-50, 69-71 (where the final accusation ends with hiatus, *χρήματα κινῶν ἱερὰ, ὧν ἕνια*).

in 150 to complain that Aeschines' "quarrel" with the Locrians was not occasioned by any formal anti-Athenian protest on the part of the Locrians, and that Aeschines' own account of these events is quite inaccurate. The narrative is resumed with the account of the tour; the Amphictyons are assaulted by the Amphissans; this is the "incident" which Aeschines has planned, according to Demosthenes. The attempt to punish the Amphissans by raising an Amphictyonic "security force" is a dismal failure, until someone suggests that Philip be asked to take charge, and of course once Philip arrives with his army, ἐρρωσθαι φράσας πολλὰ Κιρραίοις καὶ Λοκροῖς, τὴν Ἑλλάτειαν καταλαμβάνει. εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ μετέγνωσαν εὐθέως, ὥς τοῦτ' εἶδον, οἱ Θηβαῖοι. . . . (152-53). Again the beginning of Demosthenes' comment is marked by hiatus; he declares confidently that he has proof of Aeschines' guilt: δὲ δέ μοι τὰ δόγματα ταῦτα καὶ τοὺς χρόνους ἐν οἷς ἕκαστα πέπρακται, ἵν' εἰδῇθ' ἡλίκα πράγμαθ' ἢ μισρὰ κεφαλὴ ταραξάσ' αὕτη δίκην οὐκ ἔδωκε.

The tremendous consequences are contrasted with the miserable creature who made them possible. The hiatus after πέπρακται marks it as a climactic word, and hiatus is often used to mark off a significant word or phrase for special emphasis. The defiant challenge ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ ὕδατι εἰπάτω (19.57) gains additional force from the hiatus,²⁵ and when Demosthenes denounces Aeschines with the deadly word διέφθαρται it is followed by hiatus (19.98).²⁶ All through the first half of *On the Embassy* he is determined that the Athenians shall remember what Aeschines had told them of the "blessings," the ἀγαθά they could expect thanks to his conversations with Philip, and he makes sure that the expression will not be forgotten by an abrupt hiatus after the word not only the first time that he introduces it (19.19),²⁷ but on four subsequent occa-

²⁵ Was hiatus in this challenge a rhetorical convention? It is to be found in 18.139 and also in 50.2 (a speech not written by Demosthenes). Cf. also Aesch. 2.59 ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ λόγῳ εἰπέ.

²⁶ Cf. 45.27 δοῦναι δίκην ὧν διεφθάρκει, ἣν ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ καλὸν λέγειν, and by contrast 36.20, where there is no wish to underline διεφθαρκέναι and it is not followed by hiatus.

²⁷ Cf. note 15 above.

sions, in 19.24 τίς γὰρ ἂν ἡνέσχετο, τηλικαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτ' ἔσεσθαι προσδοκῶν ἀγαθά, ἢ ταῦθ' ὥς οὐκ ἔσται λέγοντός τινος ἢ κατηγοροῦντος τῶν πεπραγμένων τούτοις; and again in 35, 92, and 124.²⁸

Demosthenes also uses hiatus to slow down the pace of his delivery when he is passing from the familiar to the unexpected, from familiar events where the details are not in dispute to a startling new piece of information, from conventional or orthodox argument or comment to matters that demand closer attention, from a formal polite request to a more urgent plea. For example, in the introductory remarks in *On the Crown*, after the usual request (in two sentences without hiatus)²⁹ that the jury "listen to both sides, as their oath commands them," he explains what this means—"not only complete freedom from prejudice, but willingness to let each

²⁸ In 19.150 more recent editors (Butcher, Mathieu), with good manuscript authority, print ἀντὶ δὲ τούτων δὴ τὰ θαυμάσι' ἀγάθ' ἡμῖν ἐμελλεν ἔσεσθαι, though Reiske and Weil prefer to keep the hiatus. It is difficult to guess how readily the elision of oxytone words was practiced by orators. I am not aware of any study that points out how frequently or infrequently it was admitted by different poets, though a preliminary survey leads me to believe that it was not very common in Attic tragedy or comedy—perhaps a dozen examples at most in any play. In this speech elision of ἀγαθά would be most unlikely in any of the passages before 150, but when these "blessings" are mentioned for the sixth time elision might be appropriate.

²⁹ Although modern texts print τὸν ἀγῶνα, ἔπειθ' and τοῦτό γε, ἀλλά, these should not be taken as examples of hiatus, because elision would be natural and easy, without any obscurity of meaning or rhythmic difficulty. It is no evidence of the author's intention if the manuscripts fail to indicate elision, and editors have to decide in each instance whether hiatus or elision is intended, that is, whether a break or the absence of a break is more appropriate to the context. A good test case is 18.10: εἰ μὲν ἴστε με τοιοῦτον οἷον οὗτος ἦτιᾶτο (οὐ γὰρ ἀλλόθι πού βεβίωκ' ἢ παρ' ὑμῖν), μηδὲ φωνὴν ἀνάσχησθε, μηδ' εἰ πάντα τὰ κοινὰ ὑπέρευν πεπολίτευμαι, ἀλλ' ἀναστάντες καταψηφίσασθ' ἤδη. This is the text printed in the Oxford and Budé editions, and the examples of elision and hiatus are well chosen. Hiatus after ἦτιᾶτο is indicated, partly because οὐ follows, but also because a short break is suitable to indicate the ellipse in argument (you surely ought to know what I am like, since I have passed my life among you); and after κοινὰ hiatus helps to underline the strong word that follows, although elision, even of an oxytone, would be permissible; and just as there is hiatus after the second parenthesis, after πεπολίτευμαι, it is appropriate that there should be hiatus before the first, after ἦτιᾶτο.

speaker present his case in whatever way he sees fit," τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον τὸ μὴ προκατεγνώκεναι μηδέν, οὐδὲ τὸ τὴν εὐνοίαν ἴσην ἀποδοῦναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ καὶ τῇ τάξει καὶ τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ, ὡς βεβούληται καὶ προήρηται τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων ἕκαστος, οὕτως ἔᾶσαι χρῆσασθαι (18.2).

Although hiatus before ἀλλά is so common as to be almost conventional, here it seems to add to the significance of the "not only . . . but also" formula, insisting on the importance of what is to follow. The hiatus before ὡς is also a good example of a convention; hiatus is very common before a comparison;³⁰ it is a natural place for a short break.

Two consecutive passages from *On the Embassy* illustrate particularly well how Demosthenes can start (without hiatus) to tell a story that at first seems to be of no special interest, and then use hiatus to mark a detail that deserves notice, as the point and significance of the story becomes clear. After the capture of Olynthus, we are told (192), Philip was celebrating his own Olympic festival in Macedonia ('Ολύμπι' ἐποίει, εἰς δὲ τὴν θυσίαν . . . , the hiatus marks the event as notable, providing the setting for the story), and at a reception given for the actors and other artists, where the guests had been told that any request made would be granted, he asked the actor Satyrus why he was the only one who had not made a request: τί δὴ μόνος οὐδὲν ἐπαγγέλλεται; ἢ τιν' ἐν αὐτῷ μικροψυχίαν ἢ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀηδίαν ἐνεορακώς; εἰπεῖν δὴ φασὶ τὸν Σάτυρον ὅτι, ὦν μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι δέονται, οὐδενὸς ὦν ἐν χρεῖα τυγχάνει, ἃ δ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἐπαγγείλαιθ' ἡδέως, ῥᾶστα μὲν ἐστὶν Φιλίππῳ δοῦναι καὶ χαρίσασθαι πάντων, δέδοικε δὲ μὴ διαμάρτη (193). Satyrus' reply is marked by three instances of hiatus. And when Philip insists, saying ὡς οὐδὲν δ' τι οὐ ποιήσει, εἰπεῖν φασιν αὐτὸν ὅτι ἦν αὐτῷ Ἀπολλοφάνης ὁ Πυθναῖος ξένος καὶ φίλος. . . . Here there is hiatus before Satyrus' reply and before the name of Apolophanes, a name that may startle some of the listeners, because (as Demosthenes will remind them) Apolophanes was one of the men who had killed Philip's brother Alexander (195). Hesitantly Satyrus asks Philip to free

³⁰ For hiatus before ὡς or ὥσπερ cf. 18.122, 127, 177; 19.70, 73; before ὥστε 18.59, 103, 120, 204; 19.19, 35, 48, 72.

the daughters of Apollophanes, who have been taken prisoner at Olynthus—*αἰχμάλωτοι γεγónασι καὶ εἰσὶν παρὰ σοί, ἡλικίαν ἔχουσαι γάμου*.

He offers to provide dowries for them if they are set free. The request creates a sensation among the guests, and Philip grants it. There is no further hiatus after Satyrus has pointed out that the girls are of marriageable age, and the story finishes without comment on the generosity of Philip, because this will stand out in comparison with the cruelty and savagery of Aeschines which the next story reveals.

This story too begins quietly, without any hiatus, a story of another party, where Aeschines was a guest, and after the drinking has started a free-born lady from Olynthus, a captive from the city, is introduced; they force her to drink with them and try to make her sing; and when she refuses, Phrynon and Aeschines say it is intolerable that a miserable Olynthian prisoner of war should give herself such airs, *καὶ 'κάλει παῖδα' καὶ 'ἱμᾶντά τις φερέτω.'* ἦκεν οἰκέτης ἔχων ῥυτῆρα, καὶ πεπωκότων, οἶμαι, καὶ μικρῶν ὄντων τῶν παροξυνόντων, εἰπούσης τι καὶ δακρυσάσης ἐκείνης περιωρῆξας τὸν χιτωνίσκον ὁ οἰκέτης ξαίνει κατὰ τοῦ νώτου πολλὰς (197).

There is only the one instance of hiatus; after the shocking order "Bring in a whip someone" there is no need for further devices to catch attention, and the story must be told fast, because (as Aeschines insists, 2.4-6, and as we may well believe him) there can hardly be a word of truth in it, although Demosthenes mentions the name of the guest who saved the woman's life by getting her away and says the story is well known in various places (198).

Demosthenes does not miss the chance of blackening Aeschines' character—"With this sort of behavior on his conscience he will proceed, no doubt, to tell us about his 'career' in that gorgeous voice of his"—*αὐτίκα δὴ μάλ' ἐρεῖ λαμπρᾷ τῇ φωνῇ · ἐφ' οἷς ἔγωγ' ἀποπνίγομαι · οὐκ ἴσασιν οὔτοι τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς . . . κτλ* (199). The jury will remember, surely, how he started as a boy, helping his mother in those disreputable religious ceremonies with drunken men rolling on the floor, and the rest of his discreditable struggle for existence? The brief parenthesis ("the thought of it chokes me") is set off by

hiatus; but there is no further hiatus because the words must come tumbling out fast, as in the parallel passage in *On the Crown* (18.129-30).

Most of the illustrations offered so far have been taken from *On the Embassy* and *On the Crown*, speeches which he wrote for himself to deliver in the courts. Was his practice different when he spoke before the Assembly on the Pnyx, once he had found the style that suited him? If we read the *Philippics*, bearing in mind that they are intended for delivery in the open air, we shall notice only a few differences in the use of hiatus. Already in the *First Philippic* hiatus is common before *οὐ* and its compounds, before *εἰ*, *ἐάν*, *ἵνα*, *ὅτι*, *ὥς*, *ἀλλά*, and before *ὥς*, *οὕτως* in presenting comparisons.³¹ It is also common before and after parenthetic clauses or phrases.³² And there are some "staccato" passages where hiatus is unusually frequent, as in 10, where there is a series of questions and answers, and 33, where a strict argument is presented.

Sometimes it seems that hiatus underlines a contrast or contradiction between two clauses or phrases, as in 20: *καὶ τὰ μέγιστ' ἐν τοῖς ψηφίσμασιν αἰρούμενοι, ἐπὶ τῷ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὰ μικρὰ ποιεῖτε*.³³ When he seems to be underlining a single word, it is not always clear whether he means hiatus or elision, as in 1 *εἰ . . . τὰ δέονθ' οὗτοι συνεβούλεον*, or 5 *τὰ χωρὶ' ἄθλα τοῦ πολέμου*, though the hiatus seems unavoidable in 16, *καὶ πλοῖ' ἱκανὰ εὐτρεπίσας*, thanks to the tonic accent on *ἱκανά*, as in 29, *προσποριεῖ τὰ λοιπὰ αὐτὸ τὸ σιγάτευμα*.³⁴ As in *On the Crown* he uses hiatus at times when he is demanding spe-

³¹ Before *οὐ*—4.14, 23, 29, 34, 40, 45.

Before *εἰ* or *ἐάν*—4.1, 6, 7, 31, 35, 41, 50.

Before *ἵνα*—4.3, 27, 28, 30, 38.

Before *ὅτι* or *ὥς*—4.2, 3, 4, 17, 23, 24.

Before *ἀλλά*—4.8, 27, 43, 45, 47.

Before *ὥς* or *οὕτως* in a comparison—4.39, 40, 51.

³² Before or after a parenthesis—4.7, 10, 12, 23, 24, 31, 35, 38, 50.

³³ Cf. 4.33, 34, 36; 6.12; 14.24.

³⁴ Cf. 1.28 *μικρ' ἀναλίσκοντες τὰ λοιπὰ καρπῶνται ἀδεῶς*, where some MSS have *ἀδεῶς* before *καρπῶνται*. Modern editors, understandably, think it excessive to have hiatus (or elision) after two oxytone words in the same clause. For the special case of oxytone words see p. 148 above and note 28 above.

cial attention, as in 35, when he addresses a direct question to the Assembly.

Demosthenes is not yet at this stage using hiatus in places where it makes a demanding passage even more difficult, but ten years later, in the *Third Philippic*, he starts out with a sentence that must have taxed his powers of breath control severely: *καὶ πάντων οἶδ' ὅτι φησάντων γ' ἄν, εἰ καὶ μὴ ποιοῦσι τοῦτο, καὶ λέγειν δεῖν καὶ πράττειν ὅπως ἐκεῖνος παύσεται τῆς ὕβρεως καὶ δίκην δώσει, εἰς τοῦθ' ὑπηγμένα πάντα τὰ πράγματα καὶ προειμέν' ὁρῶ, ὥστε δέδοικα μὴ βλασφημὸν μὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀληθὲς δ' ἧ · εἰ καὶ λέγειν ἅπαντες ἐβούλοντο. . . . κτλ.* (9.1).

Once he has started he cannot stop for breath until he reaches the end of the period; the hiatus after *δώσει* and *ὁρῶ* makes even a quick pause for breath impossible, and the hiatus after *ἀληθὲς δ' ἧ* adds further to the difficulty. The orator is giving a remarkable display of virtuosity, and there is a reason for it. He wants to shock his audience into accepting the unpleasant truth—"we could not make the situation worse if we tried"—and the intensity of his manner is part of the assault on their nerves. This is very different from a conventional proemium. It is the kind of sentence that ancient critics must have had in mind when they spoke of the tremendous impact of Demosthenes' oratory (even though they had never heard him speak); it leaves the listener as well as the speaker breathless. It is no surprise that the next period flows more easily, so as not to tax the speaker beyond his strength, with no hiatus until the very end, where it will cause no difficulty, since there is no hurry to start the next sentence.

It appears that Demosthenes was not completely convinced that the style of the *First Philippic* was right for speeches on the Pnyx, and in *On the Freedom of the Rhodians* he returned to his earlier style before attempting a second experiment in the new manner.³⁵ Hiatus is quite common in this speech and the other two early speeches to the Assembly (Orations 14 and

³⁵ I accept without argument the usual conclusion that this speech (oration 15) and Oration 13 were delivered after the *First Philippic* and before the *Olynthiacs*.

16), and is found generally in similar situations to those that have been noted in the *First Philippic*. But he seems not yet to be exploiting hiatus for any particular effect.

There seems to be a distinct change, however, with the *First Olynthiac*. The long and quite elaborate paragraph, beginning in 2, in which he reveals his own opinions (ἔστι δὴ τά γ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα) is completely free from hiatus, and the only instance of hiatus which occurs before he has finished describing the situation in 7 was probably made easy by the insertion of a semi-vowel, πανταχοῦ αὐτόν (4). The first example of significant hiatus is in 9, when he wants to insist on the opportunity that Olynthus offers, the καιρός. . . . αὐτόματος τῇ πόλει, ὅς οὐδενός ἐστιν ἐλάττων τῶν προτέρων ἐκείνων.

Does this mean that Demosthenes has found the way to use his forensic style of oratory on the Pnyx, building up quite long and syntactically elaborate sentences and speaking at a fast rate, and that he is doing it by avoiding hiatus? A statistically minded critic might deny it, pointing out that there are, proportionately, not many fewer instances of hiatus in this speech than in *On the Freedom of the Rhodians*, and that in both speeches one third of the instances occur at the end of sentences and another third preceding ἀλλά, οὐ, εἰ, ὅτι, ἵνα (the words which are most commonly preceded by hiatus).

But the statistical argument loses much of its strength when one looks at the *Second Olynthiac*. This speech begins with two long sentences of a quite agitated character, designed to attract attention, but expressing quite familiar ideas, so that they can be spoken fast; there is only one example of hiatus, right at the beginning, where it causes no breathing problem (the speaker could even pause for breath, if he chose, while the audience was settling down). In what follows hiatus occurs only at the end of colon or period, in places where it will create no technical difficulty; it is only when he reaches 9 that it becomes at all frequent, and this is where his manner changes. He must speak more carefully and slowly, insisting on every point now, because he is explaining where Philip's weakness lies. He says that war-time allies who have interests in common will stay together—καὶ συμπονεῖν καὶ φέρειν τὰς συμφορὰς καὶ μένειν ἐθέλουσιν ἄνθρωποι · ὅταν δ' ἐκ

πλεονεξίας καὶ πονηρίας τις ὥσπερ οὗτος ἰσχύσει, ἡ πρώτη πρόφασις καὶ μικρὸν πταῖσμα ἅπαντ' ἀνεχαίτισε καὶ διέλυσεν.

The hiatus before ἡ πρώτη πρόφασις makes sure that people will notice and remember this expression; and in the famous simile that follows (enterprises, like houses, will collapse unless the foundation on which they are built is sound) there is hiatus before the ὥσπερ and the οὕτω (10).

A few paragraphs later (18-20) he describes the crew of worthless blackguards that Philip has gathered about him; hiatus is avoided, because he will be speaking fast, as when he describes the disreputable early life of Aeschines; but when he returns to a more "solemn" theme, in the simile of the body politic, there are two notable instances of hiatus, which show how his pace has changed.

Limits of space make it impossible to examine each political speech separately, and two important questions still remain to be asked. Did Demosthenes expect his clients, for whom he wrote speeches, to appreciate the uses of hiatus? And did other orators besides himself follow a similar method or attempt to follow his example?

Some of his clients were of course better speakers than others. Diodorus, for whom the speeches *Against Androtion* and *Against Timocrates* were written (Orations 22 and 24), was a politician and presumably accustomed to addressing an audience. There is plenty of hiatus in these speeches in the usual situations, with some instances where the effect is to emphasize the word that follows;³⁶ and in passages where fast delivery seems to be indicated, when he is berating his opponent or telling a story in which the details may not all be strictly true, hiatus is often absent.³⁷

As for the man who delivered Oration 36 (*For Phormio*)

³⁶ Notable examples are in 22.2, 4, 10. It is also interesting to notice how common hiatus is before forms of ἐγώ in the opening sections of the speech. At about the same date Demosthenes was using ἐγώ excessively himself. Cf. L. Pearson, "The Development of Demosthenes as a Political Orator," *Phoenix* 18 (1964) 103-4.

³⁷ Cf. e.g. 22.52-57 (where hiatus occurs in the comment, not the description); 24.101-03 (the hiatus before ἀλλά in 102 hardly counts), 168-69.

because Phormio himself was unable to make a coherent speech, it is reasonable to suppose he was a capable but not necessarily a distinguished speaker. The speech has always been admired, and it is indeed beautifully adapted to the limited technique of a non-professional orator. Hiatus is not as frequent as in speeches for professional orators, and it never occurs in places where it would create difficulty for the speaker.³⁸ On the contrary it seems to help him, showing him where a brief break would be appropriate (without taking breath) at comma or colon, after *ὅτι* before an if-clause in 8, marking the contrast between *μέν* and *δέ* clauses in 7, and showing him where the marks of punctuation should come in 3. It shows him when he must insist on a particular word or phrase; in 12, for example, when he declares confidently that Apollodorus is lying when he says that Pasion put a special fund or *ἀφορμή* at Phormio's disposal in the bank, he offers as final proof the argument *ὅτι μισθῶν ἐτέροις ὑστερον ταῦτα ταῦτα τοῦ ἴσου ἀργυρίου οὐ φανήσεται προσμεμισθωκὸς ἰδίαν ἀφορμήν*. It is almost as though he said "Mark my words" at *τοῦ ἴσου ἀργυρίου*. A similar short break is appropriate in 45, when he is talking about sons of worthy fathers who turn out badly, *ὅτι ἔστιν Ἀρχεστράτῳ τῷ ποτε τὸν σὸν πατέρα κτησαμένῳ υἱὸς ἐνθάδε, Ἀντίμαχος, πρῶτων οὐ κατ' ἄξιαν*. The momentary break before *υἱός* is exactly what is needed.³⁹ This is not a violent speech, and its "smooth" style is well suited to a dignified delivery.⁴⁰ Towards the end of the speech, however, the speaker gives the impression that his patience is

³⁸ It is not used in long sentences, as in 15, where a professional orator might have used it, not even when he announces the conclusion to a long argument, as in 23-24.

³⁹ For hiatus before *υἱός* cf. Aesch. 2.28. Cf. also the hiatus before *ἐπέδειξα* in 42. Good parallels can be found in Lysias 1.8, where the speaker describes what happened at his mother's funeral, *ἀκολουθήσασα ἡ ἐμὴ γυνὴ ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὀφθεῖσα χρόνῳ διαφθείρεται* (*ὀφθεῖσα* marks the turning point, when his troubles began), 1.17, when he remembers that *ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ νυκτὶ ἐψόφει ἡ μέταυλος θύρα*, and 1.24 *δᾶδας λαβόντες ἐκ τοῦ ἐγγύτατα καπηλείου εἰσερχόμεθα*.

⁴⁰ Cf. the admirable remarks of L. Gernet, *Démosthène, Plaidoyers civils* (ed. Budé) I.204: "Ce qui est la marque du discours, c'est cette modération souveraine qui interdit les éclats de voix."

wearing thin, when he turns on Apollodorus with a series of questions, many of them separated by hiatus (53).

If we look at Oration 54 (*Against Conon*), which was written for a young man, we find even clearer instances of hiatus used as a marker in a sentence, to show where a short break should be made. In the opening paragraph, for example, hiatus marks the end of a series of phrases in the genitive absolute ("with my friends advising me not to give the impression . . .") before he reaches the main verb; *συμβουλευόντων . . . μὴ φαίνεσθαι, οὕτως ἐποίησα*. And in 6 there is hiatus before a *ἵνα* clause, so that his statement of what he will do is clearly distinguished from his purpose.

Hiatus is much less common than usual in this speech, so that it seems notable when it does occur. The narrative (3-12) is interrupted by hiatus in only a few places and evidently in order to achieve a special effect; for example, when the speaker wants to emphasize the rebelliousness of the men who disregard their commanding officer's order, *τοσοῦτου ἐδέησαν παύσασθαι ἢ αἰσχυνθῆναι, ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ θᾶπτον συνεσκότασεν, εὐθὺς ὡς ἡμᾶς εἰσεπήδησαν ταύτῃ τῇ ἐσπέρᾳ* (5), and when he reaches the climax of his description of their assault upon him in the Agora, *ὥστε τὸ μὲν χεῖλος διακόψαι, τοὺς δ' ὀψθαλμοὺς συγκλεῖσαι, οὕτω δὲ κακῶς ἔχοντα κατέλιπον* (8). The hiatus will suggest to him that this is the right moment for a breathless dramatic pause, just as it will warn him to slow down and speak solemnly, when he reports the physician's verdict and his own painful helpless condition, *καὶ ὡς μὲν ὁ ἱατρὸς ἔφη, εἰ μὴ κάθαρσις αἵματος αὐτομάτῃ μοι πᾶν πολλὴ συνέβη περιωδύνῃ ὄντι καὶ ἀπορουμένῳ ἤδη, κἂν ἔμπυος γενόμενος διεφθάρην* (12).

It may perhaps be a mistake to imagine that inexperienced speakers, like most of the clients of Demosthenes, Lysias, and Isaeus, could produce any special effect by the timely use of hiatus. But we are on surer ground when we investigate the speeches of Aeschines and find that his practice is in many ways remarkably similar to that of Demosthenes. Like Demosthenes he uses hiatus with special frequency before *ἀλλά*, *οὐ*, *ὅτι*, *ὥς*, *ὥστε*, and *εἰ*, but this may be regular practice recognized by most speech writers. More significant is the use

of hiatus before or after a parenthesis, before a *δέ* clause when the first word needs special emphasis to point the contrast with what has preceded, or in the middle of a clause to underline some particular word or phrase. For example, in *On the Embassy* he reports the statement of Demosthenes that he was not aware of anything irregular about Aeschines' behavior on the first embassy, *ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑστέρᾳ αἰσθέσθαι, ἐν ᾗ συναγορεύων μοι φαίνη* (2.123). And he complains of Demosthenes' assertion that "it was my speeches which made it possible for Philip to pass Thermopylae," *πιστεύσαντες δὲ οἱ Φωκεῖς ἐμοί, εἴσω πυλῶν αὐτὸν παρεδέξαντο* (2.130).

And as for the unfortunate Phocians, whom the Athenians asked to cooperate with the Athenian *strategos* Proxenos, *ἀντὶ τοῦ παραδοῦναι τὰ χωρία Προξένῳ, ἔδησαν οἱ τύραννοι τοὺς πρόσβεις* (2.133).

In *Against Ctesiphon* he complains that "these men" (Demosthenes and Ctesiphon and others like them) refuse to accept the legal definition of "public office," *ὅταν . . . ἄς ὁ νομοθέτης ἀρχὰς ὀνομάζει, οὗτοι προσαγορεύουσι πραγματείας καὶ ἐπιμελείας* (3.16). In the next sentence he makes the solemn statement that politicians must not question what the law lays down, *ὅταν δὲ ἑτέραν μὲν φωνὴν ἀφιῇ ὁ νόμος, ἑτέραν δὲ ὁ ῥήτωρ*, the majesty of the law must always be preferred to the impudence of the politician; just as the previous sentence used hiatus to emphasize the politician's shamelessness, here it is used to emphasize the majesty of the law. He repeats this rhetorical device a few sentences later, with hiatus once again before *ὁ νόμος, τοὺς τριηράρχους ὑπευθύνους εἶναι κελεύει ὁ νόμος* (19), and when he points out that even the Aeropagus is subject to audit, the momentary pause produced by the hiatus after the word can be taken as a mark of respect for this venerable council, *τὴν βουλὴν τὴν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ ἐγγράφειν πρὸς τοὺς λογιστὰς ὁ νόμος κελεύει λόγον καὶ εὐθύνας διδόναι* (20).⁴¹ Further examples of this device can easily be found.⁴²

⁴¹ This time there is no need for hiatus before *ὁ νόμος, ὁ νόμος κελεύει*, not *κελεύει ὁ νόμος*.

⁴² Cf. 2.30 (*ἀνοχάς*), 34 (*ἐξήγγελτο*), 45 (*ἐπαινέτης*), 85 (*ἐξώρκιζον*).

This is not the place to attempt a full comparison of the practices of Aeschines with those of Demosthenes, but it is interesting to notice how Aeschines alternates "smooth" rapid passages, of narrative or argument, almost devoid of hiatus (like, for example, the historical narrative of 2.172-77),⁴³ with insistent staccato passages. A good example of this kind of "staccato" passage is in *Against Ctesiphon*, when he insists on the law and Ctesiphon's failure to observe it, ὁ μὲν νομοθέτης κελεύει ἐν τῷ δήμῳ ἐν Πυκνὴ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ἀνακηρύττειν τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου στεφανούμενον, ἄλλοθι δὲ μηδαμοῦ, Κτησιφῶν δὲ ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ, οὐ τοὺς νόμους μόνον ὑπερβὰς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν τόπον μετενεγκών (3.34).⁴⁴

It is not the intention of this article to present the kind of statistical detail which a carefully devised program might elicit from a computer. It is hoped, however, that enough evidence has been given to convince readers that hiatus was used with a definite purpose by orators, in order to achieve certain effects, and that a speech with abundant hiatus is not necessarily less carefully written or less highly polished than one in which it is almost entirely absent.

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⁴³ E.g. 2.8-11, 94-96 (with one example of hiatus before ἀλλά in 95), 3.51-53 (a good "why should I mention?" passage, intended for fast delivery; it has some nice examples of easy hiatus), 79-81 (rapid narrative).

⁴⁴ Cf. 2.147; 3.42, 55, 104.

A REPLY TO JOHN COOPER ON THE MAGNA MORALIA

John Cooper, in his article "The Magna Moralia and Aristotle's Moral Philosophy," (*AJP* 94, 1973), attempts to provide a new case for accepting the *MM* as genuine early Aristotle.¹ His case falls into two parts: i) a hypothesis designed to meet the philological objections that have been levelled at the *MM* on the grounds of its language and style (the hypothesis being that 'the *MM* is a student's published notes of a course of Aristotle's, not based on any Aristotelian manuscript but on what he actually heard Aristotle say', 334);² ii) positive arguments 'founded on the philosophical content of the work' (337). Cooper thinks that 'there are many passages of the *Magna Moralia* of which "immaturity" of doctrine [sc. Aristotle's] is an extremely plausible explanation—and a much more plausible one than the alternative, that someone whose knowledge of Aristotle's teachings was drawn from the *Eudemean* and/or *Nicomachean Ethics*, wittingly or unwittingly, made alterations of the kind we find in *Magna Moralia*. Indeed, in two cases I think it can be practically demonstrated that this explanation is correct. When one adds the fact that the author himself claims to be Aristotle, by referring to the *Analytics*' doctrine of the syllogism as his own (1201 b 25), I think the matter is settled' (337-38). The largeness of this claim was what first stimulated me to a reply. As Cooper himself says, the issue is an important one: if he could prove that the *MM* contained Aristotle's early thoughts on ethics, then we would have in this work 'an extremely valuable tool for tracing out Aristotle's philosophical development, as also for the in-

¹ A large part of the paper is also devoted to a (mainly negative) assessment of the arguments for the same view offered by F. Dirlmeier, in his commentary on the *MM* (Berlin 1958). I agree almost completely with Cooper's criticisms of Dirlmeier.

² The same hypothesis has, of course, been put forward before, both for the *MM* (cf. Cooper, 331, n. 12), and for the *EE* (P. von der Mühll, *De Aristotelis Ethicorum Eudemiorum auctoritate* [Diss. Göttingen 1909]).

terpretation and evaluation of his moral philosophy itself' (328). But I hold that he cannot prove his case; and moreover that the usual view, that the *MM* is post-Aristotelian, is still the more plausible one. I shall confine my criticisms to the positive arguments Cooper bases on the two 'decisive' passages. I shall have nothing to say about the hypothesis of post-Aristotelian interference, which is there to square the main conclusion with the admitted fact that the work contains many non-Aristotelian elements. Nor have I anything to say about 1201 b 25; but this passage is clearly not sufficient by itself to prove authenticity, and in any case 'one must not expect to explain everything' (Cooper, 348).

The two passages on which Cooper bases his case are i) 1.1, 1182 b 6-1183 b 8; and ii) 1.33.

i) I summarise his argument on the first passage as follows. In this passage, the *MM* argues for the point that *πολιτική* should concern itself with what is good for us, not with some more general good. The two alternatives under the latter heading are, first, *τὸ κοινὸν ἐν ἑπασιν ὑπάρχον ἀγαθόν* (1182 b 11-12; later abbreviated as either *τἀγαθὸν τὸ ἐνυπάρχον* or *τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθόν*), and second, the idea of the good. Now in the corresponding passage in the *NE*, the only object of attack is the Platonic idea; and in the *EE*, while there is a short passage on *τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθόν*, the main weight of the argument is again directed at the Platonists. In the *MM*, on the other hand, the discussion of *τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθόν* is given far more space than that of the idea (in fact, roughly twice as much). Furthermore, the *MM* goes so far as to 'affirm the existence' of this *κοινὸν ἀγαθόν* (Cooper, 340), and even states its definition (1182 b 20-21), whereas the possibility of such a thing is ruled out by both the *EE* and the *NE*. Cooper then asks the question: 'Why . . . does a supposed post-Aristotelian writer take such a strong and independent interest in the unhypostatized *κοινὸν ἀγαθόν*? One might, of course, invent a controversy among Aristotle's successors on this point for the *Magna Moralia* to be engaged in, but for this there is no warrant. In fact close study of the texts shows that special interest in a non-Platonic *κοινὸν ἀγαθόν* marks a stage of Aristotle's own thinking, a stage earlier than that of the *Eudemian Ethics*. It follows that

the *Magna Moralia*, which betrays this interest, reports Aristotle's argumentation at that earlier time' (339). At the end of his discussion of the passage (of which, of course, I have tried to reproduce only the main parts), Cooper says that 'certainly no follower of Aristotle's, whether wittingly or unwittingly, can have produced our text out of the more orthodox arguments of the other works. These considerations show conclusively, I think, that at least the part of the first book just analyzed goes back to some Aristotelian text or discussion earlier than either *Eudemian* or *Nicomachean Ethics*' (342).

Cooper's argument is at first sight plausible and attractive. But there are, I think, several serious flaws in it.

a) 'No follower of Aristotle's . . . can have produced our text *out of* the more orthodox arguments of the other works' (my italics). This is certainly true. But then no one who maintains the usual view, that the *MM* is post-Aristotelian, and who has read the *MM* together with the *EE* and the *NE*, could seriously hold that the author was *totally* dependent on the Aristotelian texts.³

Admittedly, on Cooper's account, it might still be puzzling to see why this Peripatetic should have been so interested in a thing whose existence the master categorically denied. But in fact (b), there is considerable doubt about whether the thing the *MM* is talking about is the same as the thing whose existence the *EE* and the *NE* deny.

In order to make this point, it will be necessary for me to reproduce the relevant parts of the passage from the *MM*. It goes like this (from 1182 b 6): 'πολιτική is to talk about good—in what sense? For good is not simple. For what is called good is either what is best in each of the things that are, and this is what is choiceworthy through its own nature [or, through the thing's own nature: τὸ διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν αἰρετόν]; or it is what makes other things good by their participation in it, and

³ See for example D. J. Allan, '*Magna Moralia* and *Nicomachean Ethics*,' *JHS* 77 (1957), who concludes that 'the work is best treated as an example of Peripatetic criticism of the master, undertaken during the attempt to reaffirm his principal positions against the followers of Chrysippus' (p. 11; my italics).

this is the idea of the good. So should [πολιτική talk] about the idea of the good, or not, but [about good] as the common good subsisting in all things? For this would seem to be something different from the idea . . . So should [πολιτική] talk about this good that subsists in [things]? Or should it not? Because the common good is this, namely as [it occurs in?] definition and induction; and the process of definition tries to state the essence of each thing, either what [is] good, or what [is] bad, or whatever else it may be; and the definition states that good in general is of this kind, namely whatever is choiceworthy in and through itself; and what is in all things is similar to the definition; and the definition states that it is good, but no science or faculty states about its own end that it is good, but to consider this is the function of another faculty (for neither the doctor nor the builder states that health or a house is a good thing, but [the first] that this produces health, and how it produces it, and [the second that] this [produces] a house); so it is clear that it is not the business of πολιτική, either, to talk about the common good. For it too is one of the sciences, along with the rest; and it is, as we agreed, never the aim of any faculty or science to state this; nor is it then the part of πολιτική to talk about the common good as it appears in defining'. This takes us down to 1182 b 31. There follows a similar argument about 'the common [good] as it appears in induction' (1182 b 31-1183 a 6). The conclusion is that 'it is clear that we must speak about the best good and the best which is best for us' (1183 a 6-7). Tacked on is another argument which shows in general that 'it is not the business of any single science or faculty [i.e. of any *practical* science] to consider good as a whole': 'the good is in all the categories: for it is in the category of substance and in the category of quality . . . But the doctor knows the good in the category of time as it applies to medicine, the navigator as it applies to navigation, and so on with respect to each science . . . And each will know the good in the category of time as it applies to him; for the doctor will not know the good in navigation, nor will the navigator the good in medicine. So not even in this way must [a science] talk about the common good; for the good in the category of time is common to all the sciences. And similarly

the good in the category of relations, and in the other categories, is common to all the sciences, but it does not belong to any faculty or science to speak about the good in the category of time in each, nor again does it belong to πολιτική to talk about the common good' (a 7-23).

The first part of this passage is extremely difficult to disentangle. Stock, in the Oxford translation, hesitantly accuses the author of an 'elementary fallacy' at 1182 b 22-4 (in a note to the text): 'The definition λέγει ὅτι ἀγαθόν. No art or science λέγει ὅτι ἀγαθόν τὸ τέλος'. My own rendering avoids this: 'the definition states that it is good [i.e. whatever we are trying to show is good by reference to the definition: for the method, see b 32ff.], but no science or faculty states about its own end that it is good'.⁴ The point of the argument seems to be that the only way in which πολιτική would be involved in talking about τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθόν (ὡς ὁ ὀρισμός) would be if it needed to prove that something was good. But then why is it assumed that that something would be its end? There are surely plenty of other things whose goodness the πολιτικός might well need to show—i.e. the *means* to his end (cf. b 25-7). And that raises a further problem: how can 'whatever is choiceworthy in and through itself' possibly be intended as a general definition of 'good' (cf. Cooper, 340), when it would exclude good as means? (There is no indication that the definition is offered merely *exempli gratia*.) The trouble, I think, goes back right to the beginning of the passage. By good, the author suggests there, we mean either 'the best in each of the things that are', or the idea. Now in fact what he seems to mean is that *the* good has two senses: either it is the end of each individual thing (which is 'in' it in a fairly literal sense), or it is the idea. Next, he asks whether πολιτική ought to talk about the idea—or perhaps about 'the common good subsisting in all things', which he shows to be different from the idea. The 'common good' that 'subsists in all things' plainly *ought* to be simply goodness under its universal aspect, since the argument which proves its difference from the idea seems to imply (or at

⁴ For the general point that no science proves the goodness of its end, cf. *EE* 1218 b 22-4.

any rate implies in the corresponding passage of the *EE*)⁵ that it is essentially an unhyposatized idea, and the idea of the good covers all goods without qualification. But I believe that the author of the *MM* misleads himself, because of the similarity between the phrases 'the best in each of the things that are' and 'the common good *subsisting in all things*', into taking good things to be coextensive with ends. At any rate that would explain why the definition seems to be offered as a general definition of 'good', but looks so unlike one (because it is in fact a definition of good as end); and it might perhaps also explain why the argument assumes that if *πολιτική* made use of *τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθόν* (for 'definitional' proof) it would be proving the goodness of its end (because the author is generally confusing goods and ends).

If this diagnosis is correct, the suggestion that there is a 'common good subsisting in all things' would amount to no more than saying that everything has an end, which plainly does not contradict either the *EE* or the *NE*. If the diagnosis is wrong, it still remains true that the definition offered is not (and could not be) a 'common definition of "good"'. (Cooper's case derives much of its plausibility from the suggestion that the *MM* not only 'affirms the existence' (see d) below) of a *κοινὸν ἀγαθόν*, but 'has no qualms about' stating its definition.)

I turn now to the second half of the passage (beginning at 1183 a 7). The argument here is that each science knows (e.g.) about the good in the category of time (*καιρός*) only in so far as is relevant to itself; the doctor won't know about it as it affects navigation, and the navigator won't know about it as it affects medicine. 'So not even in this way must [a science] talk about the common good; for the good in the category of time is common to all the sciences.' This last sentence is puzzling. What we are supposed to be discussing is a 'common good' which is 'common' in the sense of being (somehow) 'in' all good things; what the *MM* presents us with here is one which is 'common' in the sense of forming part of the subject matter of all the sciences. But it looks suspiciously as if the author *thinks*

⁵ 1218 a 14-15.

he is talking about the same 'common good' as before (it is possible that οὐδ' οὕτως (1183 a 18) means 'not even if we take "common good" in this way'; but in that case the argument would not bear on the point formally under discussion, namely whether πολιτική should concern itself with 'the common good subsisting in all things').⁶ In any case, this new kind of 'common good' is quite obviously not that whose existence is denied by the *EE* and the *NE*.

c) 'In fact close study of the texts shows that special interest in a non-Platonic κοινὸν ἀγαθόν marks a stage of Aristotle's own thinking . . .' In fact it only shows that Aristotle believed in the existence of things he called κοινά; it does not show that one of these was a κοινὸν ἀγαθόν.⁷ (Moreover, if the *Topics* is early, as it is often considered to be, then we have in 107 a 3ff. clear evidence that the early Aristotle—though this is of course itself an ambiguous expression—was perfectly well aware of the ambiguity of 'good'.⁸)

d) Cooper says (340) that the *MM* 'affirms the existence' of a κοινὸν ἀγαθόν. I suppose the reference is to a sentence like 1182 b 13-14 τὸ δὲ κοινὸν ἐν ᾧ πασιν ὑπάρχει. Yet compare *EE* 1218 a 13-15 οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ταὐτὸ τῇ ἰδέᾳ · πᾶσι γὰρ ὑπάρχει κοινόν, which occurs even after Aristotle has effectively disproved the possibility of a κοινὸν ἀγαθόν.⁹ There is nothing unnatural about this; he is merely arguing hypothetically, as he announced he would—at least with respect to the ideas—at the beginning of the argument (1217 b

⁶ The *EE*, which aims a similar argument at the Platonic idea of the good (1217 b 35ff.), makes no such difficulties for itself.

⁷ Cooper seems to refer us to four passages in particular: *Alex. Aphr.* in *Met.* 79. 17-19 (*Περὶ ἰδεῶν*); *Soph. El.* 178 b 36ff.; *Met.* 1003 a 8-12, 1039 a 1-3. None of these even mentions a κοινὸν ἀγαθόν, nor am I able to find any single passage in Aristotle that implies his acceptance of such a thing.

⁸ Interestingly, too, the point about the ambiguity of 'good' is tied to a distinction between types of predication which is at least distantly related to the doctrine of the categories. Suzanne Mansion remarks on the close resemblance between this passage and *NE* 1096 a 23ff. and *EE* 1217 b 25ff. ('Notes sur la doctrine des catégories', in *Aristotle on Dialectic, Proceedings of the Third Symposium Aristotelicum* [Oxford 1968] 193).

⁹ I.e. in 1217 b 25-35 (cf. Cooper, 340, n. 27).

20ff.: the ideas do not exist; but even if there emphatically *are* ideas, they are of no use towards the good life). Thus I suggest that it is perfectly possible that the *MM* too is arguing hypothetically. After all, it discusses the ideas without denying their existence; and Cooper does not want the author to believe in *them*.¹⁰

ii) Cooper's main argument¹¹ based on the second passage (1.33) is as follows. The *MM* like *NE* 5, distinguishes two senses of justice: justice in the sense of what is prescribed by law, and justice in the sense of 'fair dealing'. But whereas *NE* 5 treats justice in both senses as being 'relational' (*πρὸς ἕτερον*), the *MM* 'contrasts the narrower with the broader sense of justice as respectively relational and non-relational . . . It is surely incredible that anyone writing a compendium of Aristotelian ethics should thus boldly contradict his main source' (342-43). On the other hand, it is easy to explain the difference—so Cooper argues—on the assumption of the authenticity of the *MM*: the *MM* simply has an inadequate idea of the relation between the two kinds of justice, which is improved on in *NE* 5. The *MM* draws a distinction between those acts of justice in the broader sense ('universal' justice) which are *πρὸς ἕτερον*, and those which are not; whereas *NE* 5 sees a way in which *all* virtuous acts can be considered as relational: 'in a well-organized city, according to Aristotle, the laws aim to advance the happiness of all the citizens in common (1129 b 14-19), so that, since happiness consists partly in morally virtuous action, the law "bids us to live according to each of the virtues and forbids us each of the vices"' (1130 b 23-4). Hence one may regard one's virtuous disposition and its exercise, whether private or public, as a con-

¹⁰ This at any rate seems to be implied by the statement on p. 342 that 'the suggestion that politics must study . . . the Platonic Form . . . was not [a live question]'.
¹¹ I.e. the one he appears to think strongest. For the rest, it is a matter of features which 'suggest' or 'support' his thesis. 'Suggest', 'support' here mean no more than 'are consistent with'; and the features in question are in fact also consistent with a properly formulated version of the thesis Cooper is attacking. I therefore restrict myself to the main argument.

tribution to the well-being of the city just in themselves . . . ' (344).

This argument, I believe, is no stronger than the last.

a) Of course no one writing a (mere) compendium would directly contradict his source; but see i) a) above.

b) It is still a moot point whether the 'common' books (i.e. *NE* 5, 6, 7, which supposedly also fill the gap between *EE* 3 and 7) are in fact common to the two *Ethics*. Until that issue is settled, we cannot decide the real force of an argument based on a contradiction between the *MM* and *NE* V; for if, as some claim,¹² *NE* 5 belongs to the *NE* and not to the *EE*, then the position represented in the *MM* could of course go back to the original *EE* 4.

c) In any case it is not clear to me that Cooper has correctly stated the relation, or contrast, between the two accounts.

The account in the *MM* runs like this (1193 b 2-18): 'the just is of two kinds, of which one is according to law. For they say that those things are just that the law prescribes. The law tells [us] to do courageous things and temperate things and in a word all the things that are mentioned under the heading of the virtues. Hence, they say, justice really seems to be as it were complete virtue . . . But it is not the just in this sense, nor justice in this province, that we are looking for. For in the case of these rules of justice it is possible to be just on one's own (for the temperate man and the courageous man and the continent man is such even by himself); but the just in relation to someone else is different from the just according to law that we have been talking about; for it is not possible to be just by oneself in the case of the things that are just in relation to someone else [sic]. It is the just in this sense that we are looking for and justice in this province'. The corresponding passage of the *NE* is too long to render with the same completeness; but the essential parts are these (from 1129 a 26): 'justice' and 'injustice' are ambiguous terms, though their meanings are so closely related that we can easily miss the

¹² E.g. Spengel, Burnet, Dirlmeier (references in C. J. Rowe, *The Eudemean and Nicomachean Ethics: A Study in the Development of Aristotle's Thought, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*, Supplement no. 3 [1971] 79ff.).

ambiguity . . . The man who breaks the law is unjust, and so too is the man who is grasping and unfair; evidently then the man who keeps to the law and the fair man are just. (Then follows a discussion of justice and injustice in the sense of fairness and unfairness.) 'But since we agreed that the man who breaks the law is unjust and the man who keeps it just, it is clear that all things that are according to the law are in some sense just; for those things that are laid down by νομοθετική are according to law, and each of these we call just. Now the laws make pronouncements about everything, aiming at the common advantage either of all or of the best or of those in power, or something of the sort; so that in one sense we call those acts just that tend to produce and preserve happiness and its components for the political society. And the law enjoins the performance of the actions of the brave man, such as not leaving one's station nor running away nor throwing away one's weapons, and the actions of the temperate man, such as not committing adultery or acts of violence . . . So this justice is complete virtue, but not without qualification, but in relation to someone else . . . And it is complete in the fullest sense because it involves the exercise of complete virtue. It is complete because the man who possesses it can exercise his virtue in relation to someone else too, and not merely by himself; for many can exercise virtue in domestic matters, but are incapable of doing so in relation to someone else . . . So the worst man is the man who behaves viciously both towards himself and towards his friends [neighbors], but the best man is not the one who [exercises] virtue towards himself but towards someone else . . . So this justice is not a part of virtue but the whole of it . . . What the difference is between virtue and justice in this sense is clear from what has been said: they are the same, but their essence is not the same, but *qua* in relation to someone else, [we talk about] justice, and *qua* such and such a state without qualification, virtue' (down to the end of 5.1).

Much turns on the interpretation of NE 1129 b 14-15 οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ πάντων. As most commentators have recognised, Aristotle cannot literally mean that the laws have something to say about everything. It is perfectly clear from

the surrounding context that he is referring to the law as such (and not to law *and* custom, as suggested by J. A. Stewart;¹³ for someone who goes against custom would scarcely be called *παράνομος*), and to what the law actually does (not to what it should do, as e.g. Grant suggests).¹⁴ It is just possible that he could be referring to Spartan rather than to Athenian law;¹⁵ but one would surely expect him to say that that was what he was doing. And Athenian law does not, so far as I know, make pronouncements about behaviour that does not affect others in some direct way. I therefore assume that Aristotle's statement is to be taken fairly loosely;¹⁶ he means, I suggest, that the laws pronounce about all *types* of behaviour, i.e. that they prescribe actions that belong to the fields of all the various virtues, without any implication that they pronounce about all actions whatsoever.¹⁷ True, Aristotle says merely that 'the law prescribes both the actions of the courageous man . . . and those of the temperate man . . . and those of the even-tempered man . . . , and so on according to all the virtues'; but again, if this is a statement of fact, as it is, then it does not mean that the law prescribes *all* the actions of the virtuous man. Now since the sphere of universal justice is identified with that of the law (and through it), and since the sphere of operation of the law is strictly limited in the way I have suggested, I see no room at all for the doctrine that Cooper attributes to Aristotle, that all virtuous actions come under univer-

¹³ *Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle* [Oxford 1892] ad loc.

¹⁴ A. Grant, *The Ethics of Aristotle* [London 1857] (cf. also W. D. Ross, *Aristotle* [London 1923] 209).

¹⁵ This is part of Grant's suggestion (he supposes Aristotle to be wistfully thinking of the greater degree of control exercised by the Spartan state over individual life).

¹⁶ A second alternative is suggested by Ross's Oxford translation: 'the laws in their enactments on all subjects aim at the common good . . .'. On this rendering, the difficulty would simply disappear. I take it that Ross is supposing an inversion of the regular construction, with the participle usurping the function of the main verb (parallels in Kühner-Gerth, II 98-99).

¹⁷ The same sort of approach may be implied in the dark statement by Gauthier-Jolif (Gauthier, R. A., Jolif, J. Y., *L'Ethique à Nicomaque* [Louvain/Paris 1958] ad loc.) that 'on ne voit aucune raison décisive de refuser à un athénien l'opinion exprimée ici par Aristote'.

sal justice. In any case, such a point would surely need explicit statement and defence,¹⁸ for it would involve cutting across the normal distinction between private and public behaviour. When Aristotle says that universal justice is 'complete virtue' (at any rate at 1129 b 26), or 'the whole of virtue', I take it that he means only that it includes all the virtues *in so far as they* involve our relations with others. This interpretation is supported by two facts: firstly, that he is prepared to contrast the use of virtue *πρὸς ἕτερον* with the use of it *καθ' αὐτόν, ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις*, and *πρὸς αὐτόν*;¹⁹ and secondly, that all the many examples he cites are precisely of actions that affect others in an obvious and concrete way: desertion, adultery, assault, slander, and so on.

Turning now to the *MM* passage: the substantive position of the author is that some actions that come under universal justice are *πρὸς ἕτερον*, some are not; but that all the actions that come under particular justice are *πρὸς ἕτερον*. Now the author's reason for including actions that are not *πρὸς ἕτερον* under universal justice is that universal justice includes all that is prescribed by law, and the law prescribes 'all the things that are mentioned under the heading of the virtues' (1193 b 5). Thus I suggest that the *MM* is committed, as the *NE* is not, to the literal truth of the statement that 'the law prescribes about everything'; for only in that case will its argument work. I believe that the author has misunderstood his source (whether *NE* 5, or an original *EE* 4), and has taken statements like 'this justice is not a part of virtue but the whole of it' at their face value; the result being that he is left with the contradiction that universal justice is *πρὸς ἕτερον*, but includes actions which are not *πρὸς ἕτερον*. (If Cooper's analysis of the *NE* passage is preferred to mine, then one can say just that the author of the *MM* missed the real subtlety of his source.) Hence, he tries to resolve the contradiction: it is really particular justice that is *πρὸς ἕτερον*. (This explanation has the special

¹⁸ This is not provided by the sentence 1129 b 14-19, on which Cooper seems mainly to rely; for just what are the acts that 'tend to produce and preserve happiness and its components for the political society'?

¹⁹ 1129 b 33, 1130 a 7. I see no good reason for taking these phrases differently from *καθ' αὐτόν* in the passage from the *MM* (Cooper, 343, n. 31).

advantage that it gives a reason for the extraordinary choice of names in the *MM* for the two kinds of justice—the one *πρὸς ἕτερον* is actually also *κατὰ νόμον*, and the one *κατὰ νόμον* is also mainly *πρὸς ἕτερον*.²⁰ In general, the *MM* passage seems to me to be not only inadequate but incompetent. In terms of Cooper's hypothesis, this might be due to the influence of the 'intermediary' to whom we are indebted for the *MM*; but in that case his influence is too pervasive in this particular passage for it to be useful for Cooper's case.)

i) and ii) The most important single point concerns the way in which Cooper phrases the alternative to his own view. To judge by the passages we have been considering, the author of the *MM* had a relatively independent, but erratic, approach. He begins from his source (that is, the *EE*;²¹ I leave it open whether the material corresponding to *NE* 5-7 is derived from there—which would probably mean assigning the books to the *EE*—or from originals now lost from the *EE*), and often borrows bits from it, but likes to develop his own arguments—with rather mixed success. He also has a tendency to select and simplify.²² It is of course perfectly consistent with this that he should be capable on occasions of a certain insight into his Aristotelian text. But the general impression—which I regard as actually confirmed by the passages Cooper singles out—is still one of a mind of relatively limited capacity. It is this, together of course with the linguistic arguments, that remains the core of the case against authenticity.

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²⁰ This point is obscured in Cooper's article ("‘legal justice’ is not *πρὸς ἕτερον*", 338, n. 23; 'the *Magna Moralia* . . . contrasts the narrower with the broader sense of justice as respectively relational and non-relational,' 342). Both here and with the other passage, a full description of what the author actually says would have made him look much less respectable than he tends to do on Cooper's rather selective account.

²¹ Those passages where he seems to follow the *NE* (cf. Cooper, 335, n. 19) are perhaps simply cases where his semi-independent approach happens to have led him to a position similar to that of the Aristotle of the *NE*.

²² And also to correct, at least if I am right in my view of 1193 b 1-18. (Cf. also n. 3 above.)

PUBLILIUS OPTATIANUS PORFYRIUS

The poems of Publilius Optatianus Porfyrius, and his exchange of letters with Constantine, are a contemporary witness for the emperor's reign and for his attitude to literature,¹ whose value is enhanced by the vicissitudes of Porfyrius' career: he was exiled, and later advanced to a double tenure of the prefecture of the city of Rome. But the poems and the letters can be related to their author's career, only if some degree of chronological precision is attained. The present article has three specific aims: first, to review the sparse evidence for Porfyrius' career; second, to argue that he composed a cycle of twenty poems for presentation to Constantine in 324 (viz. I – XVI, XVIII – XX, with XIIIa and XIIIb counting as two poems); and third, to propose that the poet's exchange of letters with Constantine be dated to November/December 312, immediately after Constantine became master of Rome.

If little claim to complete originality can be advanced, a fresh treatment of Publilius Optatianus Porfyrius can easily be justified. Although his life and career have been discussed several times in the present century, the results have been divergent, and the twenty poems have sometimes been distributed over a period of fully thirteen years (319 to 332).² Moreover, the

¹ Three critical editions have been published: L. Müller (Leipzig: Teubner 1877); E. Kluge (Leipzig: Teubner 1926); G. (I.) Polara (Turin: Paravia 1973)—I. *Textus adiuncto indice verborum*; II. *Commentarium criticum et exegeticum*. Where these scholars are named without an explicit reference being given, a reference should be understood (1) to Müller's introduction, pp. vii-x, (2) to Kluge's discussion of the dates of the individual poems on pp. 336-48 of the article cited in note 2, or (3) to Polara's commentary on the passage under consideration.

² See especially O. Seeck, 'Das Leben des Dichters Porphyrius', *RhM*, N.F. 63 (1908) 267-82; E. Kluge, 'Studien zu Publilius Optatianus Porfyrius', *Münchener Museum* 4 (1924) 323-48; E. Groag, 'Der Dichter Porfyrius in einer stadtrömischen Inschrift', *WS* 45 (1926/27) 102-9; R. Helm *RE* 23 (1959) cols. 1928-1936, s.v. Publilius 29; A. Chastagnol, *Les Fastes de la Préfecture de Rome au Bas-Empire* (1962) 80-82; E. Castorina, *Questioni neoteriche* (1968) 275-95.

Prösopography of the Later Roman Empire has done a grave disservice to scholarship by proposing to identify Porphyrius as the anonymous prefect of the city of Rome whose horoscope Firmicus Maternus discusses (*Math.* 2.29.10-20).³ The identification has already been uncritically accepted and employed in the largest and fullest commentary on Porphyrius' works yet to be published.⁴ The *Prösopography*, however, neglected to mention the cardinal fact that the subject of the horoscope was born in March 303.⁵ He must, therefore, be Ceionius Rufius Albinus, *praefectus urbi* from 30 December 335 to 10 March 337, and the horoscope has a relevance to Porphyrius of a type which has not always been perceived.⁶ The *geniturae pater*, that is, on the correct identification, C. Ceionius Rufius Volusianus, was exiled by senatorial decree after twice holding an ordinary consulate and appears never to have returned to high office — which may be very pertinent to the date of Porphyrius' own exile.

I: *The Chronology of Porphyrius' Career*

Apart from his poems and the two letters, there are only four items of explicit evidence for the career of Porphyrius; heterogeneous in nature and disparate in the testimony which they provide. It will be necessary to proceed from the certain to the conjectural, and at least partly in reverse chronological order. The Chronographer of 354 registers Publilius Optatianus as *praefectus urbi* twice, from 7 September to 8 October 329 and from 7 April to 10 May 333 (*Chr. min.* I, p. 68). The double tenure, and the brevity of each term, are abnormal, but the

³ *P.L.R.E.* I (1971) 649, Optatianus 3; 1006-8; Anonymus 12; cf. p. 1004: "the career fits best that of Publilius Optatianus Porphyrius (*sic*) 3 (*Praefectus urbi* 329 and 333), and no other contemporary".

⁴ Polara includes Maternus' discussion of the horoscope as "Testimonia de Optatiano" no. 3 (II, pp. 1-3). For the consequences, see his commentary on I: 13-18; II: 32, etc. Nor is that the only peculiarity in Polara's treatment of Porphyrius. He denies the authenticity of poems XXII and XXIV and of the exchange of letters with Constantine (I, pp. xxix-xxxii). The arguments advanced are very far from being persuasive, and the following pages will assume that all four pieces are genuine.

⁵ W. Koch, *Astrologische Rundschau* 23 (1931) 177-83; O. Neugebauer, *AJP* 74 (1953) 418-20.

⁶ For a full discussion of the horoscope, see *JRS* 65 (1975) 1ff.

source of the information is beyond reproach. Next, Jerome records 'Porphyrius misso ad Constantinum insigni volumine exilio liberatur', under the twenty-third year of Constantine (*Chronicle* p. 232^e Helm). The year intended is presumably A.D. 328/9, but Jerome's precise date has no authority,⁷ and involves the implausibility that Porfyrius would have been plucked from exile and almost immediately invested with the urban prefecture. A decent interval between recall and prefecture can safely be postulated, and the *vicennalia* of Constantine would be a more appropriate occasion than any other.⁸

The other two pieces of evidence are inscriptions. One, from Sparta, reveals that Publius Optatianus was proconsul of Achaëa; the city honoured him as a benefactor and saviour, and the expense of the statue was defrayed by M. Aurelius Stephanus, twice high priest of the Augusti (*SEG* XI, 810 = *AE* 1931,6). The discoverer of the inscription contemplated a date of 330 or 334.⁹ But no man is likely to have been proconsul of Achaëa after an urban prefecture. Publius Optatianus Porfyrius must have been proconsul either before his exile or between his restoration and first prefecture.¹⁰ The later date tends to be preferred.¹¹ But a date before 324 cannot be excluded,¹² and two very different possibilities are open: either after 316/7, when Constantine gained control of Greece in the War of Cibalae,¹³ or else a decade or more earlier, before Maxentius began to rule Rome and Italy. Although an equestrian *praeses provinciae Achaiae* is attested between 293 and 305 (*Corinth*

⁷ R. Helm, *Philologus*, Supp. 21.2 (1929) 89.

⁸ For amnesty on the occasion of an imperial anniversary, observe Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* 8.6.10; *Mart. Pal.*, praef. 2 (the *vicennalia* of Diocletian).

⁹ A. M. Woodward, *BSA* 29 (1930) 36.

¹⁰ E. Groag also admitted (implausibly) the interval between the two prefectures, *Die Reichsbeamten von Achaia in spät-römischer Zeit* (1946) 26.

¹¹ A. Chastagnol, *Fastes*, 82; *P.L.R.E.* I, pp. 649; 1077.

¹² For the high priesthood of the Augusti at Sparta, see K. M. T. Chrimes/Atkinson, *Ancient Sparta* (1949) 202ff. It cannot be deduced from the title of the high priest that *SEG* XI, 810 must belong to a date when there was more than one Augustus, i.e. before 324.

¹³ M. T. W. Arnheim, *The Senatorial Aristocracy in the Later Roman Empire* (1972) 50, 63, assumes that Constantine did not gain control of Achaëa until 324.

VIII, 2, nos. 23-25), there is also evidence for senatorial proconsuls in the same period: Eunapius speaks of a well-educated Roman as proconsul, apparently c. 300 (VS 9:2.3ff., p. 483f.), and C. Vettius Cossinius Rufinus, *praefectus urbi* in 315/6, had earlier in his career been allotted the proconsulate of Achaëa by sortition (*ILS* 1217).¹⁴

The second inscription which bears Porfyrius' name is a fragment found at Rome, in the Piazza Colonna, which contains nothing but seven names, all incomplete:¹⁵

TURRANIUS	
CREPEREIUS	RO
PUBLILIUS	OPTATIAN
CEIONIUS RUFIVS	VOLVSI
N. ANICIUS	P
CILIVS	
PR	

For the date, two quite distinct possibilities are open. The fourth name is universally identified as Ceionius Rufius Volusianus, consul in 311 and 314, a powerful supporter of Maxentius who maintained his standing under Constantine, at least initially.¹⁶ If so, the inscription should be earlier than his fall and exile, probably in or shortly after 315 (Firmicus Maternus, *Math.* 2.29.10-12), and may without difficulty be assigned to the very early fourth century. On this dating, Turranius[s] will be L. Turranius Gratianus, *praefectus urbi* in 290/1, and the fifth man may be Anicius Faustus, consul for the second time in 298, whose full name has been conjectured to be M. Junius Caesonius Nicomachus Anicius Faustus Paulinus.¹⁷ On the

¹⁴ For these governors, see now, respectively, *P.L.R.E.* I, p. 685, Paulus 11; p. 1013, Anonymus 45; p. 777, Rufinus 15, arguing that the proconsulate should be dated 306 or earlier.

¹⁵ I print a conflation of the two reports, *Notizie degli Scavi* (1917) 22 and *Bull. Comm.* 45 (1917) 225. The first element of the fifth name has been read both as '[I]YN' (F. Fornari, *Notizie degli Scavi* [1917] 22) and as '[AM]N' (A. Chastagnol, *Fastes*, 92).

¹⁶ For discussion of his family and career, see now *JRS* 65 (1975) 1ff.

¹⁷ He is so entered in *PIR*², A 601; G. Barbieri, *L'Albo senatorio da Settimio Severo a Carino* (193-285) [1952] no. 1802; A. Chastagnol, *Fastes*, 31-33. But

other hand, a date of c. 320 is sometimes adopted,¹⁸ and can perhaps be rendered strictly irrefutable by the easy (and probable) hypothesis that the great Volusianus had a homonymous son, father of C. Ceionius Rufius Volusianus, *praefectus urbi* in 365, and that it is he, not his father, who appears on the inscription.¹⁹ Turranius[s] will then be the prefect's son,²⁰ and Anicius P[aulinus] can be the man with those names who was *praefectus urbi* in 334/5.²¹

The earlier date, though not demonstrable, is clearly preferable, and E. Groag very attractively identified the names as belonging to members of a priestly college whom Maxentius induced (or compelled) to contribute to the building of a temple.²² If that is correct, then Porfyrius had entered the college earlier than a man who was born in the fifth decade of the third century,²³ and his own birth can hardly be assigned to a date later than c. 260/270. However, even on the other view, there would still be a chance, perhaps even a probability, that he was proconsul of Achaëa before 306 — and therefore born before c. 275.

II. Historical Allusions in the Poems

Long ago L. Müller printed poems I – XX under the title 'Panegyricus Constantini' (a title which appears in the manuscripts, but is not there confined to these poems alone), and poems XXI – XXVIII as 'Carmina reliqua'. (Poem XVII is

Barbieri later corrected the entry to read 'Anicius Faustus' (p. 640), and *P.L.R.E.* I, p. 329 registers him under these two names alone. The second, sixth and seventh names are of no aid in dating, cf. *P.L.R.E.* I, p. 767, Rogatus 2; p. 10, Acilius 1; p. 1001, s.v. PR.

¹⁸ A. Chastagnol, *Fastes*, 16; 57; 81; 92. But Chastagnol denied the relevance of the horoscope of March 303, which he attributed to a Vettius Rufinus (ibid. 65ff.).

¹⁹ This Volusianus may already be attested by *Cod. Theod.* 13.3.1 (dated 321 or 324). Clearly not the consul of 311 and 314 as 'préfet du prétoire II en 321' (A. Chastagnol, *Fastes*, 58).

²⁰ *P.L.R.E.* I, pp. 402; 925.

²¹ A. Chastagnol, *Fastes*, 92.

²² E. Groag (note 2, above) 102ff.

²³ Volusianus was *corrector Italiae* from c. 282 to c. 290 (*ILS* 1213; *CIL* X, 1655).

correctly rejected by Müller, Kluge and Polara as inauthentic: it is a metrical explanation of XVIII composed by a much later hand.) Moreover, Müller expressly asserted that the 'panegyric' was written in exile and dedicated to Constantine at his *vicennalia*, in July 325. Similarly O. Seeck, in his study of Porfyrius' career, though preferring 326.²⁴ But E. Kluge, followed by most subsequent scholars, assigned three poems to dates somewhat removed from 325/6, viz. VI to 322/3, X to 319, XVIII to 332. Since the *Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire* confuses the issue by referring to "panegyrics on the occasion" of Porfyrius' recall,²⁵ the evidence for the date of each poem must be reviewed individually. The essential and undisputed points of reference are as follows: (1) Crispus and the younger Constantine had been officially invested as Caesars on 1 March 317; (2) Licinius was defeated in the summer of 324, in battles at Hadrianople on 3 July and at Chrysopolis on 18 September; (3) Constantius was proclaimed Caesar on 8 November 324; (4) Constantine's *vicennalia* were celebrated at Nicomedia for a month beginning on 25 July 325 and again in Rome in the following summer, (5) Crispus was executed in the spring or early summer of 326, while the court was traveling to Rome.²⁶

I is clearly introductory and written in exile, but contains no datable historical allusion.

II seems to allude to the defeat of Licinius (25-28: 'armis civilibus ultor, . . . per te pax, optime ductor, et bellis secura quies').

III implies that Constantine rules the whole world (12/13: 'aurea iam toto, victor, tua saecula pollent, / Constantine polo').

²⁴ O. Seeck (note 2, above) 275ff. For the arrangement of the poems in the various manuscripts, see the table provided by G. Polara, I, p. xix.

²⁵ *P.L.R.E.* I, p. 649.

²⁶ For these dates, O. Seeck, *Regesten der Kaiser und Päpste für die Jahre 311 bis 476 n. Chr.* (1919) 165; 173ff. There are several errors in E. Kluge's discussion, 'Beiträge zur Chronologie der Geschichte Constantins des Grossen', *Historisches Jahrbuch*, XLII (1922) 89-102, some of which reappear in Polara's commentary (e.g. II, p. 77: 'Constantini victoriam ex Licinio a. 323 partam').

IV introduces V and refers twice to 'vicennia' (1; 7). One couplet is of some historical importance:

hos (i.e. Crispus and the younger Constantine) rupes Cirrhaea sonet
videatque coruscos
Ponti nobilitas, altera Roma, duces (5-6)

L. Müller identified the second Rome as Nicomedia, E. Kluge as Constantinople. The latter is surely correct, but Porfyrius ought to be writing before he discovered that on 8 November 324 Constantine had both formally founded the city and proclaimed his son Constantius Caesar.²⁷ For he speaks of two Caesars only (cf. XVI, 36). The poem, therefore, appears to indicate that Constantine already intended to establish a 'second Rome' on the Bosphorus in 324.²⁸

V celebrates Constantine's conquest of Licinius (3: 'Oriente recepto', etc.), to which it conjoins his *vicennalia*: the pattern reads 'AUG XX CAES X'.

VI alludes to a victory over Sarmatians (15) and to battles at Campona (18ff.), on the River Margus (22ff.), and at Bononia on the Danube (26ff.). The poem is normally dated 322/3 and used as evidence for Porfyrius' career.²⁹ Two passages are argued to prove that the poet accompanied Constantine, presumably as *comes*, on his Sarmatian campaign:

factorum gnarum tam grandia dicere vatem
iam totiens, Auguste, licet (16-17)

quaecumque parat (sc. Musa) sub lege sonare,
scruposis innexa modis, perfecta Camenis
vult resonare meis, et testis nota tropaea

²⁷ For the *dies imperii* of Constantius, see Arianus 14.5.1; *CIL* I², 276 = *Inscr. Ital.* XIII.2, p. 259; *Chr. min.* I, p. 232; *Notizie degli Scavi* (1936) 96/7 = *AE* 1937, 119 (with plain 'idibus Nob.' in error). The coincidence of the two events is expressly stated by Themistius: βασιλεῖ δὲ εἰκότως συνανξάνεται πόλις ἢ τῆς βασιλείας ἡλικιώτις · πυνθάνομαι γὰρ ὡς καὶ ἡμφίασεν ὁμοῦ ὁ γεννήτωρ τό τε ἄστυ τῷ κύκλῳ καὶ τὸν νῆα τῇ ἀλουργίδι (*Orat.* 4.58b).

²⁸ Porfyrius tends to be overlooked in discussions of the foundation of Constantinople: e.g. A. Alföldi, *JRS* 47 (1947) 10ff.; R. Janin, *Constantinople byzantine*² (1964) 21ff.

²⁹ G. Polara rejects the date for the poem but retains the inference: 'Optatianus aperte palamque dixit se bello interfuisse' (on VI, 17).

depictis signare metris, cum munere sacro
mentis devotae placarint fata procellas (31-35)

Neither passage necessarily entails that Porfyrius was an eye-witness of Constantine's battles, only that he is a contemporary who knows about them (16). On the contrary, the second passage implies rather that the poet's exile prevents him from being an eye-witness: his Muse wishes to depict the victories as such, when 'the fates soothe the storms of her devoted mind by a sacred gift'. Since the 'sacred gift' must be an imperial pardon, the poem need not show that Porfyrius was exiled after the Sarmatian campaign. It may, nonetheless, have been written immediately after it, in 322 or 323 (the year is uncertain).³⁰

VII also refers to the Sarmatian campaign (32: 'victor Sarmatiae totiens'), and hence, despite the mention of 'toto victoria in orbe' (29), was probably written before the defeat of Licinius. If so, one passage has some historical significance:

indomitos reges seu pacis lubrica victor
aut bello sternens aut mitis foedere, nutu
esse tuos facis agrosque exercere tuorum (20-22)

Porfyrius seems to be saying that Constantine has defeated Sarmatian kings and made a treaty with them, by which they work the fields of his subjects.

VIII refers to the sons of Constantine (6ff.) and their military achievements (33). G. Polara dates the poem to 320/1 and detects an allusion to the *quinquennalia* of the Caesars (6ff.), but E. Kluge had already observed that a date c. 325 is also tenable.

IX alludes to the defeat of Licinius (2ff.), names Crispus (24) and ends with the wish for a successful celebration of the emperor's *vicennalia* and his sons' *decennalia* (35/36).

X is commonly dated to 319, on the strength of a reference to Crispus and the Franci:

paras nunc omine Crispi
Oceani intactas oras, quibus eruta Franci
dat regio procul ecce deum, cui devia latis
tota patent campis. (25-28)

³⁰ For the date of 322, most are content to appeal to O. Seeck, *Regesten*, 172. But Seeck adduced only Porfyrius and Zosimus 2.21, neither of whom actually states a date.

E. Kluge claimed that the poem was written to celebrate Crispus' victory over the Franci (which she dated to 319).³¹ But Porfyrius' main emphasis is surely on a future campaign by Constantine himself: with Crispus' earlier success as a good omen, he will reach the untouched shores of the Ocean. A phrase such as 'concordi saeclo' (21) and the line 'aspice! pacato parta est lux laeta sub orbe' (35) suggest that the poem was written after Licinius' defeat.

The words of the pattern, which include the phrase 'pater imperas, avus imperes', have commended a date in 322 to G. Polara, who puts the poem before Constantine's Sarmatian campaign, at a time when the wife of Crispus was known to be pregnant. However, since the child in question is attested only by a single allusion (*CTh* IX, 38, 1, of 30 October 322), she probably died in infancy, and the subjunctive of 'avus imperes' could have been equally apt in 324.

XI expressly celebrates the defeat of Licinius.

XII is normally also held to celebrate the defeat of Licinius, and the description of Constantine as 'mundi gloria, consul' (1) is often held to refer to his consulate in 326: hence O. Seeck dated the poem to that year, while E. Groag argued that Porfyrius used the term in autumn 325 in anticipation of Constantine's consulate on the following 1 January.³² But G. Polara has correctly observed that the future tenses (e.g. 3/4: 'mox carus Eois/tot populis pia iura feres') and the plea to Constantine to rescue the world (15-18) show that Porfyrius is writing before the defeat of Licinius (which Polara mistakenly here dates to 323). But what of 'consul'? Constantine was not in fact consul between 320 and 326. E. Kluge proposed to take the word as a synonym for 'consiliarius' or 'consultor',³³ and Polara alleges that it is 'generatim positum'. A better hypothesis is that Porfyrius, writing in the summer of 324, expected Constantine, after his impending victory, to become consul for the next year. It must surely have come as a surprise to many when one of the consuls of 325 was Licinius' pretorian prefect.³⁴

³¹ P. Bruun, *RIC* 7 (1966) 76, prefers 318.

³² O. Seeck (note 2, above) 275; E. Groag (note 2, above) 104.

³³ E. Kluge (note 26, above) 92f.

³⁴ viz. Julius Julianus (*P.L.R.E.* I, pp. 478/9).

XIIIa, XIIIb and XIV again celebrate the defeat of Licinius. XIIIa and XIIIb should be regarded as two poems, since they would have been written separately, presumably as a sort of diptych.

XV seems to contain no precise historical allusion.

XVI is normally dated after the defeat of Licinius, but G. Polara has observed that the poem speaks rather of a Constantine who rules Italy, Africa and the horrid north (10ff.) but not yet the whole world:

undique pakatis salvator maxima rebus
gaudia praestabis, dabis otia victor in orbe;
virtutum meritis vicennia praecipe vota. (33-35)

Although Polara dates the poem to 322, a date early in 324 cannot be excluded.

XVIII is commonly dated to 332, on the strength of the mention of Getae (11ff.), taken as an allusion to a Gothic war in that year (*Exc. Vales.* I, 31; *Chr. min.* I, p. 234). But the alleged allusion should be otherwise interpreted:

vincere florenti Latiales Sarmata ductu
rex tibi posse Getas viso dat limite, ultor.
vidit te, summum columnen, qua velifer aestu
serus in Oceani pressit iuga Nysia pontus,
atque rudis radii scit lux exorta tropaea (11-15)

The first two lines (as G. Polara sees) allude to the Sarmatian victory of 322 or 323, the last three to Constantine's conquest of the east in 324. Moreover, civil war has recently ended and the emperor is styled consul:

Alme, tuas laurus aetas sustollet in astra.
luce tua signes fastus sine limite consul!
Marte serenus habes reiecto munia Graium
et Medi praestas in censum sceptrata redire. (1-4)

Again (as in XII, 1), an allusion may be detected to a consulate which Constantine was expected to assume on 1 January 325.

XIX alludes to the *vicennalia* (12; 30ff.) and its pattern contains the letters 'VOT. XX'. Further, the pattern (of a ship) appears to allude to Crispus' naval victory at Chrysopolis (36: [sc. pagina] 'Augustae subolis memorans insignia fata').

XXa and XXb are a single poem. For all the twenty-six lines in XXa have eighteen letters, while the twenty-six in XXb ascend one by one from twenty-five to fifty letters: set on their sides, with 'Augusto victore iuvat rata reddere vota' between them, the two halves of the poem depict an organ (described in XXb). The poem refers to the celebration in Rome of recent victories of the emperor and the Caesars (XXa. 1ff.)³⁵ — and to the poet's enforced and unwilling absence.

Poems XXI – XXVIII differ considerably, both from the preceding poems and from one another. None is addressed to Constantine, there is no common theme or group of themes, and while one is a hymn to Christ (XXIV), another depicts a pagan altar (XXVI, esp. 1: 'vides, ut ara stem dicata Pythio'), and a third invokes pagan deities (XXVII). Only two of these poems contain anything indicating a date: XXI attributes its existence to one Bassus (14/15: 'Bassus nunc proderet carmen/imperat'), while XXII refers to the consulate of its unnamed addressee (33). O. Seeck identified the addressee of XXII with Bassus, and both with the Bassus consul in 317.³⁶ The identification, if correct, would indicate that at least two of these poems were written some years before those which Porfyrius addressed to Constantine.³⁷

Poem XXIII deserves to be brought to the attention of students of late imperial prosopography. Porfyrius warns a Greek friend from Phrygia of his wife's adultery. The *versus intextus* reads

Μάρκε τέην ἄλοχον, τὴν Ὑμνίδα, Νεῖλος ἐλαύνει.

The poet claims to be giving the real names (XXIII, 9): two senators with the *cognomen* Nilus are known from the middle of the fourth century.³⁸

³⁵ Not necessarily the *vicennalia*, as appears to be universally assumed.

³⁶ O. Seeck (note 2, above) 270f. Now known to be Caesonius Bassus (*P.L.R.E.* I, p. 154).

³⁷ Identity with Junius Bassus, consul in 331, is hesitantly preferred by A. Chastagnol, *Fastes*, 81; *P.L.R.E.* I, p. 155.

³⁸ *P.L.R.E.* I, p. 632.

III. Porfyrius and Constantine

From the facts set out so far, it is a legitimate inference (though not a necessary one) that Porfyrius composed a cycle of twenty poems (viz. I – XIIIa, XIIIb – XVI, XVIII – XX), which he intended to be presented to Constantine in support of his plea to be restored from exile. Most of the poems were written after Constantine defeated Licinius, and several passages refer to the emperor's *vicennalia* (325/6) and to the *decennalia* of the Caesars (326/7). Can a precise date be deduced? O. Seeck argued for the early months of 326,³⁹ while E. Kluge and others date many (though not all) of the poems to Constantine to the preceding year. But Porfyrius speaks of two Caesars alone (XVI.36), and never alludes to the Caesar proclaimed on 8 November 324. Accordingly, a slightly earlier date seems preferable: let it be proposed that Porfyrius finished and dispatched his cycle of poems pleading for mercy in the autumn of 324, and was recalled from exile shortly thereafter.⁴⁰

The extant poems to Constantine were not the first which Optatianus addressed to the emperor. He had presented expensively decorated manuscripts before his exile:

Quae quondam sueras pulchro decorata libello
 carmen in Augusti ferre, Thalia, manus,
 ostro tota nitens, argento auroque coruscis
 scripta notis, picto limite dicta notans,
 scriptoris bene compta manu meritoque renidens
 gratificum, domini visibus apta sacris,
 pallida nunc, . . .
 hinc trepido pede tecta petis venerabilis aulae (I.1-9)

Some of these poems may have been bucolic, for Porfyrius describes himself as 'ruris vates' (XV.15). It is accordingly of some interest that Porfyrius seems to reveal that he was African by origin (XVI.16ff.).⁴¹ In Africa at least, Latin culture and literature maintained an existence through the dark days of the

³⁹ O. Seeck (note 2, above) 267ff.

⁴⁰ Similarly, but not quite accurately, *P.L.R.E.* I, p. 649: "presumably composed in 324 and early 325, since no mention is made of Constantius Caesar".

⁴¹ O. Seeck (note 2, above) 268ff.

third century, and Nemesianus of Carthage wrote pastoral eclogues and didactic poetry c. 280.⁴²

The exchange of letters between Porfyrius and Constantine belongs to this earlier period, before the poet's exile. The imperial titles probably indicate a date before 324: 'domino Constantino maximo pio invicto et venerabili semper Augusto' and 'Invictus Constantinus Maximus Augustus'.⁴³ There is no allusion to the poet's exile or restoration, and the correspondence appears to proceed on the assumption that its occasion is Porfyrius' first (or possibly second) presentation of poems to the emperor.⁴⁴ A precise date can be divined. In autumn 312, Constantine defeated Maxentius and gained control of Italy and Africa, the Roman Senate rapidly came to terms with their new master and declared him to be the senior ruling Augustus.⁴⁵ If Optatianus speaks of 'clementia tua' (*Ep. Porfyrii* 1;9), of 'tua manus victrices' (2) and Constantine's legislation (6), and refers to his position as the first of the emperors (6: 'et invictus semper et primus es'), that may suggest that the letter was written in November/December 312 by one who had supported the defunct régime.

If this conjecture (it is no more) can be admitted, then Constantine's reply takes on a greater significance. For it becomes a sort of cultural manifesto, issued by the new ruler of Italy and Africa:

saeculo meo scribentes dicentesque non aliter benignus
auditus quam lenis aura prosequitur; denique etiam
studiis meritum a me testimonium non negatur (*Ep. Constantini* 6/7)

IV. *The Life of Porfyrius*

The occasion of the poet's exile can now be discussed. E.

⁴² Nemesianus, *Cynegetica* 64 alludes to 'divi fortissima pignora Cari', which entails a date of 283/4. On the cultural context, cf. *Tertullian. A Historical and Literary Study* (1971) 187ff.

⁴³ For the forms of Constantine's official titulature, *Diz. ep.* I, pp. 645ff. After 324 one would expect the inclusion of 'victor' or 'triumphator'.

⁴⁴ Many of the correct arguments were used by L. Müller, in his preface, p. ix.

⁴⁵ Lactantius, *Mort. Pers.* 44.11.

Groag once proposed that Porfyrius' exile (which he dated after 322) should be connected with the fall of Ceionius Rufius Volusianus, whom he also conjectured to be a relative.⁴⁶ That hypothesis can stand, in a modified form. The poem from which Groag deduced that Porfyrius was still in favour at court in 322 will not bear that interpretation (VI), and Volusianus, who was exiled when his enemies combined to overcome him in the Roman Senate (Firmicus Maternus, *Math.* 2.29.11-12), probably fell in or shortly after 315. There is no obstacle to supposing that Publilius Optatianus Porfyrius was exiled as a result of the same political conflict.

For clarity, and ease of verification (or disproof), the various hypotheses argued above can be stated schematically:—

Publilius Optatianus Porfyrius

born c. 260/270

proconsul of Achaëa before 306

Epistula ad Constantinum November/December 312

exiled in or shortly after 315

presented poems I – XX to Constantine in autumn 324

recalled from exile early in 325

praefectus urbi 7 September-8 October 239 and again 7 April-10 May 333.

Only the prefecture of the city of Rome (it must be emphasized) is firmly dated by reliable evidence: the rest depends strictly and solely on hypothesis and conjecture.⁴⁷

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⁴⁶ E. Groag (note 2, above) 107f.

⁴⁷ E. Castorina arrived at a similar general chronology, though by a slightly different route: "Tutto ciò, in definitiva, fa ritenere quanto mai probabile che già ai primi anni del IV secolo, e forse anche agli ultimi del III, Porfirio abbia poetato da *neotericus*" (note 2, above) 278.

I am grateful to my colleague Richard Tarrant for much helpful advice on the interpretation of Porfyrius' poems.

THE IDENTITY OF LEON

One of the most intractable problems facing the historian of late fifth-century Athens is that of fully identifying the protagonists. Often these men are known to us only by proper name, without patronymic or demotic; worse yet, the same proper name sometimes crops up in such different contexts as to suggest that more than one person might be involved. A case in point involves the name of Leon. Both Thucydides and Xenophon briefly record the activities of a general Leon (a Leon was a member of the *strategia* in 412/411 and 406/405);¹ and there can be little doubt that they are referring to the same man. But Thucydides also lists another Leon who signed both the Peace of Nicias and the fifty-year pact between Athens and Sparta in 421,² and Xenophon mentions a Leon of Salamis, who was arrested and condemned to death by the Thirty Tyrants in 404.³ Can either or both of these Leons be identified as the Athenian general? Gomme says that the Leon who signed the Peace of Nicias "may be the general of the Ionian War,"⁴ and Meyer, without hesitation, identifies the general Leon as Leon of Salamis.⁵ Indeed it is conceivable that all three Leons are the same person. The floruit is realistic, and the composite portrait which emerges (albeit unembellished) is quite consis-

¹ Thuc. 8.23-24, 54-55, 73; Xen., *Hell.* 1.5.16, 6.16; see also J. Beloch, *Die attische Politik* (Leipzig 1884) 293-94.

² Thuc. 5.19.2, 24.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.39.

⁴ A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, III (Oxford 1956) 680; see also J. Kirchner, *Prosopographia Attica*, II (Berlin 1903), #9100. Cf. and contrast A. Andrewes and D. M. Lewis, *JHS* 77.2 (1957), 179-180.

⁵ E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*⁴, V (Stuttgart 1958) 20 (hereafter Meyer, *G.d.A.*); see also G. E. Underhill, *A Commentary on the Hellenica of Xenophon* (Oxford 1900) 60 (hereafter Underhill, *Commentary*). It has also been suggested that this Leon can be identified with the speaker of Lysias 10; see Andrewes and Lewis, *JHS* 77.2 (1957) 179, n. 10. The suggestion is very attractive (see especially Lys. 10.4, 5, 27) save for one particular: that he was never a prisoner of the Spartans. I prefer to suppose that the general Leon was indeed captured by the Spartans in 406.

tent. But there are two serious drawbacks as regards the second identification: 1) we do not know what happened to the general Leon after 406; 2) none of the sources which note the arrest of Leon Salamis say that he was a general.⁶ The evidence is certainly worth reexamining.

The general Leon served the Athenian state with distinction. While his career was less than spectacular, he was a competent military officer who was never guilty of official misdemeanor or involved in political machinations of any kind. We first hear of him during the summer of 412, when he was one of several generals sent to Ionia in an effort to reassert Athenian control over those states which had recently revolted from the empire. Together with his colleague Diomedon (with whom he seems inseparately linked as a military partner), he restored conditions on the island of Lesbos and brought Clazomenae back into the Athenian alliance.⁷ The two generals then devastated various sites on the island of Chios,⁸ after which they presumably returned to Athens. At least Thucydides insinuates that both were present in Athens at the time of Pisander's visit during the winter of 412/411, since they were immediately sent out again to Ionia to replace Phrynichus and Scironides as commanders of the Athenian fleet.⁹ Even though it was still winter, Leon and Diomedon led a campaign against the island of Rhodes where the ships of the Peloponnesians had been hauled ashore. The results were indecisive: they defeated on land the Rhodians who came to the aid of the Peloponnesian fleet, but they were apparently unable to damage the fleet itself. They soon abandoned the island and carried on the war from Chalce where they could also keep a watchful eye for any sudden movement of the Peloponnesian navy.¹⁰ Later they returned to the Athenian base at Samos.¹¹

Leon surely was not associated with the intrigues of those

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.39; Plat. *Apol.* 32 C; Andoc. 1.94.

⁷ Thuc. 8.23.

⁸ Thuc. 8.24.2-3.

⁹ Thuc. 8.54.3: . . . ἀντέπεμψαν δὲ στρατηγοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς Διομέδοντα καὶ Λέοντα.

¹⁰ Thuc. 8.55.1.

¹¹ Thuc. 8.60.3.

'influential'¹² Athenians assigned to the fleet who had formed a conspiracy against the democratic governments of both Athens and Samos. On the contrary, he was among the Athenians who came to the assistance of the Samian democrats¹³ and was at least partly responsible for preventing the oligarchic coup on Samos.¹⁴ Nevertheless, when the news reached Samos that the Four Hundred had assumed power in Athens, Leon, like the other generals, was deposed by the personnel of the fleet.¹⁵ Presumably he returned to Athens, an innocent victim of the soldiers' suspicions.

According to Xenophon, Leon was among the generals elected to succeed Alcibiades and his colleagues,¹⁶ but his inclusion on the strategía of 406/405 is a subject of controversy, especially since Diodorus (or Ephorus), who seems to have copied his list of generals from Xenophon,¹⁷ omits Leon and names instead a certain Lysias.¹⁸ Xenophon, however, was also cognizant of this Lysias and, like Diodorus,

¹² Thuc. 8.47ff.

¹³ Thuc. 8.73.4-6. See Appendix.

¹⁴ Thucydides says that whenever Leon and Diomedon sailed elsewhere, they left some ships behind so as to protect the Samians against the possibility of a revolt. Thucydides does not make it clear, however, whether Leon himself actually participated in suppressing the rebellion.

¹⁵ Thuc. 8.76.2. G. Busolt (*Griechische Geschichte*, III.2 [Gotha 1904] 1493, n. 1 [hereafter Busolt, *G.G.*]) comments: "Es wurden mithin alle Strategen (Leon und Diomedon wohl wegen ihrer gemässigten Gesinnung) durch andere ersetzt."

¹⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.16. Xenophon's list reads as follows: Conon, Diomedon, Leon, Pericles, Erasinides, Aristocrates, Archestratus, Protomachus, Thrasylus, and Aristogenes.

¹⁷ Meyer, *G.d.A.*⁴, IV.2 (Stuttgart 1956) 344-45, n. 2.; see also Busolt, *G.G.*, III.2, 1580-81, n. 4.

¹⁸ Diod. 13.74.1. Diodorus' (Ephorus') list reads as follows: Conon, Lysias, Diomedon, Pericles, Erasinides, Aristocrates, Archestratus, Protomachus, Thrasylus (this should be Thrasylus), and Aristogenes.

In addition to the Leon-Lysias discrepancy, scholars are divided as regards the occasion of the election(s) itself. Some think that Alcibiades and certain of his colleagues on the strategía of 407/406 were 'cashiered' shortly after the battle of Notium and thus prior to the official termination of their tenure of office (e.g. Busolt, *G.G.*, III.2, 1578, n. 2; Meyer, *G.d.A.*⁴, IV.2, 337 and n. 1). Others contend that none of the generals for 407/406 were deposed (including Alcibiades), but rather that certain of them were not reelected at the

says that he was one of the eight Athenian generals at the battle of Arginusae,¹⁹ a battle in which Leon did not participate. But why doesn't Xenophon include the name of Lysias on his original list? Are we to suppose a careless error?²⁰ If so, how are we to explain Xenophon's statement in *Hellenica* 1.6.16: that the generals Leon, Conon, and Erasinides were blockaded in the harbor of Mytilene by the Spartan admiral Callicratidas and the Peloponnesian fleet at least one month prior to the battle of Arginusae? Before we reject one source at the expense of the other, we should try to see if the apparent discrepancy between Xenophon and Diodorus can be resolved.

One relevant item concerns the death of the general Arches-tratus who was also a member of the original strategia of 406/405.²¹ Lysias says that this Arches-tratus died at Mytilene²² (an oversight on the part of both Xenophon and Diodorus), but he does not relate the particular circumstances. Apparently Arches-tratus was not blockaded with Conon at Mytilene, nor did he participate in the battle of Arginusae. Hence he probably lost his life on some occasion prior to either of these events. But when? The most likely explanation is that Arches-tratus died in the course of the naval battle(s) which immediately preceded the Spartan blockade at Mytilene.

Xenophon provides a meager and somewhat confused ac-

time of the regular strategic elections for 406/405 (e.g. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*², II.2 (Berlin-Leipzig, 1931) 250-51; Underhill, *Commentary*, 23; H. Swoboda, s.v. "Leon," *RE* XII (1925), col. 2006; M. Valetton, *Mnemos.* N.S. 48 (1920) 38; C. Fornara, *The Athenian Board of Generals from 501 to 404* (Wiesbaden 1971) 70, n. 123 (hereafter Fornara, *Generals*)). The second interpretation is simpler and more reasonable. Otherwise we must suppose that the generals who superseded Alcibiades et al. at the time of the special election were soon reelected, together with other members of the strategia of 407/406 (e.g. Conon and Aristocrates), as the regular strategoi for 406/405; or, following Meyer, that there were two different boards of strategoi serving simultaneously, at least from Hekatombaion 1 (406) until after the battle of Arginusae.

¹⁹ *Xen. Hell.* 1.6.30; see also Phil. fr. 121 (F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker* III B [Leiden 1964] 139-40).

²⁰ See, e.g. Fornara, *Generals*, 70 and n. 124; J. E. Sandys, *Aristotle's Constitution of Athens* (London 1893) 129 (hereafter Sandys, *Constitution*).

²¹ *Xen. Hell.* 1.5.16; *Diod.* 13.74.1.

²² *Lys.* 21.7.

count of this confrontation between the fleets of Conon and Callicratidas.²³ He says that Conon managed to escape to Mytilene with forty ships, but that thirty ships were captured. All the crews, however, got away safely, despite the fact that the Athenians had to fight their way into the harbor against overwhelming odds (seventy Athenian ships against 170 Peloponnesian ships). If Archestratus and others were originally in the company of Conon and had died at Mytilene, Xenophon chose to ignore it.²⁴

Diodorus, on the other hand, says that there were two naval battles fought near Mytilene.²⁵ In the first encounter, thirty Athenian ships were isolated from the rest of the fleet and cut off from the harbor of Mytilene. Given this predicament, the crews finally deserted their vessels and made their way back to Mytilene by land (apparently with no loss of life). So far the accounts of Diodorus and Xenophon coincide, with the former clarifying the ambiguity of the latter. But Diodorus then goes on to describe a second battle which took place in the harbor of

²³ Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.15-17.

²⁴ Xenophon also tends to ignore those Athenians who died in the battle of Arginusae. In *Hell.* 1.6.34, he says that the crews of twenty-five Athenian ships lost their lives at Arginusae, but there is no way to distinguish the actual casualties of the battle itself from those who perished by drowning *after* the battle. This is especially true since Xenophon is totally preoccupied with the latter group—the 'possible survivors' of Arginusae (πλεῖν ἐπὶ τὰς καταδεδυκίας ναῦς καὶ τοὺς ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπους (*Hell.* 1.6.35)). To Xenophon, the real tragedy of Arginusae was the drowning of those who might otherwise have been saved, and he reiterates this again and again in his account of the trial of the generals (*Hell.* 1.7.4, 7.5, 7.17, 7.29). Diodorus also records the Athenian casualties at Arginusae (13.100.3), but, unlike Xenophon, he is primarily concerned with the consequences of the failure of the generals to recover the bodies of the dead for proper burial (13.100.1, 100.2, 100.3, 101.1, 101.6).

²⁵ Diod. 13.77-79.7. Recent studies have shown that where naval battles are concerned Diodorus was a far better historian than Xenophon (see, e.g. R. J. Littman, *TAPA* 99 (1968) 265-72; P. Pédech, *REG* 82 (1969) 43-55). Perhaps here as elsewhere Diodorus (via Ephorus) used the historian of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* as his principal source. On the possible connection between Diodorus-Ephorus and the extant fragments of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, see B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt, *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, V (London 1908) no. 842, 124-25, 143; I. A. Bruce, *An Historical Commentary on the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (Cambridge 1967) 20-22.

Mytilene on the following day, when Callicratidas tried to follow up his earlier victory and pursue the Athenians by land. The Athenians and their Mytilenean allies defended themselves gallantly at the entrance of the harbor, but were finally forced to retreat on account of the superior numbers of the Peloponnesians. In this melee many lives were lost on both sides. Though Diodorus fails to identify any of the Athenian casualties, there is good reason to suppose (following Lysias) that Archestratus was included among them.²⁶ The death of Archestratus thus created a vacancy on the *strategia* which was later filled by Lysias.²⁷

Let us now consider the fate of the general Leon. If we accept the testimony of Xenophon that Leon was with Conon at Mytilene, we must account for his curious and sudden disappearance for the remainder of the war.

Following his second naval defeat at the hands of Callicratidas, Conon was besieged at Mytilene both by land and by sea. Finally he decided to launch two of his fastest ships in an effort to inform Athens of his dilemma. While the Spartans were enjoying a mid-day break, the two Athenian ships sailed out of the harbor: one headed for the Hellespont; the other, for the open sea.²⁸ Xenophon then says that the Spartans²⁹ “*εἰσβάντες δὲ ἐδίωκον τὴν εἰς τὸ πέλαγος ἀφορμήσασαν, καὶ ἅμα τῷ ἡλίῳ δύνοντι κατέλαβον, καὶ κρατήσαντες μάχῃ, ἀναδησάμενοι ἀπῆγον εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν. ἡ δ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου φυγοῦσα ναῦς διέφυγε, καὶ ἀφικομένη εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἐξαγγέλλει τὴν πολιορκίαν.*” The general Erasimides must have been in charge of the ship that reached Athens,³⁰ which would explain his later presence at

²⁶ If Diodorus (or Ephorus) was using Xenophon as a source, as Meyer suggests (see above n. 17), he would not have known that Archestratus had died at Mytilene. In like manner, since Lysias and not Leon was present at Arginusae, he might have assumed that Xenophon was in error in listing the members of the *strategia* of 406/405 (see above nn. 16 and 18); if so, he either overlooked or failed to notice *Hell.* 1.6.16.

²⁷ See below n. 33.

²⁸ *Xen. Hell.* 1.6.19-20.

²⁹ *Xen. Hell.* 1.6.21-22.

³⁰ See Underhill, *Commentary*, 26. Perhaps this was the same ship which belonged to the defendant of Lysias 21. It appears that he was a trierarch

the battle of Arginusae.³¹ He was not only able to inform the Athenians about the precarious plight of Conon, but he could also tell them that his colleague Archestratus had been killed. The Athenians reacted immediately on both matters: they voted an armada of 110 ships to assist Conon which sailed to Ionia within a month's time,³² and they filled the vacancy on the strategia by appointing Lysias as a replacement for Archestratus.³³ But what about Leon? Is it not possible that he was in charge of the ship that was captured by the Spartans?³⁴ If Conon was going to risk the life of one general, why not two? Erasinides himself would not have known what had happened to Leon, and consequently it would have been presumptuous for the Athenians to appoint another general in Leon's place. If Leon was in command of the captured ship, then he and his crew were taken prisoner and brought back to the Spartan station in the harbor of Mytilene. After the battle of Arginusae, when the blockade was lifted, the Athenian prisoners were probably transferred to Chios,³⁵ and later perhaps to some site on the Asiatic coast (possibly Ephesus).³⁶ Xenophon is not

during the Ionian War, for he boasts that his ship was one of the best in the Athenian fleet, and says that after the death of Archestratus, Erasinides sailed on it. See Sandys, *Constitution*, 130.

³¹ Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.29.

³² Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.24; Diodorus (13.97.1) says that this armada consisted of sixty ships.

³³ See Swoboda, s.v. "Leon," *RE* XII (1925) col. 2006; s.v. "Lysias," *RE* XII.2 (1927) col. 2531; Valetton *Mnemos.* N.S. 48 (1920) 35; Beloch, *De attische Politik*, 312; *Griechische Geschichte*², II.2, 268. Busholt (*G.G.*, III.2, 1592, n. 1) and Underhill (*Commentary*, 26) I think that Lysias replaced Leon.

³⁴ See e.g. Underhill, *Commentary*, 26; Swoboda, s.v. "Leon," *RE* XII, col. 2006.

³⁵ Callicratidas left fifty ships under the command of Eteonicus to continue the blockade of Conon, while he himself took the remainder of the Peloponnesian fleet and engaged the Athenians off the Arginusae Islands. Following the Athenian victory, Eteonicus abandoned his blockade and sent his triremes to Chios (Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.36-37; Diod. 13.100.5). The Athenian prisoners probably went with the Peloponnesian fleet. It is worth noting that once Conon was free to leave Mytilene, he sailed against Chios (perhaps in an attempt to rescue the Athenian prisoners), but failed to accomplish anything (Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.38).

³⁶ When Lysander arrived on the scene, he ordered Eteonicus and the Peloponnesian fleet to join him at Ephesus (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.10; Diod. 13.104.3)

explicit on this point, but there is no evidence that the Athenian prisoners were either killed or enslaved. Xenophon tells us elsewhere that Callicratidas was opposed to selling Greeks into slavery³⁷ and that he was anxious to bring about peace between Athens and Sparta.³⁸ So as long as he was admiral, Athenian prisoners of war were probably treated most humanely.³⁹ Callicratidas lost his life in the battle of Arginusae,⁴⁰ but even when the command of the Peloponnesian navy had once again devolved on Lysander, we need not suppose a change in attitude towards the Athenian prisoners of war. Lysander, to be sure, was swayed by his allies when he put to death all the Athenians save one (the general Adeimantus) who were captured in the battle of Aegospotami (spring 405),⁴¹ but this was an unusual and singular occurrence as Lysander apparently had other plans for Athenian prisoners already in Spartan hands. According to Xenophon,⁴² "Λύσανδρος δὲ τοὺς τε φρουροὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ εἴ τινα πού ἄλλον ἴδοι Ἀθηναῖον, ἀπέπεμπεν εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας, διδοὺς ἐκεῖσε μόνον πλείουσιν ἀσφάλειαν, ἄλλοθι δ' οὐ, εἰδὼς ὅτι ὅσῳ ἔν πλείους συλλεγῶσιν εἰς τὸ ἄστυ καὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ, θᾶπτον τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἔνδειαν ἔσεσθαι." The general Leon was probably among those who were sent back.

We now turn to Leon of Salamis. The only characterization of this Leon is brief and vague; it occurs in *Hellenica* 2.3.39, in the course of a speech which Xenophon attributes to Theramenes. "ἥδειν γὰρ ὅτι ἀποθνήσκοντος μὲν Λέοντος τοῦ Σαλαμίνιου, ἀνδρὸς καὶ ὄντος καὶ δοκοῦντος ἱκανοῦ εἶναι, ἀδικοῦντος δ' οὐδὲ ἔν, οἱ ὅμοιοι τούτῳ φοβήσονται, φοβούμενοι δὲ ἐναντίοι τῇδε τῇ πολιτείᾳ ἔσονται." What did Leon of Salamis do to earn such repute? Theramenes implies that it was some conspicuous public service to the Athenian democracy. Since there is no other known contemporary by

³⁷ See Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.14.

³⁸ See Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.7.

³⁹ Plutarch (*Lys.* 7) confirms the magnanimity of Callicratidas; see also Diod. 13.76.2-6.

⁴⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.33; Diod. 13.99.5; Plut., *Lys.* 7.

⁴¹ Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.31-32; Plut. *Lys.* 13.

⁴² Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.2; see also Diod. 13.104.8, 106.8 and Plut. *Lys.* 13.

the name of Leon who might fit this description, the identification of the general Leon as Leon of Salamis seems unmistakable. The former had always been an ardent advocate of democracy and a loyal servant of Athens, and when he returned home as a prisoner of war after the battle of Aegospotami he doubtless received a hero's welcome. After all, Athens had few surviving generals of Leon's calibre, to say nothing of his virtue and integrity, and this is exactly what Theramenes is referring to in the words quoted above. When men such as Leon actively turned against the government of the Thirty, Theramenes knew that its days were numbered.⁴³ To keep this from happening, the Thirty tried to eliminate them, and in the case of Leon they were successful.⁴⁴

If the general Leon and Leon of Salamis were one and the same, there remains the further problem of Leon's association with the island of Salamis.⁴⁵ If Leon was sent back to Athens

⁴³ The Athenian Thrasybulus is another case in point. He had been banished and was in exile at the time of Theramenes' trial; see Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.42-44.

⁴⁴ See Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.14.

⁴⁵ Swoboda (s.v. "Leon," *RE* XII, col. 2007) rejects the identification of Leon the general as Leon of Salamis on the grounds that the latter was not an Athenian citizen, but rather belonged to the "alten Bewohnern" of Salamis (see Busolt-Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde*, II [Munich 1926] 871-72 and n. 2). This conclusion, however, is based primarily on the assumption that Wilhelm's restoration and interpretation of *IG* I², 1 are correct. *IG* I², 1, which is the earliest surviving Athenian decree and probably dates from the end of the sixth century, pertains to men living on the island of Salamis, but since the decree is badly mutilated, including the end of line 1, there is no way to ascertain who these men were. There are three possibilities: 1) natives of Salamis, i.e. those who continued to live on Salamis after Athens took possession of the island (see e.g. A. Wilhelm, *Ath. Mitt.* 23 [1898] 470ff.; *Sitz. Wien* 217.5 [1939] 5-11; Dittenberger, *SIG* I, 13; Schulthess, s.v. "Klerouchoi," *RE* XI.1 [1921] cols. 817-18; M. P. Nilsson, *AJP* 59 [1938] 386); 2) Athenian cleruchs who settled on Salamis after the island was awarded to Athens (see e.g. U. Kahrstedt, *Staatsgebiet und Staatsangehörige in Athen* [Stuttgart 1934] 359-62; M. Tod, *SGHI* I [Oxford 1933] no. 11; S. Luria, *Kadmos* 3 [1964] 100-7; R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *SGHI* [Oxford 1969] no. 14; W. Schwann, *AJP* 54 (1933) 39-46); 3) Athenians then resident on Salamis whether cleruchs or not (see e.g. B. D. Meritt, *Hesperia* 10 [1941] 301-7; H. T. Wade-Gery, *CQ* 40 [1946] 101-4; *SEG* X, 1).

Whoever these "men living on Salamis" were, they were responsible (to Athens?) for taxes and military service (perhaps later in the fifth century this

by Lysander, it is unlikely that he returned immediately to his home on Salamis. If he did, he was quickly uprooted, since Lysander soon devastated that island.⁴⁶ Perhaps after the government of the Thirty came to power Leon and others were allowed to return to Salamis and repair their fortunes. At least Leon was at Salamis at the time of his arrest—a task which the Thirty assigned to Socrates and four others.⁴⁷ Socrates alone refused to comply.⁴⁸

Plato cites this incident in *Apology* 32 as one of two examples to prove that Socrates never yielded to anything that he thought was wrong, even under fear of punishment or death. The other concerns Socrates' conduct at the time of the trial of the Arginusae generals, when he was the only prytanis who was not intimidated by the threats of a mob-like assembly to acquiesce in the 'illegal' motion of Callixeinus which called for a vote on the collective guilt or innocence of the eight defendants.⁴⁹ But perhaps this section of the *Apology* contains more subtle implications as regards the significance of Soc-

included naval service as well), lines 2-3. In addition, if this decree refers to Athenians and/or Athenian cleruchs (as most scholars seem to think), then presumably they were enrolled in an Athenian deme and tribe so designated at the time of Cleisthenes' reforms. In the case of Leon of Salamis, he was doubtless called 'the Salaminian' because he lived there (see Andrewes and Lewis, *JHS* 77.2 (1957) 179, n. 10), but this in itself does not preclude his being an Athenian citizen, or for that matter a strategos of Athens.

Literary testimony neither confirms nor denies the citizenship status of Leon of Salamis, yet there are at least three sources which suggest that he was indeed an Athenian citizen. In Theramenes' speech before the Thirty, Xenophon classifies Leon of Salamis in the same general grouping with Niceratus the son of Nicias and a certain Antiphon, both of whom were Athenian citizens (*Hell.* 2.3.39-40), and he does not speak of Leon when referring to the resident aliens (*Hell.* 2.3.41). Then on two occasions Lysias refers to the destruction by the Thirty of 'citizens' living on Salamis (12.52; 13.44), and in neither case does he imply that these 'citizens' were not Athenians. Leon of Salamis was certainly among them. Thirdly, Plato (*Ep.* 7.324E-325A) alludes to Socrates' refusal to obey the Thirty and participate in the illegal arrest of a certain citizen (*ἐπὶ τινα τῶν πολιτῶν*); this can only refer to Leon of Salamis (see below nn. 47 and 48).

⁴⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.9; see also Plut. *Lys.* 9.

⁴⁷ Plat. *Apol.* 32 C.

⁴⁸ Plat. *Apol.* 32 D.

⁴⁹ See also Xen. *Hell.* 1.7, especially 7.9-15.

rates' connection with the trial of the Arginusae generals and the arrest of Leon of Salamis. Were the Thirty, for example, so diabolical in their scheming that they deliberately chose to implicate Socrates in the arrest of a man who was a former strategos and colleague of the Arginusae generals—an action which would not only have caused Socrates great personal and public embarrassment, but would also have evoked bitter memories of the recent past in the minds of all Athenians? Moreover, was the Meletus who arrested Leon of Salamis the same Meletus who was the chief accuser of Socrates in 399?⁵⁰ We conclude with a problem of identity no less tantalizing and provocative than that with which we began.

Appendix: Thuc. 8.73.4

In 8.73.4, Thucydides says that when the people of Samos learned of the conspiracy to overthrow their democracy they disclosed this information to certain Athenians, among them the generals Leon and Diomedon—*οὗτοι γὰρ οὐχ ἐκόντες διὰ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἔφερον τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν*. The exact meaning of these words (especially *διὰ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου*), however, has apparently eluded or deluded the efforts of certain translators of Thucydides' work. E.g. "who were opposed to the oligarchy *because they were respected by the people*" (B. Jowett); "who, *on account of the credit which they enjoyed with the commons*, were unwilling supporters of the oligarchy" (Crawley); "for these submitted to the oligarchy unwillingly, *because they held their office by the choice of the popular party*" (C. F. Smith); "who, *because of the respect in which they were held by the Athenian people*, gave only a reluctant support to the idea of an oligarchy" (R. Warner). Jowett and Crawley might be excused or exonerated on the grounds of vagueness, but Smith and Warner, in my

⁵⁰ Andoc. 1.94. It is noteworthy that Andocides does not refer to this Leon as Leon of Salamis, a further indication that there was only one famous Leon at this time. On the identity of this Meletus, see J. Burnet, *Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito* (Oxford 1924) 9-11, 137; D. MacDowell, *Andokides On the Mysteries* (Oxford 1962), Appendix M, "Meletus," 208-210; Kirchner, *Prosopographia Attica*, II, #9825 and #9830.

opinion, are mistaken in assuming that *ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου* refers to the Athenian demos and consequently mistranslate this particular phrase (cf. J. Beloch, *Die attische Politik* (Leipzig 1884) 5, n. 4).

Thuc. 8.73 deals exclusively with events on Samos during the early months of 411, and since the activities of the Samian demos are central to Thucydides' discussion it seems only logical that the demos referred to in the phrase in question is that of Samos and not Athens. The Samians were very cautious about which Athenians they took into their confidence. They apparently trusted the trierarch Thrasybulus and the hoplite Thrasyllus as well as others because—*οἱ ἐδόκουν αἰεὶ μάλιστα ἐναντιοῦσθαι τοῖς ξυνεστῶσιν*, but they confided in Leon and Diomedon for other reasons. Leon and Diomedon had only recently rejoined the Athenian fleet, yet owing to their campaign against Rhodes they had spent very little time on Samos. Moreover, they had not been present there when the Athenian conspirators and their Samian accomplices were plotting the revolutions. Even though it might be expected that Leon and Diomedon would support the cause of the Samian demos for obvious reasons (i.e. they had replaced Phrynichus and Scironides as commanders of the Athenian fleet), Thucydides seems to imply that their relationship with the Samians was something more personal. If my interpretation is correct, Leon and Diomedon were not so much opposed to the establishment of oligarchy on Samos because they deemed it incumbent on themselves to oppose it as strategoi of Athens or because they wanted to safeguard their reputations in Athens itself, but rather because they wished to preserve the esteem in which they were held by the Samians. Unfortunately we do not know the immediate circumstances whereby Leon and Diomedon were so honored, but perhaps the words *τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν* provide an indirect clue.

The existence of oligarchy on Samos was by no means a remote possibility or indeed a new phenomenon. In fact, Thucydides tells us in 8.21 that in the previous year the Samian demos had overthrown an existing oligarchy and that they were assisted in this enterprise by certain Athenians, *οἱ ἔτυχον ἐν τρισὶ ναυσὶ παρόντες*. Thucydides goes on to say that

Athens soon granted the Samians autonomy (see *IG I²*, 101; D. Lewis, *BSA* 49 (1954) 29-31), but he never identifies any of the Athenians who participated in this revolt. Yet he informs us elsewhere (8.20.2) that Diomedon was one of the generals of the Athenian fleet at this time, and perhaps Leon, a fellow strategos, was also on the scene (although Thucydides is not specific as regards the exact time of Leon's arrival (8.23.1). So it is quite possible that Diomedon, and even Leon, had directly or indirectly assisted the Samians in expelling the oligarchy and so had gained the gratitude and respect of the Samian demos. If this is true, it would make Thucydides' comment in 8.73.4 all the more meaningful.

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REVIEWS

G. H. GELLIE. *Sophocles: A Reading*. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, distributed by International Scholarly Book Services, Portland, Oregon, 1972. Pp. ix + 307. \$19.35.

It will be a pity if the excessively modest preface of this new study of Sophocles dissuades serious literary scholars from reading it cover to cover.¹ While acknowledging that he has various audiences in mind, Gellie states (p. vii), ". . . it will be clear that most of the time I have addressed myself to a group that can be more precisely defined: the growing group of undergraduates who know no Greek but want to read Greek plays." The book will indeed appeal to this group (at least to its thoughtful members), but it also does much more. In twelve substantial chapters, first on the individual plays, then on "Plot," "Character," "Chorus," "Gods," and "Poetry," Gellie produces a series of powerful interpretations which, as a major additional attraction, are expressed almost unfailingly in crisp and forceful language. Not all his theories are fully on target, and some chapters are better than others. But taken as a whole, Gellie's work deserves a place among the significant contributions in the English-speaking world to Sophoclean scholarship in the past twenty-five years.

In the chapters on the plays, Gellie is interested equally in how the plays unfold and work as dramas and in the ideas and problems with which they grapple. The obverse is that he is not very interested in the plays as historical documents. This is a defensible stand, but it does lead Gellie to ignore almost entirely matters of dating and possible political connections, although small exceptions are to be found in the *Philoctetes* and *O.C.* chapters and in a paragraph on chronology in "Plot" (191).

A few comments on Gellie's analyses may suggest some of the main lines he pursues, though justice will not be done to the wealth of material covered or to the lively style. In general, the chapters on *Ajax*, *Antigone*, *O.T.*, *Philoctetes*, and *O.C.* are excellent, those on *Trachinae* and *Electra* a bit less so. In treating *Ajax*, Gellie focuses first on the puzzling character and function of Athena, whom he takes to speak from behind the scene and to represent impersonally the neutral force of divine power. His picture of Ajax is wholly convincing, especially in describing the dramatically awkward pains to which Sophocles goes, beginning with the deception speech, to get Ajax alone on stage for his suicide: "Sophocles contrived to get Ajax onto that bare stage so that the death scene would be the visualization of the essence of the

¹ The outlandish price is something over which Gellie had no control but which nevertheless also will be a deterrent to wide distribution.

man. He dies in front of us in the only way in which he could have lived — alone, using a sword very well" (15).

The chapter on *Antigone*, in which *inter alia* Gellie deftly traces Sophocles' change in presentation of Antigone from hard and strong to lonely and feminine in order to make her credible not only as a heroine but as a woman to be loved and mourned, is followed by a less successful one on *Trachiniae*. Here he is very good on some things, such as the role of the oracles (the oracles are also well analyzed in the *O.T.* chapter; in both places Gellie is in agreement with Knox's view that in the midst of misery oracles provide a measure of stability in telling us that we are only seeing a fulfillment of what was expected), but he trivializes (55), "The play's conflict is not between the fantastic and the humdrum, but between a man who goes his own violent way, and a woman who needs a man and his love around the house," and underestimates Heracles by insisting that Sophocles presents him only on a physical level (I realize that many would agree with Gellie on this).

The freshness (a proper word) of Gellie's chapter on *O.T.* can be appreciated only by reading it through. I mention here in particular the care with which he continually relates the events and characterization in the play to what he proposes as the basic theme: the chasm between human intelligence and total truth. On *Electra* there is again a slight falling off. Gellie presents the play in an antithetical male-female framework, the male movement being "a story of recognition, intrigue and practical success" (130), the female a tragedy of prodigious endurance and the warping of a loving nature. Much fits this scheme nicely but not all (Orestes is not so emotionally immune as Gellie would have him be), and the artifice in these instances becomes artificial. There are also moments in the chapter when Gellie's vivid writing degenerates unworthily, e.g. on the Electra-Aegisthus scene and its resemblance to Euripidean tragi-comedy (128), "Our long-suffering heroine is now sitting pat. She and we know that the big bad villain is about to fall down a hole." In order to leave some space for comment on Gellie's other chapters, I simply pass over his fine discussions of *Philoctetes* and *O.C.* except to remark, in the former, on the skill with which he handles the subtlety of the play's conflict between private truth and public falsehood (supported, in the event, by the will of the gods) and, in the latter, on his use of the theme of the aged Oedipus' moral innocence, particularly as it helps to explain the harshness of the Polyneices scene.

In the group of chapters called collectively "Components," ideas and techniques from all the plays are brought together, and Gellie emerges with interpretative categories and systems which really may be said to illuminate Sophocles. Even the weakest of these chapters, that on "Gods," suffers not from a lack of fruitful concepts (perhaps, most of all, Gellie's direct argument that Sophocles' heroes are morally more advanced than his gods) but from a rather skimpy application to the plays themselves. The chapters on plot, character, and chorus are,

so to speak, in an Aristotelian order of precedence. Plot and action determine all else and are a kind of "necessary journey" (188) which the character-drawing complements, e.g. for Ajax, "At the plotting level Ajax does not kill himself because he lacks *sophrosyne*; he lacks *sophrosyne* because he kills himself" (189). In the several plot patterns which he discovers, Gellie points unerringly to both the advantages and disadvantages which each confers on the playwright. For all their power, *Ajax* and *Antigone* have the problem that the heroes possess clear knowledge almost from the start, and the plays can barely move until their death. After them Sophocles never grants to his heroes all the facts: "The decisions to die or to suffer are still as uncompromising as ever, but the protagonists are no longer fighting in the light" (193).

Gellie's view of plot makes his evaluations of character and chorus conservative. Neither will ever carry a Sophoclean play. Character "... will be cut to the measure of the play's guiding idea" (205). All heroes need to be "great-hearted, courageous, proud, self-contained" (209), and in a sense this is all they need to be; they differ from play to play mainly in the different actions required of them. Gellie goes beyond these stark definitions in all sorts of interesting and productive ways, but Sophoclean character never quite receives its just deserts for flexibility.² In the case of the chorus, Gellie erects a number of perceptive functions, illustrates them impressively (the writing is among the best in the book), and argues strongly for his belief that the chorus has a relatively narrow, if varied, place in Sophocles' total economy: "... [they] are neither the makers nor the judges of events. Neither are they the 'ideal spectator' ..." (244). Here too, however, he denies some of Sophocles' power, and poetry, when he designates the simple marking of time as a primary function in certain odes.

And yet the final chapter, "Poetry," is as sensitive as any in the whole book. This would seem a paradox, since Gellie here must labor hardest against the absence of Greek. But his approach to the poetry is totally sound, and his sample analyses (*O.T.* 1-30 and the Old Age ode of *O.C.*) truly work. His main thesis is that the genius of Sophocles' notoriously simple poetic language will be understood best not through statistical studies or even structural analysis of images and themes; but rather through concentration on unadorned sections, particularly of dialogue, with special stress on word placement. The acuteness of his individual observations, which I have no room to treat,³ leads us to

² A helpful corrective, for the character of Ajax, is G. M. Kirkwood's essay "Homer and Sophocles' *Ajax*" in *Classical Drama and its Influence: Essays Presented to H. D. F. Kitto*, ed. M. J. Anderson (London 1965) 51-70.

³ On one point in the *O.T.* analysis Gellie is unnecessarily obscure. He translates v. 1, *ὦ τέκνα Κάδμου τοῦ πάλαι νέα τροφή*, by "O children of Cadmus the old new cherishing." "Cherishing" will baffle his readers even after Gellie has identified it as a noun. He defends his choice as an effort to preserve in "children . . . cherishing" the alliteration of *τέκνα* . . . *τροφή*, but

complete assent, and a feeling that we do know the poetic steps involved, when he concludes for the *O.T.* passage (272), "... we tend to feel that we are moving only on safe familiar ground, and when we eventually find ourselves in the terrifying places to which his plays take us, we wonder how we got there. We still feel that we have hardly left our starting point."

I do not hesitate to say that for balance, style, and intelligent criticism Gellie's book bears comparison with Goheen, Kirkwood, Kitto, Knox, and Whitman.

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BARTHÉLÉMY-A. TALADOIRE. *Térence: un théâtre de la jeunesse*. Paris, "Les Belles Lettres," 1972. Pp. 136. 25.00F (*Collection d'études anciennes*)

This book is exemplary. Unfortunately, it is *exemplum horrendum*. In 1956, Taladoire published *Essai sur le comique de Plaute* (Editions de l'Imprimerie Nationale de Monaco), a printed version of his doctoral dissertation presented at the Sorbonne in 1948. Herein he examined Plautus "sous l'aspect strictement dramatique," which seemed a promising enterprise, since the author had been active as a theatrical director. But his analysis proved little more than a division of Plautine comedies into *mouvements*, offering scholars yet another *terminus technicus* — not to mention many pages of unrelieved plot summary. The present volume, like the *oeuvre* it examines, is much shorter, although a large portion is taken up by summarizing which also divides Terence into *mouvements*. The approach seems, if anything, less fruitful than it was twenty-five years ago.

Since Taladoire's thesis a great deal of scholarly progress has been made in this field, although little awareness of it is reflected in his latest book. Typical of the author's attitude towards bibliography is this remark on p. 105: "Nous avons, il y a peu, achevé la lecture d'un livre . . . le dernier en date, à notre connaissance, traitant de cette matière . . ." He then cites a work published ten years earlier. His rhetoric is quite as casual as his reading; he can preface a quotation with "ce que me disait un jour . . ." (115). A relaxed style need not be inimical to intellectuality, as witness Cicero's letters. But here the comparison ends.

the Greek alliteration is not very strong, and the odd-sounding result defeats the attempt. "Nurture" would be better or, if the slight alliteration is to be preserved, "care."

Moving from his "analysis" of the six plays, Taladoire assesses Terence's dramaturgical development, concluding that the *Adelphoe* marks the playwright's arrival at "sa vraie formule," enabling him "de faire triompher sur le tréteau romain, contre la vieille forme plautinienne, l'esprit, les aspects et les tonalités d'une comédie nouvelle" (96). But Taladoire seems to believe that Terence's refined art had a genuine effect on Roman popular tastes, and that the generation between Rome's two great comic authors, like that between France's two great classical tragedians, saw a maturation of the audience and its expectations (cf. 4ff.). This is hard to credit, especially since a posthumous Plautus enjoyed constant successes that a living Terence rarely approximated.

Taladoire also has some unusual things to say concerning Terence's originality. Although none would dispute his assertion that "l'esprit féminin" pervades the Terentian corpus (even to the extent of affecting the male characters), few would then grant him the license to speculate upon the poet's family life back home in Carthage (114ff.).¹ We are also informed that the courtesans Thais in the *Eunuchus* and Philotis in the *Hecyra* "annoncent par plus d'un trait les bonnes filles du théâtre Elizabethain" (111). If Taladoire is thinking of the likes of Miranda, it is a far braver and newer world than most of us could imagine.

Limning his subtitle, the author explains that young Terence excelled at the presentation of love because this emotion is the exclusive concern of youth (113). Would it not have been appropriate at this point to mention Menander who, Ovid reminds us, never wrote a play *sine amore*? The comparison would not only have been apt but illuminating, as can be seen in Peter Flury's *Liebe und Liebessprache bei Menander, Plautus und Terenz* (Heidelberg 1968, p. 69 *et passim*). But the omission of both primary comparison and secondary discussion is characteristic of the entire volume. For all we might gather from Taladoire most of Menander still lies buried in the sands of Egypt, and *Année Philologique* has not appeared since the start of the sixties. In fact the most recent article cited on the *Phormio* dates from 1941. There are even surprisingly few references to Plautus, although given the author's methodology, a *mouvement* to *mouvement* comparison of structural techniques could have been attempted.

Of his making of errors there is apparently no end. He naively assumes that the Roman audience would have ready access to the New Comedy models for Terence's plays (50). This fact is complicated by the relative lack of Greek among the *hoi polloi* (granted the soldiers gleaned some in Sicily), and the total lack of texts. Elsewhere, the author seems to confound *stataria* and *motoria* (78) as well as Aristotle

¹ A similar examination of Aristophanes — based on equally non-existent evidence — is attempted *in extenso* by N. N. Dracoulides, *Psychoanalyse d'Aristophane* (Paris 1967).

and Aristophanes (113). In the *Essai*, Taladoire ascribed to Donatus the first division of Terence into acts; the error is repeated here.² And in the intervening years, he has still not mastered the spelling of Günther Jachmann's name (*Essai*, pp. 64, 226; *Térence*, p. 23). Possibly the most entertaining moment in the book is his inadvertent emendation of the most famous Terentian sentence when he cites a German essay entitled "Nichts menschliches is nur freund" [sic] (65).

The penultimate chapter offers a brief chronicle of the "Survie et fortune de Térence." Its superficiality is exceeded only by its inconsistency. Pierre Larivey's *Les Esprits* is cited as an imitation of the *Adelphoe*, without mention of its debt to Plautus' *Mostellaria* and, most importantly, the *Aulularia*. Yet there is no reference to the same author's *Les Jaloux*, although it draws upon both the *Andria* and the *Eunuchus*. No English, Italian, Spanish, or Dutch works are listed. The single important piece of German literature in the Terentian tradition appears to be *Der Winkelschreiber*, by one A. von Winterfeld. Perhaps fortunately, there is no index.

But the most grievous lack is that of a *raison d'être* for this little book. Although much can be said for Callimachean brevity, there is no depth here to compensate for modest length. A ready reproof of Taladoire's shortcomings is Heinz Haffter's exemplary (50 pages) *Terenz und seine künstlerische Eigenart*.³ But the word which best characterizes the book under review is *neglegentia*. When the *malevolus vetus poeta* hurled this accusation at Terence, the author raised a spirited defense. Here there can be none.

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J. W. BINNS, ed. Ovid. London and Boston, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973. Pp. viii + 250. \$15.95. (*Greek and Latin Studies; Classical Literature and Its Influences*)

It is inevitable in any collection of essays by different authors that the quality should vary, but on the whole, the seven essays contained in this volume are both well written and well researched. I cannot do equal justice to all in the brief space of this review and should therefore

² *Essai*, 83; *Térence*, 11. That Varro was already familiar with Terentian drama in *actus*, cf. Donatus, *ad Hec. praef.* 6 (= Wessner II, p. 192).

³ Sonderausgabe, Darmstadt 1967 = *Mus. Helv.* 10 (1953) 1-20; 73-102. Taladoire does not seem to have read Haffter's monograph, although it is conspicuously praised in the work he cites of "notre cher ami Charles Mauron" (132).

like to concentrate on those that contain the most original contributions to Ovidian scholarship.

Foremost among them is E. J. Kenney's article on "The Style of the *Metamorphoses*" which combines thorough and painstaking philological research with keen awareness of Ovid's literary art. Kenney offers a detailed analysis of Ovid's poetic vocabulary: compound words, verbal suffixes, specifically Ovidian coinages, *hapax legomena*, proper names, etc. This forms the basis for a careful and judicious differentiation of Ovid's style from Vergil's. Ovid is not simply an anti-Vergil who polemically debases Vergilian phraseology and diction. Rather, the Vergilian borrowings that permeate the *Metamorphoses* illustrate how Ovid transforms Vergil's allusive, ambiguous, and allegorical mode of expression into something more straightforward, into "the perfection of a poetic *koine*, a stylistic instrument which was freely manageable by writers of lesser genius" (119). No value judgment is implied here, for "Ovid restored to common currency what Vergil had temporarily taken out of general circulation" (ibid.). It may be noted that the same applies to Ovid's treatment of his subject matter, myth; both content and style are shaped by the same principles. As Kenney argues convincingly, Ovid in many ways returns to Lucretius' concept and practice of style. There is yet more material in Kenney's essay, but these examples alone show how substantial progress is made by placing Ovid into the tradition of Latin poetic style rather than by confining him to a tendentious and superficial juxtaposition with Vergil.

A better understanding of Ovid's reworking of Vergilian themes is also achieved by W. S. Anderson's essay on "The *Heroides*." The title is somewhat misleading as Anderson plunges in *medias res* and for almost twenty pages deals with Dido's *Letter* before turning to *Heroides* 21 and 22 as an example of Ovid's strategy in the double letters. The detailed analysis of *Heroides* 7, however, is more valuable than a general treatment of the whole collection. In retelling the story of Dido, Ovid is neither a Vergil *manqué* nor is he trying to negate the epic and heroic world. Rather, as I would put it in Ovid's own terms (*Ars Am.* 2.128),¹ he aims to *referre idem aliter* and, according to Anderson, he presents a charming and courtly instead of a majestic or heroic Dido. The sentiments Dido expresses and the rhetorical modes she employs are designed to characterize her as a modern woman rather than an antique heroine. The same applies to Ovid's treatment of Penelope, Briseis, and others. Concentration on one letter only gives Anderson the additional advantage of not repeating or having to deal with the monotonous element which, despite all of Ovid's innovativeness, remains in the collection when it is read in one sitting. Another aspect of the collection to which future critics will have to address themselves is

¹ See my remarks in *Perspectives of Roman Poetry* (Austin and London 1974) 106-7.

the differentiation between the rhetorical and literary skill of the poet and that of the heroines. Anderson skirts the issue in phrases such as "Dido . . . invites us to pity her artistically contrived character, but at the same time to admire the artistry which she (and Ovid) used to contrive it" (55), but there is more to be looked into.

Ian Du Quesnay's discussion of the *Amores* is perceptive and intelligent and progresses, with several original touches, in the direction charted by E. Reitzenstein's seminal article on "Das neue Kunstwollen in den Amores Ovids." A. S. Hollis' contribution on "The *Ars Amatoria* and *Remedia Amoris*" says nothing that is new. More positively, one could say that Hollis has resisted the temptation of trying to be unduly profound on poems in which Ovid's literary strategy is so obvious. R. J. Dickinson has written a sensible appreciation of the *Tristia*, even though it is marred by too much structural (which sometimes still is a lesser evil than structuralist) analysis. The concluding essays, D. M. Robathan's "Ovid in the Middle Ages" and Caroline Jameson's "Ovid in the Sixteenth Century," contain a wealth of information on Ovid's reception during those periods.

In sum, this is a worthwhile collection of essays, but the inflated price of the American edition will prevent many students and academics from buying it.

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GEORGE KENNEDY. *The Art of Rhetoric in The Roman World*, 300 B.C. – A.D. 300. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1972. Pp. xvi + 658. \$18.50 (His *A History of Rhetoric*, v.2)

This *mega biblion*, Volume II in Kennedy's projected *History of Rhetoric*, is unlikely to be described as *mega kakon*, if we may judge by the reception accorded Volume I (*The Art of Persuasion in Greece*), when it appeared in 1963. At that time reviewers in American and English journals rejoiced that a full-scale study of Greek rhetoric was at last available in the English language and predicted that it would be widely used by students in Departments of Classics and Public Speaking alike, a prediction that was quickly and amply fulfilled. The companion volume on Roman rhetoric, while not so close to being unique in its field, is much more detailed than its only rival, M. C. Clarke's *Rhetoric at Rome*, published in 1953, and — coming as it does almost twenty years later — commands such material as has appeared in the last two decades.¹

¹ The list of Bibliographical Abbreviations (xi-xiv) shows how few substantial studies have appeared in this field.

The relation that K. sees between his book and Clarke's, the audience at which he aims, and the chief tendency that he finds in the development of rhetoric at Rome are all set forth in the first paragraph of his Foreword, as follows:

This work is a companion volume to *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, and though the nature of the subject has somewhat altered the form and increased the size, I hope it will be useful to a similar audience: students of classics and of speech seeking an overall picture of the history of rhetoric in the classical age of Rome. I have sought to present the main lines of development, to outline and perhaps occasionally to solve some problems, and to furnish a factual and bibliographical basis for further study. M. L. Clarke's *Rhetoric at Rome* has for nearly twenty years furnished a brief introduction to the subject: I have tried to give greater depth, particularly by adding a picture of Greek developments and by giving more historical background, and I have advanced some different hypotheses. My basic theme is that the Romans imitated from the Greeks an art of persuasion which gradually developed into an art often more concerned with what I call the secondary characteristics of rhetoric: not persuasion but style and artistic effect. But in the empire an effort was made by a number of writers to recover some of the power of persuasion and some orators found new causes to plead in philosophy, Hellenism, and religion.

It may be said at the outset that K. has succeeded in his aims. What is to be hoped is that students coming through this book to a knowledge of some of the problems or some of the personages treated only sketchily by K. will be encouraged to undertake further research and perhaps challenge his conclusions. For some subjects of considerable interest are dismissed with only cursory treatment — a comment that is less a criticism than a recognition that even a volume of 658 pages must reflect personal choices. The decision to give an account of six centuries of Roman rhetoric and oratory made it inevitable that the result would be a kind of one-volume encyclopedia, some of whose entries were bound to disappoint readers looking not only for basic information but for critical comment.

The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World consists of nine chapters varying in length from chapter 3 (151 pages) to chapter 9 (27). Chapter One, "Early Roman Rhetoric," deals with the beginnings of oratory and the rhetorical elements in early Latin literature, and then takes up some of the illustrious persons said by Cicero and the historians to have been effective political orators — Cato the Elder, the Scipios, Antonius, Crassus, and Hortensius, to name only the most famous. Chapter Two is a study of *De Inventione* and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, the two earliest surviving Roman rhetorical handbooks, together with their Hellenistic sources. Chapter Three is mainly taken up with Cicero, although a few pages are devoted to his younger contemporaries, Julius Caesar, Sallust, and Mark Antony. Chapter Four is entitled, "Oratory and Rhetorical Criticism in Augustan Rome,"

and Chapter Five, "Augustan Rhetoric and Augustan Literature." Chapter Six deals with "Eloquence in the Early Empire," Chapter Seven with "Quintilian and His Younger Contemporaries," Chapter Eight with "The Age of the Sophists," and Chapter Nine with "Greek Rhetoricians of the Empire." There is an Index in which references to subjects and ancient authors are combined.

The strengths and weaknesses of the new book are much like those of *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*. Like its predecessor, *Roman Rhetoric* is systematic, lucid, and admirably equipped with bibliographical references. The weakness mentioned earlier in this review, one that is perhaps unavoidable in a study of this scope, is the tendency, especially in the last two chapters, to present authors and treatises with a minimum of critical analysis. The reader who turns, for example, to the pages devoted to such figures as Lucian and Aelius Aristides (582-90), not to mention Maximus of Tyre, may well wish that K. had been persuaded to devote two volumes to this part of his ambitious venture. It is here that the abundant footnotes, directing attention to more detailed studies, often fifty or more years old, are particularly welcome. And it must be said that in the two final chapters there are good accounts of Philostratus, Dio Chrysostom, and Fronto, and a welcome analysis of the orations of Apuleius.

The tone of the book is much like that of its predecessor — informal, personal, vigorous in the expression of opinion, candid in assessing the weaknesses of Roman rhetoric, precise in distinguishing what is important for history or sociology from what is authentically first-rate as literature. The solid core consists of the section (Chapters Two through Five) devoted to Cicero and his times and the Age of Augustus. The study of *De Inventione* and the *ad Herennium* provides an opportunity for an account of the early life and education of Cicero and a sketch of Hellenistic rhetoric (rather more detailed and circumstantial than that offered in Volume I), followed by a comparison of the two treatises, with observations on their respective dates (K. places *De Inv.* between 91 and 89 B.C., the *ad Her.* later, but still in the early 80's) and their relation to each other (K. postulates a common teacher who lectured to the two authors at different times and "might have changed his mind on some subjects or terms"). A welcome feature of this chapter is a rhetorical analysis of Cicero's earliest surviving oration, the *Pro Quinctio* of 81 B.C. Here K. investigates to what extent the young orator abides by the rhetorical precepts set forth in his own treatise and to what extent he goes beyond them and employs techniques bequeathed by his predecessors in the Roman courts. (Readers will find it useful to compare the analysis of the *Pro Quinctio* in the recent commentary by T. E. Kinsey,² who, however, measures the speech against the later rhetorical works, as well as *De Inventione*.)

Chapter Three, the longest in the book, gives a full and sympathetic

² M. Tulli Ciceronis, *Pro P. Quinctio Oratio*. (Sydney 1971)

account of Cicero's development as orator and rhetorician. It is pleasant to find such a sensitive appraisal of individual speeches in their historical context, and such an informed awareness of the ways in which Cicero met the challenges inherent in a variety of specific cases. K.'s selective study of the entire sequence of Ciceronian oratory from the speeches delivered before his consulship to the *Philippics*, is particularly welcome as a corrective to A. D. Leeman's *Orationis Ratio*,³ which deals only with the speeches down to 63 B.C., then turns to the rhetorical treatises, and entirely neglects the later orations. And as a counter to Shackleton Bailey's recent remark about "the flabbiness, pomposity, and essential fatuity of Ciceronian rhetoric at its too frequent worst,"⁴ the student will do well to ponder K.'s conclusion, "As always in studying this amazingly literate and humane man the clearest result is apt to be the realization of the vast dimensions of his character" (151). The wealth of insights and provocative comments in the chapter (e.g. p. 165, the Verrines "splendidly and grossly Roman," p. 173, the oration on the Manilian Law a preparation of the Roman mind for the deification of the Caesars, p. 185, the *Pro Murena* a victory "not for justice but for right," p. 203, Cicero's loss of self-control in the *In Pisonem* the first sign of the effect on Roman oratory of the loss of freedom of speech) make it for the student of oratory the most valuable in the book, although readers who are more interested in the effect that rhetoric had on other forms of literature will doubtless find the two following chapters the most rewarding.

The relation of rhetoric to the intellectual and political life of the Augustan Age, its effect on education, its turn away from practical oratory to literary criticism, above all its influence on the great writers of the time — Virgil and Horace, Ovid and Livy — these are the principal themes of Chapters Four and Five, and it is here that K. demonstrates what he means in his foreword by the statement that Roman rhetoric gradually developed into an art concerned not so much with persuasion as with style and artistic effect. Here too we find many debatable propositions (Augustus the greatest rhetorician of antiquity, p. 378, Horace generally lacking in interest in rhetoric, p. 401), but more important a detailed and convincing exposition of the impact of rhetoric on Rome in the first century after Christ. It is inevitable that a work on rhetoric should be a history of education as well. The small but precious book by Aubrey Gwynn, S. J., first published in 1926, reprinted in 1964, and the recent volume by M. L. Clarke (*Higher Education in the Ancient World* [Albuquerque 1971]) remind us that the two subjects are virtually identical. No one interested in the history of ancient education can afford to overlook K.'s discussion of the Latin Rhetors (90-96), imitation (*passim*), *Declamatio* (312-22), and of

³ (Amsterdam 1963)

⁴ D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero* (New York 1971) 279.

course Quintilian (487-514). Other topics of broad significance that range beyond the confines of rhetoric, strictly interpreted, are the Scipionic Circle (60-71), Atticism (241-46, now called Neo-Atticism as it applies to Latin literature; here K. expands and corrects his treatment of the subject in Volume I), the decline of eloquence in the early Empire and the reasons advanced by ancient observers (446-64).

A third volume is promised, to deal with Christian rhetoric, about which K. makes a few remarks at the close of Chapter Eight, comparing Christian apologetics with philosophy and the cultural heritage of Hellenism, as topics that ultimately supplied a wider field for rhetoric in the mid-second century after Christ. It was the stimulus of these concerns that finally restored to the orator "a positive and practical goal of persuasion: his work becomes more than declamation, exercise, or entertainment" (608). Students of the art of persuasion will await with interest what K. has to tell us of Christian oratory after Tertullian, and Christian rhetoric culminating in Augustine.⁵

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LAWRENCE GIANGRANDE. *The Use of Spoudaiogeloion in Greek and Roman Literature*. The Hague. Mouton, 1972. Pp. 139. Fl. 29.25 (*Studies in Classical Literature* 6)

In *Lucilius and Horace, A Study in the Classical Theory of Imitation* (University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature, 7 [Madison 1920] p. 209, note 1) G. C. Fiske observes that "a complete and satisfactory history of Greek satiric literature, especially of the τὸ σπουδαιογέλοιοιον has still to be written." Lawrence Giangrande has attempted to fulfill one of Fiske's *desiderata* by compiling a brief history of "the serio-comic in antiquity." Within his monograph he deals first with the term *spoudaiogeloion* and some of its common manifestations (fable, mime, parody, etc.) and then proceeds to a discussion of the "laughable" in Homer, the iambic poets, comedy, Greek philosophy, the mime, etc. A section dealing with Roman satire as exemplified by Horace and Juvenal is followed by a Conclusion, a brief Appendix dealing with Lucretius' second *prooemium*, and a long, useful Bibliography.

The concept behind this study is a good one and should have produced a valuable supplement to Mary A. Grant's *The Ancient Rhetori-*

⁵ Most of the slips and misprints will be obvious to readers and will cause no confusion, but on p. 45 read Scipio Nasica for Scipio Aemilianus, on p. 427 Virgil for Ovid, and on p. 581 history for oratory.

cal Theories of the Laughable (University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature, 21 [Madison 1924]). Unfortunately, Giangrande's book is largely a superficial treatment, rendered almost useless by an unacceptable method, errors in content, and scanty treatment of several of the most important exponents of *spoudaiogeloion*, the practice of "speaking the truth under cover of a jest" (Grant, op. cit. 20).

The author's peculiar method is most apparent in his habit of copying or closely paraphrasing, without proper acknowledgment, the work of scholars whom he lists in his bibliography.¹ For instance, in the preface, which relies heavily upon Mary Grant (but does not mention her), appear the following statements (p. 9): "The *dicta* of the *pre-Socratics* did, however, seek the improvement of *conduct*, for example, *Chilon and Democritus* 'Do not laugh at the unfortunate', *Solon*'s 'Be gentle with your friends', and *Periander*'s 'Revile with the idea of becoming friendly'. *Cleobulus* 'Do not laugh at the jester, for you will be hated by those who are ridiculed' is in the same vein."

The reader should compare this passage with Grant, p. 59; "The Greeks were also interested in the laughable from the point of view of *conduct*. This phase of the subject was first in order of development, as we saw in our examination of the sayings of the *pre-Socratic philosophers*. Examples of such early precepts are the 'Do not laugh at the unfortunate,' of *Chilon and Democritus*; *Solon*'s 'Be gentle with your friends;' and the 'Revile with the idea of becoming friendly,' of *Periander*;" and p. 13: "For example, there is the advice of *Cleobulus*: 'Do not laugh at the jester, for you will be hated by those who are ridiculed.'"

Another illustration of G.'s method is provided by the remarks (p. 16) that, "*The lost Andromeda*, for example, he might have argued, *is the first recorded drama to deal with the theme of love triumphant over obstacles and subsiding into blissful wedlock*. It was thus that *Euripides* started audiences dreaming of their own wish-fulfillments right up until modern times. *Euripides* also travesties mythology. *The Cyclops* is a dramatization of the story of *Odysseus* in the cave, a mythological travesty in which *Euripides* succeeds with the broad humor of burlesque." The obvious source is D. W. Lucas, *The Greek Tragic Poets* (New York, 2nd ed., 1959, p. 190; G. uses the first edition, London, 1950), who writes as follows:

The lost Andromeda told the more romantic story of *Perseus* and the rescue of *Andromeda*. . . . But the real interest of the play is that it is the first recorded drama to deal with the theme of love triumphant over obstacles and subsiding into a blissful wedlock. *Euripides* started the audience dreaming of their own wish-fulfillments, and they have rarely stopped since.

¹ The italics in quotations from Giangrande and his sources are my own and are intended to indicate unacknowledged borrowings.

Of the plays which do not fall readily into any of these groups the *Cyclops*, our one complete satyr-play, is a dramatization of the story of *Odysseus in the cave*, in which Euripides succeeds better with the broad humour of burlesque than one might have expected.

G. does cite Lucas later in his paragraph, but neglects to mention that he has derived his material from that book. Similar instances occur on pages 10-11 (cf. L. Radermacher, *Weinen und Lachen* [Wien 1947, rep. 1969]: 92, 93, 96-97, 102), 23 (cf. Fiske, 160), 35 (cf. Grant, 25-26), 62 (cf. E. E. Sikes. "The Humour of Homer," *CR* 54 [1940] 122 passim and note 2), 96 (cf. G. Duckworth, *The Nature of Roman Comedy* [Princeton 1971]: 304, 314, 317, 392), etc., etc.. One also should note here that footnotes are rare, although the author does find space (p. 98, note 7), in a section dealing with Bion of Borysthenes, for the useless information that "this Bion is 10th of the 15 'Bions' mentioned in the *Real-Encyclopaedie*."

Paraphrases, further, sometimes produce strange results. On page 27 (cf. p. 82), for example, the reader is told that, "*Charactêrismos*, the minute delineation of satirical types of character, is a tendency, originally apparent in Bion of Borysthenes, which gathers momentum in New Comedy, Aristotle's *Ethics*, and Theophrastus' writings. This characterization of weak types permeates all literature of the *spoudaioi geloiou* variety." G. clearly has confused the chronology found in the following passage from Fiske (186):

In what is somewhat pedantically, but conveniently called *χαρακτηρισμός*, that is in the minute delineation of satiric types of character, Bion is an adept. The tendency, which started with the New Comedy, the *Ethics* of Aristotle, and the Characters of Theophrastus, came to pervade nearly all the forms of literature conceived in the half-humorous, half-serious spirit of the *τὸ σπουδαιογέλοιον*. Bion is, then, an earlier traveller on this road which is later so clearly marked for us by the satires of Lucilius and Horace.

A misunderstanding also is evident on page 98, where one reads that "earlier Cynics had followed the rigorous precepts of Diogenes of Sinope and had included the practice of self-reproach as well as reproach of others." The source seems to be Grant (55), who credits with the use of self-reproach those Cynics (such as Crates, and later Dio of Prusa) who reacted against Diogenes' "rigorous precepts."

Additional instances are numerous, and include a reference to the "Persian myth" used by Cratinus (29), by which the myth of Perseus is meant, and the statement that (35), "like Crates, Monimus wrote parodies of Homer, of elegiac verse, of hymns and of tragedy," an expanded rendition of the remark by D. R. Dudley (*A History of Cynicism* [London 1937] 41) that the term *paignia*, used by Diogenes Laertius to refer to writings of Monimus, "... can cover a wide range of compositions, as is clear from the works of Crates, which contained parodies of Homer, of elegiac verse, of hymns, and of tragedy."

Occasional stylistic awkwardness creates other difficulties. For example, a reference to the "non-extant *Silloi* of Timon" is followed by the comment that (28), "these 'satires' had had a deep influence on the post-Homeric age of incipient satiric expression." The next sentence gives Xenophanes (who is chronologically anterior to Timon) as an example, and the reader must deduce for himself whether that poet is intended as an example of an "influence" or of an "incipient satiric expression" or whether the words "these 'satires'" refer to the *Silloi* as a literary form or specifically to the work of Timon. Less problematic, but more awkward, is the comment (82), "in the objective sketching out of character, Menander delights" (cf. Fiske, 174). To this remark may be added the phrase (50) "to return to Homer, Zeus indulges in laughter . . .," the assertion "parenthetically, Apollonius' gods converse. . . ." (49), and the observation that Penelope "is aware that it was a god who made Helen unfaithful (*Od.* 23.222) to do a shameful deed . . ." (54). Similar lapses occur on page 39, where an unqualified "they" makes Xenophanes and Plato, rather than the Homeric gods, seem "frivolous, irresponsible, and amoral," and on page 17, where we read that "the Old Comedy censors contemporary politics and society." A different sort of style, finally, is provided by attempts to insert some humor into the exposition. Thus, one learns that Arete, wife of King Alcinous, "'wears the royal pants'" (45), and that "Aphrodite is beautiful but helpless in the sight of her mischievous, unmanageable son Eros. Maybe she had preferred to argue with her child rather than change his diapers" (49).

Stylistic problems may be overlooked, of course, if a book redeems itself by its content, but this monograph provides, for the most part, an insufficient treatment of those authors most deserving of a thorough investigation in terms of their use of *spoudaiogeloion*. As a result, Bion shares a brief paragraph with Menippus, the *spoudaiogeloios* (98-99), while Homer, admittedly not known for his use of the device (72), receives a lengthy treatment based upon the numerous studies which deal with his humor. A detailed study of humor and seriousness in Bion and his student Teles would have been a valuable contribution, as would an analysis of *spoudaiogeloion* in Theophrastus' *Characteres*, an important work which is relegated to citations and a brief discussion (81-82). We must conclude, therefore, on the basis of our criticisms, that Giangrande's book has contributed nothing new to the study of its subject, except, perhaps, a largely flawed attempt at synthesizing existing literature, and that Fiske's suggested study "has still to be written."

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MICHEL LEJEUNE. *Phonétique historique du mycénien et du grec ancien*. Paris, Klincksieck, 1972. Pp. xi + 398. 56.00F (*Tradition de l'humanisme*, 9)

The second edition of Lejeune's *Traité de phonétique grecque*, which appeared in 1955, was a revision of the 1946 edition with relatively minor changes. The *Phonétique historique* here under review, on the other hand, is a virtually new work. The inclusion of Mycenaean Greek (in which Lejeune has long been known as a leading expert) would in itself be a major innovation, but the innovation does not consist merely in the addition of Mycenaean forms at the right places. It is true that there is close agreement in arrangement, as a comparison of the *tables des matières* will show, and much agreement in doctrine also, but the chronology of sound-changes in particular, even when allowance is made for the imperfections of the Linear B syllabary, can be better described now that written texts from the last half of the second millennium are accessible, and Lejeune has amply exploited the opportunities which the new material offers.

The system of Indo-European stops taken as the basis for the history of the stops in Greek is not strikingly different from the system assumed in the 1955 edition: the *modes d'articulation* are the usual three, while the "voiceless aspirates" formerly assumed in order to account for a few Indo-Iranian, Armenian and Greek forms were expressive doublets of the plain voiceless stops; the phonemes assumed to account for such sets as Gk. *κρέας*, Lat. *crur*, Skt. *kraviḥ*, Lith. *kraūjas* are, according to some, IE gutturals which in certain environments escaped the change to sibilants in the satem languages, according to others a third series distinct from both the "gutturals" and the labiovelars, but the difference is important more for the notation to be used than for the history of the phonemes in Greek. The sounds needed to account for sets like Gk. *ἄρκτος*, Skt. *ṛkṣaḥ*, Lat. *ursus*, Gk. *χθών*, Skt. *kṣam-*, etc. were unstable phonemes, the explosion of which was immediately followed by a sibilant element of very short duration, but they were single phonemes, not clusters. For the labiovelars there were three stages of development: conversion to gutturals before and after *v* and before *y*; palatalization followed by conversion to dentals before front vowels *ē ē̄* (except in Aeolic and Cypriote); conversion of all remaining labiovelars (including Aeolic and Cypriote labiovelars even before *ē*) to labials. It is curious that the rather casual treatment of labiovelars before *v* which is found in so many of the standard handbooks appear here (p. 43, and Brugmann, *Gdr.*² I,¹ 595-96; Meillet-Vendryes, *Grammaire comparée* 57; Buck, *Comparative Grammar*, 126, *Greek Dialects*², 61). Since the *v* of, for example, *γυνή* is not in ablaut-variation with *ev* (cf. *πύθουμαι*: *ἐπυθόμην*, Skt. *bodhati*: *buddhaḥ*; OCS *žena* on the other hand shows a full-grade vowel), it is difficult to see how the *v* could have arisen except through vocalization

of the labial feature of g^h . In essential agreement with this view are Hirt, *Gr. Laut- und Formenlehre*², p. 205 Anm. 2; Schwyzler, p. 292, and the statement in Lejeune that the *voyelle d'appui* took its *u*-color from the preceding labiovelar is not radically different (p. 206, §211, n. 1, p. 208, n. 6). The case of $\kappaύκλος$: Skt. *cakraḥ* is handled somewhat differently (44), but there seems to be no reason to regard it as essentially dissimilar, apart from the fact that the *v*, once produced through vocalization of the lip-rounding in the k^h , then caused delabialization of the stop after the reduplication syllable. The *u*-forms from roots containing labiovelars have a rather wide and somewhat haphazard distribution, and forms like Skt. *guruḥ* (: Gk. *βαρύς*), *kuṭra* (with the interrogative pronominal stem), OCS *kŭde* 'where' show that the vocalization of the labial feature occurred before the delabialization which affected $k^h g^h g^h$ in the "satem languages". The real problem lies in pairs like $\gammaυνῆ$: Boeot. *βava*, Skt. *guruḥ*: Gk. *βαρύς*, for there seems to be no satisfactory rule whereby to predict when the labiovelar will or will not determine the color of the vowel after it. To assume generalization of variants occurring within paradigms (for accentual or other reasons) would be only a guess.

Lejeune argues strongly (112-16) for the pronunciation of ξ as *zd* in all positions; this is at variance with the teaching of many introductory Greek textbooks ("ξ like *dz* in English *adze*") and hence with the usual practice of the American classroom, but W. Sidney Allen (*Vox Graeca*, 53-56) upheld the pronunciation as *zd*, employing arguments which partly coincide with those of Lejeune and citing a few cases of dialectal deviation. For the difficult problem of the twofold treatment of IE *y*- in Greek, sometimes as *h*-, sometimes as *z*-, W. F. Wyatt had developed an explanation which avoided laryngealism and which assigned the ξ - in forms like $\xiυγόν < yu-$ to the need to maintain voicing in distinctive contrast to the absence of voicing in *hyu- < u-*. Lejeune (167) tends to favor linguistic borrowing to account for the ξ -forms — an explanation which was not offered in the 1955 edition but which receives a slight degree of support from the fact that some at least of the forms in question, e.g. $\xiύμη$, are technical terms. But since the language which might be the source of such borrowings cannot be identified, he is forced to present the suggestion only with strong reservations.

The problem of the origin of the prothetic vowel is treated in three places: pp. 148-50, 204 (briefly, in connection with laryngeals, which he takes to be one source of prothesis) and 210-11. He regards no theory as fully satisfactory. Wyatt, *The Greek Prothetic Vowel* (American Philological Association Monograph No. 31, 1972) presented an explanation which makes no use of laryngeals but is necessarily complicated in its formulation of the precise phonetic environment in which prothesis occurred or failed to occur. When it comes to the IE and Greek vowel phonemes themselves it is slightly surprising not to find some discussion of the status of /a/, especially in those cases where it does not owe its existence to the coloring effect of a laryngeal on an

adjacent /e/. *AJP* 90 (1969) 148-49, contains some references by this reviewer to remarks of others on the popular character of *a* and *a*-diphthongs and the infrequency of *a* in inflectional endings. A related matter is the ablaut-variation of *a* and *o*, for which see Brugmann, *Gdr.*² I,¹ p. 486 (with notation $\acute{a} : a$); Hirt, *Idg. Gr.* II, 182-83; Meillet-Vendryes, 153; Buck, *Comparative Grammar*, 111; Schwyzler, 340; Kent, *Sounds of Latin*³, 73; Kuryiowicz, *Idg. Gr.* II, 251-52. Among the very few etymological groups which seem to favor such an alternation the two most commonly cited — $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\omega : \delta\gamma\mu\omicron\varsigma$ and Lat. *acutus* : $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\upsilon\tau\iota\varsigma$ — show the vowels in initial position, where laryngeals must be considered a factor, and most scholars have reservations or strong doubts regarding the propriety of admitting an alternation *a* : *o* with validity comparable to that of the far more common alternation *e* : *o*. However we miss a brief mention of the subject in the *Traité*, even if such mention were to constitute an outright rejection.

The book contains separate Indices of forms in Mycenaean and in Cypriote syllabic script, and of forms in normal alphabetic writing, a Subject Index, and a Table of Contents. Its appearance is a most welcome event for students of Ancient Greek, and its inclusion in private and institutional libraries a necessity.

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RUSSELL MEIGGS. *The Athenian Empire*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972. Pp. xvi + 632. \$25.50

This study of the Athenian Empire is a crowning achievement for Russell Meiggs' distinguished scholarly career. His concern with Athenian imperialism, developing in full familiarity with the voluminous publication since the 1920's, began, in print, with an article in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies* in 1943. It has crystallized in this book, written between 1961 and 1970. The focus is strictly on the history and institutions of the Empire. Such tempting topics as the internal development of Athenian democracy, the political factions in Athens, and the oligarchical movement during the Peloponnesian War are discussed only for their bearing on imperial policy. Relations with Persia are treated almost entirely from the Greek viewpoint, and with Sparta, from that of Athens. In sum, the book is a firmly written, largely traditional account, shaped to develop Meiggs' emphases and conclusions but judiciously argued to illuminate controversy. On occasion Meiggs' own views almost dissolve in his analysis. But the study will be standard reference for the Athenian Empire for a generation.

The structure of the book is elaborate. A narrative traces the history of the Empire from the founding of the Delian League to the collapse in

405 B.C. For this a minimal reference system, mainly to primary sources, is used. The account may be read continuously but some of the brief judgements and citation in the footnotes are arbitrary. Special problems requiring brief discussion are grouped in 26 Endnotes while those requiring elaborate treatment or reproduction of source material are set out in 17 Appendixes. Appendix 14 is a table of the tribute payments, 453/420 B.C., reproduced with some modifications and additions from that in the revised edition of Hill's *Sources*. There is, of course, some awkwardness: chapter 1, "The Nature of the Evidence," needs to be supplemented by Appendix 1, "Thucydides' Account of the Pentekontaetia," and Appendix 2, "The Use and Misuse of Diodorus"; chapter 3, "The Foundation of the Delian League," requires Endnote 1, "The Council of Samos," and Appendix 3, "The Origins of the Delian League." But in the latter Hammond's view that the Delian League was bicameral and Sealey's identification of the purpose of the League, "to plunder the King's land," are countered. Some of the chapters on the early history of the League, where problems are rife, are thinly threaded discussions of the problems. Occasionally an appendix is rather discursive: Appendix 7, "Cyprus in the Fifth Century," includes a short history of excavation on Cyprus. But Meiggs has written a *history* of the Empire and succeeded in accommodating the discussion and argument needed to document it.

There is a Select Bibliography with its items topically arranged and a Supplementary Bibliography, 1969-71. The latter has notice or discussion of the pertinence to Meiggs' own views of the work appearing after the manuscript was delivered.¹ Indexing is taken care of by a Select Index of Classical References, of Inscriptions and a General Index. Four maps at the end illustrate the tribute districts of the Empire.

The account of the Empire is well-balanced. Two chapters, on the nature of the evidence and the historical background, introduce the theme. Chapters 3 to 10 give an account of the early League and its transformation into Empire up to the Peloponnesian War. Then, the means by which Athens held the Empire are discussed in chapters 11 to 16. The war years are succinctly treated in chapters 17 to 20, and the work is concluded by three verdicts on the Empire, that of the fifth century, of the fourth century and by Meiggs' own conclusions in an Epilogue. There is much for a reviewer to discuss in this wealth of material. Epigraphical evidence from the Tribute Lists and Athenian decrees is skillfully interwoven and discussed with the literary tradition, but Meiggs' dating of some of the decrees and his judgments on controversial problems will not win everyone's acceptance; for example, he sets the Coinage Decree in the 440's and accepts the reality of the Peace of Callias with Persia. But these views are argued plausibly

¹ Unfortunately Kagan's study, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*, was too late for use if not citation, as, of course, was De Ste. Croix's book, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*.

and utilized in their context to explain the course of imperial history. Perhaps some brief summary and comment will convey an idea of the content of the book.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND FOUNDATION OF THE DELIAN LEAGUE

While Meiggs' discussion of the Ionian Revolt and of the Persian War is merely preliminary to his account of the Empire, certain threads of continuity might have been woven more strongly. He does point to the extension of the Revolt to Cyprus as a sign that Cyprus was then and continued to be regarded after 479 B.C. as a part of the Aegean Greek world. Not only were Aegean Greeks concerned about Cyprus but a substantial Greek element on Cyprus itself worked to maintain the connection. Thus Pausanias made an expedition to regain Cyprus in 478 and the island may have been designed to contribute a substantial amount in Aristides' First Assessment. Kimon tried to recover Cyprus for Greece, and the allies of the Delian League were deeply involved in the Athenian expedition to Egypt in the 450's. Cyprus had copper and Egypt wheat, so that desire to maintain the ties of trade was potent. These ties, however, had been established by East Greeks in the sixth century. We might expect that Ionians had considerable economic concern about Cyprus in the Revolt, and describe the subsequent interest of Athens and the Delian League in the southeastern Mediterranean as an attempt to maintain an established pattern of Greek activity there.

Meiggs, however, finds the chief cause for the Ionian Revolt in political feeling. Tyrants were an anachronism in the early fifth century, regarded as the instruments of Persian control in Ionia and so to be discarded. Quite properly he stresses the solidarity of the long Ionian resistance and rejects the machinations of a few individuals like Aristagoras as a cause of revolt. But there is some reason to doubt that all Ionians, except the tyrants, were anti-tyrannical and anti-Persian. The Milesians rejected not only Aristagoras but his coterie of oligarchs as well. Presumably some oligarchical elements in Ionia had been pro-Persian, and the solidarity of the revolt may have been largely a solidarity of the *demos*. The latter would have suffered from the economic consequences of the establishment of a satrapy in Thrace, where Ionians obtained silver to pay for Egyptian grain and where some had settled after the Persian conquest of their cities in 540 B.C. Probably the political attitudes of Ionian *demos* and oligarchs were no more simplistic at the time of the Revolt than in the period of the Athenian Empire and a consideration of continuity might help to explain political attitudes in the Ionian cities vis-à-vis the Empire and Persia.

In 479/478 B.C., however, the important question for Ionians was how the Greek War Alliance regarded their political future. Meiggs

argues cogently that the Alliance made a commitment to bring independence to the East Greeks through their acceptance into it of Asiatic mainlanders as well as Islanders. Implicit in this commitment was the purpose of the Delian League — to win freedom for the East Greeks as well as revenge and compensation for those who had fought the war. While the Delian League emerged as a new creation independent of the larger Hellenic League led by Sparta, the framework of political organization in Greece set up in the war was maintained until Athens broke with Sparta in the late 460's.

THE DELIAN LEAGUE AND THE TRANSFORMATION TO EMPIRE

For this very difficult period, where Thucydides' bare outline in the *Pentekontaetia* provides only a framework, Meiggs weaves a complex web of literary tradition, epigraphical evidence, and scholarly analysis. The suppression of Thasos is marked as the first unambiguous sign of tyranny by Athens and the beginning of a series of political shifts. In Athens the anti-aristocratic leaders emerged to challenge Kimon's position and policies, while in the League, where reaction to Athens' dominating position had a disintegrating effect, the commutation from ships to money was largely completed by 460 B.C. "Athens had already advanced a considerable distance on the way to Empire" (91). Meiggs, however, characterizes the decade of the 440's as crucial. He places the death of Kimon in 451 B.C., accepts the Peace of Callias with Persia as made soon thereafter and interprets subsequent actions as indicating Athens' commitment to Empire. "By a series of bold decisions she (Athens) made it abundantly clear that henceforward she would rule an Empire" (173). Thus the Cleinias Decree and the Coinage Decree are placed soon after the Peace and interpreted as means to center control in Athens. Presumably assembly meetings of the League were abandoned, and the Athenian *demos*, under the leadership of Pericles, proceeded to tighten and formalize the instruments of rule. After 443, when Thucydides, son of Melesias, was ostracized, Periclean leadership was virtually unchallenged as he directed imperial policy in the interests of Athens. Meiggs suggests that already before 435 B.C. Pericles believed war with Sparta was inevitable and against that belief interprets the events of the 430's: the founding of Amphipolis and the Black Sea Expedition, which was to ensure Athens' grain supply. The Finance Decrees of Callias are set in 434/433 B.C., made in anticipation of war. Finally the Megarian Decree, popularly interpreted in Athens as the cause of war, was an extreme demonstration of Athenian imperialism: "The Delian League had become an Athenian empire. This empire stood up to the strain of large-scale war extremely well . . ." (204).

THE MEANS OF RULE

The means by which Athens held her empire and exercised control over its members had been worked out in the period before the Peloponnesian War. Meiggs discusses in detail political control, control of jurisdiction and the tribute. Chapters 14 and 15 review the benefits of empire and the growth of Athens as the cultural center of Greece, while chapter 16 concludes this section by examining Athens' attempts to use religious cults as a tie of union. He notes that by the 430's there had been a general change in the form of government among the allies to democracy, but emphasizes that this was not obtained primarily by use of force. Threat or exercise of force was provided by the fleet, fortifications in Ionia were dismantled, and garrisons could guarantee the protection of a loyal democracy. But less overt methods worked to ensure adherence to Athens. The Athenian *demos* naturally favored its friends and watched for signs of disaffection. Loyal friends might be honored by grants of proxeny which involved tangible privileges in the Athenian courts. Visiting officials kept an eye on the member states. But the heart of the system, as Thucydides noted in the speech of the Athenian envoys at Sparta before the war, was the control of jurisdiction by the Athenian *demos*. People became dependent on its goodwill, for justice could be meted out in the interests of Athens. This particular infringement of autonomy engendered an atmosphere of favoritism and fear, more corrosive to the Empire than the payment of tribute. In a good discussion of the latter Meiggs examines the procedures and the political implications of the assessments. He concludes that on the whole over the years between 454 and 431 B.C. Athenian policy was moderate and even in 433 and 432 there was no sign of the coming of war.

The reviews of the economic benefits of empire to Athens and of the rise of Athens to cultural leadership in Greece are useful summaries but more might have been done here with archaeological material. For example, there is more evidence for Greek trade than the well-known generalizations of the Old Oligarch and for Athenian artistic leadership than a listing of Periclean buildings. However, compensation may be found in the good sketch of the reception of new philosophic and sophistic ideas in Periclean Athens. As Meiggs points out, "The vital stages in the development of Athenian imperialism took place while Athens was being intoxicated with the new spirit of rational inquiry . . . The cold analysis of empire in the speeches of Thucydides is not out of temper with the thinking of the day. There is no difficulty . . . that Pericles as well as Cleon could publicly call the empire a tyranny." Perhaps in these sections, too, it might be emphasized that while Athens provided the scene, the rest of Greece provided most of the protagonists in this cultural growth.

THE WAR YEARS

In his account of the Empire during the Peloponnesian War Meiggs focuses attention on the effects of the war on the Empire itself and on Athenian imperialism. Not until 428 B.C. did the tribute lists begin to show the strain of war. That year, of course, saw also the revolt of Mytilene, used by Thucydides to point up a change in imperial relations. Meiggs considers that in 428 B.C. there was probably an extraordinary levy on the allies, as well as on the Athenians, and discusses the harsher political attitude adopted under the political leadership of Cleon and the new radicals, as he defines them in an interesting section (317-18). This group is credited with the policy of expansion in the west, where Athenian aims are judged to have wavered between conquest or defensive interference, and with the new assessment of 425 B.C. Meiggs argues that the assessment was designed to increase individual tributes and the number of states paying, particularly in the Black Sea and the Carian-Lycian areas. While the result was a sharply higher tribute, Meiggs concludes that this was not as sensational as usually supposed. As we have noticed, he had already dissociated the Coinage Decree and other measures from the mid-twenties and set them in the context of organization of the Empire in the forties.

The Peace of Nicias brought no spirit of reconciliation between Athens and its allies nor among the hostile states of Greece. While the Islanders received some favorable treatment in the assessment of 421 B.C., "Periclean imperialism had generated too much energy and appetite to allow the Athenian demos to settle down to a stable peace." Under the exciting leadership of Alcibiades the Athenians embarked on a policy of expansion by land and sea. The former failed at Mantinea in 418 B.C. but the takeover of Melos provided a small success at sea. Meiggs reproves Thucydides for not developing the continuity between the plans of expansion under Alcibiades and the policy of the mid-twenties. The takeover of Melos was justified politically by the abortive attempt on the island in 426 B.C., and the Sicilian Expedition was the logical outcome of the previous venture to the west. It is noted that the allies do not seem to have been seriously disturbed by the moral issue raised by Melos, for they participated in large numbers in the Sicilian Expedition.

Thucydides, Meiggs observes, painted too gloomy a picture of Athens' situation after the disaster in Sicily. The fact that the city had weaker enemies and more friends than was realized is developed in a good discussion of the recovery of Samos and the revolt of Chios. Athens is given credit for a sensible, moderate policy to recovered allies and even to disloyal individuals. Dorieus, the Olympic victor from Rhodes, was spared by Athens only to be condemned [ultimately] by Sparta in 394 B.C. In fact, Meiggs justifies Cleophon's rejection of peace terms by Sparta in 410 B.C., for at that time and until after Arginusae Athens looked like a winner, thanks to the generalship of

Alcibiades. The ultimate loss of the war and the collapse of the Empire, while due in great part to the diplomacy and military leadership of Lysander, was facilitated by Athens in putting its generals to death after Arginusae.

THE VERDICTS ON THE EMPIRE

For the fifth century, of course, Thucydides is all important, if difficult to interpret. Meiggs, however, finds a consistent attitude. The narrative of the Pentekontaetia outlines the change from alliance to Athenian rule. The great set pieces in the history, from the speeches in Sparta before the outbreak of war to that of Hermocrates in Sicily, consistently stress that the dominant element in Athenian policy was the interest of Athens and that the Empire was maintained in a context of fear. Athens acknowledged its rule to be a tyranny but could not give it up. Against this Thucydidean interpretation there is no clear corrective. The "Old Oligarch" stressed the self-interest of the *demos* in maintaining the Empire. Aristophanes, who did attack the means of control, is to be placed among those whom Pericles in 430 blamed for accepting the Empire but declining the risks that were its inevitable price (395). The true verdict of the fourth century is to be found in the organization of the Second Athenian Confederacy, not in the complacent panegyric of the orators who gloried in past military achievement against Persia or, with more difficulty, in the Athenian championship of democracy.

To make his own verdict Meiggs answers two questions. The first is, "How did the Athenians regard their Empire?" In addition to the answer given by the literary tradition, that they thought primarily in terms of imperial benefits and were not ashamed to say so, Meiggs has an interesting analysis of the tone and style of the political decrees passed by the Athenian *demos*. They show no concern other than the interest of Athens and their language is strong, even violent. They do reveal by the stringent penalties provided for non-execution of their terms by Athenian magistrates that there was an opposition in Athens, but events have indicated that it was ineffective. The second question is, "How did the allies regard Athens?" That involves, of course, the well-known view of De Ste. Croix, that on the evidence of Thucydides himself there was substantial approval. Meiggs points out that the Empire was not necessarily unpopular and that there was a controlling *demos* in most of its subject-states until the war came. The answer is then implicit in Thucydides. The war sharpened class feeling and political difference. Men had to take sides as in Corcyra, and the implicit revolutionary situation acerbated by the existence of the Empire, broke out into bitter *stasis* and civil strife.

The last words are shared with Phrynichus (Thuc. 8.48.4-5, in 412 B.C.): "As for the allied states to whom they had promised oligarchy . . . he knew full well that this would not make those who had revolted

return to Athens nor those who had not revolted remain loyal. They would prefer independence under any form of government to subjection, whether by an oligarchy or a democracy." Meiggs concludes (412): "The Aegean world gained considerably from the use made by Athens of the wealth she drew from the cities and, as the Athenians claimed at Sparta in 432, they made considerably less use of force than imperial powers are expected to use, but they could have made more concessions to the general Greek passion for autonomy without undermining their position."

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RICHARD DUNCAN-JONES. *The Economy of the Roman Empire*. Cambridge [Eng.], University Press, 1974. Pp. xvi + 396. \$22.50.

An enormous mass of statistical information, mostly from epigraphic sources, has been compiled to the benefit of all in this book, and analysed systematically to illustrate various aspects of the economic life of the Roman Empire. It is necessary to say at once, however, that the book's title is misleading and claims too much. The range of the work is narrowed appreciably in the Introduction where Duncan-Jones announces his concern with the West, which becomes for the most part Africa and Italy (excluding Rome); and with wealth — in the form of incomes, prices and price levels, and capital investment; its economic setting; and the social conclusions to be drawn from the handling of wealth. There is no attention to trade and commerce, to industry and production or to any other features of economic life. The subtitle, "Quantitative Studies," provides a better indication that the book has no progressive structure, being really a collection of self-contained essays, and also defines the methodology being brought to the evidence, quantification, which is perhaps the most innovative mark of the book.

The Introduction outlines some general characteristics. Although money-based, the Roman economy was primitive despite its impressive material record, the outcome of huge and cheap supplies of labour. A strongly timocratic social system produced a wide differential between rich and poor, and wealth, essential for participation in all grades of public life, was largely controlled by a small proportion of the total population. Stable prices characterised the first two centuries A.D. with modest rates of inflation which gave way to a rampant inflationary level in the third century before subsequent recovery in the fourth. Such statements are not necessarily compelling because of familiarity;

a more cautious view, for example, of the role of money in the Roman economy would be legitimate (cf. M. H. Crawford, *JRS* 63 [1973] 40ff.). Two chapters on "Wealth and its Sources," studies respectively of the finances of the younger Pliny and of Columella's evidence on the profitability of agricultural investment, always the principal source of wealth, provoke further disquiet.

Pliny's income was derived from landed estates, house properties, legacies and usury, and in this Pliny must have been typical of many of his peers. Duncan-Jones estimates the size of Pliny's fortune as approximately HS20m. and finds that Pliny was the largest known public donor in Italy, spending perhaps as much as HS5m. on generosities. Despite the carefulness of the calculations, however, it is difficult to see precisely what purpose is served by this chapter. "Quantitative analyses . . . are gratuitous when the number of cases is small, when the student is concerned with only a few men or, perhaps, one man . . ." (W. O. Aydelotte, "Quantification in History," *AHR* 71 [1966] 805). Certainly Pliny's case-history can be used as a rough and ready standard of comparison in later chapters, but too little else is known in detail of other private fortunes to ascertain the degree of Pliny's typicality. An appendix which lists twenty-eight other fortunes is of little help (though this total exceeds those of previous researchers): the range of wealth is enormous here, and one may imagine that the information is available only because of the unusual amounts involved in most cases (Pliny ranks twenty-first on the list). In any case, the sources of these sums and the uses they were put to cannot be described in detail, and it appears doubtful whether the list is representative at large of senatorial or other incomes. Further, amounts of cash recorded in sesterces are meaningless unless a really satisfactory indication of purchasing power is provided; wheat equivalents (4ff.) are of little help when judged only in terms of lower class consumption.

The same type of broad criticism applies to the study of Columella, for whose statistics no contemporary material can be compared. Columella's figures on vine profits (generally higher than cereal production and olive growing) are shown to be erroneous because Columella discounts all capital costs, e.g. for farm buildings and grain lands. His minimum wholesale wine price conflicts with price evidence elsewhere. Income from his minimum yield and price figures suggests excessive capital investment and running costs, and his stated land price of HS1,000 per iugerum does not tally with the price assessable from income from wheat. Although viticulture remained the most profitable form of farming and represented high-return investment, Duncan-Jones revises Columella's statistics and claims that the average return on medium quality wine should be 7 percent, not 10 percent – 11 percent. The corrective is doubtless valuable, but is based solely on arbitrary estimates (e.g. amortisation rates) and the absence of corroborative evidence precludes a firm decision on Columella's representativeness.

The second and largest part of the book, "Prices and Price-Levels," has chapters on Africa, Italy, and the Latin novelists. *Inter alia*, Duncan-Jones finds a median private building cost in Africa of HS43,500 (excluding amphitheatres); for statues, a median cost of HS5,000. Expenditures on tombs were a matter of personal preference (hardly surprising), and at Lambaesis medians of HS1,380 and HS10,000 are calculated for opposite ends of the income scale. Foundations were made at the same rate of interest, 5 percent – 6 percent, as the average agricultural yield. The great variations amongst *summae honorariae* reflect the wealth of the cities from which they came and indicate insufficient voluntary munificence on the part of individuals. In Italy construction costs were higher because of the involvement of the emperor and the senatorial class. Standard burial costs of HS2,000 and HS20,000 are proposed; the percentage of salary spent on tombs tended to be highest at the top of the social scale. A median of HS10,000 is found for Italian foundations with interest rates ranging from 5 percent – 12 percent depending on the decline in size of the sum invested. The distribution of *sportulae* showed financial discrimination in favour of the socially powerful. Although Italian *summae honorariae* are less well-documented the same pattern of charges appears as in the African provinces. The figures in the novels of Petronius and Apuleius are of little value for the economic historian; neither is concerned with historical realism. By contrast, the *Historia Apollonii* is less fantastic and representative of the inflationary situation of the third century.

What emerges from these meticulous studies is the great lack of standardisation in financial matters from community to community and the confirmation from the financial viewpoint that the Empire was not a monolithic structure but a system in which control over cities was for the most part indirect. The tables of prices at the end of the African and Italian chapters are a noteworthy feature of the book, not least for future workers in the same area, but even so, when all the evidence has been collected there are still not enough types of cost material available, even from Africa and Italy, to build up a picture of the Empire as a whole. Even though impressionism is avoided by the methodology, what results is a series of local studies whose applicability on a wider front it is impossible to judge.

In two chapters on "Population and Demographic Policy" Duncan-Jones discusses population sizes in various African and Italian communities and, finally, the *alimenta* in Italy. He attempts to apply particularly the statistics of sums expended on large-scale gifts and/or distributions to the sizes of two African and ten Italian towns and makes comparison where possible with modern population figures. Duncan-Jones admits that it is difficult to proceed further beyond these twelve places, all of which are towns of limited importance. Again, therefore, a parochial quality in the work predominates. With the *alimenta* the author shows that Italian landowners received from the government a sum roughly valued at 8 percent of their estates and paid

interest at 5 percent to provide child allowances. The public system was of Nervan origin, and was intended to do nothing more than increase the Italian birth-rate. The relatively modest grants were meant for low-income families, but "poor relief" does not enter the picture (there is some confusion here, however; contrast pages 303 and 318). On the evidence from Veleia and Ligures Baebiani the landowners who participated in the schemes covered a wide range of wealth. Whether they included the decurial class is a moot point, but Duncan-Jones inclines against the possibility. The loans, if not compulsory, were at least imposed from above and the variations in loan-rates were due to inefficiency on the part of the governmental agents who organised the local schemes.

How delimited in comparison with the expectations raised by the book's title Duncan-Jones' subject matter becomes is implicit in the remarks made thus far: "the Empire" is reduced by the lack of quantifiable material to a few centres in Africa and Italy. One must add that the author is also well aware of the further restrictions imposed by his evidence. At all times he is cautious in not over-valuing statistical information. For example, he observes that only thirty-six *summae honorariae* survive for the whole Empire, that the African price material extends in time from Trajan to Gordian III but that only a quarter of it is firmly dateable, that most funerary costs oddly come from Numidia, and most records of perpetual foundations from Proconsularis. Likewise, in the chapter on population the basic figure supplied by an inscription is qualified by a number of conditions before use: whether the recipients of gifts were inhabitants of a town or its *territorium*; by an assumption of standardised interest-rates and benefits; by the exclusion of women and slaves from distributions, and so on. All of this is circumspect and proper. Yet in the end one feels that so many limitations are either inherent in the material itself or else introduced by the author that what results, despite their individual appeal, is no more than a few scattered fragments of the full mosaic.

The treatment of the *alimenta*, though a well-worn topic, calls for some detailed comment. The interpretation of *alimentis* at Pliny, *Pan.* 28.2 and 28.5 is suspect. To support the contention that Nerva, not Domitian, instituted the public *alimenta* Duncan-Jones claims that in the first passage the word means "Payments of corn to the *plebs*" (291). In stressing the birth-rate factor as the purpose of the institution he offers a more narrow and technical definition in the second passage, "Trajan's benefactions for the support of children" (295). The usages are so proximate, however, and interrelated, moreover, that this distinction is dubious. More importantly, there is of course little literary evidence to determine the exact purpose of the public system. But Duncan-Jones' argument for a population increase amongst an economically depressed group makes little sense in itself. What would be the point of creating more mouths to feed amongst low-income families? This would surely exacerbate, not resolve a problem. *Epit. de*

Caes. 12.4 refers specifically to *parentibus egestosis* which Duncan-Jones uses to show the social status of the alimentary beneficiaries, but the text surely has economic significance too and suggests an imperial concern with the elimination of poverty among the financially insecure. At Pliny, *Pan.* 28.5 *replebuntur* does not have to mean "demographic increase" (295) but simply the replacement of one generation by another; further, *castra* and *tribus* are plainly parallel and may indicate civil as well as military concerns. Albeit rhetorically, Pliny may well be anticipating a time when financial assistance to the unfortunate is no longer necessary.

Duncan-Jones demonstrates well the complexity of the organisation of the alimentary schemes at Veleia and Ligure Baebiani and contrasts the relatively few Italian children who benefited. But even though land was the most common form of investment in antiquity it credits the imperial government with little sense if one believes that the farmers who participated in the schemes derived no advantage whatsoever from the initial loans. From the governmental viewpoint taxation could well have been an alternative guarantee of income if agricultural interests were to be circumvented. In actuality, one might well see some interest in stabilising land-ownership behind the whole system, which would account for the presumably foreseen effect of diminishing market values, though not profitability, of land which Pliny evidences. At the least, Duncan-Jones' disposal of the "credit" theory is not altogether compelling.

A random number of detailed points indicate occasional precarious method or reasoning. P. 18: an "appropriate capital" for senators cannot be deduced from imperial grants to impoverished senators; there is no justification for considering such gifts to be the equivalent of annual income on a capital sum at 6 percent. The sums could just have been bailing-out grants and were no more than a "pittance" (A. H. M. Jones, *The Roman Economy* [1974] 126). P. 32: the explanation of Pliny's generosity applies only if Trajan as well as Nerva encouraged private munificence, which Duncan-Jones does not record. P. 82 n. 6: there is no evidence at Tac. *Ann.* 14.31 of *compulsory* payments at Camolodunum. P. 88: in the explanation of *summae honorariae* it should be added that there is little sign of reluctance to hold office in Africa for the first two centuries at least. P. 125: standard construction costs are deduced from four examples ranging over two hundred years. P. 128: the comparison of African and Italian tomb costs is of little value since most of the African evidence concerns veterans (which, indeed, the author makes clear). P. 273: Duncan-Jones relies on one piece of evidence from second-century Pergamum to calculate slave percentages in the population at large.

"The principal value of quantification for the study of history, stated in the simplest terms, is that it provides a means of verifying general statements." Thus a conservative quantifier (Aydelotte, art. cit. 804). Duncan-Jones' achievement has been to produce a book impor-

tant both for its exhaustive collection of materials and for applying what in ancient history is still a relatively new approach. The work is thorough and exact. But the evidence treated almost always presupposes a degree of wealth to which many could not aspire, and of these and their importance to the ancient economy the methodology tells little. The number of "general statements," whether hypotheses or conclusions, which quantification has allowed here is small in number.

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P. J. PARSONS, ed. *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, XLII. Published for the British Academy by the Egypt Exploration Society, London, 1974. Pp. 204, 12 pls. (*Graeco-Roman Memoirs*, 58)

The volume begins with fifteen new literary and subliterate texts, including a letter of Philip inserted in Demosthenes 18. 221, a curious narrative about Iolaus, and the argument of a *Tereus* (by Sophocles?). The main interest, however, lies in the official documents (and the *Acta Alexandrinorum*).

In No. 3014, which contains an earlier copy of seven sections of the justly famous gnomon of the idios logos, lines 16-17 in the reviewer's opinion should be restored as follows:

[Ῥωμαίων ἢ Ῥωμαίας κατ' ἄγνοιαν συνελθόντος]
[οὐ Ῥωμαίων τινὲς τὰ τέκνα τῶ ἡττονι γένει ἀκολουθεῖ]

The phrase οὐ Ῥωμαίων τινί, where Parsons leaves a lacuna of fourteen letters, would be the original of which BGU's ἢ ἄστοις Αἰγυπτίους is a garbled paraphrase. It can be supported by the language of Aelius Aristides, *Roman Oration* 63, who divided mankind, however rhetorically, εἰς Ῥωμαίους τε καὶ οὐ Ῥωμαίους.

Also Nos. 3015 with twenty-seven lines of court records and 3017 with an edict of the prefect Pactumeius Magnus deserve special mention.

No. 3018 presents imperial constitutions concerning paeonistae, first a rescript of Severus and Caracalla to a certain Sarapion son of Didymus, then ἄλλο θεοῦ Ἀδριανοῦ. Parsons refers to paeonistae elsewhere. The two Roman inscriptions concerning paeonistae are better cited as *IGUrbRomae* 35 and 77, the three (not one) Attic inscriptions as published in *TAPA* 71 (1940) 302-11. The reviewer would summarize the history of the institution as follows. When the poet Sophocles brought the cult of Asclepius to Athens, he composed the paean which the paenistae of Asclepius were still singing in the third century after Christ. The institution at Athens probably went back to

In the rescript of Severus and Caracalla the restoration of line 2 seems too long. Parsons restored what should have been there, but the scribe probably omitted something, perhaps Ἀραβιζός. In line 9 Parsons recognized the formula but refrained from restoring τὰ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν πρὸ ἡμῶν (not πρὸ ἐμοῦ) αὐτοκρατόρων] συν[χε]χωρημένα. Surely this is carrying caution too far; even though προτέρων may have been written instead of πρὸ ἡμῶν or some other variant may have occurred, it is the same thing. The epistle of Hadrian, Parsons thinks, was not meant for Egypt. It has in lines 13-15 a most unusual address, which it is tempting to restore as follows: [Ἀυτοκράτωρ Καῖσαρ Τραϊανὸς Ἀδριανὸς Σ]εβαστὸς τοῖς κατ[ὰ τ]ὴν ἐπαρχεί[αν] ἰδρυχοῦσι καὶ ἐπιτρόποις μὲν καὶ τοῖς σ[τ]ρατηγοῖς Ἑλλήσι τε καὶ βαρβάροις |

[καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς Συρίαν καὶ Φοινίκην κατ] ο[ι] κοῦσι χαίρειν. That is to say, it is addressed first to the Roman magistrates and procurators, second to the local officials, third to the populace. The word *στρατηγοί* was a general term for the highest city officials as in the Fragmentum Vaticanum *De eligendis magistratibus* (Studi e Testi 104). The emperor Julian, who knew well that the eponymous magistracy at Athens was the archonship, said of Constantine, "although he was *basileus* and master of all, he thought it fitting to assume the title of their *strategos*" (Orat. I 8 c). In the epistle of P. Oxy. 3018 some connection with the Arsinoite paeanistae must be assumed. For instance, Hadrian may have written: 'Ἐπέταξα παιανιστὰς τοῦ παλαιῶν Ἀρσινοειτῶν Σαράπιδος ἀνεῖ] σπράκτους παντὸς τελέσματος κ[α]τὰ τὴν ἐπαρχίαν εἶναι καὶ ἀπαρενοχλήτ]ους ἐπὶ τῶν ἰδίων [--. The claim of the paeanistae has the same basis as that of the Dionysiac Artists (so Parsons rightly).

No. 3019 preserves the heading (in Greek) to the abbreviated record of a trial on 9 March 200 before Septimius Severus. It should, as Parsons notes, be studied with the inscription from Dmeir on a trial before Caracalla (see now *Mélanges* . . . Daux 289-94).

No. 3020 contains a letter of Augustus and something of the proceedings of an embassy to Augustus. Parsons connects it with the Boule papyrus (PSI 1160 = Musurillo, *Acta* I) and P. Oxy. 2435 as a group copied shortly after the events described. The reviewer agrees that this earliest group of *Acta* should be regarded as strictly documentary (not literary).

No. 3022 contains a rough copy of a letter of Trajan to the Alexandrians. There are other documents of importance, letters, petitions, proceedings. Receipts for the capitation tax appear in Nos. 3036-3045.

Since the sources for the reign of Philip are so rare (no life of Philip even in the *Historia Augusta*), the materials from Egypt identifiable as from Philip's reign have a very special interest, not only for Parsons who contributed a valuable study, "Philippus Arabs and Egypt," in *JRS* 57 (1967) but for any student of the third century. Therefore, the splendid publication of five extensive documents from the reign of Philip with more light on Philip's attempt to reorganize the taxation of Egypt and on the critical shortage of grain will stand out among the many treasures of this volume.

There are also private documents and correspondence, before the volume closes with excellent indices. Not all the imperial letters are illustrated with photographs, but the edition of the texts deserves high praise.

JAMES H. OLIVER

BALTIMORE, MD.

PROBLEMS IN STOICISM, edited by A. A. Long. London, The Athlone Press, 1971. Pp. vi + 257. £4.00

"The Stoics," David Hume remarked in *The Natural History of Religion* (XII), "bestowed many magnificent . . . epithets on their sage . . . They forgot to add that he was not superior in prudence and understanding to an old woman." The rehabilitation of this Old Woman as a respectable thinker has been furthered considerably in the last decades by the writings of Phillip De Lacy, Émile Bréhier, Benson Mates, Victor Goldschmidt, Samuel Sambursky, Margaret Reesor, William and Martha Kneale, and others. Now this collection of ten essays, seven of which appear here for the first time, represents a further significant step in taking the veil off the Old Woman and unmasking her as a profound philosopher.

The first chapter is a persuasive attempt by F. H. Sandbach to delineate the epistemological and physiological relation of *φαντασία καταληπτική* — the central concept in the Stoics' representational theory of knowledge — to *αἴσθησις*, *κατάληψις*, *συγκατάθεσις*, and similar concepts. Professor Sandbach does not always provide new answers to such perennial questions as how one can recognize any *φαντασία* as *καταληπτική* or just how a passive subject 'assents' to an involuntary physiological process triggered by an external cause, or again whether every *φαντασία καταληπτική* is necessarily followed by assent. He is, however, acutely aware of these problems, and he does argue convincingly against Pohlenz' thesis of a substantial difference between Zeno and Chrysippus over the question of the test of truth. He shows that the two texts which have been thought to support Pohlenz' view are not entirely conclusive (Cic. *Acad. Post.* 1.42; Sext. *Emp. Math.* 7.152). Nevertheless, Cicero's statement that "*comprehensionem* . . . neque in rectis neque in pravis numerabat, sed soli credendum esse dicebat (sc. Zeno)" remains problematic. One might wonder whether these two texts (Cic., Sext. *Emp.*) should not be considered in conjunction with some other definitions of the test of truth attributed to Stoics but not examined in this chapter. Cf., for example, D. L. 7.54 (from Diocles?) = *SVF* 2.105: the tests are *αἴσθησις* and *πρόληψις* according to Chrysippus, but *νοῦς*, *αἴσθησις*, *ὄρεξις*, and *ἐπιστήμη* according to Boethus; Alex. Aphrod. *De mixture* p. 217 = *SVF* 2.473: the criterion is *κοινὰ ἔννοιαι*; Suda s.v. *πρόληψις*: the criteria are *αἴσθησις*, *γνώσις*, and *πρόληψις*; etc.¹

It is a pity that, for reasons of space, this review can only indicate briefly the contents of the remaining chapters. The fourth chapter ("Grammar and Metaphysics in the Stoa") is an illuminating attempt

¹ The passages from Diogenes and Alexander are, of course, discussed in Professor Sandbach's article "Ennoia and Prolepsis," but neither is taken into account in this chapter — nor is the passage from the Suda.

by A. C. Lloyd to explore neglected aspects of the *λεκτά*. He begins by discussing their connection with parts of speech and hence with grammar as well as dialectic. An examination of the Stoic view of the natural relation between language as sound and what it signifies then leads to a consideration of major difficulties in the Stoic theory of meaning. This part includes a valuable analysis of the distinction between utterance and *λεκτόν*, and of the relation of the theory of meaning (and of the *λεκτά*) to the four categories and to the theory of etymology. Chapter 5 ("Language and Thought in Stoicism") provides a further discussion of the *λεκτά* by A. A. Long, who first treats them with reference to the Stoic view of the relation between meaning, thought, reference, and reality. The relevance of these concepts to the Stoic theory of truth — and, in particular, to the location of the true and false in the *λεκτά* — and finally, the significance of these topics for the generation of moral concepts are the subject of the remainder of this chapter. Both these chapters also provide useful characterizations of some differences between the Aristotelian and Stoic theories of language and thought. Together, these two contributions perhaps constitute the most valuable and suggestive part of the volume.

In the sixth chapter S. G. Pembroke argues for a central role of *οἰκείωσις* in Stoic ethics. His analysis deserves close attention not only for its thorough and judicious use of problematic sources, but also because of its rejection of von Arnim's and Dirlmeier's view that the source of this concept lies in Theophrastus. Pembroke instead refers it back to Socratic philosophy. (More recently, G. B. Kerferd, perhaps with equal plausibility, has reasserted its Stoic origin; cf. *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, 55 [1972/3] 177-96.) A closer examination of its use in Epicureanism might throw further light on some of the problems Pembroke tackles.

In chapter 8 ("Freedom and Determinism in the Stoic Theory of Human Action"), Professor Long argues that the Stoic evaluation of freedom as self-determinism is reconcilable with their belief that all events and processes, including voluntary events like choice and decision, are determined. He points, for example, to the importance of character and responsibility in the Stoic attempt to combine determinism and human autonomy. Given the inclusive and absolute nature of the Stoic notion of determinism, one is, however, not surprised to learn that Professor Long concedes that the Stoics did not in every respect provide an adequate explanation of how moral responsibility can be attributed to a character that is entirely conditioned by external or antecedent causes. If his results remain problematic, it is perhaps due to the paradoxical nature of some Stoic views rather than to any lack of interpretative skill or ingenuity on the part of the author.

The final two chapters are concerned with developments in later Stoicism. In the ninth chapter I. G. Kidd gives a valuable analysis of Posidonius' theory of emotions (*πάθη*). The importance of this con-

tribution can now be understood in the larger context of Posidonius' ethics: cf. the fragments in Edelstein/Kidd, vol. I, pp. 49-58. It can also be compared profitably with chapter 11 in J. M. Rist's *Stoic Philosophy*; the differences in emphasis and interpretation show how problematic some of this material is. In the tenth chapter Gerard Watson (whose book *The Stoic Theory of Knowledge* [Belfast 1966] deserves more attention than it has received) explores the origins of the Stoic concept of natural law as well as its subsequent development and influence. Cicero emerges as the crucial link between the Stoics and those patristic authors who adopted — and reshaped — the idea of natural law.

The three remaining chapters 2, 3, 7 will not be discussed here, since all three have been published previously and are well known: the article by F. H. Sandbach on "Ennoia and Prolepsis" (*CQ* 24 [1930]) with an important postscript (33-34); the chapter on "Categories and their Uses" from J. M. Rist's *Stoic Philosophy*; I. G. Kidd's valuable article on "Stoic Intermediates and the End for Man" (*CQ* N.S.5 [1955] under a different title).

Professor Long edited these essays with admirable care. The three Indices are exemplary, the Bibliography judiciously chosen,² and the Introduction, editorial notes and cross references very helpful. Misprints are negligibly few (e.g. διαφοράς for διαφοράς, p. 23; *semaninein* for *semdinein*, p. 77; misplaced breathing on αἰθέρος, p. 47; omission of twelve words in line 8, p. 46). There might be those who will regret that only the shell and white of the Stoic egg, but not its yolk (D. L. 7.40), i.e. physics, have been treated in this volume. Yet, in the words of Professor Long, through treatment of the topics covered, "much of the coherence and significance of Stoicism as a whole can be seen" (p.v). One could with good reason go further and express the hope that, in a new and different way, some of these essays might trigger the kind of discussion of problems in Stoic philosophy that was occasioned by the publications of Jan Lukasiewicz (*Erkenntnis* V [1935] 111 ff.) and Benson Mates.

HEINRICH VON STADEN

YALE UNIVERSITY

² One misses items such as Oskar Becker's *Zwei Untersuchungen zur antiken Logik* (1957) 27-55, but on the whole the editor and the other authors have made responsible, critical use of previous scholarship.

JOHN BOARDMAN. *Athenian Black Figure Vases*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1974. Pp. 252. \$10.00.

A new book on Attic black figure, especially one at such a reasonable price, is indeed welcome. In trying to assess its worth, a question at once arises: how does it compare with Sir John Beazley's classic treatment? To this question the present writer addresses himself at once (on page 7, which is in fact the first page of the preface) "... in his *Development of Athenian Black Figure* (1951) he [Beazley] gives an account of the subject which is more profound than that offered here, but less complete, less fully illustrated, and different in its aim, being based on a series of lectures." Just how to judge a book's completeness I do not know, and why one based on lectures should be "different in its aim" from one written simply as a book is also obscure to me; I should have supposed that both would aim to treat the subject. As to 'fully illustrated', this evaluation would appear to depend on whether one considers the quality of the illustrations or their quantity. If the latter, then Boardman surely wins, whether one accepts the total as 321 (according to the list of illustrations) or 383, as given on the title page. This is indeed a prodigal offering, even though some are murky and a good many about the size of a postage stamp. One more question that arises here is Mr. Boardman's title. On page 182 he writes, "The common practice of calling Athenian vases Attic disguises the possibility that there were potteries producing figure decorated vases elsewhere in Attica than in Athens' potters' quarter." He goes on to consider this possibility, and appears to decide that there were. Thus Attic, not Athenian, would seem to be the proper adjective; yet not only does Mr. Boardman call them Athenian, but changes Beazley's title to conform.

The first seven chapters of the book are devoted to a chronological account, by painters and groups, ending with Panathenais. There follows a short chapter called "odds and ends", on Six's technique, black-glazed ware, etc. These chapters will perhaps not interest most of the readers of this journal as much as the later parts. Of these, one chapter deals with shapes and their names, which includes a discussion of which names are in fact ancient Attic, which simply modern conventions, and is thus of importance to the philologist. There follows a rather perfunctory consideration of chronology, then a useful chapter on decoration, including a chronological chart of painted letter forms compiled by Lillian Jeffery. The last two chapters deal with topics even more rarely treated in handbooks: chapter twelve is called "Scenes of Reality", i.e. the objects and activities the painters observed around them, and chapter thirteen, "Scenes of Myth". This last is especially useful, and must have put the author to a good deal of painstaking work. He not only attempts to list all the scenes from mythology depicted in Attic black figure, but also to indicate when each was particularly popular. Incidentally, he seems to feel that the many

scenes from the Trojan Cycle originated ultimately in such epics as the *Cypria*, *Aethiopis*, etc., whereas this reviewer supposes, to the contrary, that they stem only from a general and somewhat hazy knowledge of the story, with preference given to certain stock scenes which were either especially popular or lent themselves well to illustration. In any case it is interesting to see that the *Iliad* was not a favorite source.

Finally, one must comment on the "Notes and Bibliographies" at the end of the book. Although only seven pages long, it is printed in small type, and includes a wealth of up-to-date references, which are particularly detailed for the mythological scenes.

In sum, Mr. Boardman here proffers a lot of information, in condensed form, on just about every aspect of Attic black figure. His book is not, perhaps, so very profound, nor yet so very well illustrated. But, to return to where we began, its price is just ten dollars, a bargain which puts us all very much in his debt.

J. H. YOUNG

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
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PLAIN IN DICTION, PLAIN IN THOUGHT:


SOME CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING TRANSLATIONS OF THE ILIAD

Most of us know that Matthew Arnold called Homer's style rapid, plain in diction, plain in thought, and pre-eminently noble.¹ Critics, scholars and translators have added to Arnold's list: Homer's style has been called quaint, garrulous, fiery, grand, musical, perspicuous, simple, mellifluous, archaic, rugged, boisterous, monumental, insistently realistic, frightening, heart-rending, poignant, huge, uncompromising, tragic. In due course I shall examine some of this formidable list of adjectives, and perhaps add some of

¹ Matthew Arnold, "On Translating Homer," in *Essays Literary and Critical* (including Newman's reply and Arnold's reply to Newman's reply, *quo Newman laeso*). (London & New York, 1906). The R. H. Super edition of Arnold's complete prose works, vol. 1, does not include Newman's reply, although it does include Arnold's "Last Words" to Newman. (Ann Arbor, U. of Michigan Press, 1961). In fact, in a note, p. 249, Super goes so far as to say that "his (Newman's) essay has achieved undeserved immortality only by being printed in several modern editions of Arnold's essays." Because of the omission of Newman's essay, of course, much of Arnold's second essay is rendered unnecessarily mysterious by Super's splenetic hostility to poor defeated Newman. Is this a scholarly way to handle a celebrated and interesting controversy, to present only the arguments of the victorious side? Translations discussed in this article:

Bryant, William Cullen, *The Iliad of Homer* (Boston 1873)
Fitzgerald, Robert, *Homer, the Iliad* (New York, Doubleday, 1974)
Lattimore, Richmond, *The Iliad of Homer* (Chicago Univ. Press 1951)
Pope, Alexander, *The Iliad of Homer*, ed. Mack (London & New Haven, Methuen & Yale, 1967)
Rieu, E. V., *Homer, The Iliad* (Baltimore, Penguin, 1950)
Smith, William Benjamin, and Miller, Walter, *The Iliad of Homer* (N. Y., Macmillan, 1944)

I have also consulted the verse translations of Chapman and Cowper, and the prose versions of Rouse and Lang, Leaf and Myer.



my own. But first I ask the indulgence of my readers, as I present a new catalog of adjectives. These are some words which characterize the style of those who review new translations of Homer: lofty in diction, dogmatic in tone, quarrelsome, subjective, and pre-eminently windy. The critic of Homer translations always knows that *he* understands the essence of Homer's style, and invariably finds some aspect of it missing in the translation under scrutiny; he often finds merit in earlier versions but dismisses them, too, after all, and regretfully concludes that the definitive English *Iliad* has yet to appear.

I have no hope myself of escaping these charges. I too shall say that Robert Fitzgerald's handsome, new, fifteen-dollar *Iliad* is not Homer's *Iliad* (i.e. my *Iliad*); I too shall praise some past *Iliads* only to reject them ultimately; I too shall pronounce upon the essence of Homer, and shall probably fail to persuade. There is no other way; *quot homines tot Homeri*.

But let me first say a few words on behalf of the translators of Homer, all of them. The typical translator probably works at least several hours a day at some more gainful pursuit, occasionally needs the refreshment of reading a book, walking outdoors, or eating a sandwich, and may even have a family which requires an occasional exchange of civilities. I would guess that this translator might be able to turn Greek hexameters into English blank verse (or other moderately taxing meter) at the rate of about 25 lines a day. Some days, of course, he or she will work at high heat and do 100 lines; other days will find him or her worrying about *πολύφλοισβος* or the names of Thetis's companions for hours, and three or four lines will emerge after an evening's work. There are 15,693 lines in the *Iliad*; Homer undoubtedly composed them faster than anyone is able to translate them. At the rate I have estimated, the average translator, working 4 days a week, would take three years to complete the first draft of his or her translation. It takes a large slice of a person's life: delightful work, to be sure, but intense and exhausting. I have no doubt that Fitzgerald still finds himself lapsing into pentameter in his daily conversation, and dreams regularly

about Hector. The financial rewards of translation are not great, especially for a work like the *Iliad* which, as editors are likely to say, "has already been done," and as for glory, in the end the reviewers are likely to tell our translator that Mr. Pope wrote a pretty poem which was not Homer and this new one isn't even half so pretty as Pope's.

Now, Muse, help me to remember another catalogue: what are the characteristics of a good verse translation? The ideal verse translation should be 1) faithful to the original in content; 2) faithful in tone (or manner, or effect); 3) comprehensible and congenial to the reader who cannot read the original, and 4) a good poem in itself. Are these four requirements mutually compatible? No. A prose translation can always be more faithful in content than any verse rendering, but the very fact that it *is* prose makes it clearly less faithful in tone if the original is a poem. Faithfulness in content (1) may also be disastrous to (3) the modern reader's comprehension, if the original is highly topical or allusive, or may preclude (4) a fine English rendering, if the original is not in itself a good poem. Faithfulness in tone may militate against congeniality to the modern reader if the original was written in a manner now forbidden by literary fashion (e.g. Homer's redundancies, while characteristic, offend the well-Strunked college student). All translators face these problems. Most, apparently, strive to achieve all four goals to some degree; prose translators subordinate 2) and 4) to 1) and 3); some verse translators quite deliberately give up on both sorts of faithfulness in the interest of producing a comprehensible, modern, good poem. D. S. Carne-Ross, in his recent review of Fitzgerald's *Iliad*, favors this approach, and is filled with scorn for "the professors" who insist that a translation be "accurate" (latter quotation marks Carne-Ross's).²

² D. S. Carne-Ross, "On Looking Into Fitzgerald's Homer," *New York Review*, Dec. 12, 1974.

For the same attitude, see also Carne-Ross, "Structural Translation," *Arion* 1, 1 (Spring 1962) 27-38, an article which is largely an encomium on Christopher Logue's translation of Book 16. Carne-Ross calls Lattimore's translation "the great monument" to a "dead philological ex-

I want to say that I'm not a bit hurt at being called a professor in front of the sophisticated and well-heeled readers of the *New York Review*, but I would quarrel with Carne-Ross's assumption that *only* the professors care whether the translation accurately records the contents of the original. If a fine modern English poem is all the reader wants, why is he buying a translation of the *Iliad* in the first place? He would do better with a volume of Yeats. It is quite proper to marvel at the other Fitzgerald's *Rubaiyat*, but when we find out that Omar's wilderness picnic consisted not of a book of verses, a jug of wine and Thou, but a bookless, boughless desert, a hunk of cold mutton and a pretty boy, do not most readers feel just a trifle seduced and abandoned?³

Different authors or genres, of course, seem to require differing emphases among these four criteria I have enumerated. Take, for example, Aristophanes. I think very few of us would care for a translation of Aristophanes that wasn't funny. That seems to be essential for faithfulness in tone. But to make Aristophanes funny, and comprehensible to the 20th century reader, it is often essential to sacrifice or alter the original content—for example, in the case of puns. Latin lyric poetry presents another sort of problem.

hibit" (p. 38), and praises Logue for being "unencumbered by Greek scholarship to a degree that arouses even the present writer's envy" (loc. cit.).

The same point of view can be found also in the review of Lattimore's *Odyssey* by Guy Davenport, *Arion* 7, 1 (Spring 1968) 135-53. Davenport likes Fitzgerald's translation, but shows much greater enthusiasm for Logue's experiments, which he calls "a miracle of the imagination." He attacks Lattimore, often tellingly, for "lexicographic" over-literality and awkward diction, and throughout the article calls Lattimore "Professor Lattimore," in very much the same spirit that Matthew Arnold called his punching-bag "Professor Newman."

³ This information about the *Rubaiyat* comes from p. 48 of F. L. Lucas's witty and perspicuous essay "Translation," in *The Greatest Problem and other essays* (N.Y., Macmillan, 1961). Lucas discusses, in addition to translations of many other works, Pope's and Chapman's versions of the *Iliad*. There are, inevitably, points on which I disagree with Lucas, but his essay is sensible as well as entertaining, and I thank Holcombe Austin (Professor of Philosophy Emeritus, Wheaton College) for calling it to my attention.

To render the *curiosa felicitas* of Horace—to preserve his formality and polish, his essential tone—it seems to me advisable to use a strict English meter, and perhaps even rhyme. But the use of a formal meter automatically entails some loss of faithfulness in content, and may perhaps produce an “old-fashioned” effect, uncongenial to the modern reader.

And of course readers differ. It is my impression that college students generally want translations written in modern, easily understood English, but more important, they also want faithfulness in content, and are horrified to discover that the translation they are using and relying on isn't the Real Thing, and doesn't say exactly what the original author says. More sophisticated readers—dare I call the General Public that?—appear to be more interested in a well-written final product. Does anyone want faithfulness in tone? Why, we do—the professors, who have read the original and are the only readers who have no need of a translation. Should our opinion matter? It does, of course, because we make up the reading lists, and we write the reviews, and all the others depend on us to tell them if X's translation is the Real Thing. Any reader can be his own judge of criteria #3 and #4, but only we can judge faithfulness, and can try to persuade our students and the public that faithfulness means more than word-for-word reproduction of content.

Is Fitzgerald's *Iliad* faithful to Homer's *Iliad* in content? Sometimes it is, and sometimes it is not. Epithets and formulaic expressions are generally either omitted, or softened and modernized, as in “charming Briseis” for *Βρισηίδα καλλιπάρηον* (A323), and then again “Briseis in her beauty” for the same epithet in line 346. (Matthew Arnold would have approved of this.)⁴ There is, apparently, a mis-translation, or a misinterpretation, on page 22, where he treats the ritual washing of A314 as a routine neatening-up and garbage collection. But a more serious problem is Fitzgerald's tendency to “improve” on his original, to turn a plain Homeric expression into something fancier, more

⁴ Arnold, 1906 ed., p. 265.

colorful or unusual or "poetic." Let us, for example, examine the passage in the first book in which the sound of Achilles' weeping is heard by Thetis under the sea. "So he spoke weeping, and his lady mother heard him, as she sat in the depths of the sea beside her old father. Quickly she came up from the gray sea like a mist, and sat beside him as he shed tears, and fondled him with her hand, and spoke, and called him by name:" (356-61).

Fitzgerald translates the passage thus: "Eyes wet with tears,/he spoke, and her ladyship his mother heard him/ in green deeps where she lolled near her old father./Gliding she rose and broke like mist from the inshore/ grey sea face, to sit down softly before him,/ her son in tears; and fondling him she said."—"Green deeps," "lolloed," "gliding," "inshore grey sea face," and "softly" have all been contributed by Fitzgerald. This is scarcely more literal than Pope, who translates: "Far in the deep recesses of the main,/ Where aged Ocean holds his wat'ry reign,/ The Goddess-mother heard. The waves divide;/And like a mist she rose above the tide;/Beheld him mourning on the naked shores,/And thus the sorrows of his soul explores."

Fitzgerald's translation is of course less literal than Lattimore's, which is well known to Greek students as a superior trot even to Rieu's prose version. Lattimore translates the Thetis passage as follows: "So he spoke in tears and the lady his mother heard him/ as she sat in the depths of the sea at the side of her aged father,/and lightly she emerged like a mist from the grey water./She came and sat beside him as he wept, and stroked him/ with her hand and called him by name and spoke to him." Here, only the word "lightly" for *καρπαλίμως* might be considered the slightest bit free. It might be mentioned, however, that Lattimore's six-beat line is so freely handled as to be almost indistinguishable from prose. In fact, I suspect that if a passage from the Rieu version were arranged on the page as poetry next to Lattimore's, it would be hard for the average person to tell which version was verse and which was prose. Consider:

"Achilles prayed and wept, and his Lady Mother
Heard him where she sat in the depths of the sea

With her old Father. She rose swiftly from the grey water
 Like a mist, came and sat by her weeping son,
 Stroked him with her hand and spoke to him."

(Rieu, p. 32)

Is it therefore true that Lattimore is able to be so literal only because he writes in virtual prose, and that Fitzgerald takes more liberties because of the exigencies of his stricter meter? There may be something to this, but it is certainly not the whole answer. It is possible to be far more literal than Fitzgerald, and to avoid poetic diction and word order, and still to compose in a reasonably strict meter. For example:

And as he wept, his lady mother heard him,
 Down in the deepest ocean, where she sat
 Beside her ancient father, and she rose
 Up from the gray sea, quickly, like a mist
 And sat beside her weeping son, and spoke,
 And stroked him with her hand, and called his name.

This is not a particularly good translation of this passage, but it demonstrates, I trust, that it is possible to write in a meter as strict as Fitzgerald's (handled more strictly, in fact) and still to retain the strict accuracy of a Lattimore.

Bryant's version of the same passage, while using the poetic diction of his day, also manages to be both literal and metrically strict:

Thus, shedding tears, he spake. His mother heard,
 Sitting within the ocean deeps, beside
 Her aged father. Swiftly from the waves
 Of the gray deep emerging like a cloud,
 She sat before him as he wept, and smoothed
 His brow with her soft hand, and kindly said—"

(p. 16)

Fitzgerald's tendency to pretty up his original is so persistent that it seems to me to amount, often, to a real difference in content. When Fitzgerald says "charming Briseis" it does not sound Homeric; when he says "Akhilleus, fast in battle as a lion," for *πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς* in line A364, it is not Homer. But is it a pretty poem? Whether or not this lack of accuracy is compensated for by corresponding gains in other areas will be considered later.

Is the Fitzgerald version comprehensible and congenial to the modern reader? Generally, it is. But here and there a queer, archaic word intrudes, like "windrows" (p. 35), "carls" (35), "scut" (43), "poltroons" (47), "hurly-burly" (89), "spumes" (128), "gittern" (321), "bourne" (336), and "moil" (410). Perhaps he is trying to capture the feeling held by many of us who read Greek, that Homer uses some strange words; but surely, this is a mistake. Because most of us learned fifth-century Attic Greek before we learned Homer's dialect, many of Homer's words seem odd or archaic to us, which would not seem odd if we had learned Homeric Greek first. We have no way of knowing whether Homer's words seemed odd to his audience. I must echo the dogmatic dictum of Arnold to his victim, poor Professor Newman:⁵ "Homer is never quaint." Even if we could demonstrate that Homer did use an occasional word that his contemporaries did not know, Fitzgerald would not be justified in talking about the long-haired carls of Akhaia: this is an unnecessary irritation for the innocent reader, who already has beaked ships and Sminthian Apollo and entrail-tasting and greaves to struggle with.

But, in truth, Fitzgerald's translation is not overwhelmingly filled with carls and scut and windrows; far more frequently his diction is not oddly archaic, but familiarly so: he writes in the poetic style of the Victorian era. This is what I call the "nay rather" school of translating. I trust that a good many of my academic friends spend a good deal of class time trying to persuade their students to eschew this style, to abandon the "nay rather" and "smote" and "slew" they find in their notes and lexicons, and say, plainly, "no, but" and "hit" and "killed," and, further, to use good English word order, not "her son weeping she found," but "she found her son weeping."

Here are some examples of Fitzgerald's poetic diction: p. 23, "Honor at least from Zeus who storms in heaven I call my due." 29, "Zeus to his hall retired." 71, "She found her weaving in the women's hall a double violet stuff, whereon inwoven were many passages of arms by Trojan

⁵ Arnold, *ibid.*, 231.

horsemen and Akhaiaans mailed in bronze." 73, "A goddess the woman is to look at." 91, "Engage to pay Apollo, the bright archer, a perfect hekatomb of firstling lambs." 93, "Zeus,—benched in the azure up there where he dwells." 96, "Men who are first to sunder oaths their flesh the kites will feed on—tender fare." 122, "He lay for thirteen moons in a brazen jar." 132, "double-ridged her helmet was, en-chased with men-at-arms." 413, "Ah, poor man, no least presage of death is in your mind." 483, "His fate is to escape, to ensure that the great line of Dardanos may not unseeded perish from the world." 508, "Lord of earthquake, sound of mind you would not call me if I strove with you." And this is not all: for some reason the ghost of Patroklos uses "thee" and "thou" and "hast" and "shalt", and Achilles replies "Why comest hither?" In the last book, Hermes speaks entirely in rhyming couplets, which make him into a merry fellow indeed, sounding somehow as if he had just stepped out of Plautus' *Amphitryon*.

We do not condemn Pope's word order or diction when he says (A720) "Jove to his Thetis nothing could deny,/Nor was the signal vain that shook the sky." When William Cullen Bryant says (B366) "Therefore blame I not/ the Greeks if they in their beaked ships repine/at this delay," it is not especially attractive, but it is not offensive. Why does it strike such a false note when Fitzgerald does the same thing? Is it simply that this is 1975, and poetic diction of this type no longer exists? That would seem a shallow dogma, to condemn a style merely because it isn't the fashion of the moment; if we were to follow the principle consistently, we would have to condemn the music of Bach, whose style was old-fashioned in his day. Of course an archaic style makes a translation less appealing to students and the general public. But still, it seems that the real problem with Fitzgerald's archaisms is that they are used inconsistently. On every page, interwoven with the Victorian diction, we find up-to-the-minute colloquialisms. Some examples: on page 41, a cowardly soldier is called a "weak sister"; 42, there is a reference to "the hottest girls"; 44, "en route from Argos, from the bluegrass land" (where all that country and western music comes from, no doubt); 22,

"The troops meanwhile were ordered to police camp and did so, throwing refuse in the water" (of a solemn ritual cleansing before sacrifice); 30, Hephaistos tells Hera, "better make up to Father, or he'll start his thundering and shake our feast to bits."; 102, "the troops were mainly silent,"; 124 "like dogs making themselves scarce around a lion"; 137 "This beastly incorrigible truculence comes from your mother Hera"; 237 "upon his head he pulled a bull's hide helmet . . . a so-called 'cut down' "; 245, "He used his bow to whack them" (horses); 340 "Danae with her delicious legs"; 422, "One of his men at last caught on" (perceived the true situation); 448, (Hephaistos) "the Great Gamelegs" (sounds like a bird, to be distinguished from the Lesser Gamelegs); 481, "men have twisty tongues."

Now, I don't object to Danae's delicious legs, in their place, any more than I do to "double violet stuff, whereon inwoven were," in its place. But to put both in the *same* place seems to me plainly disastrous; in fact one of the classic formulas for humor is the incongruous combination of high and low diction. As many a classics teacher knows, all one needs to do for a guaranteed cheap laugh from the students is to say something like "It has been uncontroversibly established by reputable scholars that Olympian Zeus was a really cool cat."

Richmond Lattimore, deliberately striving for "the plainest language (he) could find,"⁶ fairly frequently slips into "nay rather" diction (e.g. "For Hektor the huge will not sooner be stayed from his fighting until there stirs by the ships the swift-footed son of Peleus," 8.473), and occasionally into chummy colloquialism (e.g. in 6.344 Helen calls herself a "nasty bitch"), but more often into a diction which is simply awkward and unidiomatic (e.g. 23.86, "—just as we grew up together in your house,/ when Menoitios brought me there from Opous, when I was little,/ and into your house, by reason of a baneful manslaying, on that day when I killed the son of Amphidamas.") Still, on the whole, his language is, as he intended, plainer and more modern than Fitzgerald's, and it far more accurately renders the plainness of Homer's words.

⁶ Lattimore, introduction, p. 55.

From our discussion of criterion #3 (comprehensibility and congeniality to the modern reader) let us turn to criterion #2, faithfulness in tone (or manner, or effect). The tone (manner, effect) of Homer forms almost the whole subject of Arnold's celebrated essay, and I have deferred discussion of this criterion until now because it is probably both the most crucial area and the most controversial one. Arnold's famous four characteristics (plain, plain, rapid, noble) all refer to what I call tone. Most scholars since Arnold seem to have agreed that Homer has rapidity and the two sorts of plainness, but the word "nobility" has caused more argument, partly because Arnold himself had such trouble saying exactly what he meant by the word, particularly when applied to scenes like the Thersites episode, or the comparison of Aias to a donkey. Still, words like "noble" have been used of Homer for centuries; I take it that "grand," "monumental," and "huge" all refer to the same quality.

Whatever we choose to call the effect, it seems to exist, and to be the result of 1) the large scope of the whole work—its sheer length, its panoramic view of men, gods, and the world, its dramatically satisfying, controlled and resolved plot, and 2) on the lower level of style, the formal (and formulaic) quality of the language and meter. "Dignified," "serious," and "noble" are all words which can be applied to many passages of the *Iliad*, but none of them can be applied to every scene and every line: Thersites *is* undignified; there is a fine sly humor in nearly every Olympian scene—surely when Athene punches Artemis in the breast, it is hard to view the tone as one of dignified solemnity. Still, these scenes are undeniably different in manner from anything in Aristophanes, or Petronius, or Art Buchwald. But Homer's serious scenes are also different from anything in plain serious writers like Xenophon or Livy or Hemingway. With respect to this quality (whatever we shall call it) I would say that Homer is closer to Dante and to Milton, but more particularly, closer to Hesiod, and to the authors of *Gilgamesh* and the *Nibelungenlied*. I think the key is in meter, and in formality of diction. There may be humor, there may be vulgar-

ity, there may be undignified material, but there is no way to mistake a line of Homer for ordinary conversational prose; the style produces distance and an effect of dignity because it regularly uses repetitions of sound patterns and word combinations which are unnatural from the standpoint of spoken prose. Now, any translation of the whole *Iliad* will almost inevitably preserve the grandeur and scope of the work in the large sense; on the level of style, however, this "nobility" or, as I prefer to call it, formality of tone can be achieved by either a) the consistent use of an archaic (or archaizing) poetic diction, or b) the use of a formal meter, with a consistent retention of epithets, similes, and other formulaic expressions, translated fairly literally.

The best translations of previous centuries have done both; the most successful of these, in my opinion, is William Cullen Bryant's mellifluous, literal blank verse version. For the readers of this century, it seems to me that archaic diction is no longer a live option, and that the translator must rely on meter and formula to render this aspect of Homer's manner. Obviously, some would disagree with me, and insist that formal meter is just as "dead" for the modern reader as "nay rather" diction. In answer, I urge that meter still lives, persisting curiously in an age in which poets have largely abandoned it, in popular songs, in television advertising, in children's literature and games, and in the light verse in popular magazines. In other words, the public, which would reject archaic diction, has no problem at all about accepting meter. Fitzgerald has made a good choice here, to use blank verse. Lattimore's free six-beat line, as I have said, does not sound like poetry, but like stilted prose. Miller and Smith's stricter hexameter is better, but still, no narrative meter has quite the happy poetic associations for English ears that iambic pentameter has, and no meter is so well adapted to the natural rhythms of our language and to the requirements of a long work. There was some thought in the 19th century (firmly put down by Arnold) that the ballad meter would be perfect for an English *Iliad*, and to be sure, Newman's chief contribution to us (in his wounded reply to Arnold) was to quote one of Prime Minister Gladstone's experiments in this line;

As when the billow gathers fast
 With slow and sullen roar
 Beneath the keen northwestern blast
 Against the sounding shore:
 First far at sea it rears its crest,
 Then bursts upon the beach,
 Or with proud arch and swelling breast,
 Where headlands outward reach,
 It smites their strength, and bellowing flings
 Its silver foam afar;
 So, stern and thick, the Danaan kings
 And soldiers marched to war.
 Each leader gave his men the word;
 Each warrior deep in silence heard.
 So mute they march'd, thou could'st not ken
 They were a mass of speaking men:
 And as they strode in martial might
 Their flickering arms shot back the light.⁷

This has a force and speed to it which seems to me quite wonderful, and oddly Homeric. But Gladstone didn't have time to do more than a few lines, and probably it is just as well: it seems dubious that this fine effect could continue for page after page; it is simply too obtrusive and exciting a meter; both reader and translator would be exhausted.

Blank verse, then, seems the right choice for an English *Iliad*, and Fitzgerald handles his meter skillfully. Many lines are mellifluous, and there are many passages and even whole scenes of real beauty, written with a poetic vigor which is hardly ever found in Lattimore. Nearly all the similes are particularly well handled. Here is a brief example—not a famous or unusual one, but selected more or less randomly (p. 50): “As in dark forests, measureless along/ the crests of hills, a conflagration soars,/ and the bright bed of fire glows for miles,/ and fiery lights from this great host in bronze/ played on the earth and flashed high into heaven.”

Fitzgerald's blank verse is described in the book jacket blurb as “fresh and flexible”; this means, apparently, that his lines do not always have five feet. (His substitutions of

⁷ Newman, in Arnold, op. cit., p. 291.

other feet for iambs, are hardly more daring than those of Tennyson, and his fondness for feminine line-endings is unexceptional, and often effective.) His trimeter lines (and an occasional seven footer) do not disturb the rhythm, but the four and six foot lines seem to me distinctly awkward, particularly since they seldom seem to come at significant moments, where the translator might wish to jolt the reader into paying extra attention; rather, they give the appearance of resulting from laziness or carelessness on the translator's part, as if he said to himself, "I am calling this a fresh and flexible blank verse, so why should I struggle to make this sticky phrase come out right?" Now I find it hard to believe that so good a poet as Fitzgerald really proceeded in such a sloppy manner; I think he must have had something in mind, perhaps, as Carne-Ross thinks, "to register a disturbance in the Greek."⁸ But I must admit I don't see any disturbance in, for example, *Ἡὼς μὲν ῥα θεὰ προσεβήσεντο μακρὸν Ὀλυμπον* (B48), which Fitzgerald translates "(Pure Dawn)/ had reached Olympos' mighty side."/ This shortened line does not seem to register anything in particular, and even if the translator is working from some less obvious theory here, the resulting effect is unfortunate. His inconsistent use of meter does as much as his inconsistent diction to mar an otherwise grand and musical tone, and to break up an otherwise splendidly flowing rapidity.

Homer is rapid. Arnold was surely right when he said that, and the chief flaw of verse translations (even Bryant's excellent one) has always been a lack of rapidity by comparison with even the poorest prose versions. Lattimore's choppy phrases and stilted meter make his *Iliad* one of the least rapid versions available; for this reason I have always preferred to assign, in underclass civilization courses, the Rieu Penguin prose edition, for all its faults—its lack of literal accuracy, its prosy quality, and its dated colloquialisms. Fitzgerald, too, is rapid, particularly in dialogue, and this is a fine achievement on his part. He has some high moments, but oddly, they seldom come in the places we might expect them. The death of Hector, the Trojan el-

⁸ Carne-Ross, "On Looking into Fitzgerald's Homer."

ders' comments on Helen, the meeting of Hector and Andromache—none of these famous scenes is so moving as we would want it to be. Lattimore is much better in the high moments. But there are in Fitzgerald fine passages where we hardly noticed them before, for example in the description of Poseidon in the thirteenth book:

“Then from the stony mountain down he went
with mighty strides; a tremor shook the crags
and forest under Poseidon's immortal feet.
Three giant steps, then four, and he was home
at Aigai, where his golden chambers glimmer
in the green depth and never wash away.
Here he entered; into his chariot shafts
he backed his racing team with golden manes,
put on his golden mantle, took his whip
of pliant gold, stepped up into his car,
and rolled out on the waves. Great fish beneath him
gamboled from every quarter of the deep,
aware their lord rode overhead; in laughter
whitecaps parted, and the team full tilt
airily drew unwetted the axle-tree;
with leap on leap they bore him toward the beachhead.
There is a cavern deep in the deep sea
midway between the rocky isle of Imbros
and Tenedos: here he who shakes the islands
drove his horses down, unharnessed them,
tossed them heavenly fodder, looped their hocks
with golden hobbles none could break or slip—
that they should abide here their lord's return'
and off he went to the Akhaian army.”

(p. 300)

The rapidity of this passage is striking, as is its vigor. To “plainness,” “rapidity,” and “nobility,” I would add “vigor,” as characteristics which make up the tone of the *Iliad*. When Pope calls Homer “fiery,” and when Newman (poor Professor Newman, who apparently spent his life hearing himself called “the Cardinal's younger brother”) calls Homer “rugged and boisterous,” I think they refer to the same quality. Pope's translation has vigor; Lattimore's generally has it; Fitzgerald's has it. Perhaps the least appealing quality of Bryant's otherwise fine version is an exces-

sive smoothness, a somewhat soft or pretty quality which is detrimental to Homeric strength and vigor.

Homer's plainness of diction has been discussed already, under the heading of faithfulness in content, but let me reiterate: Lattimore is plainer than Fitzgerald, but both are of course immeasurably plainer than Pope. As for plainness in thought, this too seems to come more easily to the 20th century translator than it did to his predecessors; Rieu, Lattimore, Fitzgerald and even Miller and Smith all quite adequately mirror Homer's simplicity and lack of conceit.

If we combine all the qualities thought to be essential for faithfulness to Homer in tone, does any one translation stand out for excellence in this category? I confess I cannot make a choice. In some ways Fitzgerald is clearly the most nearly Homeric, for his vigor, his rapidity, his meter, and the beauty of some passages. But Lattimore's greater plainness and more literal rendering of formulaic elements make his version more Homer-like in other ways, while the speed and simplicity of Rieu cannot be discounted, nor can the wonderful easy rhythms and fine plain phrasing of Bryant. And then, even if we decide that in tone Fitzgerald is probably the closest to Homer, we still should consider the criteria of faithfulness in content (where Fitzgerald is clearly a loser to Lattimore, to Rieu, to Bryant), and comprehensibility and congeniality to the modern reader (where Rieu would probably best Lattimore, who in turn would outrank Fitzgerald). I have not discussed the fourth criterion, that the translation be a good poem in itself, because it is so subjective an area. I do think Fitzgerald's *Iliad* a better poem than Lattimore's, but less good than Pope's or Bryant's. Many, obviously, would disagree. But for a translation, as opposed to an original poem, this is only one of several criteria, and not, for me, the most important one. That is, I prefer a moderately pretty poem that is Homer to a prettier one that is not.

I would assume that many classics teachers will henceforth be changing their book orders from Rieu or Lattimore to Fitzgerald. They will have excellent reason for doing so. Others will stay with Lattimore; their reasons will be no less valid. And I, for my own excellent reasons, will

continue to assign the Rieu version to civilization courses, and to deliver a lecture in which I read Greek to the Greekless and announce loudly that the *Iliad* is written in poetry. And I will continue to await the supertranslation of the *Iliad*, as yet unborn.*

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PANAETIUS AND MENANDER

In one of his letters to Lucilius (*Ep.* 116.5) Seneca tells a charming anecdote of the Stoic philosopher Panaetius of Rhodes:

eleganter mihi videtur Panaetius respondisse adolescentulo cuidam quaerenti an sapiens amaturus esset. 'de sapiente' inquit 'videbimus: mihi et tibi, qui adhuc a sapiente longe absumus, non est committendum ut incidamus in rem commotam, impotentem, alteri emancipatam, vilem sibi. sive enim nos respicit, humanitate eius irritamur, sive contempsit, superbia accendimur. aequae facilitas amoris quam difficultas nocet: facilitate capimur, cum difficultate certamus. itaque conscii nobis imbecillitatis nostrae quiescamus; nec vino infirmum animum committamus nec formae nec adulationi nec ullis rebus blande trahentibus.' quod Panaetius de amore quaerenti respondit, hoc ego de omnibus affectibus dico: quantum possumus nos a lubrico recedamus; in sicco quoque parum fortiter stamus.

The story reflects the way in which Hellenistic philosophers sometimes dealt with an ethical or psychological problem. A student would ask a question, and the master would answer it briefly, often with logical arguments, sometimes with a joke, but usually in a quaint or colorful way. In that period the philosopher had become a kind of spiritual guide, a father-confessor figure. He kept in touch with his disciples even after they had left the school, counseling and admonishing them by letters.¹ The epistles of Epicurus and those of Seneca are good examples for this continuing philosophical conversation, this soul-searching dialogue that never ends. But the teaching by question and answer, perhaps at the end of a formal lecture, remained popular, as Epictetus' *Diatribes*, recorded by Arrian, show.²

¹ Cf. A. D. Nock, *Conversion* (1933), ch. 11; E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (1951) 265ff.; P. Rabbow, *Seelenführung* (1954) *passim*; G. Luck, *Gnomon* 25 (1953) 367; 28 (1955) 268ff.

² Cf. Emile Bréhier, *Histoire de la philosophie*⁸ I (1967) 373: "Le maître (ou un élève) vient de faire une leçon technique; il donne la permission de

We should note the form of the question. In Greek it would have been $\tilde{\alpha}\rho' \epsilon\rho\alpha\sigma\theta\eta\sigma\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota \delta \sigma\phi\acute{o}\varsigma$; in analogy to such questions as $\tilde{\alpha}\rho\alpha \pi\omicron\lambda\iota\tau\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota \delta \sigma\phi\acute{o}\varsigma$; Panaetius avoids the issue and takes the problem down to the level of his student, politely including himself.³

The young man in the story is obviously a little naive, for the question had been answered in the affirmative by Zeno and Chrysippus.⁴ Yes, according to the early Stoics, the wise man may love. Of course Panaetius knew this, and since his doctrine of ethics is in general much less rigid than that of the early Stoics, he would certainly not have denied the wise man the right to fall in love. After all, Panaetius even recognized a natural kind of pleasure, $\eta\delta\omicron\nu\eta \kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha} \phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\nu$,⁵ and he rejected the Stoic orthodoxy even when it came to $\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\lambda\eta\gamma\sigma\iota\acute{\alpha}$ and $\acute{\alpha}\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$.⁶ But Panaetius clearly distinguishes between the $\sigma\phi\acute{o}\varsigma$ and ordinary men who have not yet reached that stage or will never reach it. For the $\sigma\phi\acute{o}\varsigma$ alone it is safe to love; for anyone else love is a danger to be avoided at all costs, like wine, like flattery, like temptations (*res blande trahentes*) in general.⁷

Love, from the Stoic view point, is a form of disease, and the four symptoms which Panaetius describes so vividly can be

l'interroger, et commence alors une improvisation, libérée de toutes formes techniques, dans un style souvent brillant et imagé, plein d'anecdotes, ayant recours à l'indignation ou à l'ironie . . ." Cf. Aulus Gellius 1.26 on the philosopher Taurus and Arrian, *Epict. Diss.* 2.1.1-7 where we seem to have a summary of the lecture of the day, followed by a diatribe (Bréhier, loc. cit., n. 2).

³ Cf. Fritz-Arthur Steinmetz, *Die Freundschaftslehre des Panaitios* (= *Palingenesia* 3, 1967) 10 on Panaetius' concept of the $\sigma\pi\omicron\upsilon\delta\alpha\iota\omicron\varsigma$. He quotes Cic. *Laelius* 18 *negant enim* (sc. Stoici veteres) *quemquam esse virum bonum nisi sapientem. sit ita sane, sed eam sapientiam interpretantur quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus*; *Tusc.* 2.51 *in quo vero erit perfecta sapientia, quem adhuc nos quidem vidimus neminem, sed philosophorum sententiis qualis hic futurus sit, si modo aliquando fuerit, exponitur*.

⁴ SVF III 650ff.; 716ff. v. A.

⁵ Sext. Emp. *Adv. dogm.* 5.73 = Fr. 112 van Straaten. He may have been influenced by Aristotle (cf. *NE* 10.1-5, pp. 1172a16ff.). Seneca, *De ira* 2.20.4 recognizes that *modica voluptas . . . laxat animos et temperat*. In the same context Seneca warns against *noctes sollicitae et desideria amoresque et quidquid aliud aut corpori nocuit aut animo, aegram mentem in querelas parat*.

⁶ Gellius 12.5 = Fr. 111 van Straaten.

⁷ Professor Siegfried Jäkel has pointed this out to me. I am grateful to him for several other comments.

observed in everyday life. Yet it occurred to me that the philosopher may have in mind a literary work or genre which traditionally represented the four conditions he names. It might be the Hellenistic love elegy—but we know too little about it; it might be the erotic epigram as we know it from Meleager's *Garland*—but there the theme of the love-slave is neglected. Perhaps Panaetius was thinking of the typical lover in Menander's plays; perhaps he was thinking of one comedy in particular. I think it can be shown that all four symptoms listed by Panaetius were dramatized by Menander in a famous play, the *Misumenos*. This play is much better known today than it was about twenty years ago, thanks to recently discovered and edited papyri. We now see that from this one play all the four aspects of love can be illustrated: (1) love as a deep emotional disturbance; (2) love as a paralysis of one's will power; (3) love as a form of voluntary enslavement; (4) love as a loss of self-respect. Here we have the typical themes of romantic love which Menander brought onto the comic stage in so many variations; but he combined them all most strikingly, I think, in the *Misumenos*.

First of all, the phrase *incidere in rem commotam* seems to suggest Greek expressions for 'falling in love' which Menander uses; e.g. *Georgos*, Fr. 4 εἰς ἔρωθ' ἦκων and perhaps *Kitharistes* 94 with Sandbach's plausible restoration, ἔπεσον [γὰρ εἰς ἔρωτ' ἐγώ.⁸

My second point is that all the symptoms occur in New Comedy. Let us consider them one by one:

(1) love as *res commota* (probably χορῆμα ταραχῶδες) is described by Terence, *Andria* 260ff. (after Menander) *tot me impediunt curae quae meum animum divorsae trahunt: amor, misericordia huius, nuptiarum sollicitatio, tum patris pudor, and Eunuchus* 59ff. (again after Menander) *in amore haec omnia insunt vitia: iniuriae, suspiciones, inimicitiae, indutiae, bellum, pax rursus*. There is also a fragment of the comic poet Caecilius, quoted in a Stoic context by Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.68 (= 259ff. R.) *deum qui non summum putet, aut stultum aut rerum esse imperitum existimem, cui in manu sit quem esse*

⁸ Cf. Peter Flury, *Liebe und Liebessprache bei Menander, Plautus und Terenz* (1968) 19, n. 25. He also compares Antiph. Fr. 235.3 K. εἰς ἔρωτα τ' ἐμπροσθόν and Aesch. *PV* 473f. ἐς νόσον πεσεῖν. On the merits of Flury's book cf. G. Luck, *Gnomon* 43 (1971) 211ff.

dementem velit, / quem sapere, quem insanire, quem in morbum inici, / quem contra amari, quem expeti, quem arcessier. This is probably also an adaptation from Menander. In the same context (*Tusc.* 4.68-76) Cicero deals with the passion of love and quotes this passage as well as *Eun.* 59ff. (see above) to illustrate the common Stoic doctrine (72) *Stoici vero et sapientem amaturum esse dicunt et amorem ipsum conatum amicitiae faciendae ex pulchritudinis specie definiunt. qui si quis est in rerum natura sine sollicitudine, sine desiderio, sine cura, sine suspirio, sit sane: vacat enim omni libidine, haec autem de libidine oratio est. sin autem est aliquis amor, ut est certe, qui nihil absit aut non multum ab insania . . .* The first sentence is an almost literal translation of a Stoic fragment which we will discuss below (261): Cicero distinguishes between *amor* as a form of *amicitia* and *amor* as *libido*. The wise man—if he really exists—is by definition free from *libido* and therefore free from all the torments of sexual desire (*sollicitudo* is close to *res commota*), but the love we can observe in real life (or in comedy, the mirror of life) is a form of madness, a mental disease. Like Panaetius, whom he may follow in this whole context,⁹ Cicero distinguishes between the σοφός and the ordinary human being; (58) *sed quoniam suspicor te non tam de sapiente quam de te ipso*—*illum enim putas omni perturbatione esse liberum, te vis . . .* This is exactly the situation of our anecdote.

(2) love as *res impotens* (probably *χρῆμα ἀκρατές*) can be illustrated from the *Andria* (879ff.) again: *adeo impotenti esse animo ut praeter civium/morem atque legem et sui voluntatem patris/ tamen hanc habere studeat cum summo probro.*¹⁰

(3) love as a form of voluntary slavery. The one Menander play which presents this aspect perhaps most memorably (as well as the others, of course) is the *Misumenos*.¹¹ The plot was

⁹ It is generally recognized, I think, that Cicero borrows from Panaetius in the *Tusc.* The numerous quotations from Greek and Roman plays are characteristic for this work. One should remember that, according to Zeno's definition (Diog. Laert. 7.110 = SVF I 205) any πάθος is ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις.

¹⁰ Aristotle, for whom Panaetius had great admiration, deals with ἀκρατεία NE 7.2 pp. 1145b11ff. There he quotes Socrates as saying that the ἀκρατής is the slave of the temptations to which he yields.

¹¹ I use Sandbach's Oxford Text (1972) and the commentary of Gomme and Sandbach (1973).

roughly known from Arrian, *Epict. Diss.* 4.1.19 (= Fr. 2 Sandb.), but the new papyri give us a much better idea of a play (though much remains puzzling) which was clearly one of Menander's greatest. Thrasonides, a professional soldier (we would say: an officer) of the *Miles gloriosus* type has come into possession of a young woman, Krateia. He falls in love with her, but she rejects him (hence the title), and though she is his property, he does not take her by force because he wants to be loved. Epictetus mentions the play and quotes two lines from it in his lecture on true freedom. He makes the point that the owner of the slave girl actually becomes her voluntary slave. To Epictetus this is the worst form of slavery, worse than the form he had known himself. The lines he quotes must come from the beginning of the play, though they cannot be joined to A1-16, the first important piece of text preserved on a papyrus. When the play begins the officer comes out of his house in the middle of the night (when most normal Greeks are asleep or make love) and confesses his wretched, shameful love. The irony of the situation is stressed by the two lines preserved in Arrian: παιδισκάριόν με καταδεδούλωκ' εὐτελές,/ ὃν οὐδὲ εἷς τῶν πολεμίων (οὐ) πώποτε. Thrasonides, the great military hero, has become the prisoner of love.¹² The woman he possesses (or thinks to possess) legally possesses him emotionally. She is in his power, and yet he refuses to touch her. This unexpected delicacy of feeling must have amused an Athenian audience. The slave image can be paralleled from other plays (e.g. Men. *Samia* 624f. ὄρκος, πόθος/ χρόνος, συνήθει', οἷς ἐδουλόμην ἐγώ; Plaut. *Bacch.* 92f. *mulier, tibi me emancipo:/ tuos sum tibi dedo operam*), but the *Misumenos* offers the most striking the most paradoxical instance.

(4) the lover tends to cheapen himself and is ready to throw his life away.¹³ Epictetus (loc. cit.) tells us that Thrasonides later on (i.e. still at the beginning of the play and probably in the same scene) demands a sword to kill himself, but someone (most likely his slave, Getas) has taken the precaution of collecting all the swords within reach and depositing them with a neighbor. Thrasonides is furious at that person who only

¹² Flury (op. cit. n. 8) has well observed this.

¹³ The interpretation of Max Pohlenz (in: *Stoa und Stoiker* [1950] 218) "der die eigene Person vergisst" is inaccurate.

meant well. Again, suicide threats are not uncommon in New Comedy (cf. e.g. Alcesimarchus in Plaut. *Cist.* 639ff.), but by now it has become almost certain, I think, that Panaetius thought of the beginning of the *Misumenos*.

We shall consider some additional evidence later on; so far we have established, I believe, that all the aberrations to which love may lead can be found right at the beginning of the *Misumenos*, and—this is important—in the exact order in which Panaetius lists them. First, the theme of emotional disturbance and suffering; then the theme of helplessness;¹⁴ then the slave image; finally the suicide threat. Thus, the anecdote confirms the order in which the fragments are printed in Sandbach's new *Oxonienensis* and the reconstruction of Gomme and Sandbach (commentary pp. 438ff.). We have seen that, four-hundred years after Menander's death a Stoic philosopher, Epictetus, still quotes from the *Misumenos* to document the madness of love. We shall see that the same play was already used in the early Stoa for the same purpose. No doubt Panaetius who represents the so-called Middle Stoa, remembered the same play when he answered the young man's question.

There is only a short section on love in von Arnim's *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta* (III 716-22), but the first fragment (716), from Diog. Laert. 7.129, shows that both Zeno and Chrysippus¹⁵ thought it was right for the σοφός to love "the young men who by their looks show a natural talent for ἀρετή." To the early Stoics love is an "attempt toward being friends because of physical beauty; its end is not sex but friendship. Thrasonides certainly, though he had the woman he loved in his power, stayed away from her because she hated him. Thus love

¹⁴ By falling in love so helplessly, Thrasonides also violates τὸ πρέπον, an important concept in Panaetius' ethics. Cf. R. Reitzenstein, *Werden und Wesen der Humanität* (1907) 11; 28; M. van Straaten, *Panétius. Sa vie, ses écrits et sa doctrine avec une édition des fragments* (1946) 160ff.

¹⁵ There is an anecdote about Chrysippus, preserved by Stob. *Flor.* 63.31 Mein. (=SVF III 720) which shows that this philosopher was not always very scrupulous both about his logic and his language: Χρυσίππων · εἰπόντος τινός 'οὐκ ἐρασθήσεται ὁ σοφός · μαρτυρεῖ γοῦν Μενέδημος, 'Επίκουρος, 'Αλεξίνος. 'ταύτη' ἔφη 'χρήσσομαι ἀποδείξει · εἰ γὰρ 'Αλεξίνος ὁ ἀνάγωγος καὶ 'Επίκουρος ὁ ἀναίσθητος καὶ Μενέδημος ὁ — οὐ φησιν, ἐρασθήσεται ἄρα. This might be called arguing with a club. One wonders what shocking epithet was in the textual gap.

is for the sake of *φιλία* as Chrysippus, too, writes in his book *On Love*, and it is not to be blamed. Beauty they describe as the bloom (or shine) of *ἀρετή*."

καὶ ἐρασθήσεσθαι δὲ τὸν σοφὸν τῶν νέων τῶν ἐμφαινόντων διὰ τοῦ εἶδους τὴν πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὐφυΐαν, ὥς φησι Ζήνων ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ βίων καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ Ἡθικῇ.

Εἶναι δὲ τὸν ἔρωτα ἐπιβολὴν φιλοποιίας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον· καὶ μὴ εἶναι συνουσίαν, ἀλλὰ φιλίαν. τὸν γοῦν Θρασωνίδην καίπερ ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ ἔχοντα τὴν ἐρωμένην, διὰ τὸ μισεῖσθαι ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῆς. εἶναι οὖν τὸν ἔρωτα φιλίαν, ὥς καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἔρωτός φησι· καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἐπίμειπτον αὐτόν. εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὥραν ἄνθος ἀρετῆς.

Part of this important testimony has been translated by Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.72, almost word by word. He renders *φιλία* by *amicitia*, and I suppose we have to translate both terms by "friendship," since there seems to be no other word; but we should remember that *φιλέω* also means "to kiss" and that *amicus* is derived from *amare*.¹⁶ For the Stoics this "friendship" which does not involve sex (it is contrasted to *συνουσία*) is the true, the highest form of love.¹⁷ The *σοφός* may love someone because he or she is beautiful, but only because physical beauty indicates a natural talent for *ἀρετή*; hence it is called the "bloom" of *ἀρετή*.

The most important part of the testimony is the clear reference to the *Misumenos*, even though neither author nor title are

¹⁶ Cf. Steinmetz, pp. 46ff. He quotes Cic. *Laelius* 26 *amor enim, ex quo amicitia nominata est princeps est ad benevolentiam coniungendam*. Later on he writes (27) *deinde cum similis sensus exstitit amoris, si aliquem nacti sumus, cuius cum natura et moribus congruamus, quod in eo quasi lumen aliquod probitatis et virtutis perspicere videamur*. Steinmetz (50, n. 186) compares *Tusc.* 2.58 *sumus enim natura . . . studiosissimi appetentissime honestatis: cuius si quasi lumen aliquod aspeximus, nihil est quod, ut eo potiamur, non parati simus et ferre et perpeti*. Cicero is probably following Panaetius in both contexts (Steinmetz loc. cit.), but it should be added that this is Panaetius' variation of the early Stoic concept that beauty leads to *φιλία*, because it is *ἄνθος ἀρετῆς* (above, 261f). Cicero translates *ἄνθος* by *lumen* which is perfectly legitimate (cf. Theog. 452). Steinmetz should have said more about the emotional character of *φιλία* in antiquity; 'friendship' is rather misleading.

¹⁷ This may be true of Aristotle's concept of *φιλία* in *NE* 8 and 9. Steinmetz (loc. cit.) suggests that Panaetius owes much to Aristotle and Menander. On Peripatetic ideas in Menander cf. now F. Wehrli in: *Entretiens Fondation Hardt* 16 (1970) 147ff. Steinmetz (pp. 148ff.) also notes that Panaetius warned his disciples against the "flatterer", *κόλαξ*, a well-known type of the New Comedy.

mentioned. But the play was so famous that the name of the main character, Thrasonides, was sufficient. Hence this is a valid *testimonium* for the play, and it should definitely be included in critical editions,¹⁸ along with the Epictetus passage and the other texts. We see that Zeno, the founder of the school, a younger contemporary of Menander, realized the value of the play which he may have seen performed, for his theory of love. Even a man like Thrasonides does not just want sex (which he could have had); he wants love, and without love the mere physical act means nothing to him. This is the point which the play makes, and it makes it as it opens; the early Stoics as well as Epictetus paraphrase the famous first scene.

It can be shown, I think, that Panaetius' ethics were deeply influenced by Menander. The extant fragments do not reflect this adequately. We have to look at the first two books of Cicero's *De officiis* which are based on Panaetius' treatise *π. καθήκοντος* to see how passages from the New Comedy are used by the philosopher to illustrate some of his ideas. It has been suggested¹⁹ that each time Cicero quotes Terence, his Greek original had a quote from Menander. I think this is true, because all the Terentian comedies quoted are derived from plays by Menander. To give an example: *Off.* 1.30 Cicero quotes *Heautont.* 77 with the following comment *est enim difficilis cura rerum alienarum, quamquam Terentianus ille Chremes 'humani nihil a se alienum putat'*. The line has been discussed many times,²⁰ but there seems to be no general agreement about its original Greek form. Fr. 475 K.-Th. (= 602 Kock) is, perhaps, the likeliest candidate, *ἄνθρωπος εἰμ', ἄνθρωπος οὐδέ τις ἐστὶ μοι ἀλλότριος, ἂν ἧ χρηστός*, if one accepts Headlam's restoration. But there can be little doubt that in Panaetius' treatise the original Greek line from Menander's *Heautontimorumenos*, whatever it looked like, was quoted.

Menander's influence on Panaetius can also be seen in his use of the term *humanitas* in our anecdote. It may seem a strange term in this context. The *humanitas* of the beloved towards the

¹⁸ It is missing in the recent editions which I compared, but Gomme and Sandbach quote it *ad Misum*. A12 without any comment.

¹⁹ Steinmetz, pp. 149ff.

²⁰ E.g. by A. Koerte, *Hermes* 77 (1942) 101ff.; M. Pohlenz, *ibid.* 78 (1943) 270ff.

lover? But it is contrasted with *superbia* (ὑβρις) and it implies *facilitas amoris*. This may give us a clue to the Greek.

Broadly speaking, *humanitas* corresponds either to φιλανθρωπία or παιδεία or to a combination of both. As times changed, one aspect could be emphasized more than the other, and the aspects themselves could be interpreted differently. In certain contexts, for instance, φιλανθρωπία as well as *humanitas* means nothing more than "good manners." Isocrates, *Antidosis* 132 gives the following piece of advice: "if you wish to succeed in politics you must be pleasant and polite in your manner, your way of speaking;" the adverb he uses is φιλανθρώπως. And the rhetor Porcius Latro, quoted by the Elder Seneca, *Controv.* 2.7.3, speaking about the way in which a Roman *matrona* should behave in the street: "let her go about with her eyes on the ground. In the face of overzealous greeting (by a gentleman) let her be impolite rather than immodest," *ferat iacentis in terram oculos; adversus officiosum salutatorem inhumana potius quam inverecunda sit*. It would have been a sign of *humanitas* to respond to the effusive greeting of the man with a smile or a few kind words. Not to return the greeting at all—because it might encourage him—is definitely *inhumanum*, ἀπάνθρωπον.²¹

It has often been said that it was Panaetius' concept of *humanitas* that influenced the Scipionic Circle. This view has been disputed,²² and again it must be said that the extant fragments of Panaetius' teaching are not very helpful. Still, I think it can be shown indirectly how important Menander's concept of *humanitas* was for Panaetius and, through him, for the Scipionic Circle and for Cicero.

For Menander, φιλάνθρωπος and related terms seem to have a variety of meanings. In passages such as *Aspis* 395, *Sam.* 35, *Pap. Didot* 1:41, *Dysk.* 105, 573, it means "kind," "friendly," "generous," "courteous;"²³ it comes close to the "well-mannered" (see above), and it includes politeness, understanding, sympathy. In Cicero, too, *humanitas* is associated

²¹ In Seneca *humanitas* is almost always = φιλανθρωπία and often associated with *clementia* or *misericordia*. Cf. *Ep.* 88.30; 99.20; *Clem.* 1.2, etc., R. Reitzenstein (op. cit. n. 14) 6; 25.

²² E.g. by R. Harder, *Hermes* 69 (1934) 68ff.

²³ Gomme and Sandbach (p. 95) on *Aspis* 395.

with *suavitas* (social grace), *mansuetudo* (gentleness), *facilitas* (pleasantness), *liberalitas* (generosity).

But the terms *ἄνθρωπος*, *ἀνθρώπινος* also have a special value in Menander. A famous line (Fr. 484 K.-Th. = 761 Kock) is very significant for Menander's *humanitas*:

ὥς χαρίεν ἔστ' ἄνθρωπος, ἂν ἄνθρωπος ᾦ.

Gomme and Sandbach (p. 547) compare it to *Samia* 17 δι' ἐκείνον ᾗν ἄνθρωπος, and it is worthwhile to quote their comment: "'Through him I was a human being.' The idea that man is by nature admirable, pride in being human, and the belief that to be human means to be humane, are concepts more than once expressed by Menander's characters. They lie behind the use of the adverb *ἀνθρωπίνως*, *Aspis* 260, *Mis.* 302, and the line frag. 484 . . ."

It can be shown that Panaetius embodied this value of Menander's *humanitas* in his ethics. Again, we must turn to Cicero. We have already said that in *Off.* 1 and 2 he follows Panaetius. It is very likely that most of *Rep.*, especially Book 1 is based on Panaetius' *π. πολιτείας*.²⁴ The idea that a truly human being, *homo vere humanus*, represents a superior breed, a social ideal can be found *Off.* 1.105 *sunt enim quidam homines non re sed nomine* (cf. 3.26 *quid cum eo disseras qui hominem ex homine tollat?*) and *Rep.* 1.17.18 *quod autem imperium, qui magistratus, quod regnum potest esse quam despicientem omnia humana et inferiora sapientia ducentem nihil umquam nisi sempiternum et divinum animo volutare? cui persuasum sit appellari ceteros homines, esse solos eos qui essent politi propriis humanitatis artibus*. Both passages are very close to each other and to Menander, Fr. 484, but the second one introduces a new definition of the *homo vere humanus*: (1) he looks down on all human things; (2) he is well-educated. If Cicero did follow Panaetius in *Rep.* 1 we can claim for the Stoic philosopher the idea that *παιδεία* is part of *humanitas*.

I think it has become probable that Panaetius' view of love and his concept of *humanitas* as part of his ethics owe a great deal to Menander. From what we know about him, Menander himself embodied the culture, the life-style, the charm and ease

²⁴ Philippon, RE 13 (1939) 1116; Pohlenz, *ibid.* 18.2 (1949) 437. In Book 2 he seems to follow Polybius, another member of the Scipionic Circle and himself influenced by Panaetius' thought, it would appear.

of a great Athenian gentleman;²⁵ he shows us in his plays the good society of Athens in the late 4th century, as he knew it, perhaps the most civilized society that ever existed. These plays, written to entertain, tell us a great deal about human nature and human relations, and since this is the subject of ethics, Panaetius must have realized how valuable they were to illustrate problems and conflicts in everyday life. Much of his ethical doctrine, as we can reconstruct it, may be considered an interpretation of the world of Menander, the incomparable world of Athens in the late classical period.

Not only the Stoics, but other philosophers of the Hellenistic and the Imperial period are fond of quoting Menander when they discuss the phenomenon of love. Plutarch, in a fragment from his essay *De amore* preserved by Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 4.20.34 calls love the *πνεῦμα κοινόν* which animates all of Menander's plays and describes the playwright himself as an "enthusiastic worshipper," *θιασώτην . . . καὶ ὀργιαστήν*, of the god Eros.²⁶ In the same fragment Plutarch says that Menander deals with the theme of love "in a rather philosophical manner" and then quotes Fr. 568 K.-Th. (= 541 Kock):

τῖνι δεδούλωνται ποτε;
ὄψει; φλύαρος· τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς πάντες ἄν
ῥων· κρίσιν γὰρ τὸ βλέπειν ἴσῃν ἔχει.
ἀλλ' ἡδονὴ τις τοὺς ἐρῶντας ἐπάγεται
συνουσίας; πῶς οὖν ἕτερος ταύτην ἔχων
οὐδὲν πέπονθεν, ἀλλ' ἀπῆλθε καταγελῶν,
ἕτερος (δ') ἀπόλωλε; καιρός ἐστιν ἡ νόσος
ψυχῆς· ὁ πληγεὶς δ' εἰσβολῇ²⁷ τιτρώσκεται.

²⁵ There is a miniature bronze portrait of Menander in the J. Paul Getty Museum in Malibu, California, published and discussed by Bernard Ashmole in: *AJA* 77 (1973) 60; plates 11-12. It authenticates the more than fifty replicas of a well-known type, because the base which has never been separated from the bust clearly bears the name Menandros. The little bust alone among all the replicas, as Bernard Ashmole observes, conveys the impression that the poet squinted, as the *Suda* says he did (ed. A. Adler [1933] 361; 589). The poet is not idealized at all; one has the feeling of looking at a real person—charming, perceptive and with a great sense of humor. It is altogether an unusual portrait.

²⁶ The terms are borrowed from the language of the mystery religions, as in Xenophon, *Symp.* 8.1 who calls the worshippers of Eros *θιασῶται τοῦ θεοῦ*. For some parallels in Latin love poetry cf. G. Luck, in: *Antike Lyrik* (Wissensch. Buchgesellsch. Darmstadt [1970]) 472, n. 15.

²⁷ In the last line I prefer Bentley's *εἰσβολῇ* to Sandbach's recent suggestion

It would be tempting to think that this passage is from the *Misumenos*; Plutarch was familiar with this play and quotes (*De cup. div.* 525a) the lines A4-5.

What positive attitude did Panaetius recommend against the dangers and temptations and worries of life? I think it can be summed up by the term *εὐθυμία*. We know that he wrote a treatise *π. εὐθυμίας*, and it has been suggested that Plutarch's essay with the same title is based on it.²⁸ There are certainly Stoic ideas in this essay, and Menander is quoted in it no less than five times. At least the conclusion should be presented here for its beauty and quiet dignity:

20. "Αγαμαι δὲ το τοῦ Διογένους, ὃς τὸν ἐν
 Λακεδαιμόνι ξένον ὁρῶν παρασκευαζόμενον εἰς
 ἐορτήν τινα καὶ φιλοτιμούμενον, "ἀνὴρ δ'," εἶπεν,
 "ἀγαθὸς οὐ πᾶσαν ἡμέραν ἐορτήν ἡγεῖται," καὶ
 πάνν γε λαμπράν, εἰ σωφρονούμεν. ἱερὸν μὲν γὰρ
 ἀγιώτατον ὁ κόσμος ἐστὶ καὶ θεοπρεπέστατον· εἰς
 δὲ τοῦτον ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰσάγεται διὰ τῆς γενέσεως
 οὐ χειροκμήτων οὐδ' ἀκινήτων ἀγαλμάτων θεατῆς,
 ἀλλ' οἷα νοῦς θεῖος αἰσθητὰ μιμήματα νοητῶν,
 φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων, ἔμφυτον ἀρχὴν ζωῆς ἔχοντα καὶ
 D κινήσεως ἔφηνεν, ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα καὶ
 ποταμοὺς νέον ὕδωρ ἐξιέντας αἰεὶ καὶ γῆν φντοῖς τε
 καὶ ζώοις τροφὰς ἀναπέμπουσιν. ὦν τὸν βίον
 μύησιν ὄντα καὶ τελετὴν τελειοτάτην εὐθυμίας δεῖ
 μεστὸν εἶναι καὶ γήθους· οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ
 Κρόνια καὶ Διάσια καὶ Παναθήναια καὶ τοιαύτας
 ἄλλας ἡμέρας περιμένουσιν, ἢν' ἡσθῶσι καὶ ἀνα-
 πνεύσωσιν, ὦνητοῦ γέλωτος μίμοις καὶ ὀρχησταῖς
 μισθοὺς τελέσαντες. εἴτ' ἐκεῖ μὲν εὐφημοὶ καθή-
 (477) μεθα κοσμίως· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὀδύρεται μνούμενος οὐδὲ
 θρηνεῖ Πύθια θεώμενος ἢ πίνων ἐν Κρονίοις· ἃς δ'
 E ὁ θεὸς ἡμῖν ἐορτὰς χορηγεῖ καὶ μυσταγωγεῖ κατ-
 αισχύνουσιν, ἐν ὀδυρμοῖς τὰ πολλὰ καὶ βαρυθυ-
 μίαις καὶ μερίμναις ἐπιπόνοις διατρίβοντες. καὶ
 τῶν μὲν ὀργάνων χαίρουσι τοῖς ἐπιτερπὲς ἡχοῦσι
 καὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τοῖς ᾄδουσι, καὶ τὰ παίζοντα καὶ

εἰς ἀκμήν. The unmetrical *τεῖσω δὴ†* of Stobaeus cannot be corrected from *Amat.* 763 because of a lacuna, co-extensive with these letters, in the MSS.

²⁸ G. Siefert, *Plutarchs Schrift π. εὐθυμίας* (Schulportia 1908), accepted by Pohlenz, Ziegler and others.

σκιρτῶντα τῶν ζώων ἡδέως ὀρῶσι, καὶ τοῦναντίον
 ὠρνομένοις καὶ βρυχωμένοις καὶ σκυθρωπάξουσιν
 ἀνιῶνται· τὸν δ' ἐαυτῶν βίον ἀμειδῇ καὶ κατηφῇ
 καὶ τοῖς ἀτερπεστάτοις πάθει καὶ πράγμασι καὶ
 φροντίσι μὴδὲν πέρας ἐχούσαις πιεζόμενον αἰ
 F καὶ συνθλιβόμενον ὀρῶντες, οὐχ ὅπως αὐτοὶ μὲν
 ἐαυτοῖς ἀναπνοήν τινα καὶ ὁρσίωνην πορίζουσιν·
 πόθεν; 'ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἑτέρων παρακαλούντων προσ-
 δέχονται λόγον ᾧ χρώμενοι καὶ τοῖς παροῦσιν
 ἀμέμπτως συνοίσονται καὶ τῶν γεγονότων εὖ-
 χαρίστως μνημονεύσουσι καὶ πρὸς τὸ λοιπὸν ἴλεω
 τὴν ἐλπίδα καὶ φαιδρὰν ἔχοντες ἀδεῶς καὶ ἀν-
 υπόπτως προσάξουσιν.

For him who has peace of mind, every day is a holyday and the whole world a sanctuary. He overlooks the worries and conflicts of daily life with supreme indifference, and he will naturally avoid all the temptations against which Panaetius warns.

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ON PLUTARCH MORALIA 431 E-F
(DE DEFECTU ORACULORUM 39)

διὰ τί τὰς ἐν τοῖς σώμασι ψυχὰς ἐκείνης τῆς δυνάμεως ἀποστεροῦμεν, ἢ τὰ μέλλοντα καὶ προγιγνώσκειν πεφύκασι καὶ προδηλοῦν οἱ δαίμονες; οὔτε γὰρ δύναμιν οὔτε μέρος οὐδὲν ἐπιγίγνεσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς, ὅταν ἀπολίπωσι τὸ σῶμα, μὴ κεκτημέναις πρότερον εἰκός ἐστιν· ἀλλ' αἰ μὲν ἔχειν, ἔχειν δὲ φανυλότερα τῷ σώματι μεμιγμένας, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὅλως ἄδηλα καὶ κεκρυμμένα τὰ δ' ἄσθενη καὶ ἀμαυρὰ καὶ τοῖς δι' ὁμίχλης ὁρῶσιν ἢ κινουμένοις ἐν ὑγρῷ παραπλησίως δύσεργα καὶ βραδέα καὶ πολλὴν ποθοῦντα θεραπείαν τοῦ οἰκείου καὶ ἀνάληψιν ἀφαίρουν δὲ καὶ κάθαρσιν τοῦ κλέπτοντος.

κλέπτοντος¹: κωλύοντος ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ συνδεδεμένη τῷ σώματι τὴν προγνωστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν ἐκτυφλοῦνται δὲ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ γεῶδες ἀνάγκρουν τοῦ σώματος J: καλύπτοντος (vel κρύπτοντος) Emperius

The conjecture of the German scholar Adolf Emperius (1806-41) has ousted κλέπτοντος from all modern texts. The sense requirements of the passage will be satisfied by a word for 'covering', 'concealing' and those who think κλέπτειν can mean only 'to steal' adopt the obvious καλύπτοντος. Emendation, however, is unnecessary and unjustifiable. The notion of concealment is inherent in that of stealing and, in fact, κλέπτω sometimes means to 'conceal' or 'hide', even in a purely physical sense (LSJ s. κλέπτω III. Some of the instances given here are much better than others).

In Plutarch himself (before A.D. 50–after A.D. 120) there is at least the following evidence for maintaining that κλέπτοντος can mean 'concealing' *vel sim.*: (1) *Coniugalia Praecepta* 19 (140D) οὐδενὶ γὰρ θεῶν ἱερὰ κλεπτόμενα καὶ λανθάνοντα² δρᾶται

¹ κλέπτοντος is taken as 'clearly corrupt' by R. Renehan, *Greek Textual Criticism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969) 31. We can still accept, with modification, Renehan's view of the reading in J; though it may originally have been an explanatory note on κλέπτοντος not intended to replace it in the text.

² κλεπτόμενα καὶ λανθάνοντα: a characteristic Plutarchian pairing of words. Such pairs often consist of (near-) synonyms.

κεχαρισμένως ὑπὸ γυναικός, i.e. 'rites the performance of which is kept hidden', especially from her husband; (2) *De Fortuna Romanorum* 320 E καὶ μὴν τό τε λαθεῖν αὐτοὺς τρεφομένους καὶ παιδευομένους ἐν Γαβίοις ἀγνοηθῆναι τε Σιλβίας ὄντας υἱοὺς καὶ θυγατριδοὺς Νυμίτορος τοῦ βασιλέως παντάπασι τύχης κλέμμα καὶ σόφισμα φαίνεται γεγεννημένον, ὅπως μὴ ἀπόλωνται πρὸ τῶν ἔργων διὰ τὸ γένος, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτοῖς φανῶσι τοῖς κατορθώμασι, γνωρίσματα τῆς εὐγενείας τὴν ἀρετὴν παρέχοντες. Here κλέμμα refers both to the concealment of Romulus and Remus and to the concealment of their identity. Notice the association in each passage of κλεπτόμενα, κλέμμα with a form of λανθάνω, and also the use of φανῶσι in the second passage.

In Achilles Tatius (probably not later than 2nd. cent. A.D.³) there are several places where κλέπτω means 'conceal', 'hide', 'cover' *vel sim.*: 1.5.3 ὅλοις ἔβλεπον τὴν κόρην τοῖς προσώποις, κλέπτων ἅμα τὴν θέαν; 2.7.5. καὶ γὰρ κατεφίλουν σιωπῇ, κλέπτων τῶν φιλημάτων τὸν ψόφον; 3.10.1 κωκύσας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βύθιον, τῷ δὲ νῶ κλέψας τοῦ κωκυτοῦ τὸν ψόφον; 4.5.2 δὲ μὲν κλέπτει τὴν πνοὴν καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν οὐκ ἐπιδείκνυται. . . . ἂν δὲ μικρὸν ἐξοικήσῃ καὶ ὑπερβῇ τοὺς ὅρους, ἀνοίγει τῆς κλοπῆς τὴν ἡδονήν; 6.1.1 κλέπτει τὸ πρόσωπον τῷ πέπλῳ; 8.6.9 τέμνει δὴ τοὺς καλάμους ὑπὸ ὀργῆς ὁ Πάν ὡς κλέπτοντας αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐρωμένην. ἐπεὶ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα οὐκ εἶχεν εὐρεῖν, . . . ; 8.10.10 κλέπτει τὸ ἔργον καὶ πάντα ἀποκρύπτειται. Cf. Ach. Tat. 4.18.3 οἶνος γὰρ φύσεως ὕδατος κλοπῇ (cf. 4.5.2 supra).

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³ See E. Vilborg, *Achilles Tatius, Leucippe and Clitophon* (Stockholm 1955) xvff.

PROPERTIUS 4.11.53

uel cuius,†rasos† cum Vesta reposceret ignis,
exhibuit uiuos carbasus alba focos.
53 *rasos* FLPDVVo., *iasos* μν

There have been many attempts, none of them successful, to emend this verse: *cui commissos* Itali, *cuius castos* Markland, *tu cui sacros* Peerlkamp, *cui sacra suos* Baehrens, *cui sacratos* Polster, *cui iam extinctos* Plessis, *cui seruatos* Otto, *cuius sacros* Rothstein, *cui iuratos* Butler and Phillimore, *cuius stratos* Shackleton Bailey, *cui tum Iliacos* Barber, *cuius raptos* Alton, *cui iusta suos* Camps, *cui iam canos* or *tu cui canos* Smyth.¹ What Propertius meant is clear enough. Vesta claimed her fire too late, after a careless Vestal had let it go out. Propertius wrote, I suggest: *uel cuius seros cum Vesta reposceret ignis*. *serus* in this sense is not uncommon; and the adjective here, as elsewhere in poetry, is put for the adverb. Compare, for structure and idiom, Prop. 3.1.35 *meque inter seros laudabit Roma nepotes*, 4.4.45 *Pallados extinctos si quis mirabitur ignis*; Virg. *Georg.* 1.291 *et quidam seros hiberni ad luminis ignis*; Stat. *Theb.* 2.388 *queriturque fidem tam sero reposci*. How is the corruption to be explained? *seros* was turned into *resos* by the inversion of three letters—a frequent scribal error²—and *resos* then made into *rasos*—not very apposite, but a word—by the alteration of a single letter.

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¹ W. R. Smyth, *Thesaurus Criticus ad Sexti Propertii Textum* (Leiden 1970) 160-61.

² Examples in Housman, *Manilius* I, LVI-LVII.

THREE POETS OBSERVE PICUS

ipse Quirinali lituo parvaeque sedebat
succinctus trabea laevaue ancile gerebat
Picus, equum domitor; quem capta cupidine coniunx
aurea percussus virga versumque venenis
fecit avem Circe sparsitque coloribus alas
Vergil *Aeneid*, 7.187-91.

hoc [Asculum] Picus quondam, nomen memorabile ab alto
Saturno, statuit genitor, quem carmine Circe
exutum formae volitare per aethera iussit
et sparsit croceum plumis fugientis honorem.
Silius Italicus *Punica*, 8. 439-42.

indignatus avem duro fera robora rostro
figit et iratus longis dat vulnera ramis;
purpureum chlamydis pennae traxere colorem;
fibula quod fuerat vestemque momorderat aurum
pluma fit, et fulvo cervix praecingitur auro,
nec quicquam antiquum Pico nisi nomine restat.
Ovid *Metamorphoses*, 14.391-96.

Picus is often mentioned by the Romans, but rarely described in his woodpecker form. Indeed, it seems impossible to say what kind of woodpecker the divinity Picus was supposed to be, or even if the Romans had a specific identification for him. Pliny seems to leave the identity of the Picus Martius vague,¹ as do other authors. Only Vergil, Ovid and Silius Italicus describe Picus in color, but Vergil and Silius, perhaps deliberately, may refer to almost any woodpecker, while Ovid for reasons unknown describes in some detail no woodpecker that ever was.

Vergil in five lines neatly alludes to Picus as king, augur, Martial type and woodpecker. As king of the aborigines Picus is represented as a cedar statue clad in a trabea which Servius (ad

¹ Pliny *NH* 10.40, although his source, Aristotle *HA* 9.9, distinguishes the Black, Spotted and Green varieties. In *NH* 11.122 ("dedit natura cirros pico quoque Martio et grui Balearicae") he seems most probably to refer to the prominent crest of the Black Woodpecker, but not necessarily, as all woodpeckers in question have red on their heads.

loc.) tells us is the purple and scarlet cloak of the augur, but which might equally well be the purple and white one of a king.² In any case, red will have been a major color. Of the three poets, Vergil is the least specific as to the color of the woodpecker. Circe scattered colors on the wings, but these may be taken as the flashing black and white of the Spotted Woodpeckers (*Dendrocopos Maior*, *D. Medius*, *D. Minor*) or the green of the Green Woodpecker (*Picus Viridis*). Although the Black Woodpecker is nowadays called *Dryocopus* (or *Picus*) *Martius*, his all black wings can hardly be what Vergil is describing here.³ Black and white, however, are admissible as *colores*.⁴ *Picus'* *trabea*, whose color would be known to the reader, might also suggest some one of the woodpeckers' red markings, as for instance, the red under tail coverts and red nape of the Great Spotted Woodpecker, or the red crown and moustaches of the Green.

Silius Italicus takes the inspiration for his lines from Vergil, and as usual makes Vergil's impressionistic image more concrete, although for us no less ambiguous. The difficulty is that *croceus*, saffron color, can range from yellow to bright orange red. If we take it as yellow, we have to picture the bright yellowish green rump of the Green Woodpecker, which flashes conspicuously in flight, or much less probably the yellow crown of the small Three Toed Woodpecker (*Picoides Tridactylus*) which is hardly to be found in Italy at all. But if, more probably, Silius means a red color, then any of the red markings would do, and since all the common Italian woodpeckers have a red crown, Silius' version seems to be a 'how did the woodpecker get his red head' story, which was meant to apply to all of them.⁵

At first sight Ovid seems a more conscientious bird watcher, and not only dwells lovingly on the colors of his woodpecker, but locates them definitely on its topography. His story, in-

² See E. Schuppe, "Trabea," *RE* 6A, pt. 2 (1937) 1860-1862. Purple must be taken as reddish, rather than violet.

³ For the woodpeckers of Italy, see E. H. Giglioli, *Avifauna Italica* (Florence 1889) I, 332-41; for illustrations, any modern bird guide, e.g. H. Heinzel, R. Fitter, J. Parslow, *The Birds of Britain and Europe* (1973) 193ff.

⁴ On the analogy of Vergil *Georgics* 1.452f., referring among other *colores* to dark (*caeruleus*) spots on the face of the sun. See T. R. Price, "The Color System of Vergil," *AJP* 4 (1883) 6.

⁵ One might be tempted to restore *coccum* for *croceum* in this line.

spired by Vergil's, starts from a statue of King Picus, but in this case the statue is of marble and has a woodpecker on its head. His story tells how the king went off hunting clad in a purple (*poenicea*) chlamys held by a pin of yellow gold. When slighted by Picus, Circe turned him into a bird whose wings (*pennae*) took on the color of his chlamys (here, *purpurea*) and who has around his throat yellow gold feathers in place of the pin. But no woodpecker Ovid ever saw in the oaks of Italy, or anywhere else in his world, can possibly be so described. *Pennae* in Ovid generally means wing feathers rather than other plumage. We might dubiously stretch the meaning and the location and take the purple of the cloak as one or more of the woodpeckers' red markings, on the head or under the tail, but if the gold, which must be on the neck, has to be explained along with the purple, we can only dismiss the description as pure fantasy, if woodpeckers alone are scrutinized. There are, however, two birds, one real and one fantastic, which do answer to the description; the unanswered question is whether or not Ovid had one of these in mind, and if so, why?

One bird commonly seen in Italy does in fact possess both reddish wings, described in antiquity as purple,⁶ and a bright yellow throat. This is the Bee Eater (*Merops Apiaster*) whose image Ovid surely had in mind here if he was thinking of a real bird,⁷ although there is no doubt he means Picus to be a woodpecker, as he is accurate enough on woodpecker habitat and characteristic behavior. Picus in a fury on his sudden transformation bangs with his beak on oak branches. It is hard to see why or how Ovid could have made a mistake about quite common birds and confuse two very dissimilar species. Aemilius Macer, a friend of both Vergil and Ovid, included some version of the Picus/Picumnus story in his *Ornithogonia*, and it is always possible the mistake was his, and was repeated by Ovid, although this does nothing to solve, and indeed doubles, the question.⁸ In late Latin glossaries *Merops* is on occasion explained as being a Green Woodpecker, but this confusion seems

⁶ *Cyranides*, ed. F. de Mely (1898) p. 92: "μέροψ στρουθίον ἐστὶν ὀλοπράσιον, τὰ δὲ πτερὰ πορφυρεά."

⁷ The Bee Eater has a blue green front, chestnut head and mantle, and yellow throat. It digs holes in banks, but not trees, and catches its insects on the wing.

⁸ Aemilius Macer in W. Morel, *Frag. Poetarum Latinorum* (Teubner 1927) 107, fr. 1: "et nunc agrestis inter Picumnus habetur."

only possible in a country which had never seen a Bee Eater.⁹ Perhaps Ovid in his active mind's eye saw Vergil's statue as wearing a purple (and scarlet or white) cloak fastened with a gold pin and went on from there, finding a bird with colors to fit his image, or possibly ignoring real birds altogether.

One other, but fantastic, candidate comes to mind. As far as it goes, the color scheme of Ovid's Picus is very like that of the phoenix as given, for example, by Pliny.¹⁰ And although Ovid will not have been unable to tell the difference between woodpeckers and phoenixes, there does seem to have been ancient confusion between woodpeckers and gryphons, at least in the name, as we know only from Nonius' interpretation of a line from Plautus.¹¹ Gryphons and phoenixes were both oriental sun birds and took on some of the same characteristics, which, although I have been unable to find any specific references, may have given the gryphon as well as the phoenix the red and gold colors of the sun.¹² To depict Picus as a gryphon or even a phoenix, however, would have to have been a deliberate confusion on Ovid's part, and since there seems no reason he would purposely invest a native inhabitant of Italy in the plumage of an oriental migrant, the questions why and how he made his mistake remain.

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⁹ Examples in O. Keller, *Die antike Tierwelt* (Leipzig 1913) II, 51, from the *Carmina Burana* and the *Lichtentaler Glossen*.

¹⁰ *NH* 10.3: "auri fulgore circa collo, cetero purpureum, caeruleum roseis caudam pennisque distinguuntibus, cristis fauces, caputque plumeo apice honestante." See R. Van den Broek, *The Myth of the Phoenix* (Leiden 1972) 253ff. for other and often quite different descriptions.

¹¹ Nonius Marcellus, ed. W. Lindsay (Teubner 1903) II, p. 222 (p. 152 Merc.): "Picos veteres esse voluerunt, quos Graeci grypas appellant." on Plautus *Aulularia* 701: "Pici (or pici) divitiis, qui aureos montes colunt." Gryphons were, indeed, the most famous ancient gold hoarders, like dragons in the Mediaeval period, but Plautus himself may rather have been referring to a legend which makes woodpeckers gold hoarders. Why else dig a hole in a tree? Variants of this legend make springwort the open sesame to the woodpecker's hole, as in Pliny *NH* 10.40; see C. Swainson, *The Folk Lore of British Birds* (London 1886) 101.

¹² The only description of the gryphon in color I have found is in Aelian *NA* 4.27; it is nothing like Pliny's description. For phoenix-gryphon relationships, see R. Van den Broek, *op. cit.*, 273ff.

COMPULSORY SCHOOLING AT ATHENS AND ROME?

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY OF HELLENISTIC EDUCATION*

When reading the comedies of Terence, Plautus and Menander, which, in spite of their various limitations, may be regarded as testimonies to Hellenistic life,¹ one finds passages which refer to the education and training of growing sons and these passages, when viewed as a whole, lead us to understand that the attendance of elementary and secondary schools was taken for granted.² Thus the question arises as to whether, at the time of the *νέα κωμωδία* and the 'fabula palliata,' there was already such a thing as compulsory education at Athens or at Rome. In other words, were parents in those days perhaps already obliged by law to provide an education for their children?

Because the testimonies of the Hellenistic-Roman comedy themselves offer no answer to this question, we must look to other sources and, since there is a clear distinction to be drawn in legal problems between the Greek and Roman systems, we shall first consider the situation at Rome.

A passage in Cicero's *De Republica* already gives sufficient information in this connection. There Cicero causes a member of the Scipionic Circle—probably the chief speaker in this dialogue, P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus Numantinus³—to examine the criticism made by the Greek

* This article has grown out of my Bonn dissertation of 1971 entitled 'Die hellenistische Erziehung im Spiegel der *νέα κωμωδία* und der *fabula palliata*' (Bonn, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, 1972; distribution by E. J. Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands).

¹ Cf. W. Tarn, *Hellenistic civilisation*³ (London 1952) 273; C. Préaux, "Ménandre et la société athénienne," *Cd'E* 32 (1957) 84-100; Menander, *Dyskolos*, Griechisch und deutsch mit textkritischem Apparat und Erläuterungen hrsg. v. M. Treu (München 1960) 97-100; W. G. Arnott, "Menander qui vitae ostendit vitam," *G&R* 15, 2nd Series (1968) 1-17 and P. Schmitz, *Die hellenistische Erziehung im Spiegel der νέα κωμωδία und der fabula palliata* (Bonn 1972) 32-39.

² Cf. e.g. Men. fr. 430 a (Koerte/Thierfelder); Plaut. *Bacch.* 424ff., *Most.* 123ff., 151ff.; Ter. *Eun.* 476ff.; also my own remarks loc. cit. (cf. n. 1), 96-100.

³ The name of the speaker at this stage in *De Republica* 4.3 is not actually

historian, Polybius, of the Roman legislation concerning education, and to emphasize that the Romans had never wanted to standardize the 'disciplina puerilis' or to organize it on a legal basis.⁴ Since the concept 'disciplina puerilis' embraces the whole realm of education and training, the existence of compulsory schooling as such is thus precluded. One could now object that this dialogue about the state never actually took place and cannot therefore be used as evidence of the Hellenistic period.⁵ However, on closer observation this objection proves itself unfounded, because we know⁶ that Cicero devoted extreme care to this work which took him three years to complete.⁷ He sought permission to use the libraries of Varro

known but several instances point to Scipio Africanus. Once, as a result of the address of Laelius in *Cic. Rep.* 4.4, it becomes clear, that the previous statements on paederasty must be attributed to Scipio and consequently he may be considered as a possible author of the remarks on education here in question. As may be seen from these remarks themselves the topic of education is introduced here for the first time and, since Scipio leads the whole dialogue (*Rep.* 1.34-37) this circumstance also suggests that these lines may be spoken by him. This assumption is further strengthened by *Rep.* 2.65; for, as R. Philippson (*RE* 7 A [1939] 1112 and 1113f., s.v. "M. Tullius Cicero") emphasizes, Scipio announces with the words "puto nobis mox de instituendis et conservandis civitatibus aptiorem, Tubero, fore disserendi locum" not only the content of Book 4, but also the fact that he himself will speak personally on this subject. As a fourth supporting point comes the fact that the formulation "Polybius noster hospes" in *Rep.* 4.3 does not acquire its fullest sense until it is referred back to Scipio. As Polybius himself reports in his own historical work he has become a real friend of Scipio's and there is a very appealing account of how, on his return to Rome as a hostage after the battle of Pydna (168 B.C.) he met the young Scipio at the house of his father L. Aemilius Paullus (the victor at Pydna) and became his mentor and confidant (cf. Polyb. 32.8ff.)

⁴ Cf. *Cic. Rep.* 4.3.

⁵ For the literary classification of the Ciceronian dialogues cf. R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog*, I (Leipzig 1895) 293f., 457ff.; F. Klingner, "Cicero," in *Römische Geisteswelt*² (München 1953; revised reprint 1965) 135-37; E. Bickel, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur*² (Heidelberg 1961) 381-82; F. Wehrli *Lexikon der Alten Welt* (Zürich 1965) 724f., s.v. "Dialog."

⁶ Cf. R. Philippson, loc. cit. (cf. n. 3), 1109, 1116f.; N. Wilsing, *Aufbau und Quellen von Cicero de re publica* (Diss. Leipzig 1929) and the review of this work by R. Philippson, *Phil. Woch.* 50 (1930) 1171-84.

⁷ Our earliest reports on this work date from May 54 B.C. (cf. *Cic. Att.* 4.14.1; *Qu. fr.* 2.13.1), and in June 51 Cicero writes to Atticus (*Att.* 5.12.2) saying that a friend is now perusing his books.

and Atticus,⁸ certainly consulted Greek and Roman archaeologists, philosophers and historians, and perhaps was already able to use the first part of Varro's *Antiquitates rerum humanarum et divinarum* in the 41 books of which the system of private, state and cultural antiquities was dealt with.⁹

As a result we may suppose that he had informed himself with particular thoroughness in matters of such importance as the 'ius Romanum' and Polybius's critique of Roman education, especially since his contemporaries would easily have become aware of any mistake because they themselves could check both sources.¹⁰

We can therefore regard the statement from Cic. *Rep.* 4.3 as historically correct, and since its content dates from the time of the Scipionic Circle—i.e. the same circle of people with whom P. Terentius Afer also maintained contact¹¹—its relevance for the period of Hellenistic-Roman comedy is also guaranteed. We can therefore uphold the conclusion that at Rome no law existed, at any rate up until the time of Terence, which made the provision of school education compulsory.¹²

⁸ Cf. Cic. *Att.* 4.14.1. Cicero also reports on the use of his friends' libraries about *Fin.* 3.7ff.

⁹ Varro worked on the first part of the *Antiquitates* the *Res humanae* at the middle of the fifties and thus it is conceivable that some of the books written by Varro himself about private and state antiquity were among those 'libri Varronis' requested by Cicero in 54 B.C. (*Att.* 4.14.1), as R. Philippon, loc. cit. (cf. n. 3), 1117 supposes. The fact that Cicero held the *Antiquitates* of Varro in high esteem can be clearly seen from his *Academici posteriores* 1.9

¹⁰ Unfortunately the statement of Polybius is no longer obtainable in its original wording, but it would probably have been in the 6th book of the *Histories* where the Roman constitution becomes the theme. Cf. e.g. *M. Tullio Cicerone, De re publica*, ed. L. Ferrero,⁴ (Firenze 1967) 148.

¹¹ This fact is sufficiently guaranteed by the performance of the two comedies of Terence, *Hecyra* and *Adelphoe* at the obsequies for Scipio's father, L. Aemilius Paullus (cf. Ter. *Hec. Didasc.* 1.7f., 2.5f.; *Ad. Didasc.* 1f.). Since it is primarily the chronological assessment which concerns us here, it remains of little significance to us whether the connection between Terence and the Scipionic Circle was very close or not, as implied by the *vita* from the pen of C. Suetonius Tranquillus (§ 2), passed down by Donatus, or whether Terence even received help in his writings from this circle (cf. *vita* § 4).

Therefore it need only be mentioned in passing that Terence himself by no means denies having contact with the 'nobiles' but rather sees it as a form of highest praise when his plays please such men as these (Ter. *Ad.* 15-21; cf.

But what was the situation in Greece? The criticism by Polybius of the circumstances at Rome and the remark from the Scipionic Circle to the effect that the Greeks had devoted useless efforts to the education of the young¹³ lead us to conclude that in Greece the state was intensively involved in matters of education. In view of this it would be conceivable that compulsory schooling had existed and in fact we find a suggestion of the existence of such laws among the works of certain classical scholars.¹⁴ Others, such as H. I. Marrou remain extremely sceptical with regard to such attempts,¹⁵ or plainly refute the existence of compulsory schooling, as for example E. Schuppe, T. J. Haarhoff and M. P. Nilsson.¹⁶

also *Haut.* 22-26). However, any extensive help from the 'nobiles' is nevertheless improbable, and the real root of this rumour seems to lie in the fact that Terence, as a young writer, sought acceptance in the highest social circles and found it, much to the annoyance of those who envied him. It is then a foregone conclusion that he may have received encouragement and incentives from this circle.

In connection with this whole problem, and the question of which individual men can be understood to have belonged to the 'nobiles', cf. Th. Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*,² II, (1857; Berlin 1903) 436f.; *Ausgewählte Komödien des P. Terentius Afer*, erklärt von K. Dziatzko, II, *Adelphoe*,² revised by R. Kauer (Leipzig 1903; reprinted Amsterdam 1964) 29; G. Norwood, *The art of Terence* (1923; reprinted New York 1965) 132-36; E. Bickel, loc. cit. (cf. n. 5), 450f.; the literature mentioned by H. Marti in his research report, *Lustrum* 6 (1961) 220-22 and 8 (1963) 15f.; also H. Strasburger, "Der Scipionenkreis," *Hermes* 94 (1966) 60-72.

¹² The Roman state did not see any necessity for an active education policy until the imperial age (cf. H. I. Marrou, *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité*,³ [Paris 1955] German translation by Ch. Beumann: *Geschichte der Erziehung im klassischen Altertum*, [Freiburg/München 1957] 435-54, 594-96 and J. J. Eyre, "Roman education in the late republic and early empire," *G&R*, 2nd Series 10 [1963] 57, 59), yet at Rome it never appears to have come to the point of compulsory schooling bound by law.

¹³ Cic. *Rep.* 4.3: "... disciplinam puerilem . . . , de qua Graeci multum frustra laborarunt, . . ."

¹⁴ Cf. e.g. P. Girard, *L'éducation athénienne au V^e et au IV^e siècle avant J.-C.*,² (Paris 1891) 8-41 and C. Schneider, *Kulturgeschichte des Hellenismus*, I (München 1967) 134.

¹⁵ H. I. Marrou, loc. cit. (cf. n. 12), 537 n. 3.

¹⁶ E. Schuppe, *RE* 18 (1942) 2375, s.v. "Paidagogos;" T. J. Haarhoff, *OCD* (1949; unrevised reprint 1968) 306, s.v. "Education;" M. P. Nilsson, *Die hellenistische Schule* (München 1955) 10.

Since this divergence of opinion indicates the presence of a real problem, it is essential to refer in detail to the most significant sources of evidence in antiquity.

As chief testimony for the existence of compulsory schooling at Athens P. Girard refers to a passage in Plato's *Crito* where the laws put the following question to Socrates: ἢ οὐ καλῶς προσέταττον ἡμῶν οἱ ἐπὶ τούτῳ (sc. τροφῇ τε καὶ παιδείᾳ)¹⁷ τεταγμένοι νόμοι παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σὺ σε ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν;¹⁸ In fact this pronouncement seems to plead the existence of a legal obligation among Athenian citizens already in the 5th century B.C. to have their children instructed in 'Music' and 'Gymnastics.' However, doubt is expressed by Becker/Göhl and Adam as to whether at this stage one can speak of a strict legal compulsion. J. Adam says: "The word παραγγέλλοντες is not to be pressed: it is doubtful to what extent Athenian parents were compelled by law to educate their children,"¹⁹ and Becker/Göhl make the following comment on this passage: "allein in wie weit ein Zwang dabei ausgeübt worden sei, läßt sich daraus, zumal bei der Milde des Ausdrucks παραγγέλλειν, nicht abnehmen. . . ."²⁰ H. I. Marrou brings another counter-argument when he calls for the understanding of the νόμοι which occur in Plato's *Crito* as 'custom' or 'unwritten laws.'²¹

If these arguments are not in themselves conclusive they reveal nevertheless the weakness of the interpretation by Girard. They indicate that the passage quoted from the *Crito* is open to various interpretations because of the vagueness of the two keywords παραγγέλλοντες and νόμοι. It is therefore not possible, from this passage alone, to determine whether or not Plato is speaking of a legal compulsion or merely of custom and practice.

¹⁷ Cf. Pl. *Cri.* 50D5-7.

¹⁸ P. Girard, loc. cit. (cf. n. 14), 32. Pl. *Cri.* 50D7-E1. It is of no significance to our argument that Stallbaum wanted to eliminate the word νόμοι at this point, since the context (cf. 50A6-54D1) clearly points to the νόμοι as Socrates' partners in conversation.

¹⁹ *Platonis Crito*, ed. by J. Adam (Cambridge 1888; unrevised reprint 1896) 64.

²⁰ W. A. Becker/H. Göhl, *Charikles*, II (Berlin 1877) 52.

²¹ H. I. Marrou, loc. cit. (cf. n. 12), 537 n. 3.

In this difficulty we are aided, however, by a passage from Plato's *Laws*; for in the 7th book, in which Plato concerns himself exclusively with matters of education, he examines the problem of compulsory schooling and he clearly criticizes the conventions of his Polis up to that time when he demands that each child be instructed, even against the will of his father, by a teacher.²² Consequently it would appear that in his time the education of children depended upon the initiative of the individual parents, a situation which we find explicitly confirmed in the *Politics* of Aristotle. There Aristotle criticizes likewise the existing practice of leaving the responsibility for the provision of education and instruction to the discretion of the individual and he says, in his own words: *φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντων, καὶ ταύτης τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἶναι κοινὴν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰδίαν, ὃν τρόπον νῦν ἕκαστος ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν αὐτοῦ τέκνων ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ μάθῃσιν ἰδίαν, ἣν ἂν δόξη, διδάσκων.*²³

Since both these pieces of evidence plead unambiguously against the existence of compulsory education, the *νόμοι* which we find in Plato's *Crito* cannot be understood to mean general, compulsory school attendance, and thus the interpretation of P. Girard is no longer valid. Whether we can agree with H. I. Marrou, however, who wishes to understand by *νόμοι* merely unwritten laws and practice, or whether yet another, third interpretation is possible, will be shown from the following argument. For the present, however, it can be stated with certainty that, according to the evidence of Plato's *Crito*, a school education was at any rate customary in the majority of cases.

The speech *Against Timarchus* made in court by Aeschines²⁴ which is to be dated approximately from 345 B.C. also has an important role in the discussion of compulsory

²² Pl. *Leg.* 7.804C8-D6. Cf. W. Jaeger, *Paideia*³, III (Berlin 1959) 334.

²³ Arist. *Pol.* 8.1337a22-26.

²⁴ Cf. *The Speeches of Aeschines*, ed. by C. D. Adams (London 1919; reprinted 1958) 2 and J. H. Kühn, *Lexikon der Alten Welt* (Zürich 1965) 79f., s.v. "Aischines." On the subject of the historical situation and the political significance of the speeches of Aeschines cf. F. Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit*, III, 2, (Leipzig 1898; unrevised reprint, Hildesheim 1962) 153-266; C. D. Adams, loc. cit., VII-XIX; C. M. Bowra, *Ancient Greek Literature*,² (rev. Oxford 1967) 107-9.

schooling. This speech is produced by E. Schuppe as proof for his thesis which claims that there was a law of Solon according to which "Kinder, die keine Ausbildung erhalten hatten, . . . für ihre Eltern im Alter nicht zu sorgen brauchten."²⁵

Undoubtedly a law such as this would be an economic pressure and, in effect, it would be virtually the same as a direct compulsion to educate children. However, neither the passage quoted by E. Schuppe,²⁶ nor another from this speech *Against Timarchus* provides sufficient proof for this thesis. For, as is emphasized by Hermann/Stark, Becker/Göll and Girard,²⁷ the education laws quoted by Aeschines serve only to protect morals and are designed, above all, to prevent paederasty at school as far as possible. This aim is clearly to be seen not only in the passage wrongly interpreted by E. Schuppe, where it is merely stated that a grown man need not provide either food or shelter for his elderly father if the latter hired him out as a child for prostitution, but also from the entire context of this paragraph.

It would lead us too far, however, if we were to study in detail each line of this text and so it must suffice to refer to a few particularly revealing parts of it.

One should mention firstly the introductory remarks in § 8 of the speech in which it is announced that those laws would be examined which contributed to the 'morality' (*εὐκοσμία*) of the boys. One should mention also the passage in which Aeschines gives as the reason for the laws regarding number of pupils, hours of opening of school (*διδασκαλεῖον*) and palaestra the fact that the law-givers were very mistrustful of allowing the teacher to meet a boy there alone or after dark.²⁸

Thirdly there is the regulation quoted here according to which a choregus must be over forty years old on taking up

²⁵ E. Schuppe, loc. cit. (cf. n. 16), 2375.

²⁶ Aeschin. *In Tim.* 13

²⁷ K. F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch der griechischen Antiquitäten*, III: *Lehrbuch der griechischen Privatalterthümer mit Einschluss der Rechtsalterthümer*,² revised by K. B. Stark, (Heidelberg 1870) 270 with 277 n. 23; W. A. Becker/H. Göll, loc. cit. (cf. n. 20), II, 52; P. Girard, loc. cit. (cf. n. 14), 39. In more recent times H. I. Marrou, loc. cit. (cf. n. 12), 537 n. 3 and M. P. Nilsson, loc. cit. (cf. n. 16), 9f. have hinted again at this fact.

²⁸ Aeschin. *In Tim.* 9f.

office so that—as it stands here literally—he is already of the most chaste age (*ἐν τῇ σωφρονεστάτῃ αὐτοῦ ἡλικίᾳ*) when he comes into contact with the boys.²⁹

If Schuppe's reference to Aeschines cannot, as a result of this, be regarded as proof for the existence of compulsory schooling, it is nevertheless not completely valueless since the speech *Against Timarchus* makes clear that in the early stages of Hellenism the Athenians already had at their disposal an impressive number of detailed regulations concerning the organization of the schools.

Contrary to the opinions of Becker/Göll, Girard and Schuppe³⁰ I consider it rash to attribute these laws to Solon. For, as correctly demonstrated by M. P. Nilsson,³¹ Solon and Draco are indeed mentioned by Aeschines by name in § 6, but Solon is not explicitly given as the originator of the education laws. At this point we find, on the contrary, the vague expression *ὁ γὰρ νομοθέτης . . . ἀποδείκνυσι*³² and, since shortly before reference was made to Solon, *Draco καὶ οἱ κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους ἐκείνους νομοθεταί*³³ it must remain open to question, simply because of the precise wording, just who is to be regarded here as the author of these laws. Apart from this, even the exact mention of Solon by name would be scarcely credible, since the Attic orators generally quoted the laws from the code of the year 403 B.C. and they only present them as the laws of Solon for the sake of greater rhetorical effect.³⁴ Consequently, M. P. Nilsson must also be considered right in so far as he recognizes in these education laws the attempt "die Lockerheit und die Mißbräuche zu steuern, die seit dem Anfang der Sophistenzeit eingerissen waren."³⁵

These problems are, however, only of minor importance for

²⁹ Aeschin. *In Tim.* 11.

³⁰ W. A. Becker/H. Göll, loc. cit. (cf. n. 20) II, 52; P. Girard, loc. cit. (cf. n. 14), 39; E. Schuppe, loc. cit. (cf. n. 16), 2375.

³¹ M. P. Nilsson, loc. cit. (cf. n. 16), 9 n. 2.

³² Aeschin. *In Tim.* 9.

³³ Aeschin. *In Tim.* 7.

³⁴ Cf. J. Schreiner, *De corporis iuris Atheniensium* (Diss. Bonn 1913) 29; E. Ruschenbusch, "ΠΑΤΡΙΟΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ, Theseus, Drakon, Solon und Kleisthenes in Publizistik und Geschichtsschreibung," *Historia* 7 (1958) 399ff.; likewise, "ΣΟΛΩΝΟΣ ΝΟΜΟΙ," *Historia*, Einzelschriften 9 (1966) 53f., 57.

³⁵ M. P. Nilsson, loc. cit. (cf. n. 16), 9f.

our argument as a whole; since we want, in the first place, to get a clear view of the situation in Hellenistic Times, it is enough to maintain that the Athenian Polis appears in the year 345 B.C. as the lawful protector of the school system. Thus the great interest of the state in the school, which we were able to postulate on the basis of the passages quoted from Cicero, is here completely confirmed. What is more, the state intervention in these matters also shows that the school and the palaestra were made use of at this time at least by a large number of the citizens. For, had it merely been a matter of exceptional cases, there would scarcely have existed much interest in a legal code to govern schooling.

However Schuppe's reference is not only helpful in this connection. He also points the way to the answer to our questions about compulsory schooling. We have seen above that E. Schuppe is of the opinion that there was a law by which only those children who had received an education were obliged later to care for their elderly parents. The passage quoted as a proof—Aeschin. *In Tim.* 13—had to be rejected, but the fact itself does not seem completely without significance. In Book 6 *De architectura* Vitruvius says: "non minus poetae qui in scaena pronuntiaverunt, ut . . . Alexis, qui Athenienses ait oportere ideo laudari quod omnium Graecorum leges cogunt parentes ali a liberis, Atheniensium non omnes nisi eos qui liberos artibus erudissent."³⁶ From this it can be seen that at the time of *νέα κωμῳδία*, as whose contemporary Alexis is named here,³⁷ there really existed such a law at Athens, and since Vitruvius draws upon the rich heritage of late Hellenism,³⁸ we may believe what he says. Nevertheless, let us check as to whether it can be further guaranteed by other witnesses and whether we may interpret the words of Vitruvius, 'artibus erudire' in such a way that they include school education.

Closely related to the testimony of Vitruvius is a note in the

³⁶ Vitr. 6.3.

³⁷ The comedian Alexis, quoted by Vitruvius is generally classed with the so-called Middle Comedy (cf. G. Kaibel, *RE* I [1894] 1468-1471), yet, since he lived even longer than Menander, we may claim his testimony also for the heyday of the New Comedy.

³⁸ Re life, works and analysis of sources cf. E. Wistrand, *Vitruv-Studien* (1933); P. Thielscher, *RE* 9 A I (1961) 419-89, s.v. "Vitruv."

biography of Solon by Plutarch. There we read, among other things, of Solon's law-giving activities: νόμον ἔγραψεν, νῆψ τρέφειν πατέρα μὴ διδάξάμενον τέχνην ἐπάναγκες μὴ εἶναι.³⁹ If one overlooks the fact that here, instead of the plural 'parentes'—'liberi' the singular form πατήρ—νῆψ stands, then the two statements are almost identical: in both cases the law spoken of is valid for the region of Attic Athens, and in both cases the law holds people exempt from the obligation to care for elderly parents where these had not made provision for the children's, or the sons' education. Unfortunately the correspondence between the two texts goes so far that we find in Plutarch's formulation διδάσκεσθαι τέχνην the direct equivalent of 'artibus erudire' and thus we gain no extra information about the kind of education received. However, this congruency of terms also brings an advantage; it proves irrefutably that both pieces of evidence refer to the same law and so one can safely claim that the very law which applied, according to Vitruvius, at the time of the comedian Alexis, was considered by Plutarch to have been passed by Solon.

But how far can we believe Plutarch in this respect? The analysis of his work has shown that he had, on the one hand, access to an annotated edition of Solon's laws, the 'Axones,'⁴⁰ but on the other hand he also used very questionable material from second-hand sources.⁴¹ Therefore we must try to ascertain whether we can trace his words back within the tradition or confirm them with other testimonies which are independent of them.

Fortunately this law about provision for elderly parents is mentioned once again by Aristophanes in a charming scene. In the *Birds* a young man applies for admission to the bird state because he believes he could thus legally strangle his father and inherit. To his greatest distress he discovers that the birds have an old law, handed down on so-called κύρβεις, which obliges young birds to feed their fathers if they have been reared by them until they are fledged.⁴²

³⁹ Plut., *Sol.* 22.1.

⁴⁰ This expression, which actually denotes the four-edged axial wooden tablets on which the Solonic laws 'bustrophedon' were engraved, is popularly used in antiquity as a synonym for Σόλωνος νόμοι.

⁴¹ Cf. E. Ruschenbusch, ΣΟΛΩΝΟΣ ΝΟΜΟΙ (cf. n. 34), 46f.

⁴² Ar. Av. 1353-57.

These lines are extremely revealing. They afford firstly a contemporary source as final proof of the existence of the law described by Vitruvius and Plutarch.⁴³ Secondly, their chronological proximity to Alexis⁴⁴ can be brought in as confirmation that this law, in accordance with the evidence of Vitruvius, was in force at the time of the New Comedy.⁴⁵

And thirdly, the formulation *ἐν ταῖς κύρβεσιν* also proves that the law originated with Solon, as claimed by Plutarch. As E. Ruschenbusch recently showed, the *κύρβεις* can be understood as the bearers of the Solonic laws and are therefore to be regarded as synonymous with the 'Axones'.⁴⁶ Accordingly we may maintain, as an interim result of our enquiries, that at Athens at the time of the New Comedy there was a Solonic law by which only those sons who had enjoyed an education had to support their parents in their old age.

It only remains now for us to clarify what is to be understood by this term 'education.' We have tried to render with this word the expressions 'artibus erudire' and *τέχνην διδάσκεισθαι*, and, if so desired, one could equally well hereby include the *τρέφειν* of Aristophanes which we tried to translate by 'to rear,' since already at the time of Hesiod and Pindar this verb could denote not merely a purely physiological 'feeding' but also a psycho-intellectual 'cultivating' and 'upbringing'.⁴⁷ From this last point can be seen that the consideration of *τρέφειν* cannot itself alone bring any enlightenment as to the specific kind of education, although we do come a step closer if

⁴³ Since these lines unintentionally provide further historical information and as such can be regarded as an 'involuntary' source in the sense of G. Droysen (cf. A. v. Brandt, *Werkzeug des Historikers*,⁵ [Stuttgart 1969] 62ff.), their objectivity and conclusive force are undisputable.

⁴⁴ A period of approximately 42 years elapses between the year in which the *Birds* were performed (414 B.C.) and the year of birth of Alexis.

⁴⁵ Cf. n. 37.

⁴⁶ Cf. E. Ruschenbusch, *ΣΟΛΩΝΟΣ ΝΟΜΟΙ* (cf. n. 34), 14-22 and in connection with the term 'Axones' also p. 3f. and 13f. Similarly also the Schol. Ar. Av. 1354 in which *ἐν ταῖς κύρβεσιν* is paraphrased with the words *χαλκαὶ σάνιδες* 'brazen (=hard) wooden tablets'.

⁴⁷ A detailed investigation of the meaning of this verb may be found in the work of Claude Moussy, *Recherches sur τρέφω et les verbes grecs signifiant 'nourrir'*, (Paris 1969). Cf. also *Thesaurus Graecae Linguae*, VIII, Parisiis (1829 ?), 2390ff. Also my own exposition loc. cit. (cf. n. 1), 47-50. For its use in Hesiod and Pindar cf. esp. C. Moussy, loc. cit., 52f.

we include the context of this passage in our investigations. Here v. 1355f. mentions the aim of *τρέφειν* as being that the father stork should prepare the young for flight.⁴⁸ When applied to human beings this means firstly, that the aim of education is only then achieved, when the child can take his life into his own hands and look after himself, and secondly, it means that it is the duty of the father to provide him with the necessary skills for this. Thus, in this specific instance, *τρέφειν* embraces everything that belonged to the 'equipment' of a man of those times, and consequently its content comes extremely close to the terms *τέχνην διδάσκεισθαι* and 'artibus erudire' used by Plutarch and Vitruvius.

Basically these two expressions also designate a 'training in skills,' and it is only recently that J. Kube has very well demonstrated how the content of the term *τέχνη* has altered in accordance with the sociological, economic and cultural development of Greece.⁴⁹ Perhaps it is therefore best to understand the term in general as the capacity of human beings to hold their own successfully in their environment. Now, however, we find ourselves faced by the necessity of clarifying the content of the expression *τέχνην διδάσκεισθαι* and its Latin equivalent 'artibus erudire' with the sole help of recourse to the history of the time, and since this produces no evidence that refers directly to compulsory schooling it is unfortunately no longer possible to say with absolute certainty whether attendance at school belonged to the 'education' which the law demanded.

However, since, according to the testimony of the New Attic Comedy, attendance at school and palaestra were regarded as a necessary part of the education of a young man,⁵⁰ instruction in these things is presumably implied in the content of the expressions *τέχνην διδάσκεισθαι* and 'artibus erudire,' especially since an Athenian of that time could only successfully practise his profession as landowner, merchant, banker, etc.⁵¹ if he had at least an elementary knowledge of reading, writing, and arithmetic.

⁴⁸ Ar. Av. 1355f.: ἐπὶν ὁ πατὴρ ὁ πελαργὸς ἐκπετησίμους | πάντας ποιήσῃ τοὺς πελαργιδέας τρέφων, . . .

⁴⁹ J. Kube, *TEXNH und APETH* (Berlin 1969).

⁵⁰ Cf. esp. Ter. Eun. 476-78, also n. 2.

⁵¹ On the subject of the social situation at Hellenistic Athens cf. also M.

Let us refer once again at this point to the passage in the *Crito* dialogue in which the fictitious laws ask Socrates whether it would not have been a good thing if they had made his father responsible for educating and instructing him in 'Music' and 'Gymnastics.' It does not thus seem irrelevant to give our previous explanation⁵² greater precision and, following the suggestion of A. R. W. Harrison,⁵³ to look on these lines as "a free interpretation" of the Solonic law of education. For, since the term *τέχνη*, used in the law refers quite generally to the education necessary at that time, the words *ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν* chosen by Plato could be seen as a concrete expression of the letter of the law. As a principal argument in favour of this interpretation—which is of course also chronologically sound, for there would otherwise be no point in discussing it—there comes the fact that improves our hitherto existing explanation in one essential point. That is to say, it enables us to go beyond the negative formulation that the *νόμοι* which appear in the *Crito* cannot be laws governing universal compulsory schooling, and allows us to understand these in terms of fact as the Solonic decree concerning education and the provision of a livelihood.

The reason why there is no contradiction inherent in this, as one might at first sight imagine, lies in the peculiar character of the Solonic law. For, on the one hand, it does exert a strong pressure on the parents by linking the right to be supported by one's sons with the obligation to educate them in the first place, yet on the other hand, it does not explicitly prescribe the education of the young people, as compulsory schooling would demand.

All things considered, therefore, it cannot be proved that

Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (Oxford 1941); German translation by G. and E. Bayer: *Die hellenistische Welt, Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft*, I (Stuttgart 1955) 127ff.

⁵² See p. 3f.

⁵³ A. R. W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens* (Oxford 1968) 78 n. 3. This thought is also to be found already 'in nuce' in the work of W. G. Becker, *Platons Gesetze und das griechische Familienrecht* (München 1932) 206f.; who states, in connection with this passage from Plato: "Die . . . Erziehungspflicht des Vaters dem Kinde gegenüber erhält jedoch durch das solonische Gesetz, das die Unterhaltspflicht der Kinder von der Erfüllung der Erziehungspflicht der Eltern abhängig macht, privatrechtlichen Charakter".

there was compulsory schooling in the modern sense of the word up to the time of Hellenism, yet the Solonic law concerning the provision of a means of subsistence plays a major role here. It must be regarded as a strong inducement to educate sons in the skills necessary for living, and since instruction in, among other things, reading, writing, arithmetic, gymnastics and music at that time constituted part of an education, instruction in these things can be reckoned to have been contained in the education demanded by the law.

Let us remember also that the school laws quoted by Aeschines lead us to believe in a high frequency of public schools, sons in the skills necessary for living, and since instruction in, among other things, reading, writing, arithmetic, gymnastics and music at that time constituted part of an education, instruction in these things can be reckoned to have been contained in the education demanded by the law.

There is, however, no mention in our sources as yet of school attendance by girls, and this, as we know, only becomes customary at a later period.⁵⁵

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⁵⁴ Cf. also Thphr. *Char.* 30.14, according to which it was a foregone conclusion, even for the miserly *αλοχγομερδής*, that his sons should be sent to school. In this connection cf. *Theophrast, Charaktere*, hrsg. und erklärt von P. Steinmetz, II (München 1962) 345.

⁵⁵ Cf. H. I. Marrou, loc. cit. (cf. n. 12), 212 with 551, n. 7.

PROBLEMS IN THE TEXT-HISTORY OF PETRONIUS IN ANTIQUITY AND THE MIDDLE AGES*

The text of Petronius might at last be thought of as well established. It is of course sadly incomplete and will probably ever remain so, but apart from sporadic argument over dislocation,¹ and the continuing debate over interpolation,² scholars are accepting it as a reading, working text sufficient for all needs. One might ask, then, what the purpose is of a further exploration of the text's historical foundations. Part of the answer lies in the great uncertainty of many steps in the *Satyricon*'s tradition. I have thought that a presentation of some of the most important problems not independently but within the framework of a theory that traces the *Satyricon*'s development from the autograph to the close of the Middle Ages could offer some new and useful insights. The object in view is not a better text but a more truthful perception of the one we have, and perhaps an increased understanding of the original.

The early textual history of the *Satyricon* may be divided conveniently into two focal study areas: 1) the ancient citations, external to the text-tradition, which by their greater proximity to the original give the best evidence for the state of the text between the time of the autograph and the emergence of the archetype; 2) the medieval sources, wherein, commencing from about A.D. 800, lies the foundation for the MS tradition, and whose function is therefore to clarify the relationships between the various branches of the tradition and relate them to the *Satyricon* archetype.

It is natural to begin the discussion of the *Satyricon*'s original

* A version of this paper was given to The Petronian Society at the APA Annual Meeting, 1973.

¹ For the latest, comprehensive treatment see H. van Thiel, *Petron: Überlieferung und Rekonstruktion* (Leiden 1971); hereafter cited as van Thiel. Cf. note 24.

² Consult the reviews of K. Müller, *Petroni Arbitri Satyricon* (Munich 1961), hereafter = Müller¹, and K. Müller and W. Ehlers, *Petronius Satyricon: Schel-mengeschiedten* (Munich 1965), hereafter = Müller². My unpublished doctoral dissertation *Interpolations in Petronius* (Harvard University 1972) deals with this subject. See below page 300, and note 20.

compass from the other end—the surviving evidence. The text with which we have been left is, first of all, fairly short: 180 pages or so of Latin. This shortness in itself might not have been suspicious were it not for a second consideration: the text is fragmented. Even that would not justify a very different conception of the original since one doubts that within the present tradition much is missing. Yet the third feature, the snatches of external, independent evidence for different contexts and a work of impressive length, seems decisive for investigating the possibility of just such a difference. To this add the artistic undesirability of an incomplete narrative, and one has a strong *prima facie* case for a substantial text-reduction. Determining the circumstances of that reduction must for the student of Petronius be accomplished by a special mixture of hypothesis and fact.

The central question might be posed thus: which factor was more instrumental in the formation of the present text, deliberate abridgement or pure accident? It is a commonplace that Petronius' *Satyricon* was *sui generis*. If we accept the prevailing view, as most recently stated by J. P. Sullivan,³ that it was written for the amusement of the Neronian literary circle, it must have been a most unusual work for a most unusual *coterie*, and thus should almost immediately have encountered problems with survival. Despite its obvious artistic merit⁴ there is no evidence from the ancient sources that the work itself was understood any more than it is today and it may have been appreciated less. If we entertain the theory of an excerption made relatively soon after the original we must admit that the present contents are somewhat reinforcing: assuming that human nature changes very little and that the copyist had his reasons for not reproducing the whole, there is much in the present *Satyricon* of perennial interest. Into a casual framework of the picaresque adventure story are woven maxims, poetry, art theory, literary criticism, rhetorical precepts, moral echoes, linguistic oddities, satire, humor, erotic precedents. By the

³ J. P. Sullivan, "Petronius, Seneca, and Lucan: A Neronian Literary Feud?" *TAPA* 99 (1968) 467.

⁴ For a cogent reaffirmation of Petronius' literary ability see R. Beck, "Some Observations on the Narrative Technique of Petronius," *Phoenix* 27 (1973) 42-61.

same token, the work might also have been deemed of uneven interest or usefulness. Then there are the strictly physical considerations. A work of considerable length might put much strain on the copyist's resources, and the likelihood of excerpting could be directly in proportion to the work's length.

The excellent possibilities for excerpting that are offered by the present text are unfortunately not confirmed by the early textual history. The evidence for use of Petronius in antiquity is very scanty, and is in fact totally inadequate to the task of determining when the full text ceased to exist. After Tacitus, Pliny, and Plutarch, there is only a scattering of references, and one is immediately faced with having to consider the prospect, ever increasing with the passage of years, that these came from an excerpt or excerpts. For although some classical works survived complete until the fourth century A.D.⁵ this cannot be assumed with Petronius. All that may be deduced with certainty is that more of the *Satyricon* existed in antiquity than exists now.⁶ Still less might the citations help to determine the absolute length of the original although presenting a different context or elaborating on one remaining.⁷

In the fifth century A.D. references to Petronius become more frequent: he is cited by half-a-dozen scholars and grammarians. The sixth added Boethius and John of Lydia, and Fulgentius, who quoted him thirteen times, nine in prose. It is tempting to see in this heightened activity not merely a change in fashion but a change in the condition of the Petronian MSS; but what is involved we are not at liberty to divine. Of the mentions of Fulgentius only one has its exact counterpart in the present text (*Myth.* 57.9 = *Sat.* 82.5). The crucial question: was Fulgentius using the full *Satyricon* or an epitome? A second, of slightly lesser import: can Fulgentius be trusted to be giving the actual words of Petronius? Answering this point V. Ciaffi compares Fulgentius' use of Vergil and Plautus, among others, to the MS authority, and concludes that while Petronius may have been subjected to alteration of form or sense "nel *Satyricon* quei luoghi o luoghi molti simili esisterano."⁸ The source of

⁵ E.g. Livy; see F. Hall, *A Companion to Classical Texts* (Oxford 1913) 19.

⁶ For convenience, on the citations consult Müller¹ LIV-LVI, 185-94.

⁷ See e.g. the citation of Sidonius Apollinaris (fr. IIII Müller) uniting Petronius, Priapus and Massilia.

⁸ V. Ciaffi, *Fulgenzio e Petronio* (Turin 1963) 24.

Fulgentius' citations is however a matter for more equivocation. Ciaffi (13) believes that he used excerpts of general literary, linguistic and thematic interest. But if in fact Fulgentius was using an epitome the infrequency of citations paralleled in our 'epitome' points to it being a different collection.

If on the other hand Fulgentius used a complete and continuous text (admittedly less probably) the lack of correlation could be explained as follows: Hall (note 5, 70) has observed a tendency in ancient grammarians and epitomizers to make far more liberal excerpts from the earlier books of a work than the later. Applied to Petronius the solitary reference to a portion surviving in our *Satyricon*, which is regarded to be episodes very late in the plot, would be explained by supposing that Fulgentius' copy of the *Satyricon* or excerpts of it comprised the earlier portions. Whatever the text Fulgentius used, it can have nothing to do with the *Satyricon* archetype.

Canonical to the theory of excerpts being made in antiquity is the belief that they in some way correspond to the excerpts in our tradition, L, O and H. For it is to these Buecheler seems to be referring in his statement "iam sub Theodosii aetatem excerptas esse satiras facile credo";⁹ and through his influence the archetype has been lodged in antiquity. This is in my opinion too early, and there is no evidence for it, as shall be seen.

P. B. Corbett has recently offered a refinement to the "epitome theory,"¹⁰ suggesting that a fourth- or fifth-century scholar abridged the work according to a schema in which all the important genres might be preserved. This, although superficially satisfying, invites objections. First, it is too convenient; it suggests that the interests of scholars of antiquity correspond in remarkable degree with our own, even to the point of excluding genres that we might not know of. Secondly, one wonders how a plan so well conceived could be so clumsily executed, for if our tradition provides this epitome's reflection, what a peculiarly uneven rendition it must have been.

Abandoning the epitome theory, one should concede that the *Satyricon* became heavily damaged after Fulgentius' manifest

⁹ F. Buecheler, *Petroni Saturae* (Berlin 1862) XI. This, Buecheler's first edition, is a milestone in Petronian textual scholarship. Müller constructs his stemma in good part from him. (See especially Buecheler XXV-XXVI).

¹⁰ P. B. Corbett, *Petronius* (New York 1970) 43.

use, and that the portion remaining survived precariously until its permanence was secured by a recension in early Carolingian times. It is my intent to accept this, and in support of my hypothesis I shall offer the nature of the archetype, and its condition. One might picture the theory more vividly, if perhaps not with absolute accuracy, as follows: shortly after Fulgentius a deliberate and systematic attempt was made at Christian instance to suppress and destroy the *Satyricon*, hence curbing for all time its demonstrably rising popularity. When this had proceeded so that all the early books of the text upon which survival depended had been destroyed, the last five books or so were saved. For the next three centuries an erosion of the most exposed part of the remnant, the beginning and especially the end, continued. The *Cena* was provided with the protection of being in the middle (so, Müller¹ XXXVII-XXXVIII).

It is now unnecessary to consider any abridgement up to the time of the archetype, although quite possibly the story of the Widow of Ephesus and the *Bellum Civile* perhaps and other short pieces were detached earlier and circulated independently. There is no internal evidence of this; and the abridgement and detachment later within the tradition clearly does not provide it.

Perhaps already reflecting the heavy damage that the *Satyricon* was now taking, the citations in the seventh century drop off sharply. Isidore of Seville, however, uses Petronius in various ways, quoting him twice and making conflation of stories that depend on him partly. Significantly, on all these occasions but one the context is preserved in the MSS. Now, by whatever account, the greater portion of the *Satyricon* was lost irrecoverably, and Isidore or his source had seen a text not differing markedly from our own.¹¹

Affecting the one or the other theory for the present state of the text is the evidence for its reduction, consisting in the references to the numbering of the work in books. What, in a nutshell, is the proportion to the original of the *Satyricon*

¹¹ W. C. McDermott, "Isidore and Petronius," *C&M* 23 (1962) 143-47, is of the opinion that Isidore's citations from Petronius are second hand (143 note 2). On the same page he states that his use of the story of the unbreakable glass and of the Corinthian Bronze clearly shows "that Isidore had available, wholly or in excerpts," a text of Petronius.

surviving, and would the answer support better the concept of epitome or attenuation? Terentianus Maurus in the second century A.D. refers to Petronius as "disertus libris suis." We might make this unremarkable comment a possible starting point, inferring as it does that the work was divided into books (which is not a feature of the MSS save the Petronius portion of the *codex Traguriensis*), and implying perhaps that it was lengthy. This at a time when the entire work should have been extant. The next indications are no earlier than ninth century and therefore do not precede the date of the archetype. They are glosses owned by P. Daniel, a French scholar of the sixteenth century, said to come from the Benedictine Abbey at Fleury. One, containing a single word, quoted by Douza, Goldast and others, is supposed by Daniel to come "e libro primo Satyrarum." Since the word appears in *Sat.* 88.4 there is a problem of contradiction with the other evidence which consistently suggests a different focus. It must be a simple paleographic corruption. Another gloss of Daniel, and an addition to an eleventh-century Fulgentius MS, together with a fifteenth-century Petronius MS, and references in the correspondence of a scholar of the same period, all suggest that the surviving portion has a relationship to Books 14-16 of the *Satyricon*. The Renaissance evidence, dealt with briefly here because of its obvious implications for the early tradition, is possibly the most significant.¹² The *codex Traguriensis* (AH¹³) written in Italy in the fifteenth century contains twice: "Petroni Arbitri Satyri fragmenta ex libro quinto et sexto decimo." At exactly the same period in history Poggio Bracciolini received a copy of Petronius from Cologne which he called Book 15, presumably on the basis of the internal evidence. The possible effects of this coincidence in chronology are considerable.¹⁴ Poggio had in the previous years turned up another 'Petronius' either in France or Britain and it had been sent to Italy. The *codex Traguriensis* comprises two MSS from

¹² For recent discussion of this evidence see Müller² 403-12, and van Thiel 21-24. The contradictions are of particular concern since they might reflect the relative value of the testimony.

¹³ Following current practice I shall use Müller's symbols, the source for which being usually Buecheler.

¹⁴ Buecheler VI-VII first established the connection, but he did not explore it beyond suggesting that the Cologne MS was a forerunner of the Italian codices.

two Petronian traditions. The conclusion to be drawn was that the components of the *Traguriensis* corresponded exactly to Poggio's discoveries.¹⁵ Whatever their actual relationship it must be seen as extremely likely that the book-numbering in the former are owed to the latter. Nor might the inconsistencies detract from the importance of these ciphers to our tradition—although the evidence is late and could possibly revert to the same source, a Fleury one, for instance. Yet the probability of their being purely invented and deliberately misleading, or else mistaken, is slight. Hence although the exact length of the original may never be known, it might be conceived of as substantially longer than the present text—about twenty books, of which the present portion contains a fragment of the last twenty-five percent.

We have seen that the epitome theory necessitated that its contents be identical or nearly so with the archetype; hence the tradition LOH would actually represent the excerptor's choice. We may now add as an objection to this view that these would be excerpts taken from only the last fraction of the *Satyricon*, meaning either that the rest had been ignored or that already in antiquity it had been lost. And yet if so much had thus been lost what would be the point, indeed, of an epitome.

The theory of attenuation by suppression and neglect conveniently, too, eliminates a good deal of the bulk—some precipitately, some gradually, with the end result in the archetype. This seems more in keeping with the *Satyricon*'s estimated length and with the close contextual affinity of the surviving portion, which the book-numbering confirms.

* * *

The medieval tradition of Petronius commences with B (= *Bernensis* 357 + *Leidensis Vossianus* 4° 30). Being at once by

¹⁵ So, first, A. C. Clark, "The Trau MS. of Petronius," *CR* 22 (1908) 178. He argued that the *Cena* (H) was the earlier find of Poggio, the *particula*, and that the Cologne MS was the so-called Vulgate. On internal grounds this seems less likely than the reverse, as was pointed out by Sabbadini, and E. T. Sage, "Petronius, Poggio, and John of Salisbury," *CP* 11 (1916) 12f. While this was endorsed by Müller with new arguments, the difficulties have led G. Berger, "Zur Wiederentdeckung Petrons in Italien," *Petronian Society Newsletter* 4,1 (1973) 6, to be skeptical. Sage himself kept constantly in mind the possibility of pure coincidence.

far the oldest MS and the most solid evidence for the state of the text in the Carolingian period its importance is paramount, and its exact date must have some bearing on the history of the text. Buecheler had put it in the tenth or eleventh century and was followed by Ernout without comment. This date is probably paleographically too late and would somewhat cramp B's significance. Chatelain dated it to the ninth century and has been firmly endorsed by Müller. Sage, depending on Carey's knowledge of the Fleury script,¹⁶ puts the date a couple of generations earlier, or in the early 800's.¹⁷

If the identity of B could be established through its readings with one *codex Altissiodurensis*, apparently in the possession of P. Pithou in the sixteenth century, not only could its early provenance be posited but some of the readings now lost in the O-class, of which B is the most important witness, could be restored; for B contains a gap between *Sat.* 80.9 verse 8 and *Sat.* 109 verse 1. Buecheler was sure that they were one and the same, and therefore held B's entire text to be recovered, also endorsing the connection between B and Auxerre, the place of activity of the ninth-century poet Heiric. Although this equation has met with approval (Müller accepts it without discussion) it must still be regarded as controversial (Sage *TTP*, note 17, 27-31 is the main detractor). Of about seventy readings of *Alt.* cited by Pithou fourteen fall within this gap, of which only four are adopted by Buecheler despite their alleged *bonitas*. He was clearly influenced by Heiric's familiarity with a MS of Petronius, and by the correspondence of names. Sage's vigorous argument for Fleury as the home of B includes the following points: 1) Pithou's MS nomenclature does not guarantee their provenance; 2) John of Salisbury had connections with Fleury and his Petronius quotations demonstrate an affinity with B.

Finally, Buecheler himself cannot have connected Heiric with B since he dated the MS to the tenth or eleventh century. He would thus seem to regard B as a descendant.

Ullman continued to adhere to Buecheler, attributing dis-

¹⁶ P. Daniel, the owner of the Fleury glosses, had also owned B. When the monastery was sacked in 1562 he secured the greater part of the library.

¹⁷ See E. T. Sage, "The Text-Tradition of Petronius—Preliminary Paper," *AJP* 50 (1929) 24; hereafter cited as Sage *TTP*.

crepancies to mistakes by Pithou in citing his readings.¹⁸ Sage, while admitting the striking resemblance in many readings, emphasized the many differences, which cannot, he argued, be laid to so careful a scholar as Pithou. The dispute was important, with the stakes being the abode of Petronius in the Carolingian era. One might suggest a compromise: B and *Alt.* are close relatives without being identical. Even more Petronian activity in the period is suggested.

One might try to illuminate the controversy by going to the text of Heiric. A poem of his, complete in A.D. 873, demonstrates a direct knowledge of the *Bellum Civile*, which happens to exist in both the L- and the O-class of the MSS of Petronius. Although the reminiscences are authentic they are too imprecise and jejune for the MS source to be determined. One thinks of *Sat.* 119 verse 5 *fulvum quae*, the reading of Scaliger, the *Memmianus* and Heiric, and *quae fulvum* in O, whence apparently coming over into Tornaesius and Pithou. The interesting case of *septifluus*, the reading of Heiric and appearing in some MS sources, might have been promising. The good MSS contain unmetrical readings: *semperflavius* B; *semper fluvius* *Alt.*; *semperfluus* R; the inferior MSS have the reading of Heiric, of difficult sense and occurring nowhere else in Latin. Is it genuine or a conjecture from Heiric? The evidence of Heiric is thus far from conclusive, but it proves that in his day there was at least one active archetype. The role of the L-tradition is still very much in doubt.

An inspection of O shows that it was in intent an abridged edition, made in the early ninth century. For the fuller text we must go to L, which reflects it somewhat imperfectly. Since L is based not on a number of medieval MSS like O but on passages and readings reconstructed from sixteenth-century editions its 5:2 superiority in size does not guarantee O's dependence on it. There are in fact passages in O not appearing in L, proving the independence. O at any rate fits comfortably into the context of L and therefore derives from a forerunner in good condition at some early stage. The reason for its abridgement seems not far to seek: there is a fondness for poetry; the narrative context is shortened and the more turgid passages have been eliminated.

¹⁸ B. L. Ullman, "The Text of Petronius in the Sixteenth Century," *CP* 25 (1930) 140 note 2.

The Cloak Affair is absent; some of the Quartilla episode is there, but the "punishment" has been excluded. (One ponders on the double standard that allows Psyche's *noces* to remain.) The most notable absence is the *Cena*. Only part of chapter 55, containing a poem of evident interest, is reproduced in a skeleton of context. The absence of most of the *Cena* from L as well poses a problem in the sources: only the initial ten chapters remain, slightly shortened but in a way to suggest damage to the MS rather than conscious abbreviation. It contains the parts of chapter 55 that occur in O, and seven apothegms inserted after *Sat.* 82.5—slightly out of place, since the *Cena* ends after chapter 78. It is posited that neither L nor O derived any of this from the *Cena*, but that they were parts of the original archetype, in the case of L restored from O (chapter 55) and the *florilegia* (apothegms).¹⁹

For these reasons L's character is elusive. Müller¹ XXXVI tried to establish its place in the tradition as follows: "λ autem duos filios procreavit, quorum is quem L dico . . . patris fuit simillimus; alter vero filius (O) . . ." Although he regards L to be old by association with O he does not commit himself to a date; further, he distinguishes carefully between λ and L. Finally, he grows more cautious still (Müller² 415): "Daraus wurde im 9. Jahrhundert ein Auszug (λ) angefertigt, der uns in den Zeugen der L-Klasse erhalten ist," and he even implies by his latest stemma (Müller² 415) that L is in fact younger than O and nearer φ in age. Considering this, van Thiel is perhaps too polemical in stating his differences with Müller (note 19).

The presence of part of the *Cena* in L does, however, give the best indication of two traditions of descent, hence a divergence of the MSS. Given the date of B this must have taken place in

¹⁹ Van Thiel 7 states it thus: "L ist eine sekundäre Sammlung verschiedener Sammlungen von Petronexzerpten, steht also nicht an der Spitze unserer Überlieferung (als λ im Stemma . . .), sondern an ihrem Ende." The seeds of his theory lie in Sage *TTP* (above, note 17) 36: "Part at least of the *Cena* chapters that are found in Family I [L] came from the florilegia." See also Sage, *The MSS of Petronius* (Unpublished; Special Collections, The Joseph Regenstein Library, University of Chicago) 389: "The resemblance between the existing Family I and Family II [O] texts suggests that this chapter [*Sat.* 55] came from a Family II MS. (This lengthy work of Sage, not quite finished at his death in 1936, is hereafter cited as Sage *MSS*.) Cf. van Thiel 3. Sage and van Thiel do better than Müller, who theorizes that L is an excerpt of λ.

about A.D. 800. The one tradition, containing the full *Cena*, survives in H, whereas the other, the antecedent of L, is only imperfectly recorded. It is necessary to invent another symbol for it since it must be distinguished from L, and Müller's λ and van Thiel's A carry different meanings. To preserve its character I would like to call it L*. The early textual history of the present archetype might now be constructed thus: In the late eighth century or early ninth a MS of Petronius came to light, the damaged survivor of the Dark Ages, containing the entire memory of the author. It was in poor condition, so it was recopied by an early Carolingian scribe. In the course of so doing he interpolated his fresh copy to improve the clarity, for it was his intention to produce a full and complete edition.²⁰ An excerpt of his copy (L*) was then made—the *Cena Trimalchionis*, whose special nature and unity of theme made it suitable therefor—which thus was detached and began to circulate independently. Whether it was made simultaneously or by the same person cannot be known. Similarly, the abbreviated edition O was made from L*, possibly some years later and this time by another scribe for school use, perhaps in Fleury. Both L* and the *Cena* MSS were not very active. The former began to suffer damage, chiefly in the loss of the *Cena*, inasmuch as this can be verified. Other damage not capable of verification left the text disjointed and irrecoverable. The *Cena* was remarked on by John of Salisbury, whereafter it disappeared for centuries. If it is to be connected with the *codex Coloniensis* of Poggio fame it must have found its way through northern France to Germany.

No MS representing fully or accurately the text of L* survives. The evidence for it consists in the so-called L-tradition which is derived entirely from MSS now lost in the possession of sixteenth-century scholars. The savants of the day were none too careful with their sources: for their text-editions in addition to these MSS they used readings of the early printed editions based on the active O-archetype, and also the occasional

²⁰ HLO exhibit in abundance such accretions, proving that the origin of them was both common and early. At no other time within the tradition could the bulk of them, especially the important ones of descriptive and explanatory nature, have been made. The *Cena's* absence for a large part of the history of the text dictates this. Unity of authorship is the likeliest prospect.

O MS (e.g. the *Bituricus*), so it has become very difficult to recover the pure form of the L MSS of such interest to the present. Authority when quoted is suspect; terminology like 'vetus' is valueless. And even Tornaesius' enthusiastic description of the *Cuiacianus* as "exemplar vetustissimum in membranis descriptum" must be taken with a grain of salt. We recall Scaliger's remark that the MSS of Cujas were not usually old.

Militating further against the great age of the L MSS is the similarity of their readings wherever unambiguously established to readings of the O-class in a stage of differentiation from B and bearing resemblance to the surviving and datable representatives R, and particularly P. Müller¹ XVI attributes these resemblances to contamination, usually from the *editio Sambuci*.²¹ While this might be true in some cases L readings agree on seventy-five occasions with readings of the well-developed O MSS, diverging from B and R. Fifty of these Müller² rejected as agreeing in error—too high a number for van Thiel to see them as contamination of readings. Contamination of sources, the adoption of portions of O by the compiler of L, was nearer the truth.²² That is to say, the genuine twelfth- and thirteenth-century affiliations in L date the lost MSS to that period and no earlier.

The age of L* is not affected, since L is only the archetype of the sixteenth-century editions. What became of L* after it was created and twice excerpted is not very clear. There is however some evidence for its activity, apart from appearance in L: possible influence on John of Salisbury, and on the Petronian *florilegia*. John, an Englishman with French connections, in the twelfth century demonstrated an acquaintance with Petronius

²¹ Little evidence exists that medieval MSS of the O-class were known in the sixteenth century. The *codex Sambuci* was Renaissance. Only the *codex Bituricus* (*deperditus*) is certain. B, which could be *Alt. Pithoei*, is remarkably free from correcting hands. It is ironical that the survival of the O MSS is perhaps due to their being unknown in sixteenth-century France.

²² Van Thiel 4. It is again noteworthy how well the independent work of Sage and van Thiel agrees. Cf. Sage MSS 250: "The Family I MSS known in the sixteenth century were no earlier than the thirteenth century, and these restorations [of the apothegms and *Sat.* 55] had taken place by that time." Widu-Wolfgang Ehlers, "Zu den Petronexzerpten des Florilegium Gallicum," *Philologus* 118 (1974) 109-12, objects to the concept of "Kontamination von Texten."

covering all the present text but no more. The sources he used were active parts of the Carolingian archetype; the number of intermediaries cannot be known. He quotes exactly from Petronius nineteen times. The archetype of the O MSS was active throughout the Middle Ages as witnessed by BRP. It is thus not surprising that there is a resemblance of readings between John's MS and B, as may be tested in the story of the Widow of Ephesus. Of greater textual significance is his knowledge of the *Cena*, for it gives the only indication we have of its existence at that time, and of the areas in L not covered by the O-class. Apart from quotes John demonstrates familiarity by making allusions and paraphrases. Three of these refer to situations exclusive to L. On four other occasions he refers to a context occurring only in the *Cena*.²³ A remark of John himself might help to determine his sources: In *Polycraticus* 8.7 he says: "Coenam Trimalchionis apud Petronium, si potes, ingredere . . ." He then refers to the scene in chapter 49. The words have very reasonably been taken to mean that John knew that the *Cena* MS was rare in his time. The contemporary compiler of the first *florilegium* certainly knew the *Cena* though probably as part of L*; and while different passages were selected by him and John, where the texts overlap, notably in the *Matrona* chapters, the readings are so alike as to suggest to Sage (MSS 256) that they came from the same source. Sage inclined to believing that John had consulted a single MS, used also by the *florilegium* compiler, wherein the full *Cena* resided together with the surviving L*, to then having suffered little damage but which "as a result of persistent copying and constant alteration kept pace with the evolution of Family II [O]" (Sage MSS 264). Yet when John implies that the *Cena* is rare it is quite apparent that he is referring to a MS containing it alone. He could have seen a copy when in France and begrudged not being able to possess it. His other sources, perhaps an L or an O text or both or excerpts therefrom, he might have owned. It would be reasonable to have expected him if he had the *Cena* to have used it more often, perhaps with verbatim quotes: it contains much material for making points. The likeliest solution is that John

²³ L: *Sat.* 2.1 in *Polycrat.* 3.10, *Sat.* 83.9 in *Polycrat.* 7.15, *Sat.* 137.9 in *Polycrat.* 7.16; *Cena*: *Sat.* 37.7 in *Polycrat.* 3.13, *Sat.* 40, 49 in *Polycrat.* 8.7, *Sat.* 51.6 in *Polycrat.* 4.5.

used his own excerpt of a MS similar to L*. He is thus a witness to the L-tradition before L's creation.

The archetype of the Petronius portion of the medieval *florilegia* goes back to the twelfth century, the time of John. Its remarkable similarity to L in their mutual passages is explainable in one of two ways: either L and φ were using a common archetype (so, Müller² 413) or L obtained its readings from φ (Sage, van Thiel). If the latter were true the value of φ , usually disparaged owing to its shortness and arbitrary alterations, would be enhanced. If the two possibilities are presented within the context of the earlier evidence, including suspicion over the date of L, the following depiction of their relationship is allowed: L recovered from φ the seven detached *Cena* passages. These its forerunner (L*) lost since the time of John, together with the major portion of the *Cena*. The recovery date we might assign to the thirteenth century from L's MS affiliations. L as we know it is thus a repaired edition.²⁴ The restorer worked with φ and a mutilated MS of the L* type, which he corrected on a MS from the O-tradition. Chapter 55, an isolated passage appearing in the *Cena* narrative, was of course obtained from O.²⁵

The activities of the O-class in the Middle Ages are more demonstrable and thus less controversial. The *codex Bituricus Pitthoei* shows in its readings a similarity with P. E, the mythical *codex Messaniensis*, destroyed by fire after it was hastily collated by Jahn (the collation does not even survive), was pretty certainly Renaissance and not medieval.

* * *

We may now summarize the circumstances that have led in this critical period to the establishment of the present text. In

²⁴ Van Thiel posits an additional source, a grammatical-lexical treatise. He devotes the latter part of his work to showing how unskilled use of these disparate sources has resulted in dislocation. He cannot establish the date of L (7 note 2), though connecting it with the flowering of studies in twelfth-century France from which Petronius benefited.

²⁵ In O there are a number of passages that do not now occur in (or were not restored to) L. Müller took them as evidence that O was not derived from L but reverted independently to the same source. According to him, then, omissions in L were due simply to oversight. If this were true it would make the task of telling when the correction was made more difficult. The alternative, corroboration

the very early ninth century there emerged an archetype that may or may not have reflected in content Books 14-16 of the original *Satyricon*. This archetype was not an excerpt or epitome but the result of copying a damaged and consecutive remnant of the original. Of that remnant altogether three editions were made, not necessarily at the same time or place but within a few years of each other; the first, containing a better and fuller version of what is now exclusively in L plus the complete *Cena*, was in intent complete. John of Salisbury may have possessed excerpts from it when it had lost already some of the *Cena*. Of it there is no MS tradition. There was one abbreviated edition, and one whole extract. A severely damaged copy of the complete edition was the L-compiler's exemplar, although not long before it had been seen by the maker of φ in better shape. Of the *Cena* John of Salisbury saw a copy, perhaps the only one extant. The abridgement possesses a very close witness in B.

Throughout this time the O-archetype was productive. R came not from B but from one intermediary or more. It is likely that other MSS surrounded B, one being the *Alt. Pithoei*. B itself lay untouched for centuries. After R came P, a MS squarely thirteenth century by hand and readings. Its readings show affinities with L, as far as L can be vouched for through its sources. This agreement could be due solely to reading contamination, but more likely came through L being corrected on an O MS similar to P. L therefore also dates from the thirteenth century and is an attempted restoration of the full text of Petronius by an individual who had access to an L* text, damaged and entirely without *Cena* after chapter 37. Although some of chapter 55 was in the *florilegia*, to which the restorer also had access, here he used his O source. The full *Cena* was unavailable. From such origins do we see a text exactly reflected in L. L generated two descendants of the same age, the *Cuiacianus* and the *Benedictinus*. A short while later the latter produced two more, the *Dalecampianus* and the *Memmianus*. All these are now lost and their readings must be recovered from the

rated by the other material, is to posit that the restorer of L corrected on an O MS that was missing the passages too. See e.g. at *Sat.* 133.3 verse 24, a line occurring only in B.

sixteenth century. This ends L-class activity in the medieval period.

We are more fortunate with the O-class. BRP. and the *Bituricus* were all made in France in their respective eras, δ , a MS close to P, was discovered in France by Poggio and was sent by him from Britain to Italy. The survival of the *Cena* hangs from slender limbs. Since detachment it stayed in France until seen by John of Salisbury. Then, if it has a connection with Poggio's Cologne discovery, it made its way there. In the fifteenth century a *Cena* was copied in Italy together with a text of the O-class—both separately—into a single MS. It then disappeared almost immediately and was discovered two hundred years later having crossed the Adriatic. It perhaps typifies the troubled history of the text.

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REVIEWS

WILLIAM C. SCOTT. *The Oral Nature of the Homeric Simile*. Leiden, Brill, 1974. Pp. ix + 212. Fl. 56.00 (*Mnemosyne. Bibliotheca classica Batava. Supplementum* 28)

Scott analyzes the formal qualities of Homeric similes, applying as far as possible the approach with which M. Parry demonstrated the traditional nature of Homeric epithets. Such a systematic study is welcome, for the similes, while peculiarly characteristic of Homeric art, have often been considered anomalies of a sort, somehow extraneous or "spontaneous" additions to the traditional genre. This opinion has been reinforced recently by G. Shipp's studies of the late linguistic forms attested in many Homeric similes. Other Homerists however, especially J. Notopoulos, have suggested that the similes may be just as "oral" and traditional as the narrative passages of epic. While not denying the poet's freedom to use similes for aesthetic purposes, Scott concludes that they constitute a thoroughly traditional feature of oral epic.

The author's premise, like his method, derives from Parry: if the poet's use of similes is highly standardized, the similes are likely to be inherited elements in his formulaic repertoire. First Scott examines the relationship between simile and surrounding narrative. He lists fourteen narrative contexts in which are found almost all the similes of both *Iliad* (95 percent) and *Odyssey* (94 percent). These contexts include both narrative themes, such as "the journey of a god," and compositional techniques, e.g. "the joining of two scenes." Next the similes are classified according to their subject matter; Scott finds some sixteen subjects (fire, river, etc.) which again account for a large percentage of the similes in both epics. (It should be noted that although the correlations between simile and narrative are described quantitatively, they are not statistically analyzed. One might ask, for example, how many narrative themes are *not* associated with similes, or what percentage of the epics are included in Scott's fourteen narrative contexts.) Finally the simile subjects are correlated with the contexts in which they appear. Deer similes, for example, are always found in contexts of fear or cowardice; fish similes are used only in contexts of killing or death. Such apparent restriction of simile subjects to particular narrative junctures suggests that the choice and position of similes have been standardized. Scott argues that this standardization has resulted from the continual refinement of epic diction by generations of singers.

Being inherited elements of the epic tradition, the author argues, similes like epithets need not always be organically and inseparably connected with the narrative, as long as they are minimally appropriate in terms of the traditional simile-narrative configurations. Poetic

niceties such as the *Stimmungsgleichnis* admired by Wilamowitz and H. Fraenkel may enliven some contexts, but they are not an integral part of Homeric compositional technique. Thus according to Scott, the famous stallion simile attested in *Iliad* 6 for Paris' return to battle, and repeated in *Iliad* 15 for Hector's return is equally appropriate to both contexts on the compositional level, despite its closer emotional parallels to the Paris scene.

Next Scott examines the linguistic and metrical characteristics of similes. Some short similes are surely traditional, for they exhibit the same qualities of metrical versatility as do Parry's epithets. For the longer similes, Scott minimizes his differences with Shipp, who has emphasized the disproportionate number of late linguistic forms in the extended similes, even suggesting that they are later additions to already existing narratives. Scott finds however that the long similes appear to be as "oral" in their composition (e.g. in their normal metrical placement of word-types) as are the narrative portions of the epics. Moreover, since recent studies suggest that the epic language was changing considerably when the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were composed, Scott can explain the linguistic lateness of similes as the result of changes operating on epic diction as a whole.

The author finds further indications of the traditional nature of epic similes in the rapport which they seem to demand between singer and audience. Their extremely paratactic style, in which many elements are grammatically unrelated, could make the extended similes unintelligible without the audience's imaginative participation in the scene being described. This active relationship between singer and audience has been described as a characteristic of oral poetry.

In his final chapter Scott draws parallels between Homeric structural techniques and similar compositions in the visual arts, following the method developed by C. Whitman. He finds particularly interesting examples of possible "visual similes" in a group of sixth-century sarcophagus lids from Clazomenae. A number of these covers have one picture panel at the top showing warriors engaged in battle, while a corresponding panel at the bottom features a lion pursuing other animals. The pictures strangely recall the common Homeric comparison of warriors to lions.

Despite the shortcomings of his quantitative analysis, Scott has made a strong case for the traditional role of similes in oral epic. Some readers will find his approach too mechanistic, but the book should be useful to Homerists (not least for its appendix, in which all the similes of *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are classified). Once the traditional nature of a simile is understood, its aesthetic use and even its mythical significance may be more confidently explored. This should be a productive area for research. Scott himself, for example, admits to some difficulty in explaining how certain vegetal similes relate to their context. (It is perplexing in this respect that he does not include in his list of similes either Glaukos' famous analogy of men to leaves in *Iliad* 6 or Odysseus' comparison of Nausikaa to a date palm in *Odyssey* 6.) Considerations

of deeper traditional meaning, however, are outside the province of this book. Scott's well-organized study adds to our understanding of the formal nature of Homeric composition, while raising perhaps as many questions as it resolves.

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R. G. USSHER. *Aristophanes, Ecclesiazusae*. Edited with Introduction and Commentary. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973. Pp. xlviii + 259. £4.00. \$13.00.

The *Ecclesiazusae* is generally dismissed (with the *Plutus*) as an exponent of that most nebulous form, Middle Comedy. With the exception of the *Lysistrata* it is the Aristophanic play of which there have been the fewest separate annotated editions. The last English commentary (which, incidentally, was also the first) was that of Rogers, in 1902. No one, therefore, will greet this new edition with a cry of *γλαῦκ' Ἀθήναζε*.

Although Ussher's is not quite "the first full edition with an English commentary" (as proclaimed by the dust jacket blurb), it can justifiably boast of being the most useful edition of this play ever published. This is due mainly to its informative and up-to-date commentary, which elucidates linguistic and textual, as well as archaeological, historical, social, and theatrical questions. Ussher has been signally diligent on this last category, as evidenced by his extensive editorial work on the identification of speakers: see, e.g. his handling of lines 43, 54, 261, 279, 382, 608, 934.

From its very first words the Introduction may create, in some readers, a sensation of *déjà lu*: a large part of it is merely a réchauffé of the editor's article on "The Staging of the *Ecclesiazusae*," *Hermes* 97 (1969) 22-37, which, oddly enough, he does not cite anywhere. While we can only speculate on Ussher's motives for this strange omission, it is comforting to read his tolerant estimate of this neglected comedy: "impartial reading," he states, "shows that in spirit and in content the play stands well within Old Comedy's traditions, and that Aristophanes, while indubitably older, does not suffer from concomitant exhaustion" (p. xiii). On the problem of the relationship between Praxagora's communist manifesto and Plato's Book 5 of the *Republic* Ussher rejects the view that Aristophanes ridicules Platonic theories (Rogers, Murray, Norwood), or that Plato built, with serious intent, on the proposals put forward by Aristophanes (Adam); he cautiously concludes: "that Aristophanes parodies Plato is (if not quite impossible) unlikely; that Plato copies Aristophanes (or even refers to him) much more so. That both rely on an earlier philosopher is not only likely, but attractive" (p. xx). On the dating of the play

Ussher breaks no new ground but he provides an excellent up-to-date discussion, and re-examines each relevant statement in Praxagora's address at 192-203. He concludes by rejecting the commonly accepted date of 392, which, he contends (following Rogers), rests on a misinterpretation of τὸ συμμαχικόν (line 193): this does not refer to the post-Haliartus League, he argues, but to the original, earlier anti-Spartan League between Thebes and Athens (p. xxv): the date of the play, therefore, should be pushed back to the spring of 393.

In establishing the text Ussher has examined anew the seven MSS which preserve this comedy, including A (Perusinus H 56) and Vb1 (Barberinianus I 45), which have never before been collated for the *Ecclesiazusae*. Since these add nothing significant to our knowledge, Ussher's text is not drastically different from that of Coulon; at 9, however, he accepts the evidence of A as the only true reading. Most of the textual innovations are introduced through emendations, of which these few may be singled out: Dover's transposition of lines 22-23, Denniston's ἐπαναβάλησθε (276), and von Blumenthal's brilliant ἡμέρας (495), exhumed from the pages of *Hermes*. The editor's own abundant conjectural activity is evidenced by the 39 occurrences of his name in the apparatus; the bulk of these concern assignment of speakers (see above), although in about a dozen places Ussher's conjectures affect the text directly: in two of these (1098 and 1112) he was anticipated by Cantarella, whose edition of the play (1964) he appears not to have used. Among Ussher's more convincing emendations may be noted ἐκείνου τὸ σκόταλον δς, at 78 (cf. *Hermes* 94 [1966] 376-77). On at least one occasion Ussher reports the testimony of the manuscripts faultily: at 351 he prints ἐμοὶ {δ'}: the use of angle brackets as well as the note in the apparatus lead us to believe that δ' is a later editorial addition, while in fact it is the reading of the manuscripts.

Ussher's apparatus is a model of accuracy; he often corrects Coulon in assigning conjectures to their rightful authors (see at 64, 150, 226); nor is Ussher himself ever rash in such matters: see his comments at 220, 517, 710.

Let us hope that the remaining eight comedies (I include the *Peace* which should be revised) also find such competent editors as Dover, MacDowell, and Ussher.

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J. A. de FOUCAULT. *Recherches sur la langue et le style de Polybe*. Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1972. Pp. x + 396. 85.00F. (*Collection d'études anciennes*)

Polybius' most recent revival began in the late fifties with the appearance of the first volumes of Walbank's *Historical Commentary* and of

Mauersberger's *Polybius-Lexikon*. Since then no appearances have been more welcome than the Budé text of Pédech and de Foucault. The present volume is at bottom a copious and systematic résumé of the 56 *Etudes générales ou particulières* listed in its *Bibliographie* pp. viii–x. Plainly a work of greater utility than originality, it will no doubt serve the French seminars and students everywhere. The 56 source-monographs allow a treatment covering the author from every aspect of linguistic-philological analysis. The general headings are: Vocabulary, Morphology, Syntax, Style. Under the first heading, for instance, are found word derivation and composition, and influences of poetry, of sources, of dialects and of Latin on the vocabulary. Under the last are included particles, comparisons and metaphors, word order, hiatus, the period, composition, and genres of literary developments. The lexicological appendix, got up by comparison of the Index Verborum in Schweighäuser's edition with the appropriate articles in *LSJ*, covers pp. 325–89. All of this is carried off in a consistently enlightened fashion. De Foucault resists Büttner-Wobst's avoidance of hiatus without underestimating the importance of the phenomenon for a just estimate of Polybius' language. He properly insists that the differences between Polybius' language and that of classical Attic authors has commonly been exaggerated. He covertly delights in exposing Meillet's sketchy notions about the Hellenistic optative. He well surmises (p. 69) with Cuny that the superior survival in Attic of the dual forms in *-αιν* as opposed to those in *-α* is due to the unambiguity of the former vis-à-vis the neuter plurals. (For details see note 17 of my article in the forthcoming *TAPA* "In Defense of the Special Dual Feminine Forms of the Article and Pronouns *τά, ταῖν, ταῦτα, ταῦταιν, κτλ.* in Attic Greek." Neither de Foucault nor Cuny show appreciation of the hyper-feminine expressiveness of these forms.) In fact de Foucault in his treatment of syntax goes even further and ventures into the gray area between wonted theory and the customary editorial practice. His critical remarks on the text are most welcome, allowing one as it does to get down to cases. P. 147: de Foucault is right to defend against Pédech and others the pure optative *ἔχοι* at 2.37.6 on the ground that *ἄν* may be understood from the preceding paragraphs. But he is wrong to reject the pure optative in a potential sense at 10.40.9 *εὔξασθαί τις τοῖς θεοῖς τολμήσειε*. The pure optative in a potential sense is commonly used in all periods with forms of the indefinite or interrogative pronouns—the distinction between the two is often arbitrary. The first examples in Polybius which come to hand are 1.65.6 *τις . . . ἐπιγνοίη* 2.61.11 *Οὐ τί κάλλιον ἔργον . . . γένοιτο*; 12.20.3 *ἄ τις οὐδ' ἐξαριθμήσαιο ῥαδίως*—all of these needlessly emended by editors. P. 151: it is certainly right to accentuate with the Mss. as infinitives, not optatives, *κατασπεῖσαι* and *ποιῆσαι* in a causal subordinate initiated by *ἐπεὶ* in 0.0. at 3.11.6. De Foucault does not mention that these forms show Polybius' reserves about the historical significance of the anecdote which Hannibal tells to Antiochus. Any doubt is removed by the prefacing statement in 3.11.4. The plausible element of

the tale is explained in 3.12.1. (For a fuller treatment of this intrusion of the 0.0. infinitive into subordinates in 0.0. in Attic texts see Guy Cooper, *Zur syntaktischen Theorie und Textkritik der attischen Autoren* [Zürich, 1971] 65ff. abridged *STT*). P. 158: the correction of the aorist infinitive used where a future would be logically expected is very properly opposed by de Foucault, for this construction is indubitably classical and has been well explained (*STT* 123-44). P. 159: it is also right to resist the correction of the future infinitive used in a modal sense where an aorist would be expected. But it is mistaken to explain this with the contention that Polybius' use of the future infinitive is incorrect by classical standards. The examples de Foucault gives from Polybius are all perfectly consonant with classical usage as that is outlined *STT* 112-22. P. 164: de Foucault is inaccurate in asserting that Hewlett in *AJP* 11, (1891) 286 & 289 rejects the positive use of the genitive articular infinitive in a final sense at 12.28a.3. De Foucault seems, moreover, too eager to introduce the genitive article in other passages where the infinitive of the tradition gives a good sense as an accusative. The modern reader tends to miss the protean meanings—often causal or even final—of the accusative of the infinitive as of other nouns. Hewlett op.cit. p. 278 has convincingly shown that at 5.31.3 the reading τό. . . γίνεσθαι should *not* be changed. P. 180: de Foucault interprets ὄτι at 31.12.4 as equivalent to quotation marks. There is such a thing (*STT* 204ff.), but this is not it; it is the regular ὄτι introducing 0.0. The intrusion of an oblique infinitive after such a ὄτι is a licit but expressive construction (*STT* 65-74). Polybius felt that the whole business of Demetrius I. Soter's escape from Rome was almost too good to be true, a myth as it were in its own time. But of this de Foucault betrays no inkling. P. 180: the gloss δεῖ on the imperatival infinitive ἀγαγεῖν at 1.4.1 is rightly rejected. This is a common corruption (*STT* 59-60). The imperatival infinitive is used because Polybius wishes to put his own historical method in the light of moral imperative (*STT* 61-62). P. 192: de Foucault proves here that he knows all about the omission of ἄν in the apodosis. It is essentially the same in later as in classical authors (*STT* 196-201). Doctrinal misconceptions on this point still occasion the retention of conjectures and less worthily attested readings, even in otherwise exemplary editions, e.g. in the Einarsen-de Lacy volumes of the Loeb Plutarch's *Moralia* 542A 552EF(?) 596 B, 1087C, 1089EF. P. 313: the more important reason for rejecting the conjecture νῆ Δία at 6.13.5 is that it cannot in this place be interpreted as introducing hypophora or suggested hypophora. This is its common use in the classical period (*STT* 14) as well as in Polybius. Οὐ μὰ Δία does not introduce hypophora and it is therefore not, as de Foucault would have it be, simply the negative form of νῆ Δία.

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KENNETH QUINN. *Catullus: The Poems*. Edited with Introduction, Revised Text and Commentary. London, Macmillan; New York, St. Martin's Press, 1970. Pp. 456.

The many virtues of Quinn's commentary do not require substantial illustration or defense, for they are immediately apparent. Much useful information on syntax, metrics, history, mythology and style has been succinctly compressed into less than 400 pages (at the cost, however, of a page layout that is unattractive and difficult to read). Quinn is adept at reducing complicated matters of fact to a handy format. His explanations of nuances of style are especially sensitive, particularly when he is demonstrating the elusive poetry of deceptively plain and direct statement and the wit in poems too often dismissed as mere abuse.

For most poems the format followed in the commentary is: 1) introduction, 2) individual notes, 3) selected bibliography, where, inevitably, each reader will have his own quarrel with the selection. Every reader will miss an index, especially for guidance to the short and useful essays scattered through the notes on the range of meanings of some of Catullus' favorite words. Nor is there an apparatus criticus, although Quinn does include a list of differences between his text and Mynors' 1967 O.C.T. and adds many textual notes.

The critical method is roughly speaking a mixture of traditional philology, with its careful attention to linguistic precision and historical fact, and New Criticism, two approaches which share their concern with the close examination of the text itself, although the New Critics are less likely to forget that the object of examination is a work of art. Some readers who feel that certain troubling psychological issues in Catullus' poetry cannot be ignored today, even in a commentary on a Latin text, will regret the method's avoidance of such matters.

Quinn describes his procedure in the preface: "to reconstruct, by piecing together the data provided by the text or deducible from the text as plausible, necessary deduction, the hypothesis upon which each poem rests." (p.x). Terms like "hypothesis" and "data" may have for some an unhappy ring of scientism and they tend to get in the way of seeing the poem itself. Furthermore, "hypothesis," in practice, turns out to mean variously a poem's occasion, its "intention," its "meaning," or even a prose paraphrase of its "content." Quinn himself may have had increasing doubts about the validity of the method, since he appears to use it less frequently as the book progresses, less in the elegiacs than in the polymetrics.

Those who have little taste for hypothesis-hunting would welcome Quinn's alertness to Catullan irony, were the notion not overused and loosely used and were not other words more appropriate in many places. One of the worst examples of its misuse is in poem 64. On the difficult problem of Catullus' attitude to the Age of Heroes, Quinn believes that the passages at the beginning and end (22-30 and

384-408) prove Catullus' seriousness in his admiration for the past and in his disgust with the present and invokes irony to dismiss details embarrassing to this thesis as they occur in the body of the poem. He fails to reconcile what he regards as Catullus' basic position with these bits of counter-evidence by blandly labeling the latter irony; (for an attempt to solve the question, see YCS 21 [1969] 171-92).

Irony is a "tool fairly freely [used] in my commentary," Quinn writes elsewhere (*Arion* 9 [1970] 273). Apart from a light urbanity of style, which too often degenerates into coyness and an affectation of French phrases, and a slanginess that will frequently puzzle American students, I fear that the chief result of Quinn's irony, in a disastrous union with his zeal for uncovering irony in Catullus, is the evasion of direct confrontation with the sexual in Catullus, which brings us to the gravest flaw in this book.

After Fordyce's crude emasculation of the Catullan corpus rendered it useless for teaching, one hoped that the next English commentary would undertake the task with greater candor. Sadly, Quinn saves Catullus from Fordyce's gelding for indecent exposure only by dressing him up all too often in emperor's clothes of irony. When he can bring himself to face sexual matters squarely, he manifests his usual sensitivity and thoroughness, but this is not always the case. More often there is squeamishness and prissiness, which sometimes masquerades as a sophisticated refusal to be shocked by what, Quinn constantly assures us, can be explained away as irony. Sexual innuendo and even blunt statement are often simply ignored, coyly dismissed, translated as innocuously as possible, denied literal meaning, or clothed in Latin paraphrase. Throughout one has the feeling that sex and what can be called the poetry of obscenity are simply not regarded as important enough to deserve the same degree and detail of analysis lavished on other human concerns, such as the technicalities of spinning and weaving.

Quinn's practical criticism of obscene and otherwise sexual passages rests upon two faulty assumptions. (1) If a poet is not speaking *seriously* or does not *mean* what he says (and this involves more profound critical problems than Quinn seems to realize), then it is less important to explain exactly *what* he is saying if it has anything to do with sex. Quinn does not state this assumption in so many words, but he constantly acts in accordance with it. (2) If a poet is not speaking *seriously* or does not *mean* what he says, then a piece of obvious obscenity can somehow be cleansed. When, for example, Catullus threatens or describes an obscene act, if we can prove that there was no intention to perform that act literally, then it ceases to be an obscene act and can be translated by a euphemism. Whether the act was actually performed or intended to be performed is almost always a critical red herring; who cares? What we want is the accurate and honest statement of what the act is and the accurate and honest explanation of the wit, the poetry, and—why not?—the obscenity of the description of the act. Quinn's confusion in this regard is best

documented in this treatment of poems 15 and 16, where a transposition from obscenity of language to obscenity of gesture will make clear what Quinn is up to: imagine 1) equating the gesture of turning up one's nose with the gesture of thumbing one's nose, on the grounds that the obscene act signified by the latter is not literally intended, and 2) using only Latin to explain what thumbing one's nose means.

Quinn's diffidence about the sexual and the obscene may be reverence for the innocence of the young students into whose hands this book might fall. But Catullus has nothing to say about the mechanics and varieties of sex that would be news to today's average fifteen-year-olds; what would be news is a precise and informed understanding of the wit and poetic craft of Catullus on the subject of sex.

Such teaching raises serious questions of moral and intellectual honesty. When classicists do not take sex seriously it is difficult for students of intelligence and decency to take classics seriously. The present book plays into the hands of teachers who would corrupt Catullus by purifying him because Quinn's frankness in some notes may lead the unwary student to drop his guard in others where Quinn finds it necessary to palliate Catullus' sexual openness. These Latin poems are easily accessible to the modern reader and their immediate appeal is strong. The health of classics depends on a fully candid approach to such an author.

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MICHAEL WIGODSKY. *Vergil and Early Latin Poetry*. Wiesbaden, F. Steiner, 1972. Pp. x + 168. DM 30.00 (*Hermes, Zeitschrift für Klassische Philologie, Einzelschriften, Heft 24*)

This is an eminently learned philological monograph of the kind one sees rarely published by a young American scholar. The material is, exclusively, pre-Vergilian Latin works that are no longer extant in their entirety. W. admits that Vergil's imitations of early Latin poetry are a minor aspect of his art (139), but scholars of Latin literature can be grateful to him for presenting a comprehensive, if not complete, overview of the subject and for being sensible and judicious in the process.

W.'s good sense is evident from the start. He devotes a long, useful introduction to ancient and modern views of imitation and differentiates between allusive and structural imitation.¹ The distinction is vital for Vergil's use of Latin writers as well as Homer, and W.

¹ It may be noted that S. Strabyla, whose monograph *Latin Tragedy in Vergil's Poetry* (Polish Academy 1970) is somewhat cold-shouldered by W., allows for additional differentiation. His typology of Vergilian *imitatio* is threefold: verbal, verbal and material, and verbal and structural. According to him, the middle type is most frequent in Vergil's use of the Roman tragedians.

convincingly rejects Knauer's schematic overemphasis on the structural type of imitation. Another difficulty is, of course, the fragmentary nature of the comparative material. Thus the danger is ever-present that unwarranted meaning may be imputed to "parallels" that are parallels only because so much of the literature has been lost and our knowledge of the currency of certain phrases in spoken Latin is completely inadequate. The term "borrowing," therefore, is often misapplied. W. should have taken this somewhat more into account when, somewhat *en passant*, he hypothesizes the ultimate reason for the extent of Vergil's *imitatio*: "Vergil's borrowings, which after all include things so ordinary that the merest poetaster would not have been forced to borrow them for lack of invention, can be explained thus as acts of piety, the same piety that, outside the sphere of literature, led him to show the Trojans' search for a new home as a return to the home of their ancestors, and Augustus' new Golden Age as the restoration of a primeval state." (p. 5). It is a beautiful analogy, but on close scrutiny quite indemonstrable.

W. then proceeds to discuss, author by author, putative and real Vergilian borrowings from Livius Andronicus to Cicero (with a useful epilogue on Catullus and Lucretius). He has to go over much trodden ground and could easily be blamed often for merely weighing the evidence and coming to no clear conclusions. But the point is precisely that the evidence often is inconclusive and that W. rejects the overzealous and simplistic approaches of many of his predecessors, including E. Norden. Examples of *causes célèbres* treated by Wigodsky in this fashion include Naevius' *Atlantes* fragment, the question of Dido's role in the *Bellum Punicum*,² the function of *Discordia* in Ennius' *Annales*, and Vergil's debt to Pacuvius and Accius.

One of the strongest points of this book is that W. demolishes the unchecked growth of conjectural Ennianisms that owe their existence to circular method and to the fixation of Norden and, alas, his imitators on deriving coincidences between Livy and Vergil from Ennius (chapter 9). This is not to detract from the achievement of a great classicist, but as in the case of Richard Heinze's misdirected monograph on the presumed epic style of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, the cause of Latin scholarship is not well served by the worshipful perpetuation of superficial assumptions.

710 footnotes on 139 text pages give some idea of the format of this book. The ten pages of additional notes are not easily digested. Nor is the author's prose style in general. It is understandable that *disiecta fragmenta* are not easily brought together, but the predominantly additive and enumerative mode of presentation, punctuated by an

² To Wigodsky's refutation of Buchheit's reconstruction I would add the argument that, considering Anchises' own dalliance with Venus (and he was punished not for the affair itself, but for bragging about it), it is unreasonable to suppose that he would have objected to a love affair of his much-travelled son.

unforgivable plethora of semicola, could have been improved with some care even if this book emphatically is not meant for the coffee table. But it would be ungrateful to end on a carping note because this is a valuable contribution to Vergilian scholarship.

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STEELE COMMAGER. *A Prolegomenon to Propertius*. Norman, Oklahoma, University of Oklahoma Press, 1974. Pp. 77. (*University of Cincinnati Lectures in Memory of Louise Taft Semple, Third Series, 1971*)

This is an effective, if brief, introduction to Propertius which will be useful for the newcomer to this poet as well as stimulating, on a number of matters, for the specialist. Unfortunately, the long period of time which has elapsed between the delivery of these papers and their appearance in print has allowed several of the good observations to lose the impact they would have had earlier.

C. paints an arresting picture of the complications Propertius' translator must face. He has a good section on how intimately the poet fuses the roles of lover and poet: if Propertius makes love in a "narrow" bed (2.1.45), it is because he favors a poetic tradition of restraint and careful craftsmanship (2.1.40); when Cynthia leaves him, her absence from his bed is absence from his poetry (*e nostris carminibus*, 1.11.8). C. does not go on from here to caution his audience against taking everything Propertius says too literally, which he might have done, having made the demonstration that love is poetry and the manipulation of the reader's mood; perhaps this reminder has been sufficiently stated during the last decade.

The first paper makes a real contribution with its analysis of 1.13, which is surrounded by sinister associations: *Taenarius* (1.13.22) recalls for the learned reader Neptune's sanctuary which concealed an entrance into the underworld (Thucydides 1.128 tells how suppliants were enticed out of it and killed). Hercules is evoked in Hebe's arms at the moment of his fiery consummation in (not *ab*) *Oetaeis iugis*. *Una dies* (1.13.25) is from Lucretius 3.898-99 (One can also compare *Carm. Epigraph.* 405.1, 1159.2, 2079.2, 2081.1, and 2106.2). *Una* structures the elegy and leads from *una vices* in 1.13.10, to *una dies*, with which it rhymes, to *una sit ista tibi* in 36: Gallus' flame is to be his final, fateful destiny. C. also looks at 2.25.11-12 and the roasting of the lover in the Bull of Phalaris, and 3.13.15ff., where the pyre used for suttee is called a "bed," *lectus*. Elegy 1.1, too, receives a careful reading which will benefit students of Propertius by its elucidation of the highly specialized color displayed by virtually every word of the opening lines. *Velocem* (1.1.15) returns us from the less familiar account of

Milanion to the usual story about Hippomenes racing Atalanta. *Tardus amor* puns on this. *In me tardus amor* (1.1.17) is paralleled by *in me nostra Venus*, which Housman wanted to alter in 33. C. adds a tentative query on Cynthia as the Moon (cf. E. O'Neill, *CP* 53 [1958] 1-8).

In his second lecture, "An Anti-Political Legacy," C. provides a good, general account of Propertius' opposition to active participation in Roman political projects. He gives most time to 2.1, 2.7, and 2.10. His newest remarks are these: the epitaph which concludes 2.1 is intended humorously, yet pointedly, to allude to the *civilis busta* of 2.1.27; "virgin Arabia" (*intactae Arabiae*), trembling before Octavian—called "Augustus" for the first time in 2.10.15—is erotic and undercuts the apparently serious description of foreign campaigns in the elegy. In 2.7 the reference to the "horse of Castor" in verse 16 is drawn from the *transvectio equitum* when the Knights led their horses before the Princeps in honor of Castor (Suet. *Aug.* 38); the *equites*, Propertius' own class, were precisely those most opposed to the marriage laws (Suet. *Aug.* 34; Dio Cass. 56.1.2)! C. sees the purpose of the manuscripts' *patriis natos* in 2.7.13 (cf. W. R. Nethercut, *Mnemosyne* 24 [1971], 380-84), and offers a good argument for Postgate's *nomine* in verse 20: the *hapax legomenon*, *Borysthenidas*, in 18 is no casual elegance, but is chosen to stir the imagination to comprehend the farthest reaches of Rome's empire. So far, and beyond, will Propertius' fame travel, if not his sons.

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JOHN BRISCOE. *A Commentary on Livy, Books XXXI–XXXIII*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973. Pp. xviii + 370. \$25.75; £8.

Although John Briscoe does not give explicitly his reason for treating Books 31-33, rather than the Livian pentad, as the unit for his commentary, it can readily be inferred that the justification intended would be that these are the books covering the Second Macedonian War. But the commentary is not exclusively historical. It attends to matters of language and style, and textual problems are examined whether or not they have bearing on historical issues. Briscoe holds that "one of the purposes of a commentary is to serve as a repository of references to modern literature," and generally proceeds as if this were one of its principal purposes. Citations of the literature tend to crowd out the author's own exegesis, which is often overlaconic. The accumulation of references is perhaps carried to extremes on occasion. The limit seems to be reached in a note on 31.7.9, *morte Pyrrhi*: "Pyrrhus died in street fighting in Argos in 272," followed by a string of fourteen ancient references and three modern (Niese, Lévêque, and Kienast's

RE article; but not E. Will's *Histoire politique du monde hellénistique*). Briscoe is not always so exhaustive. For "full bibliography" on a more significant matter, the outbreak of the Second Punic War (72), he is content to refer to Cassola's work published in 1962, and nothing is added in the "Addenda" (342-48).

Some important matters are discussed by Briscoe in an extensive Introduction. Still baffling, in spite of a century of *Quellenforschung*, is the question broached first (1-12), Livy's sources and his methods of composition. Briscoe's theory, briefly, is that for events to do with the Greek world Livy followed Polybius closely, but sometimes combined with Polybius the contaminated accounts of "annalists" (thus 31.14-18 would be Livy's own reworking of two discordant accounts, Polybius' and an annalist's: p. 47); but for non-Hellenic material Livy followed no one closely and ("it may be") gave his own account based on "notes on what he had read," so that, except for specific citations, his narrative cannot be assigned to individual sources. This view differs rather markedly from recently expressed opinions of F. W. Walbank (in the volume of essays on Livy edited by T. A. Dorey, p. 49) and P. G. Walsh (most recently in his edition of Livy Book 21, p. 38), who are agreed that Livy tends to follow a single source, or at least, one source at a time. There seems to be an absence of proof for any of the theories. His view leads Briscoe to treat the non-Hellenic "annalistic" parts of Livy with more credulity than is sensible. He concedes in a general way that "a wholesale defence of almost everything in the annalists is absurd," but does not maintain in practice a high enough level of critical reserve and scepticism. It is true that much of the archival-seeming material in Livy (lists of magistrates, assignment of provinces, disposition of troops, reports on religious matters, and so on) really must trace back to original records of a documentary nature. But there are at least three hazards to which the transmission has been exposed: inaccurate reproduction of material by later sources; filling-up of gaps in the record by enterprising annalists of the type of Valerius Antias, aiming for a plausible effect and a smooth finish; and misinterpretation of the data by annalists or others. So, when an official's name was preserved as "Cn. Cornelius" according to the normal documentary style of contemporary records, it was natural to want to be able to say which of the many Cn. Corneli was meant. A plausible *cognomen* was easy to supply, and as a result a Spanish proconsul was misidentified (31.50.11, Lentulus instead of Blasio). The whole question of "archival" material in Livy is not one that can be decided in general terms; it can only be dealt with effectively by detailed analysis of particular passages. Briscoe's prepossession, unfortunately, is to assume the accuracy of the data rather than to probe it. Still, in a useful discussion (following Tränkle) of Livy's language and style (pp. 12-17; the speeches are treated separately, 17-22), he makes the necessary point that Livy's flat style for "archival" material is not to be taken as a sign that he is quoting archival sources more or less

verbatim: "Livy knew this was the kind of material found in the *annales*, and deliberately used the appropriate style."

Briscoe has two extended sections on the history covered by these books: one on "Flamininus and Roman politics" (22-35), the other on "Livy's account of the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War" (36-47). The idea is to avoid fragmentation of the overall view among a multitude of disjointed notes, but in the process the commentary is further denuded. Briscoe sees Flamininus' policy in Greece as aiming "to achieve a balance of power, to prevent any one state. . . . from becoming too powerful, and thus to make Roman military presence or intervention unnecessary" (28); no set argument is presented for this view, which seems to leave out the essential point—that the Romans always intended to be obeyed. Briscoe goes on to give what he calls a prosopographical analysis of the 190s, with regard to Flamininus' relationship to other leading politicians. The version according to Briscoe has an unhappy resemblance to the version according to Scullard (*Roman Politics 220-150 B.C.*), though it exhibits certain deviations. Briscoe believes in a group he calls "the Scipios" and another he names "the Fulvians," but he does not believe that the so-called Fabian group survived the death of Q. Fabius Maximus. Roman politics in the half decade under study seems to reduce to a two-party struggle, in which "the Scipios" are cast as a kind of peace party and "the Fulvians" as the party for war. To illustrate how this scenario is painted in,—P. Villius Tappulus, consul 199, is represented by Briscoe as "a supporter of the Fulvians:" for "nothing contradicts such a hypothesis," and his colleague L. Lentulus was brother to the man who as consul in 201 is alleged to have opposed Scipio (32).T. Flamininus was backed by "men from diverse groups," including Fulvians, but perhaps even by Scipio, the opponent of the Fulvians—though admittedly "Scipionic consuls of 197" did work against Flamininus (32f.). A less absolute faith might conclude that "groups" such as these are too frail or fluid to be regarded as the key to understanding contemporary politics. The basic fallacies in Briscoe's type of approach have been pointed out often enough, and notably well by F. Cassola at the beginning of his work *I gruppi politici romani nel terzo secolo a.C.* One must agree that politics can hardly be conducted without political groupings. But the mechanical methods adopted by Briscoe in order to populate his "groups" lead to schematic distortion of the political reality.

Many years of modern discussion of the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War have generated an impenetrable fog around the topic. Briscoe's contribution certainly does not dispel it; is in fact rather congested. His account of the course of events leading to the outbreak of war is based on the assumption that the Roman calendar in 201-200 was running three months in advance of the extrapolated Julian calendar. This common assumption derives from the state of the calendar in 190, when the consuls entering office on the Ides of March 190 actually

began on 18 November 191 (cf. P. S. Derow, *Phoenix* 1973, 346). It is probable that this situation had been reached through failure to intercalate in the years 200-191. Consequently, the consuls of 200 will not have entered office "some time in December" of 201 (42), but about the middle of February 200. This makes a considerable difference to Briscoe's calculations on the events of 201-200 (43f.). For example, it is not true that "an Athenian embassy before the consular elections is impossible on chronological grounds" (55).

Briscoe accepts the peculiar view that the Roman politicians who wanted war with Philip were "frightened of a possible invasion of Italy by Philip" (45). Their adversary, Scipio, "was opposed, initially at least, to the war proposal" (46). The reasons for thinking so are given in the commentary (70f.), and are characteristic: (1) on the one hand, the possible Scipionic connections of the opposing tribune, Q. Baebius. He was Scipionic because Q. Baebius Tamphilus in 218 was on an embassy to Carthage which "appears to have been heavily weighted with supporters of the Scipios" (it was, however, led by a Fabius! and its composition is less certain than is generally supposed—see *PACA* 1966, 24 n. 63); and because Q. Baebius Herennius, tr. pl. 216, was related to C. Terentius Varro; because Cn. Baebius Tamphilus was consul with L. Aemilius Paullus in 182; because L. Baebius was legate under Scipio in 203; because M. Baebius Tamphilus was consul with P. Cornelius Cethegus in 181; because a Cn. Baebius was one of the praetors in 168 when Aemilius Paullus was again consul. This farrago is called "a valid prosopographical argument." It is in reality a good example of the *nomen* fallacy. (2) Scipio's veterans may have been involved in the rejection of the war vote. If true, this would seem a more relevant argument. But it need do no more than explain why Scipio failed to take a conspicuous stand on the issue (for his silence is the starting point of modern speculation); it would not compel the conclusion that Scipio himself was opposed to the declaration of war.

There is of course a lot of prosopographical detail in the commentary since Livy provides much scope for it. Some specimens may usefully be put to scrutiny. Qñ p. 57, the story in Val. Max. 6.6.1 and Justin 30.3.4, that M. Aemilius Lepidus was sent to Egypt to be *tutor* of the young Ptolemy, is said to be "highly unlikely," in spite of the fact that it is authenticated by Aemilian coinage portraying Lepidus as *tutor regis*. What rather should seem unlikely is that Lepidus, a mere youth and a non-senator in 201, was a senatorial *legatus* then (as stated in Liv. 31.2.3; but Polybius 16.34 does not in fact call him *πρεσβευτής*). Briscoe sees that Livy lists the *legati* in improper order (Lepidus sandwiched between Claudius Nero and Sempronius Tuditanus, ex-consuls and ex-censors), but he does not draw what seems the appropriate conclusion, that the insertion of Lepidus' name is suspect. Lepidus must have accompanied the embassy, but perhaps was not strictly a member of it.

On p. 63f. Briscoe finds nothing to criticize in Livy's list of the decemvirs appointed in 201 to assign lands to Scipio's veterans

(31.4.3). Yet the first name, P. Servilius, is most suspicious: the man ought to be the highest-ranking consular member, but he is totally unknown; and consular Servilii figure in third and fourth places on the list, where they are in order.—Briscoe oversimplifies the problem of names 5 and 6, *L. et A. Hostilii Catones*, when he says flatly that *MRR* 1.322 errs in identifying L. Hostilius here as a praetor of 207. One has to go a bit deeper. The MSS of 27.35.1-2 offer *T. et A. Hostilii Catones* as praetors in 207, but *T.* has been emended to *C.* on the strength of 27.36.11, *C. Hostilio*; in 27.51.8 the MSS give *A.* or *Aulus Hostilius* (one has *Q.* in erasure), but editors emend this to *C. Hostilius* because the man is urban praetor, whereas *A. Hostilius* was assigned to Sardinia in 27.36.11 (the procedure of "emendation" in such cases seems distinctly questionable). It is surely likely that the two Hostilii Catones who keep turning up together are supposed to be the same persons throughout—praetors together in 207, decemvirs together in 201, and *legati* of L. Scipio together in 190 (38.55.5; *MRR* 1.359). The references to L./C. Hostilius Cato have to be combined into a single person, probably L. Hostilius Cato. (The *praenomen* Gaius may have arisen from confusion with the C. Hostilius recorded as urban praetor in 209: 27.6.12, 11.6: *MRR* 1.285).—Name 9 appears in Livy as *P. Aelius Paetus*. Briscoe identifies him as the consul of 201. This is surely unbelievable. Not merely is it unlikely that a consul in office would be put on such a commission, but Aelius' place in the list is that of a senator below praetorian rank (names 8 and 10 are likewise non-praetorian). Unless P. Aelius Paetus, the decemvir, is a younger man of the same name as the consul (not very likely), a common type of error will have occurred in the annalistic transmission. In short, there is a good chance that decemvir no. 9 was an Aelius, not so good a chance that he was a P. Aelius, and very little chance at all that he was a P. Aelius Paetus.

P. 64f. Briscoe offers two grounds for regarding Q. Minucius Rufus, praetor 200, as a supporter of Scipio. One is that Q. Minucius Thermus was a strong supporter of Scipio when tr. pl. in 201. No further explanation is given. We are apparently faced again with the crude assumption that persons having the same *nomen* can automatically be treated as political allies. (The filiation of Rufus and Thermus is C.f.C.n. and Q.f.L.n. respectively, so that they can only have been distantly related, if at all.) The other ground is that Q. Minucius Rufus has the same filiation as M. Minucius Rufus, consul 221, and "it is not impossible" they were brothers; and M. Rufus was, according to Briscoe, supported by "the Scipios" in the period 221-217. It is extremely improbable that the consul of 221 was brother of the praetor of 200 (consul 197). A more likely construction of their relationship would make them uncle and nephew. (M. Rufus, praetor 197, may also be noted,—presumably son of his namesake or brother of Quintus.) It is no doubt possible still to believe that Q. Minucius Rufus was a supporter of Scipio, but it is scarcely legitimate to pretend that there is any evidence for it.

P. 65f. (cf. 162, 180). It is to Briscoe's credit that he comments on a

point generally ignored, namely that the MSS are unanimous in identifying the curule aedile of 201 as Titus, not Lucius, Quinctius Flamininus. This type of notice (celebration of the *ludi Romani* by the curule aediles) is certainly documentary in origin, deriving perhaps from the pontifical records. But Briscoe follows the editors in rejecting the name Titus on account of the later passage, 32.7.9, which has T. Flamininus standing for the consulship *ex quaestura*. It is true, as Briscoe says, that "*praenomina* are regularly corrupted" in the manuscript tradition. But it is also true that *praenomina* and many other things are regularly muddled and confused in the annalistic tradition. The passage in 32.7 is a piece of annalistic composition after the manner of Valerius Antias (Plutarch *Titus* 2.1 has a garbled echo of it). The possible inconsistency between it and 31.4.5 is not sufficient ground for emending the latter and rejecting Titus' aedileship in 201. (Strictly, in the conditions of that period, it is not impossible for Titus to have been aedile 201, quaestor 200 or 199, and consul 198, though it does not seem probable.) Confusion is certainly present when Livy 31.49.6 makes Titus a triumvir for the colony of Venusia in 200, whereas Plutarch *Titus* 1.4 has him commissioner for Narnia and Cosa in 199. It is difficult to see how Plutarch came to connect Flamininus with the latter commission if, as Briscoe assumes, there was no connection at all. It looks as though there may have been some confusion between the offices of T. and L. Flamininus. At any rate, the accepted version of the brothers' careers deserves to be regarded with some scepticism, not treated as if all were certain and nothing doubtful.

It may be that Briscoe will be moved to pursue his commentary on Livy further into the fourth decad, in a later volume or volumes. If he should do so, one might hope—without being able to expect—that he would come to perceive the unsatisfactory character of two features of the commentary to which he seems to have committed himself rather resolutely so far, *viz.* tenuous prosopographical speculation about political relationships, and excessive faith in the detailed accuracy of the annalistic tradition for the early second century. As it stands, this commentary must be considered a setback. It will tend to hamper critical analysis of the political history of the period, not least because its solid qualities of conscientious research may cause it to be treated as a reliable guide and will certainly cause it to be used as a standard reference.

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ALBIN LESKY. *Die tragische Dichtung der Hellenen* (Dritte, völlig neubearbeitete und erweiterte Auflage). Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972. Pp. 544. DM 65.00 (*Studienhefte zur Altertumswissenschaft, Heft 2*)

Professor Lesky's *Die tragische Dichtung der Hellenen*, first published in 1956, is not to be confused with his *Die griechische Tragödie*, which first appeared in 1938 and of which the second edition (1958) was issued in English as *Greek Tragedy* (1965). As Lesky explains in the Foreword to the first edition of *Die tragische Dichtung* (1956), his primary undertaking was to concern himself with the problems of scholarship presented by Greek tragedy, whereas *Die griechische Tragödie* is essentially a literary study.

In this third edition of *Die tragische Dichtung* the general form is unchanged from earlier editions and the same chapters appear as before: I, Origins; II, Thespis; III, Choerilus, Phrynichus, and Pratinas; IV, Aeschylus; V, Sophocles; VI, Euripides; VII, Ion, Agathon, and Critias; VIII, "Fadeout" (*Ausklang*). The same subdivision of the chapters on the three extant playwrights is used, with sections on biography, text tradition and editions, the extant plays, the fragments (in the Euripides chapter the fragments are for the most part taken up along with the plays, in chronological order), dramatic form and diction, and, finally, a section consisting of comments on important general features of each playwright's work. There is, as in the earlier editions, an introductory bibliography of principal modern books of criticism in the field and its subdivisions; throughout the book there are extensive special bibliographies, bunched as much as possible at the beginning of the discussion of each play or topic.

The size of this edition, twice as long as the first, is partly due to the increase in the number of the bibliographical references, and indeed Lesky calls attention in his Foreword to the "extraordinary mass and the international breadth" of work in tragedy during the past two decades. But the increase is not solely a consequence of the inexorable trend of our inflationary times; it is in some measure due also to a deliberate change in scope. The sections which pertain to the extant plays have been greatly expanded by the addition of fairly full accounts of the dramatic action of the plays, in what Lesky calls "descriptive analyses." This expansion means that the book now covers some of the same territory as Lesky's *Greek Tragedy*, but *Die tragische Dichtung* remains essentially a series of discussions of problems of interpretation, and a thoroughly documented source book of information about all aspects of the criticism and history of Attic tragedy except for textual and metrical questions. Lesky's judgment in interpretation is prudent, his presentation is clear, his knowledge of the modern critical work in the field is vast, his report of it both fair and full.

Lesky's own interpretative contributions are to be found mainly in the final sections of the chapters on the three extant poets, where, under various headings, he presents his views on significant aspects of

the work of the playwrights. These are the most readable and, so far as literary criticism is concerned, the most valuable sections of the book. But, throughout, the combination of judgment, learning, and thoroughness makes it unique among books on Greek tragedy.

An important service of the book is its comprehensive report of modern criticism. Among studies meriting inclusion I have noticed the absence of the following: Snell's *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, Vol. I; H. J. Rose's *Commentary on the Surviving Plays of Aeschylus*; A. A. Long, *Language and Thought in Sophocles*; Ann Burnett, *Catastrophe Survived*; Margarete Bieber, *Die Denkmäler zum Theaterwesen im Altertum*, 1920 (which her later book in English does not in some important respects replace). Further notes on this category: Solmsen's *Hesiod and Aeschylus* was published in Ithaca, New York; the Oxford *Aeschylus* has now been edited by Page; the reference to Bates's *Sophocles*, 1964, should indicate that this is a reprint of a 1930 book. Some desiderata on more limited topics: Lattimore's Introduction to his translation of the *Oresteia* deserves mention (and so, by the way, do some other introductions to the University of Chicago series, notably Arrowsmith's to *Heracles* and *The Bacchae*); in the bibliographical note to *Prometheus Bound* Herington's *The Author of the Prometheus Bound* deserves place; to the discussion of human responsibility in Aeschylus, Lloyd Jones's *The Justice of Zeus*, Kitto's *Poiesis* (for chapters 1 and 2), and N. G. L. Hammond's article, "Personal Freedom and its Limitations in the *Oresteia*," *JHS* 85 (1965) should be added. In the biographical section on Sophocles, Woodbury's "Sophocles among the Generals," *Phoenix* 24 (1970), would be useful. Finally, though I do not want to get into proof-reading details, surely in the bibliographical note on *Antigone* R. F. Goheen should be recovered from his disguise as F. Gohen.

An English translation would be welcome. Those who will mostly use the book, Classics teachers and graduate students, are accustomed to the task of finding much needed help in German. But it would be salutary for the ever-increasing numbers of our colleagues in other departments who engage themselves with some seriousness in the study of Greek tragedy, but who are accustomed to doing it all in English, to be made aware of the range and complexity of the problems that face those who want to study and interpret the plays with disciplined comprehension.

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KEVIN CLINTON. *The Sacred Officials of the Eleusinian Mysteries*. Philadelphia, The American Philosophical Society, 1974. 143 p. 17 figs. \$12.00. (*Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Series*, v. 64. pt. 3)

This valuable monograph developed out of two projects on which the author began work as a graduate student with James H. Oliver at the Johns Hopkins University: (1) a collection of all the epigraphical evidence pertaining to the sanctuary and the mysteries of Demeter and Kore at Eleusis; (2) a corpus of the Greek and Latin inscriptions from this site. Permission has been granted by the Greek Archaeological Service for the preparation of the corpus and Clinton has published preliminary articles, especially the substantial study in *Arch. Eph.* (1971) 81-136.

In the present study he brings together the literary, epigraphic, and archaeological evidence for the officials who administered the Eleusinian cult both at the main sanctuary in Eleusis and at the Eleusinion in Athens. Although the index of passages cited occupies six pages and the author has collected one hundred and ninety-two individuals who served Demeter and Kore in official capacities, the evidence is too scattered chronologically to permit a continuous history of the sacred officials. Clinton has therefore adopted a prosopographical arrangement in chronological order of all the holders of each priesthood. The names span a period from the early fifth century B.C. to the late fourth century after Christ.

Together with the prosopographical data on the incumbents the author discusses the nature of the post, its duties, qualifications for election, method of selection, length of incumbency, perquisites, rank in the hierarchy of the cult and social standing in the state, participation of the priests in civic life and in non-Eleusinian cults, and religious dress. This arrangement makes it easy to find in one place all the known individuals who held a particular post and a full discussion of the history and nature of the office.

Control of the mysteries was firmly in the hands of the two powerful *gene* of the Eumolpidai and the Kerykes, to the virtual exclusion of the deme of Eleusis. From the former *genos* came the Hierophant (36 known incumbents). The other most prominent official, the Daduch (31 examples), was always a member of the Kerykes, as were the sacred herald, the altar priest, and the Pyrphoros. Less exclusive in gentile origin were the priestess of Demeter and Kore and the Hierophantides. Other sacred officials discussed are the *exegetai* of the Eumolpidai, the *phaidyntes*, *panages*, *Iakchagogos*, the priest of the god and goddess, the priest of Triptolemos, the priestess of Plouton, *hymnagogos*, the priest *lithophoros*, *daeirites*, and the hearth-initiates. The large numbers of worshippers and would-be initiates who joined the grand parade from Athens and filled the rock-hewn interior of the vast Telesterion required a numerous and

well-organized battery of sacred officials to guide them through the secret rites.

The information has been carefully collected and clearly presented. Clinton has re-examined personally almost all the important inscriptions. What keeps this book from being an arid extract from Kirchner's *Prosopographia Attica*, brought up to date, is extended discussion of several key documents for the Eleusinian mysteries such as *IG I*², 6; 76, first-fruits decree; *II*², 1092, the Eleusinian endowment; 1188; 2332; and I. Threpsiades, K. Kourouniotes, *Eleusiniaka* 1(1932) 223-36. It has also been possible for Clinton to quote from C. N. Edmonson's text of the lengthy unpublished Agora inscription of the fourth century B.C. which describes many aspects of the mysteries in considerable detail.

Among the Eleusinian officials most frequently represented in art are the hearth-initiates or *παῖδες ἀφ' ἑστίας* who came from the leading Athenian families. Girls as well as boys served, although all the fifteen known statues discussed by Clinton (pp. 98-108) are male. Portrait statues were erected in the Eleusinion in Athens and at Eleusis depicting these youths dressed in a short chiton and holding a piglet. Prominent features include a lock of hair that was cut off and consecrated at initiation (Pollux 1. p. 90, Bethe) and a myrtle wreath. Clinton's full discussion of this type of statue and his convincing interpretation of its attributes will be useful for the identification of future finds in marble and terracotta and of related figures from other sites.

Although the antiquity of the once autonomous sanctuary at Eleusis, its extensive land holdings in Attika, and the international reputation of its mysteries bestowed on its numerous and highly organized clergy a status remarkable even among long-term officials drawn from gene, Clinton finds no evidence that the Eleusinian priests as a body "possessed political clout in any significant or consistent way" in the pre-Roman period. In the condemnation of Alkibiades and his associates for profaning the mysteries in 415 B.C., all the Eleusinian priests and priestesses were ordered by the state to curse the offenders. One priestess refused and the Hierophant worded his curse in such a way as to put the responsibility—and the embarrassment when he was later ordered to rescind the curse—squarely on the state. In Roman times many of the priests held high political office but their success in public life was usually grounded in more tangible assets, although an Eleusinian priesthood offered opportunities for increased public exposure.

An Appendix in eight parts consists of a list of all the officials in chronological order, with cross references to the full discussion in the text; discussion of the *proedria* for Eleusinian priests in the theatre of Dionysos in Athens; a table of Eleusinian officials in the *Aeisitai* lists of A.D. 165-210; and epigraphical notes on *IG II*², 1045; 3713+4089; 3475+3476; 4075+4083; 3531. Selected bibliography, a list of passages cited, and a very detailed general index complete this elegantly

printed monograph. Only one of the seventeen photographs (p. 19) falls below a high standard of legibility and reproduction.

Clinton's skillful and accurate reporting of readings, his thorough knowledge of the stones of Eleusis, and the absence of *odium epigraphicum* from his writing—all prominent features of this work—bode well for his Eleusinian corpus. His control of the evidence for the operation of the cult and the mysteries as a whole—clearly revealed in his treatment of the sacred officials—lead us to hope that he will someday undertake a full-scale study of Athens' most important contribution to the history of ancient religion.

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Inscriptions de Délos, Période de l'Amphictyonie Attico-Délienne.

Actes Administratifs (Nos 89-104-33), publiés par Jacques Coupry. Pp. iv + 123. Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, Fonds d'Épigraphie Grecque, Fondation du Duc de Loubat. Paris, E. de Boccard, 1972.

This collection consists of financial records of the amphictyony, including rentals, adjudications, loans, leases, and inventories of temple dedications from both Athens and Delos, thirty-one from Delos and twenty from Athens of which latter four can no longer be found. Part of one text (No. 98) is preserved in the library of Trinity College, Cambridge (the Sandwich Marble) and one text (No. 104-31) is in the epigraphical collection at Eleusis. The text of No. 104-30 depends on a transcription by Michel Fourmont and has been successively improved by various editors. The text of No. 104-9 depends solely on a copy of K. S. Pittakys (he himself established this spelling of his name in *L'ancienne Athènes*). Coupry quite rightly treats Pittakys' transcript with respect and reports a reliable text, as his notes and commentary show. In the preface he explains his seemingly curious numbering of the inscriptions, made to fit them between the last number (88) of Plassart's earlier volume and the first number (105) used by Durrbach in *IG XI*, 2.

Many of these texts have been studied in a preliminary way by Coupry himself, with publications principally in the *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique*. Where autopsy has been possible not only has Coupry examined the stones again but he has had the benefit of inspection by Jacques Tréheux and Georges Daux, whose epigraphical skills are an added guarantee of the accuracy of readings and transcriptions. One cannot praise too highly the care and erudition with which this latest addition to the *Inscriptions de Délos* has been prepared. The numerous new readings and the discriminating commentary mark a distinct advance over earlier publications and deserve praise for the

editor whose preliminary work over many years has culminated in this superb production.

Among the many improvements in texts already known a refinement might be noted, for example, in the first line of No. 97, from Athens, where there are also three changes in restoration, two of them significant. Additional restorations in this inscription are made possible by comparison with the Delian copy of the same text, already noted in one of Coupry's earlier publications. The result is a vastly improved edition of the whole inscription. Such improvements are typical of other texts in the collection. One might cite, for example, No. 98, where there is now evidence for the reverse of the Athens fragment first noticed by Markellos Mitsos, No. 104-3 (lines 8 and 11) for significantly improved readings, No. 104-4 for the new text ἐ[κ] τῶ[ν] π[ρὸς τὰν] ἐ[κ] τῶ[ν] in line 27, No. 104-10 for a new determination of margins. These are only samples from the wealth of new material which the publication affords.

The commentary on No. 97 deals with questions of Athenian as well as of Delian chronology, fixing the date of the Athenian archon Demostratos mentioned in lines 6 and 25 to 393/2 rather than to 390/89, which year belonged to a second archon of the same name. Correspondences between the Delian and Athenian calendars are further discussed in the commentary on No. 89, where Coupry makes no restoration of the name of the Athenian month in line 21. He retains Ἀθήνησι (restored) which I should prefer to omit since the intercalary year 433/2 in Athens almost surely requires the restoration χρόνος [ἄρχει ἐμβόλιμος Ποσειδιῶν] μὴν (cf. *Hesperia* 5 [1936] 378, to which Coupry refers) or perhaps χρόνος [ἄρχει Ποσειδιῶν ὑστερος] μὴν. The calendar character of the year 433/2 in Athens depends on the evidence of *IG* I², 295 that the Panathenaia of 433 fell between Prytany I 13 and Prytany I *ultimo* of the same year. This relationship of the festival to the prytany calendar is impossible unless 433/2 was a year of thirteen months. Were it otherwise the Panathenaia must have fallen in Skirophorion of the preceding Attic year! A table of correspondences for the beginnings of these years when Apseudes was archon can be found in *Proc Phil Soc* 115 (1971) 114. R. Meiggs and D. M. Lewis, in their recent publication of Coupry's No. 89 (*Greek Hist. Inscr.*, No. 62, pp. 169-71), do not restore Ἀθήνησι in line 21 and so leave open the possibility of a solution; with Ἀθήνησι restored no solution is possible.

The printing is almost flawless, with very few errors in typography. I prefer not to detail the insignificant ones that I have noticed. One might wish that the dates of the texts, where known, could have been indicated more prominently: for example, a. 393/2 a. at the beginning of No. 97 rather than first noted in the commentary below the *apparatus criticus*. But this is a matter of style in editing and in no way detracts from the scholarly excellence of the publication.

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N. G. L. HAMMOND. *Studies in Greek History*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973. Pp. xvi + 574; illus. \$40.00.

This collection of studies is described in the Preface as a companion to the author's *History of Greece* and is said to be published "in the hope that they will enable students to grapple with detailed evidence and form their conclusions." This is an admirable purpose, but only advanced students can profit in this manner. It may not be out of place to tell that when the first edition of the *History* was published in 1959 I hurried to examine it in the hope of finding a superior new work. I read the first part with great enthusiasm but as I proceeded found so many deficiencies—or what seemed deficiencies to me—that the book seemed unusable as a text. This unevenness in quality continues in the present work.

The first three chapters are essentially archaeological dealing with problems from Mycenaean times to the Doric migration. They may emphasize and enhance somewhat the role of Albania and Epirus in transmitting settlers and cultural elements to Greece, but only strengthen and probably expand somewhat our knowledge of the role of the west and the northwest. They add little new concerning the coming of groups of immigrants to various parts of Greece, a problem for which no work is more helpful than C. D. Buck's *Greek Dialects*.

In chapter 4, "The Creation of Classical Sparta," great emphasis is placed on dating the reform of the government but one of the most important sentences is: "In the spheres of art and trade the greatest age of Sparta ensued from 700 to 550 B.C." (p. 89). In this connection it is noted that the habit of historians of placing "the end of the Dark Age at about 600 B.C." is due to "the predominance of the Attic tradition in Greek history." Among places which by the early sixth century "had passed or were passing their acme in the development of art and culture; Chalcis, Eretria, Crete, and even Corinth and Sparta" are listed. This is even more important than the statement about Sparta. A chapter on the early development of these and other places would be almost more useful than the entire rest of the book. Why, for instance, does Thucydides call the Corinthian Gulf the Crisaean Gulf?

Chapters 5 to 8 on Solon and the battles of Marathon and Salamis are largely based on a careful and detailed analysis of the sources but this is often too positive and almost dogmatic. It is impossible here to examine such statements in detail. Concerning Solon there are so many problems that it may be best to note only one point. In many ways accepting the presence of coinage at Athens in Solon's time, as most of us older scholars once did and as Hammond still does, may simplify the interpretation of certain problems, but now it seems best to accept the view of numismatists that coinage had not yet been introduced. The attribution in our sources of changes in coinage to Solon is no proof of its existence at the time. It may well be an example of the way in which measures of unknown origin are attached to great names. Related to this is the legend of the conversation of Solon with Croesus.

For an example of a misinterpretation of a technical point in the

sources we can turn to chapter 10, a valiant and largely successful effort to solve the problem of military commands in Athens. However, it gets off to a bad start in arguing that when the Athenians elected ten generals *κατὰ φυλὰς* as recorded in *Ath. Pol.* 22.2 (cited on p. 346) each tribe did not elect its general but that the Athenian people did so, electing one from each tribe. To illustrate this usage of the phrase a string of examples are given including some examples of selection by lot. Here it would seem that in the case of the use of lot it would be necessary to draw lots separately for each tribe. *Ath. Pol.* 63.1 (quoted on p. 348 but with the crucial part omitted) would seem to be decisive. Here it is stated that the archons cast lot for ten groups of dicasts with the secretary of the *thesmothetes* drawing lots for the tenth tribe. Clearly each official drew lots for one tribe. Obviously this method was used for sortition by tribes and it may well have been used also for election by tribes. There is a similar mistake in defending the dogmatic statement: "The word *στρατηγός* has only one meaning in the *Ath. Pol.*, that of an official commanding the army" (p. 350). Just before this we are told that in 4.2 contingent commanders are called *hipparchoi*, but if the *hipparchoi* in this sentence are contingent commanders, so certainly are the *strategoi*. Before the selection of archons by lot, the *strategoi* may well have been considered contingent commanders while the *polemarchos* was the commander-in-chief. When the *taxiarchoi* were first created to be the contingent commanders is not known.

And now a few words concerning topography. This is the forte of the author. The only drawback is that at times it seems to be topography for its own sake and does not illuminate the political conflicts to any extent. Thus chapter 14, "Military Operations in Amphilochia," throws little light on the struggle between Athens and Corinth for the control of northwestern Greece and the efforts of Amphilochians and Acarnanians to withdraw from the conflict. The most valuable topographical study is chapter 12, "The Main Road from Boeotia to the Peloponnese," a study of the routes passing through the northwest Megarid and not touching Attica. A report from Athens indicates that all colleagues do not agree, but the study presented is convincing. Moreover there is the consideration that there must have been a passable road here when Aratus in 245 B.C. led the Achaean army to Boeotia. Little information has been preserved about this expedition except that the Achaeans arrived too late to support the Boeotians against the Aetolians, but it is clear that they did not have sufficient ships to transport the army across the gulf. It is also clear that the army could not have passed through Attica without provoking war with Macedonia.

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JOHN WICKERSHAM and GERALD VERBRUGGHE. *The Fourth Century B.C.* Toronto, Hakkert, 1973. Pp. 129. \$2.50. (*Greek Historical Documents Ser.*)

This is a very welcome collection of translations assembled to provide illumination of Greek diplomatic history from 403 to 336 B.C. The authors have produced fresh new translations of the documents, introduced in each case by a headnote which includes material on the historical background, a description of the document itself, and often a brief bibliography and original publication information for those who wish to pursue further investigation of a particular subject. In addition there is a brief glossary of technical terms and a number of tables of useful information, such as Athenian eponymous archons and Spartan and Persian king lists. The book is intended as an introductory collection for beginning students of Greek history, as well as a handy reference for scholars; in both capacities it is successful.

In selecting the documents themselves, the authors have drawn heavily on Tod's *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, vol. II; two thirds of their translations derive from this source. There are additional inscriptions, from other sources, so that the bulk of the documents is epigraphical in nature. Among the literary documents selected, it is particularly gratifying to find the invaluable *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, which have not been readily available for 50 years in translation. A number of speeches from Xenophon, as well as various brief excerpts from Diodorus, Isocrates and Demosthenes which bear on diplomacy and statecraft comprise the rest of the collection. Generally the choice of selections is judicious, and there is nothing like it available now in English.

On the whole the translations appear sound, although I have found several problems. On p. 13 the authors speak of Ismenias' supporters in Thebes as "the radical party"; there is absolutely no basis for such a translation in the text, which says merely *οἱ περὶ* . . . ; the phrase "radical party" reflects the authors' judgement of a group that wanted war. On p. 31, the phrase "prytanized the peace" is not very helpful for anyone; on p. 61, *Σικελίας* turns out "Syracuse" in reference to the tyrant Dionysius. There are also errors of fact: on p. 24, the date of document A should be June 394, not 395; and on p. 75 the headnote speaks of Philip's accession as King of Macedon in 359, when in fact he served only as regent until 356. These are minor errors, however, and can be corrected in a second edition. I wonder if the authors ought not to have provided a brief discussion of what they consider an "historical document" to be, in view of the range and variety of selections chosen? This would be particularly useful for the beginning students for whom, in part, the book is intended.

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- G. V. SUMNER. *The Orators in Cicero's Brutus*; Prosopography and Chronology, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1973. Pp. 197. \$12.50 (*The Phoenix*, Supplementary vol. 11)

'The first section of this study consists in a register of the orators in the *Brutus*, set down in Cicero's *ordo* and with what is known or can reasonably be inferred about their careers of office entered against each name, while in the end column is offered the nearest approximation to the orator's birth-date. The second section, which is the main body of the work both in bulk and in importance, is a detailed prosopographical commentary, in which the problems about careers and identities and dates are thrashed out, and controversial decisions in the Register are accounted for. After that the third section attempts to define accurately the chronological structure of the *Brutus*, so far as that can be done. A fourth section examines the rather important question of how and where Cicero got hold of his knowledge of orators' dates. The brief section of conclusions addresses itself wholly to the giving of a final verdict on the dispute about Cicero's chronographic aims and methods in the dialogue. In the appendix an attempt is made to develop further the emerging picture of Cicero as prosopographer and chronographer, by a close examination of passages in the Atticus correspondence which exhibit him in this light. The Index, it should be noted, is meant to be 'a functioning part of the prosopographical apparatus of the volume' (From the author's introduction).

On the main point of enquiry A. E. Douglas' claim that the orators are listed according to a 'very precise method' as from §110 and a 'taut chronological sequence' from §138 is refuted: 'the *Brutus* occasionally lends additional support to inferences about the biographical date of Roman public figures, but it is never sufficient warrant for *precise* reckoning, in the absence of other evidence.' This goes nearly, but not quite, as far as E. Badian's cited pronouncement that 'the order in the *Brutus* will not help in fixing the chronology of a man or an event not otherwise chronologically anchored.'

Sumner has already established himself as a strenuous, accurate, and resourceful prosopographer, especially by his valuable paper on 'The Lex Annalis under Caesar' (*Phoenix*, 1971), and this book is full of interesting, often convincing, observations and ideas. He is not reluctant to challenge current opinions, finding e.g. further reason to discredit L. R. Taylor's dating of Cn. Plancius' Aedileship to 55 and taking a long, sceptical (though not definitely negative) look at Badian's theory of the patrician *cursus honorum* after Sulla in connexion with Caesar's birth-date.

In his genealogies Sumner works on the assumption that praenomina, in leading families at any rate, followed a fixed pattern, the eldest son always taking his father's. Apparent exceptions can be explained by postulating a first-born who died after the birth of a brother. For instance, L. Aemilius Paulus (Consul in 50) was clearly

older than his brother M. Aemilius Lepidus the Triumvir; yet Lepidus bore his father's name. Therefore Sumner concludes that an earlier M. Aemilius Lepidus died, or was adopted, in infancy (a possibility suggested in my note on Cic. *Att.* 2.24.2). This is, no doubt, sound as a general principle, though variations from custom for particular reasons may well have occurred, as in the case of manumitted slaves (witness M. Pomponius Dionysius). Sumner's ordering of the late-republican Lentuli is a *tour de force*. It is a pity, though, that he has overlooked Cn. Lentulus Vatia, who might have helped him in his search for the lurking plebeian (see *CQ* 10 [1960] 258, n. 3 and my note on *Att.* 12.28.3). Unless I have long been mistaken, Cicero's grandson, 'Lentulus puer,' points his infant finger in the right direction; but he too is ignored. Sumner thinks with Willems that it was Cn. Lentulus Marcellinus, Consul in 56. This does not require his theory that 'Cn. Marcellinus' father, P. Lentulus Marcelli f., may have retained, after adoption, his original plebeian status, since, as he recognizes, Marcellinus might himself have been adopted by a plebeian; but the theory itself, which arises in an inverted form in connexion with Metellus Scipio (see below), is questionable. Nor does the fact that Marcellinus was one of the septemviri epulones 'almost certainly assure that he was plebeian (cf. Willems, *Sénat.* 1.444);' our evidence is too scanty to establish this theory of Mommsen's.

It is generally recognized that T. Postumius of *Brutus* 269 and L. Postumius of Ps.-Sall. *Ep. ad Caes.* 2.9.4 are to be identified. Sumner, pursuing a theory already advanced in his article in *Phoenix*, would further identify him with C. Postumius, a monetalis ca. 74. This means changing the praenomen in *both* of our literary sources. Also, if the author of the *Epistle* is to be trusted, L. Postumius was not a *nobilis*, whereas C. Postumius apparently was ('the typology of his coins associates him with previous moneyers from the Postumii Albini'); notwithstanding that, as Sumner fails to remark, the praenomen Gaius is not otherwise attested among patrician members of the gens. On the other hand, his statement that 'no T. Postumii occur in the whole era of the Republic, let alone its last century,' though true, is much less significant than he seems to suppose, provided that this Postumius was a commoner (though it counts for what it is worth in favour of calling him Lucius).

Sumner rightly rejects L. R. Taylor's theory that the office for which Metellus Scipio and Favonius competed in May 60 (Cic. *Att.* 2.1.9) was the Curule Aedileship. In place of the traditional view that it was the Tribunate, which involves 'a notorious incongruity' in that he was Interrex in 53 (but his adoption into a plebeian family has to be reckoned with anyway), Sumner would make it the Quaestorship. That is theoretically possible, though quaestorian elections did not usually make so much stir. His suggestion that the quaestorian elections for 60 were so late as to be held five or six months after the beginning of the year can hardly be entertained. Such things only

happened in years of turmoil. Metellus' office, whatever it was, must have been suffect, as M. Alford saw.

According to Sumner, the Visellius mentioned in Cic. *Att.* 3.23.4 of November 58 as having drafted a law to recall Cicero for T. Fadius, Tribune in 57, is clearly not Cicero's cousin C. Visellius Varro. The manuscripts, it is true, call him T. Visellius, but the praenomen is usually omitted as a copyist's repetition from *T. Fadio*. Sumner, however, seems to base his conclusion on the implication in *Brutus* 264 that Varro died in the year after his Curule Aedileship, which is usually dated ca. 59 (Sumner would prefer 67 or 66, but on no cogent evidence). Suppose it *was* 59, there is nothing to prevent Varro drafting his law for a tribunician candidate or designate (Cicero's ex-Quaestor) in 58 and dying later the same year. In favour of the identification is his relationship with Cicero and his expertise as a jurisconsult.

In the Appendix Sumner discusses *inter alia* the dating of certain letters to Atticus numbered in my series 303, 305, 309-12, and proposes yet a further rearrangement. This is too complicated a matter to discuss here, but I allow myself another word about the much-debated text of 309 (13.33).3:

de Tuditano autem, quod putas *εὔλογον* est, tum illum, quoniam fuit ad Corinthum (non enim temere dixit Hortensius), aut quaestorem aut tribunum mil. fuisse, idque potius credo; sed tu de Antiocho scire poteris. vide etiam quo anno quaestor aut tribunus mil. fuerit; si neutrum cadet, in praefectis an in cubernalibus fuerit, modo fuerit in eo bello.

Sumner does not seem to have attended closely to Badian's explanation (in *Hommages à Marcel Renard*, I, pp. 57f.) of *quo anno* (Badian himself attributes it to Sjögren, whom he thinks I failed to understand; if so, the failure continues). According to this the additional point which Cicero asks Atticus to look into is 'obviously' whether Tuditanus' Quaestorship or Military Tribunate (as the case might be) was in 146 or 145. I regard this as less obvious than ingenious and more ingenious than convincing. Surely this information was already covered in *tu de Antiocho scire poteris*. For how was Antiochus going to find out which of the two offices Tuditanus held when he was at Corinth? Would he not find out the year in which Tuditanus was recorded as holding one or the other, and so get his answer? Clearly he would, if, as Sumner plausibly argues, he was to consult 'a readily available record of the holders of the quaestorship in each year.' And what follows (*si neutrum*, sqq.) shows that the question in Cicero's mind is still *what* post did Tuditanus (if Tuditanus it was, and not, as suggested by Corradus and myself, another person) hold at Corinth?

A few criticisms of detail on a book which is packed with intricately related details must not be thought to impugn its generally admirable standard of factual and logical accuracy.

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P. R. C. WEAVER. *Familia Caesaris. A Social Study of the Emperor's Freedmen and Slaves*. Cambridge [Engl.], Cambridge University Press, 1972. Pp. xii + 330. \$19.50.

Until recently, social historians of the first three centuries of Imperial Rome have focussed almost exclusively upon the senatorial and equestrian orders. The volume under review constitutes the first comprehensive study in English of a group of less distinguished, but no less ambitious men: the slaves and freedmen whose careers were spent in the service of the Caesars.

In the case of the *Caesaris servus* or *Augusti libertus*, the juridical disadvantage imposed by servile birth or descent was offset by the fact that his master was the emperor himself. Here is an example, therefore, of what M. K. Hopkins has labelled "status dissonance": despite their origins, members of the *familia* could command a social status, and acquire wealth and influence, which were distinctly superior not only to those of other members of the slaveborn classes, but also to those of many freeborn Roman citizens. The *familia Caesaris* "came to form what was virtually an *ordo libertorum et servorum principis*, a new estate or status group in the hierarchy of Roman imperial society" (p. 5). The subject is important: one wants to understand not merely the process by which the *familia Caesaris* became an elite, but also the organization of posts and grades inside the system in order to assess the degree of social differentiation which existed within the *familia* itself. And the evidence is to hand. More than four thousand of the Emperor's slaves and freedmen can be identified, over a period which extends from the reign of Augustus to the early years of the third century. Nevertheless, the previous scholarly neglect of the *familia Caesaris* is quite explicable. The chief primary sources, inscriptions, are normally brief and provide only scanty information when taken one by one; and the majority, from Rome, are published in the sixth volume of the CIL, which lacks all indices save that of names.¹ Only after an exhaustive study of all the texts, and a statistical analysis (based upon shifts in onomastic patterns, the presence and abbreviation of titles, mention of occupations and official posts) does the material yield results, permitting inferences as to ages of manumission and of death, marriage patterns, and the ascending order of positions in the hierarchy. The wonder is not so much that a systematic study of the *familia Caesaris* was long in coming, but rather the sudden and simultaneous appearance in 1964 of no fewer than four theses on the subject in different universities abroad, with every investigator completely unaware of the others. H. Chantraine's work has since been published as *Freigelassene und Sklaven im Dienst der römischen Kaiser* (1967), G. Boulvert's as *Esclaves et Affranchis Impériaux sous le Haut-Empire Romain* (1970); Weaver's book is the most recent to appear in print,

¹ But a complete word-index, produced with the assistance of a computer, is at last in preparation: see now E. Jory and D. G. Moore (eds.), CIL VI, pt. 7, fasc. 1, A-C (Berlin 1974), fasc. 2, D-F (Berlin 1975).

even though a long series of preliminary articles began as early as 1963. Postponement of publication has enabled him to digest Chantraine's and Boulvert's results, "to point out the areas where progress and agreement can be recorded and where the main problems still lie". Chantraine's study attempts to develop a chronological sequence for the inscriptions through an analysis of the nomenclature of the imperial slaves and freedmen, and Boulvert's interests are chiefly juridical and administrative. Weaver has much of substance to say on these topics, but his primary focus is elsewhere. His is above all a social study, concentrating upon individual careers and family relationships.

In part I, "Nomenclature and Chronology" (pp. 15-92), Weaver first discusses the 607 inscriptions from the *familia* which can be assigned either to a particular year or, more often, to the reign of a particular emperor. The chief value of these (which are listed, with references, in an appendix, where they are distributed reign by reign) is that they provide fixed reference points for the use of different formulae in nomenclature—formulae which Weaver analyzes in detail, along with the types of status indication: *Caesaris servus*, *Augusti libertus*, and their multiple positions, abbreviations, and regional variations. Here, as elsewhere in the book, Weaver places his investigation in a wider social context by contrasting the practices of the Emperors' staff with those of the slaveborn classes outside the *familia Caesaris*; he challenges the startling conclusion of Tenney Frank, which has been reinforced more recently by H. Thylander and Lily Ross Taylor (*AJP* 82 [1961] 113ff), that some 90 percent of the inhabitants of Rome in the first centuries A. D. were themselves slaves, freedmen, or of freedmen descent within at most three generations.

The chief emphasis in part II, "The Family Circle" (pp. 93-196), is upon the question of the status of the wives and children within the *familia Caesaris*. Weaver estimates that 64 percent of the wives of imperial freedmen and slaves from Rome were *ingenuae*, and only 36 percent *libertae* and *servae*; these figures are in contrast not only with those of the wives of *servi Caesaris* and *Augusti liberti* elsewhere than at Rome (where the proportions of freeborn to freed/slave are 42 percent and 58 percent, respectively), but more strikingly with figures obtained from an analysis of 700 slave and freedman marriages *outside* the *familia*: these show that no more than 15 percent of the wives of freedmen, and no more than 5 percent of the wives of slaves, can have been *ingenuae*. Here is one of the most significant conclusions of the book: if roughly two thirds of the wives in the *familia Caesaris* in Rome were in fact freeborn, clearly the freedmen and slaves in the Emperor's service experienced exceptional upward mobility, enjoying a social status which was in marked contrast to the circumstances of their birth. But caution is required: indication of status is explicitly attested for only 10 percent of the wives of Imperial slaves and freedmen known from the inscriptions, and hence Weaver's conclusion cannot be re-

garded as proven, nor his arguments, based almost entirely upon nomenclature, as more than plausible.²

Nor is Weaver's interpretation of the *SC Claudianum* of A. D. 52 wholly convincing. He assumes that *ingenuae* who cohabited with Imperial slaves suffered a reduction in status, were regarded as *servae Caesaris* and that their children were also considered as slaves. He thinks that the *SC* was primarily promulgated in the interests of the *familia Caesaris* which thereby managed to renew itself from its own members. The increasing use of *verna* in the inscriptions of 2nd c. imperial slaves is our chief evidence for this recruitment process. The original purport of the *SC Claudianum* is far from clear, but is it likely that at so early a point in the development of the *familia* the *SC Claudianum* was conceived with the needs of that group principally in mind? And why, one continues to wonder, were freeborn women apparently so willing to impair their status by marrying slaves and freedmen, especially since, as Weaver goes on to show elsewhere, the functionaries in the lower grades of the civil service had slight expectation of advancement to wealth or influence? For reasons of security? In any case this marriage pattern is at odds both with that practised in the higher strata of Roman society (where our evidence is more abundant), and also in the Roman *municipia* (where again the local notables known to us from inscriptions tended to choose their wives from among members of their own class).

Part III, "The Emperor's Service" (pp. 197-294) treats the occupational and administrative hierarchy. Weaver contends that the efficient functioning of the bureaucracy required "order and opportunity in its lower as well as its higher ranks" (p. 224), as well as "rules, grades, and a momentum and tradition of its own, relatively independent of the whims of particular emperors" (p. 237). The remainder of this section

² Consider, for example, Eria Veneria of Puteoli, the wife of the *Caesaris servus* published subsequently to the appearance of Weaver's book (*AJA* 77 [1973] 157ff): her nomenclature affords no basis for determining whether she was freeborn, or (since Veneria was a common servile name) the former slave of a local (H)erius. And the same may be said of a number of the wives with non-imperial *nomina* and *cognomina*, married to members of the subclerical ranks of the administrative hierarchy where upward mobility, on Weaver's own showing, was extremely unusual. Claudia Macaria (*CIL* VI, 8445 = *ILS*, 1553; cf. pp. 228, 309) is assumed to be *ingenua*; why not, rather, the ex-slave of a freeborn woman of servile descent, especially since her husband was of lowly status (his promotion to *praepositus* in the Imperial Palace is an assumption, not a fact)? Further grounds for doubt are provided by examples of the reverse type: if Weaver's theory of social improvement through marriage were correct, we ought not to find so many examples of slave wives of men who were highly placed within the *familia*. Yet consider *CIL* VI, 297 = *ILS*, 1767, cf. p. 310—not an isolated instance.

corroborates these contentions, although here and there this reviewer finds the treatment overly schematic, and the flavor of the British Civil Service a trifle strong. The author moves from slaves of slaves (*servi vicarii*), to slaves of freedmen and freedmen of freedmen, to '*vicariani*' (the imperial freedmen and slaves who bore *agnomina* terminating in *-ianus*, *-anus*, *-inus*, derived from *nomina* or *cognomina* of a former master). He distinguishes among the "sub-clerical" workers who had no expectation of further advancement, the "junior clerical grades" (*adiutores*), the "intermediate clerical grades" (freedmen *tabularii* and *a commentariis*), the senior grades (*tabularii a rationibus* and *tabularii provinciae*, freedmen *proximi*, the leaderships of the "Palatine bureaux" (*a rationibus*, *ab epistulis*, *a libellis*, *a studiis*, etc.), and, at the top of the ladder, the freedmen procurators. The work concludes with a survey of those freedmen, a fortunate few, who were advanced to membership in the equestrian order, and with a review of the career (which appeared first in *CQ*, 1965) of the best known member of this elite, the father of Claudius Etruscus.

As will be clear from the foregoing, this book can be neither rapidly read nor easily digested. Given the nature of the evidence, it could hardly have been otherwise. This is solid scholarship, carefully argued, patiently constructed, meticulously documented. Weaver is fully in control of his difficult material, made the more accessible owing to the full epigraphical references (which include Dessau numbers) both in the text and in the appendices, and owing also to comprehensive *indices* and bibliography.³ Occasionally one wishes for fuller discussion of the historical implications of Weaver's findings. For example, it follows from his remarks on p. 52 that sailors in the period of Augustus were slaves—but that view presents difficulties which are perhaps not faced squarely enough by the author, as he himself seems to have recognized in note 9; and he attends perhaps not quite enough to the significance of the particular geographical locations of the inscriptions outside Rome which record members of the *familia* (e.g. *CIL* X, 1729; cf. p. 242). The municipal *libertina nobilitas*, Augustales, are mentioned neither in the text nor in the appendices. Even if their prospects for assimilation into the *familia Caesaris* were dim, interaction between these two privileged groups of *liberti* was in fact frequent and close: observe *CIL* XI, 3614 (= *ILS*, 5918a, Caere, A.D. 113), which reveals that Ulpian Aug. 1. Vesbinus erected at his own expense a building for the local Augustales.

Not one of the authors of the three recent studies of the *familia* has included illustrative plates of the epigraphical texts, and this despite their preoccupation with criteria for dating. The hazards of chronological conclusions derived exclusively from impressions of layout and lettering are well known, and Weaver quite properly rehearses them

³ Bibliographical supplement: Weaver's review of Boulvert appeared not in *Labeo* 17 (1971) but in 18 (1972) 218ff; his article in *Antichthon* 5 (1971), will be found on pp. 77-84.

(p. 11). But he goes too far, in my opinion, when he recommends abandoning such criteria altogether. The selective use of plates in R. Meiggs' *Roman Ostia* affords a model: a photographic sample of the principal types of texts, including those which are precisely dated, would have helped to convey an impression of changing epigraphical practice between the first and third centuries, and thus to bring readers more closely to grips with the actual source material for the study of the *familia*. Illustration is the more to be desired since the original publications of most of these inscriptions appeared without facsimiles, and good photographs are now readily available. Plates would have increased somewhat the costs of publication, but the price of the book is already beyond the reach of many readers, owing (we are told in the preface) to the comprehensive system of epigraphical cross references.

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EMIL SCHÜRER. *The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 B.C.-A.D. 135)*. Vol. I. Revised and edited by Geza Vermes & Fergus Millar. Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark LTD 1973. Pp. xvi + 614. £10.00.

Few works have served scholars as well as Emil Schürer's classic *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi*. From its original appearance in 1874 as *Lehrbuch der neutestamentlichen Zeitgeschichte* it became a standard reference work on Judaism in the age of Jesus, and it maintained that position for nearly a century. The fourth and latest German edition appeared in 1909, however, and in spite of Schürer's great erudition, painstaking research, and well-conceived organization, the work has become badly dated. Even in a rather static field the ongoing scholarly discussion would need to be taken into account, and the discoveries of new archaeological, epigraphical, numismatic, and literary evidence—especially the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Bar Kokhba documents—have made the study of this period anything but static. Geza Vermes, Fergus Millar, and associates have rendered a real service to the scholarly community, therefore, with this new, completely revised, and updated English edition of Schürer's old classic.

This new edition attempts to preserve all that is still valid of Schürer's original work and to present it in a form compatible with the original intent of the work, but, for this very reason, the many additions, corrections, and deletions in the text are unmarked. Nevertheless, the work is still basically Schürer's, at least as far as the evidence now available allows. The new volume makes no attempt to offer an interpretive synthesis, a summary of contemporary interpretations, or still less to place undue emphasis on the views of the editors. It simply

offers material for historical research, following the model of the earlier work, but brought up to date. It performs this task so well, however, that one may well consider the new edition a classic in its own right.

It would be easy for such a work, the product of the cooperative efforts of a number of translators and revisors, to reflect its origin in committee by stylistic unevenness, but the present work is surprisingly free of such flaws. The book is written in a very readable and, as far as this reader could discern, consistent English style. Moreover, the typographical mistakes are kept to a bare minimum. One can only hope the succeeding volumes will maintain the same level of excellence while appearing as rapidly as possible.

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SILVIA RIZZO. Il lessico filologico degli umanisti. Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1973. Pp. xiv + 394. L.10,000. (*Sussidi eruditi*, 26)

This is a work of great diligence and learning that everyone concerned with the transmission of ancient texts will henceforth have to keep at hand. The greater part of Greek and Latin literature has come to us through manuscripts, some of them now lost and others only tentatively identified, which were used by the early Humanists for their own collations and recensions of the texts, including *editiones principes*. We therefore need to know precisely what meanings they attached to the various words by which they described those manuscripts and their use of them.

It should occasion no astonishment that the Humanists did not have a precise technical vocabulary, and that a given term may be used by different writers or even by the same writer with more than one meaning. Our own vocabulary is not free of potential ambiguities: when we speak of *interpolations* in a text, we mean either (1) spurious lines or passages, or (2) scribal emendations; and when we refer to *pages* in Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, we mean the numbered columns, but we might say that a given copy had been mutilated by the loss of a page (= 4 columns). All of the many and lively debates about the too famous Hersfeld codex, now partly or entirely lost, that contained the minor works of Tacitus and Suetonius, turn upon the question, often unrecognized, whether the words *folium*, *charta*, and *pagina* in the several descriptions of the manuscript refer to the same thing or to different things and thus show that two or even three manuscripts of similar or identical content came to light almost simultaneously. We can all call to mind identifications of manuscripts used by some Renaissance scholar that were based on the natural assumption that what he described as a *codex emendatus* must show corrections in his or another hand, but

Miss Rizzo makes it clear that in the normal terminology of the Humanists a manuscript was *emendatus* because it did not need to be corrected. It would be easy to list a considerable number of studies in *Überlieferungsgeschichte* in which errors or uncertainties could have been eliminated, had the present book been available when they were written.

In this treatise Miss Rizzo considers systematically the words used by early Humanists to designate and describe books and portions thereof, palaeographic characteristics, procedures in copying, emendations and other operations of textual criticism, and editions of a text. Whenever a Humanist refers to a manuscript that has been positively identified as the one he used, the author has inspected the manuscript and thus established the exact meaning of the various descriptive terms beyond peradventure of doubt. That is what makes her work so authoritative.

We could not expect any scholar to read through all the writings of all the Humanists who flourished before the Sixteenth Century. Miss Rizzo has covered with exemplary thoroughness the scholars, from Petrarch and Salutati to Politian and the elder Beroaldus, who are most important for her purposes, and it would be grossly captious to list Humanists whom she might have included in her study. I think, however, that I may not unreasonably regret the omission of Perotti's *Cornucopiae*, for that grotesque lexicon, which was used by Politian and perhaps others even before it was first printed in 1489,¹ was the work of a man whom his contemporaries recognized as a "diligentissimus vocabulorum perscrutator,"² was often reprinted, and was a principal though unacknowledged source of later lexica, so that it must have exerted, directly or indirectly, a great influence on subsequent usage. It may be useful, therefore, to list here some of Perotti's definitions in the order of the pages in Miss Rizzo's book on which they could have been used to advantage. The numbers within parentheses that follow each quotation refer to column and beginning line in the Aldine edition of 1513, which is the earliest of the three or four that are most commonly found in American libraries.³

¹ Politian's envious colleagues accordingly spread a rumor that he had purloined from the yet unpublished work his first *Centuria miscellaneorum*; see the first part of the "coronis" that Politian added to that collection of exemplary studies in ecdotics and hermeneutics, which may be found in any edition of his *Opera* and is annexed to some (if not all) editions of his *Epistolae*.

² Raphaël Volaterranus, *Commentariorum Vrbanoꝝ libri XXXVIII*, Basileae, 1559, p. 491.

³ I have listed the editions known to me in my edition of Perotti's version of the *Enchiridion* of Epictetus (Urbana 1954) 146f.; there may have been others. I have checked some passages in the Aldine editions of 1513 and 1517 and the edition published at Basel in 1526 against the manuscript (Vrb. Lat. 301)

p. 5: VOLUMEN pars codicis, ut puta, Metamorphoseon liber in quindecim volumina distinctus est. (204.59) LIBER etiam modo pro ipso opere integro accipitur, quamlibet sit magnus, etiam si contineat Aeneida & Bucolica & Georgica simul, modo pro certa parte operis, ut Virgilio Aeneis in duodecim libros distincta est. (812.25)

p. 12: TITULUS proprie index cuiusunque operis, qui Graece ἔλεγχος dicitur Item titulus libri dicitur qui vel qualitatem operis vel nomen auctoris vel numerum librorum ostendit. (826.57)

p. 18: A papyro igitur frutice charta est PAPHYRUS appellata, quod scilicet ex papyro fieret. Postea vero id genus chartae inventum est quo nunc passim mortales utuntur fitque ex linteolis contritis, & nihilominus pristinum papyri nomen remansit & distinctio generum: nam subtilis illa epistolaris & Augusta vocatur, & altera communis sive amphitheatrica sive Fanniana, & grossior illa atque inutilis emporetica, & ultima bibula. Claudia vero illa grandior crassiorque a rege nunc regalis dicitur; haec dente propter scabriciem aut concha levigatur, propter quod minus sorbet & ob id caducae literae fiunt.⁴ Quae causa impulit nos ut genus aliud chartae inveniremus, quae tenuitate, densitate, candore, levore, phylurae longitudine & commodior est & aspectu gratior; hanc opifices a nostro nomine Perottam nuncupavere. (416.15)

p. 35: PAGINA utraque pars phyllurae⁵ sive folii dicta. (618.50) CHARTAM MEMBRANAMQUE saepenumero auctores pro foliis sive phylluris usurpant, ut si dicam codicem triginta chartis sive triginta mem-

without finding significant differences. I have the impression that the Tusculan edition (1522), though noteworthy for its typography, is less accurate.

⁴ The designations of grades of paper were, of course, derived from Pliny's list (13.23-25, 74-81) of varieties of papyrus, but the terms remained in general use among the Humanists and appear, with some modifications, in the *Amalthea onomastica* of Josephus Laurentius (Venetiis 1673), which I particularly commend to those who may be interested in the vocabulary of scholarship in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, since Laurentius collected his *voces abstrusiores* from sources that include the writings of Budé, Salmasius, Lipsius, Barclay, Lambinus, Turnebus, et al.

⁵ This ghost word obviously comes from Pliny 13.23.74, where modern editions have "Praeparatur ex eo [sc. papyro] charta diviso acu in praetenuas sed quam latissimas phyluras," but Perotti's manuscript and many others read "chartae divisae . . . phyluras," and Perotti, not unreasonably, derived the last word from φύλλον (cf. 419.34), perhaps regarding it as the correct form of φυλλάδιον, if he knew that word. And although he was misled by his text of Pliny, he was not entirely wrong in assigning a meaning to the word: in Cassius Dio 67.12.2 and 72.8.4 and in Herodian 1.17.1, φυλλάδιαι are sheets of a writing-material. From Perotti the word passed to Calepinus and into general use, retaining the meaning he gave it even after the spelling was corrected. In the classified Italian-Latin vocabulary appended to the *Amalthea* of Laurentius, § "Libraria repositoria," the equivalent of 'foglio di carta' is *phylūralphylūra*, although *philyra* is the preferred form in the body of the lexicon.

branis contineri Quintil.: "cum aperto codice chartas explicaret."⁶ (416.41)

p. 44: QUATERNIO quatuor chartarum.⁷ (884.41)

p. 82: LIBRARIJ vero sunt qui libros transcribunt, sicut BIBLIOPOLAE qui libros vendunt BIBLIOGRAPHUS librarius. (812.18)

p. 101: SYNGRAPHUM scriptura quae fit in alicuius rei fidem & ab aliquibus simul conscribitur . . . AUTHOGRAPHUM scriptura similis manu propria facta, & AUTHOGRAPHUS adiectivum, unde libros Ciceronis authographos scriptos dicimus.⁸ (828.60) IDIOGRAPHUS propria alicuius manu scriptus, & IDIOGRAPHUM chirographum, hoc est privata scriptura. (370.10)

p. 110: INTERLINIRE dicimus superinducto atramento aut alio liquore scripturam aliquam picturamve destruere. (236.1)

p. 205: Verbum NOTO . . . aliquando pro eo quod est 'ab alio dictata seu lucubrata conscribo,' unde qui dictat SCRIPTOR, qui vero scribit NOTARIUS appellatur. (533.11) SCRIPTORES non librarii sed ipsi, ut ita dicam, authores operum dicuntur . . . SCRIBA qui vel gesta vel epistolas vel tabellas scribit, praesertim iussu alterius, unde . . . dicere possumus . . . scribas librarios qui libros a nobis editos scribunt; item scribas tabularios quos vocamus TABELLIONES. (828.8)

p. 306: SCHEDA folium chartae sive papyri nondum compactum & ligatum, quod et phylluram nuncupamus. (952.1) PROTOCOLLUM quod breviter & succincte notatur a tabellione ut extendi deinde atque absolvi possit. (420.3)

There are, of course, many definitions in the *Cornucopiae* that neither supplement nor modify Miss Rizzo's conclusions.

The learned lady has mastered the vast amount of material she assembled, and she has used it with a scholarly sobriety and precision that it is seldom possible to question. I have noticed some minor

⁶ I need not remark that the quotation does not come from Quintilian. It was probably derived from some compilation akin to the now fragmentary work of "Lucius Caecilius Minutianus Apuleius." I speculated about Perotti's sources in *TAPA* 78 (1947) 376-424, an article that I cannot cite without again apologizing for the blunder on p. 412 occasioned by my failure to recognize *Aen.* 12.903f. after my assistant had presumably checked the entry against Merguet's *Lexicon*, Wetmore's *Index*, and the *Thesaurus*. I suspect that Perotti understood the quotation to mean, 'while he was smoothing out the sheets after the book had been unbound.'

⁷ Note that by his silence Perotti rejects the use of *quaternio* to denote any number of folded sheets or a notebook, a usage which, as Miss Rizzo shows (44), goes back to the Sixth Century.

⁸ There is an obvious confusion with *author*, which Perotti (603.27) derives from *αὐτός*, "quoniam qui author est, per se ipse facit, non ab alio accipit," and distinguishes from *auctor*, which "longe aliud significat, hoc est, eum qui augeat." Perotti was doubtless the source of the remark by Grapaldo that Miss Rizzo quotes.

inaccuracies that would scarcely be worth mention, if her work were not certain to be used as an authoritative reference.

p. 6: Since 'ancient' includes the writers of the Roman decline and fall, it is not correct to say that in ancient usage *volumen* was never a synonym of *liber* as formal division of a literary work; see, e.g. Jerome *Com. ad Zach.* 3.14. And it should not be "dibattuta dagli studiosi" whether *liber* was anciently used to designate a work divided into many books: Vopiscus (whoever he was) so uses it in his *Tacitus* 10.3.⁹

p. 36: It is not a proper deduction that when a Humanist terminates a letter *quia pagina deficit*, he is referring to a sheet rather than one side of it. The reverse was normally used for the address. If the sheet was a large one, so that part of the reverse could be folded in when the letter was sealed, the communication could be carried over to the reverse for a few lines, but, as is evident from the large number of original letters bound together in Vat. Lat. 3908, that was not usually done.

p. 37: When Politian calls a quaternion a *paginarum decuria*, he must have meant simply a fascicle or gathering of sheets, using *decuria*—somewhat preciously, to be sure—in the sense of a group or association and without a specific numerical implication. I cannot believe that Politian misstated the number of leaves to avoid a non-classical word (which he could have paraphrased in several ways), but I am quite ready to believe that he set a trap for his censorious contemporaries and would have sprung it by citing *decuria lictorum*, *decuria scribarum*, etc.

p. 116: There is some confusion in the reasoning about *litterae antiquae*. When Salutati sought a manuscript of Abelard in that script, he knew, of course, that the codex would be Mediaeval, but he probably believed that the Carolingian minuscule was the style of writing used in Roman times. I know of no evidence that any Humanist thought of a Carolingian manuscript, as distinct from the style of writing, as ancient. I have the impression, which I cannot document at the moment, that some early Humanists believed that Roman writing included both capitals, which were used alone on inscriptions, and minuscules, which were used in correspondence and ordinary books. That Politian knew better is shown by Miss Rizzo's very able analysis (147-64) of his use of *antiquus*, *vetus*, etc. with reference to the date of codices which she was able to identify and examine.

p. 137: When a Humanist closes a letter with the statement that he wrote *manu veloci*, he need mean no more than that he *composed* and wrote in haste, and I doubt that a reference to a cursive hand was ever intended.

⁹ What is more, it is virtually certain that when Vopiscus says *librum scribi* he means *codicem describi* or perhaps, since thirty books would make a bulky volume, *codices describi*; see Cicero Poghirc, *Studi Classici* 6 (1964) 153.

p. 200: Politian was, I think, absolutely consistent in distinguishing between *scriptor* and *librarius*. In the one passage that Miss Rizzo mentions as an exception (*Epist.* 4.9, near the end), she did not notice that (1) Politian is really quoting Priscian (*Inst.* 2.7 = Keil, Vol. II, pp. 47f.), and (2) Priscian was not talking about copyists, but about errors made by the original writer, i.e. either the author or the person who wrote to his dictation.

p. 238: I feel certain that Miss Rizzo misconstrues Poggio and creates a problem where none exists. I take *prima syncopa* as an ablative, and I understand Poggio to mean 'The text ends at the first lacuna with the following words . . .'

p. 278: For the use of *recensuit* at the end of Humanistic plays Miss Rizzo relied on a secondary source which I do not have at hand, but which evidently misled her. It is true that Ugolino's pathetic *Philogenia* ends, "Valete vos et plaudite. Alphius recensuit," but it is useless to speculate about the meaning of the last word if one has not noticed that Alphius is the name of the venal cleric who appears in Act IX, whence it seems to me likely that the actor who took that rôle was either the author or the director. The anonymous *Ianus sacerdos* ends, "Savucius edidit, Vgo recensuit," and Savucius is the name of the adroit young man who traps and exposes the holy pervert who is the protagonist; it appears therefore that the rôle was taken by either the author or the director, and that Hugo, who had the other of these two functions, did not act in the play.¹⁰ On the other hand, when Hercules Florus had the hero of his *Zaphira*, produced at Barcelona in 1502, end the play by quoting the colophon to the *Eunuchus* in the "Codex decurtatus" of Terence, "Ego Calliopeius recensui," he probably intended the audience to laugh.

p. 306: It is not quite correct to say that when some Humanists used *scheda* to mean 'first draft,' the word "ha evidentemente perduto il valore originario di 'foglio.'" They are using a different word, which

¹⁰ If the author observed the distinction made in the Scholia Bembina to Terence (ad *Heaut.* 10), "poëta docet, discit actor, edunt magistri," the rôle of Savucius was taken by the sponsor, but *edere* is commonly used of authors, and no one can have supposed that Calliopius composed the plays of Terence. As for the word *recitator* mentioned by Miss Rizzo (p. 278, n.3), it may not have retained its Mediaeval meaning. In the plays of Tito Livio, performed at Venice in 1432-35, the prologue of at least one is spoken by a *recitator*, whom C. W. Previtè-Orton, in his edition of the *Opera* (Cantabrigiae 1932; p. xxi), regards as the prompter. In Zemberti's *Dolotechne* (Venetiis 1504), a *recitator* delivers an epilogue after the actors have left the stage. It would not have been unreasonable to say that the prompter *recensuit* the speeches delivered by the various actors. The production of Latin comedies cannot have been very elaborate, except at princely courts. Tito Livio evidently directed his own plays, and other authors may have done likewise, and could even have served as prompters, if they did not appear on the stage themselves and had no one to assist them in rehearsals.

they learned from Isidore *Orig.* 6.14.8, who defines it as "quod adhuc emendatur et nondum in libris redactum est."¹¹

This book contains much more than its title promises. The author corrects *obiter* misprints and omissions in the early (and often only) printed editions of the Humanists' commentaries and other works, usually by reference to manuscripts she has collated. She has established to whom should be given credit for many emendations now falsely ascribed in the apparatus of our critical editions: for example, the correction in Cic. *Off.* 1.18.61, which Atzert, Fedeli, and others credit to Balduinus (1556), was made by Politian (before 1488), who also restored the Greek in Cic. *Fam.* 1.14.1 and saw that the verse in Suet. *Dom.* 14.2 had been preserved in the *Anthologia Planudea*. In Cic. *Fam.* 1.2.1 and 2.7.4, the emendations now attributed to "edd." were made by Valla. In Plaut. *Mil.* 1178, the credit belongs to the elder Beroaldus. I have given only samples of the rectifications that I hope to see in future editions.

Miss Rizzo examines critically several still unsolved editorial problems, notably the vexed question whether the manuscript of Statius's *Silvae* found by Poggio ever reached Italy. She pronounces no judgment, but she clears away the rubbish of theories based on misinterpretation of Politian's statements, and she has left to future editors only the choice between two alternatives. Her book is, indeed, a comprehensive study of the philological methods of the Humanists that will go far to correct the facile generalizations about reckless *divinatio* and the like that have been repeated from generation to generation in modern scholarship, and she gives us in an appendix a detailed study of Poggio's emendation of his manuscript of Cicero's *Philippicae* by collating the Ninth-Century manuscript that is now known as V. A second appendix describes the ways in which men kept copies of their own letters, and a third gives us for the first time an accurate critical edition of the part of Salutati's *De fato* in which the essentials of modern editorial methods are brilliantly anticipated. We shall all henceforth be indebted to Silvia Rizzo.

REVILO P. OLIVER

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

¹¹ Isidore calls this *scheda* a "nomen Graecum," presumably to distinguish it from the Latin word, but it seems not to occur in Greek. Lampe includes *σχέδη*, 'draft,' on the strength of one occurrence, of which both form and meaning are uncertain, in a Patristic writer of the late Sixth Century; *σχέδιον*, 'memorandum' (or possibly, 'rough draft') appears in Christian writers of the Fourth Century.

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
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Since it was founded in 1880 by Basil L. Gildersleeve, the *American Journal of Philology* has reflected the progress of classical studies in this country and abroad.

For almost a hundred years the *Journal* was edited exclusively by the members of the Department of Classics at the Johns Hopkins University.

As Johns Hopkins enters its second century it was felt that the *Journal* should become more fully representative of research done in all areas, and that scholars at other American universities should be invited to participate in editorial policy.

It is my pleasure to introduce the new members of the editorial board:

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
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Bernard M. W. Knox, *The Center of Hellenic Studies*

Jaen Puhvel, *University of California, Los Angeles*.

To the members of the former editorial board who will no longer serve I should like to express my thanks for the contribution they made to the *Journal*.

Georg Luck
EDITOR



AESCH., *PERS.* 922

γαῖ δ' αἰάζει τὰν ἐγγαίαν
ἦβαν κτλ.

Schol: ἐγγαίαν: ἐγγχώριαν.—τουτέστι τὴν ἐγγχώριον. ἢ οὕτως·
ἡ γῆ ἡμῶν τὴν ἔξω τῆς γῆς ἦβην κτλ.

The scholiast's alternative interpretation of ἐγγαίαν as ἔξω τῆς γῆς seems to paraphrase ἐκγαίαν, a compound which, though not elsewhere attested, is not unlikely to have been underlying the MS's ἐγγαίαν, as the pronunciation of ἐκ before γ as ἐγ in fifth- and fourth-century Athens is known to have influenced contemporary spelling (see Barrett *ad Hipp.* 447-50; see also ἐκγίγνομαι and ἐκγονος in the Suppl. to LSJ).

This would suggest that a variant reading ἐκγαίαν was known to the scholiast in Aesch., *Pers.* 922. Whether such a reading is acceptable, is another question. What seems to be important is the testimony of the scholiast to the existence of this variant.

RAANANA MERIDOR

THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM

THE FIRST STASIMON OF THE *HECUBA* 444ff.

At *Hec.* 100 the chorus enters to inform Hecuba that Polyxena, her last remaining daughter,¹ must shortly die, her sacrifice demanded by the ghost of Achilles as his price for releasing the Greek fleet which, returning from Troy, has been delayed by adverse winds on the shores of Thrace. The chorus tells how the Greeks themselves were at first divided, Agamemnon arguing on the girl's behalf, the sons of Theseus arguing for her death, and how the assembly was finally convinced by Odysseus' argument that gratitude to the greatest of their heroes requires the Greeks to give to Achilles the honor he demands. When Hecuba tells Polyxena of her impending fate Polyxena laments, not for herself, but for the grief which her death will cause Hecuba. Odysseus then arrives to fetch Polyxena, and Hecuba appeals to him for the life of her daughter; but Odysseus refuses, repeating his argument that Achilles, as the greatest of the Greeks, deserves the greatest honors from those whom he has benefited, and that his right to these honors did not end with his death but continues even now. Unlike Hecuba, Polyxena will not plead for her life, for, as she says, she had been a princess in the house of Priam, born to be a bride of kings, but now she is a slave to cook, to sweep, to weave, and to have her bed befouled by a husband who is nothing but a common slave. Polyxena has no hope of ever living honorably in Greece, and living without honor is a burden which she is not prepared to bear. "Take me off and kill me now," she says to Odysseus, and to her mother: "Do not interfere, but help me rather to escape disgrace." Odysseus leads Polyxena away to her death and the chorus sings the first stasimon (444ff.).

In this first stasimon the chorus ignore the sufferings of Polyxena and Hecuba, and sing instead of their own far lesser woes, viz. their future servitude in Greece. But if the chorus does not sing of Polyxena and/or Hecuba, then, we must ask, what if anything does this ode have to do with the rest of the

¹ Cf. 421. Hecuba's other daughters are all dead except Cassandra who has been made Agamemnon's concubine.

play? The easiest response would be to dismiss the ode as "irrelevant," but in order to do this we must also provide some convincing reason why Euripides would choose to write an irrelevant ode, and no such reason has yet been provided.² Indeed, both here and elsewhere, in the absence of some compelling proof that a particular ode is irrelevant, we would seem to be on far safer grounds methodologically if we assume that the ode is relevant to its context, albeit not in an immediate and obvious way with the chorus directly commenting on the dramatic situation. I believe that this is the case with the first stasimon of the *Hecuba*. By analyzing this ode I hope to show that it emphasizes certain themes which are in fact extensions of specific elements in the preceding scene; the relevance of the ode will then be seen to lie not in what the chorus says, but in the implications to be drawn from the juxtaposition of their statements to the preceding dramatic events.

We may begin our analysis of this ode with its most striking feature, its geographical references to "the anchorage of the Dorian land" (*Δωρίδος ὄρμον αἶας*, 450), Phthia (451-54), the Aegean islands, especially Delos (455-65), and Athens (466-74). "The anchorage of the Dorian land" is an anachronistic description of the Peloponnese where the Dorians later settled,³ while Phthia in southern Thessaly is used by synecdoche for Thessaly as a whole. The scholiast⁴ explains these references by associat-

² H. D. F. Kitto, *Greek Tragedy*² (London 1961) 221f., sees as the one overriding idea of the *Hecuba* "the suffering which the human race inflicts upon itself through its follies and wickedness," and argues that the purpose of the three choral odes is to keep before the audience the ruin of Troy "because the fall of Troy . . . is made the symbol of the whole—the sufferings of humanity—of which the events on the stage are parts and vivid illustrations." Kitto's argument seems more appropriate to the *Troades* than the *Hecuba* for the choral odes here, particularly the first and third stasima, deal not so much with the fall of Troy as with the chorus' personal experiences of that fall and its consequences, and these experiences are ill suited for the role of universal symbolism claimed for them by Kitto, piling as they do in comparison with the massive on-stage sufferings of Hecuba et al. G. M. A. Grube, *The Drama of Euripides*² (London 1973) 114, sees the chorus' songs providing background for and thus re-enforcing the sorrows of Hecuba, but again the "sufferings" of the chorus are so slight and picturesque that they provide, if anything, release from, not re-enforcement of, the on-stage sufferings.

³ Doris in northern Greece is totally landlocked and has no anchorage.

⁴ Ad 450, 451, 455, 466.

ing "the Dorian land" (i.e. the Peloponnese) with Agamemnon, Phthia with Achilles' son Neoptolemus, the islands again with Agamemnon since Homer says that Agamemnon *πολλῇσιν νήσοισι καὶ Ἀργεῖ παντὶ ἀνάσσειν* (B 108), and Athens with the sons of Theseus. This explanation is unsatisfactory. At this point in the play both Agamemnon and Neoptolemus have been briefly mentioned, Agamemnon arguing against Polyxena's death, Neoptolemus as her intended executioner, but neither has actually appeared—Neoptolemus never does—and neither has yet played any significant role in the action of the play comparable, e.g., to that of Odysseus who, by contrast, is totally ignored in this ode. Moreover, despite the quote from the *Iliad*, Agamemnon is not usually associated with the Aegean islands. Finally, this explanation does not account for the particular emphasis on Delos. On the other hand, as we shall see, the scholiast is at least partially right in his last point: the mention of Athens would recall the advocacy by Theseus' sons of the death of Polyxena.

The references to the Peloponnese and Thessaly can be adequately explained on a totally non-symbolic level. The Peloponnese and Thessaly were the two principal regions from which the Greek army was drawn, and the two regions to which the bulk of that army would return home with its captives, including the chorus. But neither the Aegean islands nor Athens provided comparable forces to the Trojan expedition, and neither are *prima facie* logical destinations for the captive women in the same way that the Peloponnese and Thessaly are.

In view of the anachronistic description of the Peloponnese as Dorian, it is possible that the chorus intends to say that its destination may be anywhere in the whole Greek-speaking world which they describe in terms of lands closely identified with its three principal ethnolinguistic divisions: the Peloponnese inhabited by Dorians, Thessaly inhabited by Aeolians, and the Aegean islands and Athens inhabited by Ionians.⁵ In the context of this threefold ethnic division the special references to

⁵ For this threefold division and for Aeolians in Thessaly, cf. e.g. Apollodorus 1.7.3. The same threefold ethnic division is seen, e.g. at *Troad*. 30f. where Poseidon describes the new masters of the captive Trojan women as Arcadians (early inhabitants of the Peloponnese substituted for the anachronistic Dorians), (Aeolian) Thessalians and (Ionian) Athenians.

Delos and Athens become understandable. From as early as the Homeric *Hymn to Apollo* (*Hym.* 3.147ff.) Delos was the site of a periodic *πανήγυρις*, a festal gathering for all the Ionians.⁶ Athens on the other hand styled herself the mother city of the Ionians⁷ and involved her allies, primarily Ionians, in her own Panathenaic festival which is also indirectly referred to in this ode (468-74, on which see below).⁸

While the chorus may foresee the locale of their future servitude as being anywhere in Greece, the only activity which they specifically mention as a part of that servitude is their possible participation in certain religious rites at Delos in honor of Artemis (462-65) and at Athens in honor of Athena (468-74). In considering these rites we should first note that Delos itself, though thought to be the birthplace of Artemis,⁹ was primarily associated not with Artemis but with Apollo. Thus the Athenians, following a custom which they believed went back to Theseus, annually sent a *θεωρία* to Delos in honor of Apollo.¹⁰ Moreover, the great Ionian *πανήγυρις* on Delos, as we know from the Homeric *Hymn* (3.146ff.), was primarily a festival in honor of Apollo, and at this festival the chorus of Delian girls,¹¹ whom the *Hymn* calls *ἐκατηβελέταο θεράπναι* (3.157), sang first (*πρῶτον*) of Apollo, and only then of Leto and Artemis as secondary deities (3.158-59). Over the centuries this festival declined in importance, but in the winter of 426/25 the Athenians purified the island of Delos and restored and reorganized the *πανήγυρις* (Thuc. 3.104). The importance given to

⁶ T. W. Allen, W. R. Halliday and E. E. Sikes, *The Homeric Hymns*² (Oxford 1936) 183ff., place the composition of the first part of the *Hymn* (addressed to Delian Apollo) in the eighth or seventh century B.C., and possibly earlier. Their eighth-century *terminus ante quem* for the foundation of the *πανήγυρις* itself is based on the reasonable assumption that the sacrifice and male chorus which Pausanias (4.4.1) says the Messenians sent to Apollo on Delos on one occasion in the eighth century were part of the general Ionian *πανήγυρις*. The frequency of the *πανήγυρις* at this early date is uncertain.

⁷ E.g. Hdt. 8.22.1-2, Thuc. 6.82.3-4, Isoc. 4.122.

⁸ For the allies' involvement in the great Panathenaic festival, see Benjamin Dean Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery and Malcolm Francis McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, 3 (Princeton 1950) 138, 148.

⁹ More precisely, Artemis was thought to have been born either on Delos itself or on the adjacent island of Rheneia.

¹⁰ Plato, *Phaedo* 58a8-b4.

¹¹ *κούραι Δηλιάδες*, *Hym.* 3.157; cf. *Δηλιάσιν . . . κούραισιν*, *Hec.* 462-63.

Delos in our ode is taken by scholars as a reflection of a heightened awareness of Delian ritual resulting from the reorganization of 426/25, and is the main reason for placing the *Hecuba* shortly after rather than before that date. We have then a Delian ritual oriented primarily towards Apollo, in part annually involving the Athenians, in part recently reorganized by the Athenians themselves so that Euripides' audience would be aware of the Delian ritual and its Apolline associations. When the chorus speaks in this context of serving Artemis rather than Apollo¹² it calls particular attention to the goddess and her worship. Because of this particular and unexpected emphasis we may be confident that the mention of service to Artemis, and presumably also the parallel mention of service to Athena, are intended to be something more than decorative elaborations on simple geographical references to Delos and Athens.

In the case of Athena there is a particular humiliation for the Trojan women in serving a goddess who had been one of the chief supporters of the Greeks. Artemis, however, had sided with the Trojans (cf. *Il.* Y 38-39) even though she took little active part in the war. The chorus, by failing to distinguish between service to their former supporter and service to their former enemy, seems to suggest that both past friendships and past hostilities are now irrelevant, and that all that really matters is the new—and totally friendless—situation in which the chorus finds itself.

Yet if all Euripides wished to convey here was a sense of being abandoned even by one's former divine protectors, then his purpose would have been served far more effectively if he had coupled service to Athena with service to Apollo, a more active supporter of the Trojans than Artemis and, incidentally, the primary god at Delos. Rather, the joint mention of service to Artemis and to Athena—and to no other god or goddess except Artemis and Athena—calls attention not to the differences between these goddesses but to what they have in common. There is, however, really very little which they do have in common, but this very fact lays special emphasis on what they do share,

¹² The chorus does allude to Apollo's birth on Delos (458-61), but unlike Artemis (and Athena), Apollo is not mentioned by name and, again unlike Artemis (and Athena), there is no suggestion that the chorus may also serve Apollo.

notably their one most obvious common characteristic, that they are the most prominent virgin goddesses in the Greek pantheon. Euripides, by associating his chorus with these two goddesses, leaves the impression that the chorus too will share in this same common characteristic, not precisely of virginity—the chorus are already parents (cf. 475) albeit young ones—but of sexual abstinence as part of their servitude in Greece. This impression is borne out by a consideration of the forms of service to which the chorus refers.

The first of these forms is that of praising Artemis with the Delian girls (462-65). Our knowledge of fifth-century religious rituals is so fragmentary that it is impossible to say whether or not a specific rite stands behind this allusion.¹³ However, unlike the Delian cult of Apollo which entered into Athenian domestic religion, there seems to be no special reason why the details of the Delian cult of Artemis should have been familiar to the Athenians.¹⁴ It is therefore not likely that Euripides here refers to some specific Delian ritual the knowledge of which has been lost to us; probably he is dealing simply in terms of general associations such as those of Muhammad with Mecca and of Mary with Lourdes.

But even if the reference to singing with the Delian girls is not intended to evoke any specific ritual, the special mention of the

¹³ There is to my knowledge no direct evidence for any aspect of the fifth-century Delian cult to Artemis beyond Herodotus' brief description of two minor rituals conducted in honor of the Hyperborean Maidens at their "tombs" near the temple of Artemis (Hdt. 4.34-35); the Hyperborean Maidens are closely associated with Artemis, but their exact origin and nature are far from certain (for a discussion of the problem and a possible solution see H. Gallet de Santerre, *Délos primitive et archaïque = Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*, fasc. 192 [Paris 1958] 165-73). There is some epigraphic evidence for the cult of Artemis on Delos in the third century and later, but it is probably unwise to project this data back into the fifth century: we do know that as a result of Delos' political vicissitudes and of the imperial ambitions of Athens the island's cult to Apollo was periodically reorganized (see T. Homolle, "Delia" in C. Daremberg and E. Saglio, *Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines*, t. 2, part 1 [Graz 1963] 59), and we cannot be sure that the same was not true for the cult of Artemis as well.

¹⁴ Although the Homeric *Hymn to Apollo* (3.158f.) does say that the Delian girls sang of Artemis after they had sung of Apollo as a part of the Ionian *πανηγυρίς*, the period which the *Hymn* describes is too remote to provide evidence that the worship of Artemis was also a part of the reorganized fifth-century *πανηγυρίς*.

Δηλιάδες κοῦραι nevertheless does play a role in the development of the ode as a whole. The word *κόρη/κούρη*¹⁵ is used most frequently for young girls who are not married. The mention of these *κούραι* here in association with Artemis calls to mind the virgin-goddess aspect of Artemis, the aspect of the goddess which is subsequently brought to the fore, as we have said, by the association of Artemis with Athena.

Unlike their service to Artemis, the service to Athena which the chorus anticipates (466-74) involves a quite specific Athenian cult ritual with which the audience could be expected to be familiar, the weaving of the peplos which was presented to Athena as a part of the Panathenaic festival. The mention of this particular cult act recalls the incident in the sixth book of the *Iliad* (Z 269ff.) where Hecuba, at the behest of Hector, takes the finest peplos from the palace stores and, in the company of other Trojan women, brings it to the temple of Athena where she offers it to the goddess with the prayer, which goes unheeded, that Athena take pity upon the Trojans. The present reference, however, is sufficiently different from the Homeric incident to show that it is something more than a simple re-evocation of the earlier event. For our purpose, the most important of these differences is the fact that Homer had described the final step in the process, the offering of a previously woven peplos, while the chorus speaks of the earlier step of actually weaving the peplos.

Our evidence concerning the weaving of the Athenian peplos is sketchy and, in part, contradictory. We do know that the process was nominally under the direction of two of the *ἄρρηφόροι*, young girls aged seven to eleven (*Etym. Mag.* s.v. *ἄρρηφορεῖν*), although the real supervisors were probably the priestesses of Athena who are mentioned by *Suda* (s.v. *χαλκεῖα*) as sharing with the *ἄρρηφόροι* the task of beginning to weave the peplos. The actual weaving on the other hand was done by females called *ἐργαστῖναι* (Hesych. s.v.). The Marcian scholiast, commenting on the present passage, says (on 467):

οὐ μόνον γὰρ παρθένοι ὕφαινον, ὥς φησιν Ἀπολλόδωρος
ἐν τῷ { . . . } περὶ θεῶν [FGH F 105], ἀλλὰ καὶ τέλειαι
γυναικες, ὥς Φερεκράτης ἐν Δουλοδιδασκάλῳ
[cf. fragm. 46 Kock].

¹⁵ Elsewhere when Euripides uses the Ionic *κούρη* instead of *κόρη* it is always

Clearly the scholiast here understands *τέλειαι γυναῖκες* as "married women," in contrast to *παρθένοι*, "maidens," and the use of *τέλειος* in the sense of "married," though rare, is not unparalleled.¹⁶ Thus, according to the scholiast, Apollodorus says only that maidens did the weaving while Pherecrates says that the weaving was done by married women as well (or instead). Because of comedy's well-known potential for humorous distortion, evidence drawn from a comic playwright such as Pherecrates must always be treated with suspicion. Moreover, in the present instance, the conflicting testimony of the scholarly Apollodorus appears to be confirmed by a first-century inscription (*IG* II² 1034) which speaks only of . . . τῶν παρθένων τῶν [ἡρ]ασμένων τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ τὰ ἔρια τὰ [εἰς τὸ]ν πέπλον,¹⁷ with no mention of married women. The weight of evidence requires us to reject Pherecrates' testimony, as related by the scholiast, that married women were engaged in weaving the peplos, and to conclude, with Apollodorus, that only unmarried females did the weaving.¹⁸ Euripides, for his own poetic

metri gratia in non-iambic passages. This seems to be the case here as well, although the form *κούραισιν* also recalls the language of the Homeric *Hymn to Apollo* (see above, note 11) and in effect emphasizes the "Ionicness" of Delos.

¹⁶ *LSJ* s.v. *τέλειος* I.2.b.

¹⁷ The inscription includes a listing with space for the names of at least 58 *παρθένοι*. The text of the inscription, except for the listing of *παρθένοι*, is also printed as *SIG*⁴ 718. The inscription is dated 98/7, but there is no reason to believe that it represents a situation significantly different from that of Euripides' day since the cults of Athens were not subject to the kinds of pressures which produced, e.g. the periodic reorganization of the Delian cult of Apollo mentioned above (note 13).

¹⁸ The statements of Pherecrates and Apollodorus cannot be reconciled by assuming that Apollodorus is speaking only of the *ἀρρηφόροι* while Pherecrates is referring to the *ἐργαστῖναι* since, according to *IG* II² 1034, the *ἐργαστῖναι* were *παρθένοι* as well. Nor can the conflicting statements be reconciled by assuming that Pherecrates used *τέλειαι γυναῖκες* in the sense of "adult women" with no reference one way or the other to marriage (*LSJ* s.v. *τέλειος* I.2.a) in order to say that unmarried females, both young girls and adult women, wove the peplos. Such an interpretation would be contrary to normal Greek usage which regularly contrasts *γυνή* and *παρθένος* as "married woman" and "unmarried girl" (e.g. *Soph. Trach.* 148, *Theoc.* 27.65; on *παρθένον γυναῖκα* at *Hes. Theog.* 513-14 see M. L. West *Hesiod: Theogony* [Oxford 1966] ad loc.). It also seems more natural to assume that the *παρθένοι* whose fathers approached the Boule with a request for a decree in their honor (*IG* II² 1034) were young girls rather than adult spinsters.

purposes, has allowed his chorus to make a slight mistake¹⁹ by imagining that they too could participate in the weaving even though they had already been married, and the scholiast (or the scholiast's source), taking the chorus' remarks as a reflection of fact, used Pherecrates' *τέλειαι γυναῖκες*, probably out of context,²⁰ to cover the circumstance of married women weaving the peplos.²¹

At a bare minimum then, the evidence shows that the weaving of the peplos was a specific cult act with which virginity was associated inasmuch as the peplos was woven under the official supervision of unmarried girls (the *ἀρρηφόροι*) and was offered to a virgin goddess (Athena). Moreover, if the preceding interpretation of the evidence is correct, not only the supervision but the actual weaving of the peplos was done by unmarried females.

To summarize our discussion of this point, the joint mention of Artemis and Athena calls attention to their most significant shared characteristic, that they are virgin goddesses. This emphasis on their virginity is re-enforced, on the one hand, by the mention of the Delian *κούραι*, the word suggesting young unmarried girls, and, on the other hand, by the reference to the weaving of the Athenian peplos, a cult act with strong virginal associations. By having his chorus say that it may serve two virgin goddesses, and specifically that it may do so in the company of the Delian *κούραι* or with those who weave the peplos, Euripides indirectly suggests as a possible condition of the chorus' future servitude if not actual virginity, since they are

¹⁹ Cf. their similar mistake of assuming that, though slaves, they would be allowed to weave the peplos. There is no indication that anyone other than freeborn citizens were allowed to participate in this rite.

²⁰ In view of the many different meanings of the adjective *τέλειος* it is impossible to conjecture what this original context might have been.

²¹ It is interesting to note that the Marcian scholiast cites Pherecrates' statement about *τέλειαι γυναῖκες* in a way which suggests that he is using it to refute a predominant tradition of which Apollodorus' statement is cited as an example, viz, that only *παρθένοι* did the weaving. Similarly the Vatican scholiast (on 444) begins his explanation of the peplos by saying that it was woven by *παρθένοι*; later, at the end of his explanation—apparently because of the words *ὁ μοι τεκῶν ἐμῶν* in the text (475)—he adds as a corrective that not only *παρθένοι* worked on the peplos, but also *αἱ μὴ οὕτως ἔχουσαι*. In the same way the Marcian scholiast also felt it necessary to explain *ὁ μοι τεκῶν ἐμῶν* (475) by adding the explanation *ἐν γὰρ τῷ χορῷ καὶ παρθένοι εἰσὶ καὶ γυναῖκες*.

widows, then at least an approximation of that state through sexual abstinence in the future.

Sexual imagery occurs again in the closing lines of the ode when the chorus sings (479-83):

ἐγὼ δ' ἐν ξεί—
να χθονὶ δὴ κέκλημαι δού—
λα, λιποῦσ' Ἀσίαν,
Εὐρώπας θεραπνᾶν ἀλλά—
ξασ' Αἰδα θαλάμους.²²

This passage is arranged in an $A_1 - B_1 - A_2 - B_2$ pattern, with (A_1) being a slave in a foreign land equated with (A_2) dwelling in Europe,²³ and (B_1) leaving Asia equated with (B_2) leaving the marriage chambers of Hades. The chorus can describe Asia as the marriage chambers of Hades, in the first instance, because their own husbands, with whom they shared their marriage chambers, are now dead in captured Troy, as the chorus will later sing in detail in the third stasimon (914ff., esp. 933-38). Here, however, the chorus sings not of their husbands but of their fathers (476) and of their children (475). In this lament for the generation which came before and for the generation which was to follow but now will not there is a feeling of universal loss: no matter what his age, every male in Troy is dead. In another sense, Asia itself, Troy—the land (χθονός, 476) and not merely the city—is also dead, destroyed in smoke and flame by the Greeks (476-79), as surely and as totally as the Titans were slain by the thunderbolt of Zeus (cf. 472-74). Indeed, the only way to remain in Asia is to die, “to marry Hades” in the image used by the chorus. But, it must be noted, the chorus does not remain in Asia, it acquiesces in slavery and in so doing it chooses to live rather than to die.

²² The text is that printed by Murray (*Euripidis Fabulae*, I [Oxonii 1902]) including Wilamowitz' emendation θεραπνᾶν (gen. pl.). For this construction with ἀλλάσσω, accusative for the thing given and genitive for the thing taken in exchange, cf. Aesch. PV 966-67, Thuc. 8.82.1 (ἀλλάσσω in the middle voice); a similar accusative with ἀλλάσσω is found at Eur. Alc. 660-61.

²³ The equation is re-enforced by the choice of the word θεραπνᾶν (482) for “abodes”; although “abode, habitation” is the only meaning of θεραπνῆ in Euripides, the word is used elsewhere (e.g. in the Homeric *Hymn to Apollo* 157) with the meaning “female servant,” a meaning which Euripides usually renders by the closely related θεράπεινα.

"Choose," however, is too strong a word to use for the chorus. At the start of the ode the chorus sings (444-47):

αὔρα, ποντιάς αὔρα,

 ποῖ με τὰν μελέαν πορεύ-
 σεις;

To choose is to act, but the chorus does not act, it only acquiesces and accepts. It is totally passive, ready, as it says, to be wafted by the gentle breeze (αὔρα, 444, the emphatic first word of the ode, further emphasized by repetition). The chorus does nothing, but then it has been reduced to such a position of helplessness that the only thing which it can do is to die, and this it will not do.

We have then an ode suggesting: (i) sexual abstinence, (ii) passivity, and (iii) slavery as an alternative to death. These three themes may be seen as reflections of specific elements in the preceding episode. In that episode Polyxena refuses to plead with Odysseus for her life. She does so in part, but only in small part, because she sees her death as inevitable anyway (cf. 346). The primary reason why Polyxena is willing to die is her desire to escape the disgrace which she sees as the unavoidable result of slavery (347ff., 370ff.). Thus while the chorus sees slavery as preferable to death, Polyxena sees death as preferable to slavery, for Polyxena, unlike the chorus and Hecuba, is still a believer in the old aristocratic code of the Homeric heroes, a code which requires, among other things, that honor (τὸ καλόν) be sought at all costs and that disgrace (τὸ αἰσχρόν) be avoided even at the cost of death.²⁴ By a particular irony, the original cause of Polyxena's death lies in another facet of this same aristocratic code, (the argument advanced by the sons of Theseus and by Odysseus) that respect is due the hero even after his death. And by a further irony, Polyxena herself reaps the rewards of this same code when, as we learn from Talthybius in the following episode, the Greeks, impressed by her

²⁴ On this aristocratic "heroic" code of values in general, see A. W. H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility* (Oxford 1960) 30ff., 154ff.; for Polyxena's maintenance of these values, see *ibid.* 161; for the role of these values in the *Hecuba* in general, see A. W. H. Adkins, "Basic Values in Euripides' *Hecuba* and *Hercules Furens*", *CQ* NS 16 (1966) 193-209.

noble heroism, honor Polyxena too after her death (cf. 571ff.). A particular system of values then, the old "heroic" aristocratic code, requires Polyxena's death. To one who stands apart from this code, the death of Polyxena may appear tragic, but to those who accept the code, as the Greeks who were convinced by Odysseus accepted it and as Polyxena herself accepts it, Polyxena's death is anything but tragic. Polyxena not only gets exactly what she wants, escape from the disgrace of slavery, but she obtains the further reward of respect for her heroism. In terms of the values which Polyxena holds, her death is a triumph, not a loss.

But is the audience expected to share or to question these values? On the one hand it may be noted that Athens in our choral ode receives a special emphasis by its final climactic position in the list of places. This emphasis on Athens reminds us of the special role which two Athenians, the sons of Theseus, played in the earlier debate when they argued that the Greeks should sacrifice Polyxena (120ff.). We are told that Euripides made Theseus' sons the advocates of Polyxena's death as a means of expressing his "bitterness against his country,"²⁵ but the *Hecuba* is a relatively early play (425 or 424)²⁶ and there is little evidence that Euripides had already turned anti-Athenian at this early date. Moreover, since there is nothing in the present ode to suggest that the mention of Athens here is in any way derogatory, we must conclude—unless we are willing to charge Euripides with gross inconsistency—that the earlier portrayal of the sons of Theseus was likewise not meant to be uncomplimentary. And if this is the case, then it must also follow that the position which the sons of Theseus, and later Odysseus, defend, that Polyxena should be sacrificed as an appropriate honor to the dead Achilles, is a position which Euripides' audience would find at least acceptable.²⁷ And if the sacrifice of Polyxena is acceptable, then the aristocratic code of honor

²⁵ Gilbert Murray, *Euripides and His Age* (New York and London 1913) 87, 117.

²⁶ Murray, *Euripidis Fabulae* (above, note 22), introductory note to the *Hecuba*. The *Hecuba* must be earlier than 423 since *Hec.* 171ff. are parodied in Aristophanes' *Nubes* (1165f.) which appeared that year.

²⁷ For the acceptability of this position to the contemporary Athenian audience, see Adkins, *CQ* NS 16 (1966) 198f.; cf. also A. C. Schlesinger, "Two

which is responsible for that sacrifice would likewise be at least acceptable.

And yet in our ode Euripides seems to be suggesting something quite different, not exactly that the aristocratic code is wrong, but that alternatives exist which the code cannot recognize. To begin with, Polyxena's adherence to the code requires her to assert her own independence as far as this is possible as a way of demonstrating that she is not a slave of others. If she must die at the hands of the Greeks, she will actively seek her own death and remake what necessity requires into the result of her own free will. Polyxena "takes charge," dominating the scene between herself, Hecuba and Odysseus to such a degree that, at the end of the scene, it is not Odysseus who orders about Polyxena, but Polyxena who commands Odysseus that he lead her away (432); and at her execution, as we learn from Talthymbius in the following episode, Polyxena stage-manages her own death in a way that demonstrates to all her own nobility and independence (545ff., esp. 549-52). In contrast, the chorus seeks nothing and accepts whatever will be. To the either/or choice of pleading for life (as Hecuba had done) or actively pursuing the goal of death (as Polyxena does), the chorus supplies a third alternative, passivity. Euripides does not say that this passivity is superior to the active choice of Polyxena—indeed, in the context, passivity would probably change nothing—, only that passivity does exist as a possibility unrecognized by the aristocratic code of Polyxena.

Further, while Polyxena views death as the escape from slavery, the chorus forces us to consider as well the converse which Polyxena might have caused us to forget, that slavery is also an escape from death. Similarly the chorus paints their own slavery in rather mild terms, while Polyxena sees her slavery as total humiliation, a humiliation which she concretizes in terms of the demeaning chores which a domestic slave must perform, and of the disgrace which she must suffer in sharing with a slave

Notes on Euripides," *CPh* 32 (1937) 67-70, who argues that, through the on-stage appearance of the ghost of Polydorus and through the arrangement of Hecuba's and Odysseus' speeches, Euripides has structured his play to favor the arguments calling for the sacrifice of Polyxena; Schlesinger thus sees the allying of Theseus' sons with the "right" side of the debate as a "patriotic touch" added by Euripides.

her bed once worthy of a king. The chorus' emphasis on virginity—a somewhat awkward emphasis if applied only to the chorus of young widows—is fully logical when applied to the still unwed Polyxena since it suggests a third alternative to her either/or proposition of sexual union with king or with slave, viz. no sexual union at all. And if there is a third alternative to king or slave, then, one feels, there must also be a third alternative to Polyxena's either/or of disgrace or death, and the chorus suggests what that alternative might be when it sings of serving goddesses instead of slave masters and, in contrast to Polyxena's demeaning vision of domestic chores, of a servitude with honor, weaving the peplos of Athena.

In all of this the women of the chorus are consciously commenting only on their own fate, but their comments, when juxtaposed as they are with the scenes which deal with Polyxena's death, force us to review those scenes in a new light. Specifically, the comments of the chorus more sharply define the aristocratic attitudes which account for Polyxena's death by suggesting alternative attitudes which are not immediately evident. Polyxena's death is the result of, and a triumph according to, the old "heroic" code of honor. Euripides is not implying that this code is wrong, and, if anything, the grandeur of Polyxena's behavior is enhanced by the contrast with the lesser behavior of the chorus. But Euripides does seem to suggest that this aristocratic code is not the only one by which one may live. Polyxena's code is one of extremes, extreme glory and extreme disgrace, extreme heroism and the extreme of death. Such a code has its own rewards for those, like Polyxena, who are capable of living by it. But Euripides seems to be saying that life need not be seen only in extreme terms, and that simpler rewards and lesser punishments are possible for the less heroic as well.

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NEGATIVE THEOLOGY AND ABSTRACTION IN PLOTINUS

In an article dated 1961, Jean Trouillard¹ asks whether the rejection of the excessively rationalist Plotinus bequeathed to us by a former generation of commentators will now entail a Plotinus who departs radically from classical intellectualism, a Plotinus for whom the activity of philosophy is nothing more than a postscript. "Ne faut-il pas craindre une exténuation de la philosophie, si l'essentiel est acquis avant son intervention?" (440). His own reply is that philosophy has an essentially critical

¹ "Valeur critique de la mystique plotinienne," *RPhL* 59 (1961) 431-44. Other relevant writings are as follows: Armstrong, A. H., "Plotinus' Doctrine of the Infinite and its Significance for Christian Thought," *Downside Review* 73 (1955) 47-58 (see Sweeney and Clarke); id., *The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus* (1940); Beierwaltes, W., "Die Metaphysik des Lichtes in der Philosophie Plotins," *ZPhF* 15 (1961) 334-62; Bréhier, E., "Le Parménide de Platon et la théologie négative de Plotin," *Sophia* 6 (1938) 33-38; Clarke, W. N., "Infinity in Plotinus: A Reply," *Gregorianum* 40 (1959) 75-98; Corte, M., "Plotin et la nuit de l'esprit," *Etudes carmélitaines* 23 (1938) 102-15; Daniélou, J., *Platonisme et théologie mystique* (Paris 1944); Eborowicz, L., "Le sens de la contemplation chez Plotin et saint Augustin," *Giornale di Metafisica* 18 (1963) 219-40; de Gandillac, M., *La sagesse de Plotin* (Paris 1966); Frenkian, A. M., "Les origines de la théologie négative de Parménide à Plotin," *Rivista Classica* 15 (1943) 11-50; Günther, P. R. E., *Das Problem d. Theodizee im Neuplatonismus* (Borna 1906); Hadot, P., *Théologie négative*, in *Encyclopaedia Universalis* (Paris); Hoffmann, E., *Platonismus und Mystik im Altertum* (Heidelberg 1935); Inge, W. R., *The Philosophy of Plotinus* (London 1929); MacLeod, C. W., "ΑΝΑΛΥΣΙΣ: A Study in Ancient Mysticism," *JThS*, N.S. 21 (1970) 43-55; Mensching, G., *Das heilige Schweigen*, (Giessen 1926), *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten*, Bd. xx, Hft. 2; Müller, H. F., "Das Problem der Theodizee bei Leibniz und Plotinos," *Neue Jahrbücher für Antike und deutsche Bildung* 57 (1919) 199-230; Puech, H. C., "La ténèbre mystique chez le Pseudo-Denys l'Aréopagite et dans la tradition patristique," *Etudes carmélitaines* 23/2 (1938) 33-53; Rist, J. M., "Plotinus on Matter and Evil," *Phronesis* 6 (1961) 154-66; id., "The Neoplatonic One and Plato's Parmenides," *TAPA* 93 (1962) 389-401; Schlette, H. R., *Das Eine und das Andere: Studien zur Problematik des Negativen in der Metaphysik Plotins*, (München 1966); Sweeney, L., "Plotinus revisited," *Gregorianum* 40 (1959) 327-31; id., "Another Interpretation of Ennead 6.7.32," *Modern Schoolman* 38 (1960-61) 289-303; id., "Infinity in Plotinus," *Gregorianum* 38 (1957) 515-35, 713-32; Trouillard, op. cit.; id., "The Logic of Attribution in Plotinus," *International*

role for Plotinus: it does not itself provide the goal of the philosopher, which is the ascent towards union with the One, but it recognizes and unmasks the One through the reasoning process.²

A. H. Armstrong has recently addressed himself to the same problem in an article entitled "Elements in the Thought of Plotinus at Variance with Classical Intellectualism."³ In the course of his discussion, Armstrong refers to the principle of negative theology, but does not regard it as a serious divergence from classical rationalism. "One may have to negate everything in the end; but one cannot negate it till one has understood it thoroughly. And negation does not mean abandonment" (21). It is the intention of this paper to provide a philosophical assessment of this notion of negation.

Armstrong also notes (20) that Plotinus is prepared to raise all sorts of awkward questions about the nature of thinking, and the validity of the rational processes that conduct the mind towards an apprehension of truth and intelligible reality. The negative approach raises precisely this question: it arises from the belief that more can be known about the One by the process of negation (*ἀπόφασις*, or more exactly as far as Plotinus is concerned, *ἀφαίρεσις*) than by the process of affirmation or predication (*κατάφασις*). In other words, it is safer, and indeed more accurate to say of the One that it is non-just, than that it is just. The latter statement, despite its intention of approximating to some quality belonging to the One, merely serves to place limitations on the perception of the One. To predicate justice of the One is

Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1961) 125-38; *La Procession plotinienne* (Paris 1955); id., *La Purification plotinienne* (Paris 1955); Whittaker, J., "Neopythagoreanism and the Transcendent Absolute," *SymbOslo* 48 (1973) 77-86; id., "ΕΠΕΚΕΙΝΑ ΝΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ," *Vigiliae Christianae* 23 (1969) 91-104; id., "Neopythagoreanism and Negative Theology," *SymbOslo* 44 (1969) 109-25; Wolfson, H. A., "Albinos and Plotinus on divine attributes," *HThR* 45 (1952) 115-30; Zandee, J., *The Terminology of Plotinus and of Some Gnostic Writings, Mainly the Fourth Treatise of the Jung Codex* (Brill 1961).

² Trouillard notes that the corresponding function in the sphere of ethics and religion is the process of purification (*κάθαρσις*). The use of imagery drawn from popular religion is not without interest for this study; the notion of *σιγή* in religious observance is used to cast light on the approach to the One via negation.

³ *JHS* 93 (1973) 13-22.

practically on the same level of absurdity as to predicate a furrowed brow of the One: in fact all human discourse is made for another task than that of describing this ultimate Being. Thus its extreme transcendence renders discourse inadequate: language is an instrument designed for the apprehension of lower realities than the One.

The negative approach, which, as we shall see, is based on the idea of abstraction in Plotinus, has parallels within the sphere of popular religion, and two aspects of the religious phenomenology of the time serve Plotinus in the manner in which he illustrates the procedure of abstraction. Firstly abstraction is presented as analogous to the purification ritual of the mysteries. In *Enn.* 1.6.1.7 we are given a fairly classical description of the ascent of the soul: anyone who has seen the Good, we are told, knows what Plotinus means when he says that it is beautiful.⁴ When ascending one puts off that which one accumulated during the fall or descent of the soul: this stripping off of concepts is compared to the stripping of the clothes of the initiate to the mysteries, and to the rites of purification which precede them (*οἷον ἐπὶ τὰ ἅγια τῶν ἱερῶν τοῖς ἀνιοῦσι καθάρσεις τε καὶ ἱματίων ἀποθέσεις*). In order to see, the self must rid itself of corporeity, which though it does derive from the One is at the same time absolutely foreign to it.⁵ Similarly, *Enn.* 1.2.19.4 raises the question of purification, ostensibly in an effort to define virtue, but in fact in a manner which clarifies the notion of the ascent and conversion (*ἐπιστροφή*) of the soul. The process is likened to being stripped of what is alien (*ἀλλότριος*). Traces of the Good in the soul mean that the purification process leads to a positive result, but Plotinus hesitates over stating that the end product is the Good itself: it is rather a good which is prone to allying itself with both that which is opposite to it and that

⁴ This manner of alluding to the ultimate experience is also familiar from the mysteries: see Paus. 1.37.4. Dubbed "allusionisme" by Méautis, "Plutarque et l'Orphisme" in *Mélanges Gustave Glotz* (Paris 1932) 577-78, it stresses the principle of the *arcana* in both the mysteries and Neoplatonism, by implying that only those few who have had the experience can genuinely be said to understand it.

⁵ Armstrong (Loeb ed., p. 252-54) notes the comparison with Plato, *Symposium* 211. Trouillard sees the whole of philosophy as being cathartic (i.e. critical) in Plotinus.

which is kindred to it. In this way the abstracting process is couched in terminology which is familiar from the religious context; conversely, one could regard it as an early example of the Neoplatonic attempt to give the philosopher's version of popular religion.

A second major parallel between the negative method and traditional religion may be found in the use of the theme of silence: silence was considered to be a part of protocol in the mysteries, a ritual recognition of the awesomeness of the divinity, and apart from its ritual value it also had a real value, in that the divine presence was thought to strike dumb—to reduce the initiate to a state of trembling inarticulateness.⁶ Thus in *Enn.* 6.8.39.11, after exploring the possible relationship of chance and necessity with the One, and stating that the Good does not exist (*οὐδὲ ὑπέσται*), Plotinus asks what then is this thing which does not exist? The reply is simply that we can seek no further; that we must depart in silence (*σιωπήσαντας*), having been forced into an intellectual impasse (*ἐν ἀπόρρῳ τῇ γνώμῃ*). This passage moreover develops into a classical statement of the negative approach: as the Beutler/Theiler notes point out, in accordance with Aristotle's view⁷ that for any entity one must investigate four aspects, *τὸ ὅτι, τὸ διότι, εἰ ἔστι, τί ἔστι*, Plotinus examines the existence, nature and origin of the One, maintaining that it has a form of existence, but that the other categories are inapplicable. We can find no cause for the Good, since that would be to seek a higher principle, and the universal principle has itself no principle. In our efforts to grasp the One we tend, says Plotinus, to imagine a kind of place or location, such as chaos, into which we then introduce the One. We are then left wondering how and whence it came into this place. Such an image must be dispensed with, and such questions dismissed. It has no place, no quality, no form, no relation to any other being (*οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο*). All we can say is that it is, and this merely

⁶ Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* 5.11.67.3) tells us the story that Pythagoras imposed a five-year vow of silence in his disciples in order for them to better pursue their contemplation of the divine. Passages throwing light on what could be called the phenomenology of silence have been collected by O. Casel, *De Philosophorum Graecorum Silentio Mystico* (Giessen 1919): see also my "Theme of Silence in Clement of Alexandria," *JThS* 24 (1973) 197-202.

⁷ *An. post.* 2ff.

to make discourse about it possible (ὥς ἔστι, λεγόμενον ὑπ' ἀνάγκης τῶν λόγων εἶναι).⁸

But the silence provoked by the One ought really to be seen as a major onslaught on the usefulness of language in this regard, and this particular problem provides one very useful lead-in to the Plotinian use of negative theology. Porphyry describes Plotinus's mystical experiences as occurring in "unspeakable actuality," and the use of the term ἄρρητος here is not simply empty rhetoric. It also is a term familiar from the mysteries, designating the inexpressible character of the divine presence; τὰ ἄρρητα often refers to the content of the mysteries. In 4.3.27.38 we are told that both reasoning and language are characteristic of the soul only in its this-worldly state: in the higher state, the souls are like eyes which see all since nothing is concealed. All is immediately evident, and thus the uncertainties which render language necessary are removed. Even on this level we know by sight alone, but never totally. The central idea here is a strange one: souls on the level of the intelligible act in order (ἐν τάξει) and according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν); there is therefore no need for the giving of orders or advice—this does seem an intriguing way of characterizing the essential function of discourse.⁹

Secondly, language is a result of multiplicity, in Plotinus' thought. In 5.3.27.13 the word ἄρρητος is again used of the One, since to apply a name to it would be to imply that he was one among a series of things; and in any case, such a name would detract from the self-sufficiency of the One since it would be other than the One. There is a clear statement throughout Plotinus that language is a way of coping with multiplicity, since objects are distinguished from one another by names or predi-

⁸ Plotinus' willingness to say that the One "is" (ἔστι), but does not "exist" (υπέσθη) might cause one to posit a consistent distinction between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις. I do not think this can be sustained. The two terms are not technical in the sense that they have no distinct and carefully adhered to usage. In 6.8.39.20 he reverses the present distinction, asserting that the One is without essence (ἄνευ οὐσίας), but has "a sort of existence" (τὴν οἷον ὑπόστασιν). See R. E. Witt, 'ΥΠΟΨΤΑΣΙΣ, in *Amicitiae Corolla, A Volume of Essays Presented to James Rendel Harris*, edited by H. G. Wood (London 1933); esp. p. 335ff.

⁹ Similarly, reasoning is seen as a diminution of the intelligence. The soul that resorts to reasoning to grasp the nature of reality is like the artist who has lost his instinctive artistry: props and techniques are required as auxiliaries.

cates. At certain points language is seen simply as a list of names for the multiplicity of differentiated objects which populate the sensible world. Intellection also implies multiplicity; the human intelligence is separative in its function (*ὁ μερίζων νοῦς*). In 5.3.49.11 the intelligence is also depicted as a fragmenting force, on the basis of the explanation given in 10: it focusses on either sameness or difference, both of which presuppose a multiplicity of objects to be compared under these categories. They are in fact the ultimate genera of *Sophist* 254ff. and *Timaeus* 35ff., and one notes how precisely the Stranger in *Sophist* 259e foreshadows the Plotinian problem of discourse: "The separation of each thing from all (others) is the ultimate stalemate of all discourse. For our discourse emerges out of the interweaving of classes with each other." Thus Plotinus in 10, 24ff. asserts that discourse (*λόγος*) is multiple and that indivisibility entails the impossibility of discourse (*ἡλογώθη*).

It is clear that Plotinus is saying not only that intelligence renders multiple, but that it is also itself multiple: in taking the object into itself, the intelligence multiplies it (*λαβοῦσα ἐν αὐτῇ αὐτὸ πολὺ ποιήσασα*); *Enn.* 5.3.49.11 begins with the statement that the intelligence is multiple. Any attempt to apply the intelligence to the One multiplies it, and it therefore recedes from the grasp of the intelligence. Thought is on a level with being, that is, being which has expanded to its fullness by taking on the form of thought and life: and thought is therefore multiple (*πολλά*; 6.6.34.6). The very act of vision implies multiplicity, since it comprises the seeing intelligence and the object seen: further, the object seen is multiple in itself. If it acts it must affect another object, or if it acts on itself alone, it must itself be composite or multiple (5.3.49.10).

This passage alludes to another sort of approach towards the end, where the possibility of apprehension which does not *embrace* the object known, and therefore does not absorb its multiplicity, is mentioned. This contact of thought and the object is considered by Plotinus to be not yet knowledge, but simply touch (*θίξις*). Such non-embracing contact is thought to be *ἄρρητος* (perhaps "non-verbal" in this context) and non-intelligent (*ἀνόητος*), and is clearly not considered by Plotinus to be a form of knowledge. The touch/contact model for the relation of the mind to the object is a familiar issue, since

Epicurean epistemology had endeavoured to reduce knowledge to this status. And Plotinus is susceptible to this view in certain contexts, where a higher level of knowledge is under discussion. The touch/view of knowledge can be useful in understanding the relation of the mind to the One, where there can be no thought of the mind "embracing," "circumscribing," or taking the One into itself. Clement of Alexandria also found the idea useful in the context of his own Christian Platonism, and indeed the extreme transcendence of the deity in both profane and Christian Platonism made it difficult to conceive of the actual mode of contact between the mind and the divine: the idea that they simply touched must have seemed safer than any notion which seemed to imply grasping, or embracing. It should be stressed however that this idea is toyed with, only.¹⁰

The background to these passages is the stock Greek theme of the identity of nature between the knower and the known; put differently, the view is that intelligible objects are inside the intellect. *Enn.* 3.8.30.8 states that objects known tend to become identical with the knowing subject, not merely like each other, but actually and substantially the same, and this principle is stated repeatedly in relation to the intelligible. Both this passage and 5.1.10.8, 17 quote (in this first case, loosely) Parmenides' statement that thinking and being are one and the same (*τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι*).¹¹ Now it is clear that the Good is above the level of the intelligible, which is located at the level of essence. In 6.7.38.37 it is stated that the Good is above intelligence; 6.7.38.36 confirms this. The ontological status of the One will be examined more closely in a moment, but it can be accepted that what is true of intelligence and the intelligible cannot ordinarily apply to the One. But Plotinus does nevertheless extend the principle of the identity of the knower and the known, perhaps by analogy, to the issue of the soul's knowledge of the One. This is one of the positive declarations he is prepared

¹⁰ See *Strom.* 5.11.74.1 and my comments in an article to appear in *Vigiliae Christianae* (1976): Clement uses the touch model of knowledge in order to move away from the idea that God can be known *ὁριστικῶς*. See also J. M. Rist, *Epicurus: An Introduction* (Cambridge [Eng.] 1972) 32-37, and *Plotinus. The Road to Reality* (Cambridge [Eng.] 1967) 50ff.

¹¹ Parm. Fr.B3 (Diels-Kranz).

to make about the knowledge of the One, and it does stand out amid the general carnage wrought by the negative method.

In the case of the intelligible, the multiplicity of objects known is matched by the multiplicity of the intellect; and the two merge. This is an old Platonic theme, according to which the epistemological apparatus to be used must somehow be the same as the objects which are to be grasped by it. There has to be a sort of ontological similarity between the two parties. Plotinus now extends this to the knowledge of the One, and here again the same conditions which apply to the "ontology" of the One must be held to apply to the ontology of the knower. Thus in 1.6.1.9 the true visionary becomes nothing other than pure light, not "measured by dimensions, or bounded by shape into littleness, or expanded to size by unboundedness, but everywhere unmeasured, because greater than all measure and superior to all quality."¹² Epistemology here runs into ontology, since the primary conditions to be fulfilled for knowing the One concern the individual's state of being.

The extension of this notion from the intelligible to the One I take to be clearly stated in 6.7.38.36, where we are told that our thought rises to the height of the intelligible, then moves up to the One, carried on by a kind of wave, when suddenly we see: not an object, but light itself. Just as there is no distinction between the intelligence and its object, so here there is no distinction between the object seen and the light which illuminates it; there is but light (*οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἐν ἐκείνῳ τὸ μὲν ὁρώμενον, τὸ δὲ φῶς αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ νοῦς καὶ νοούμενον, ἀλλ' αὐγὴ γεννώσα ταῦτα εἰς ὅστερον καὶ ἀφείσα εἶναι παρ' αὐτῷ*). The analogy is also present in *Enn.* 3.8.30.11, where it is said that in respect of seeing, a form of fulfilment and completion comes from the object perceived. Similarly the Good brings fulfilment to the intellect, which becomes conformed to the Good. The form (*εἶδος*) which comes upon it from the Good conforms it to the latter (intellect is a potency which may become act, like sight, and therefore is subject to the form/matter distinction. The form which the intellect strives towards is stamped upon it by the Good, which thus leaves a trace on it). The confusion of vision and object seen on the level of the One is attested also in

¹² Armstrong's translation, Loeb ed., 259-61.

5.3.49.8, and from this passage one may glean some explanation of the idea of light which Plotinus uses: he was much attracted to this image, as were, it would seem, most Greek-speaking intellectuals of late antiquity, and in philosophy the notion of light has a genuine metaphysical use.¹³ Light is not considered to enable vision, but as being vision itself: it does not elucidate in order to enable sight, but is sight itself. Even on the level of the intelligible, we are told, light is vision: the internal light of the eye merges with external light. Thither, of course, there is no organ such as the eye, and no looking outside the organ. Light is seen by light: light sees itself. There is no thought of seeing the One as lit by light, nor of seeing any form: the soul sees light itself which is formless (5.5.32.7).

Transcendence and abstraction

In the first place it is necessary to determine the position of the One on the ontological scale, particularly with reference to being and intelligence, and Plotinus' most characteristic formula for making this clear is borrowed from the *Republic* (6.509b), where Plato compares the Good to the sun, and states that the Good is beyond essence (*ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*). This phrase was elevated in both Neoplatonism and Patristic philosophy to the status of a technical term, and the word *ἐπέκεινα* in particular is very widely used in statements of transcendence.¹⁴ The phrase is found in Plotinus under various guises and describes the position of the One in relation to essence and the intelligible. In 6.8.39.19 Plotinus refers to Plato's phrase as allegorical,¹⁵ and proceeds to try to discern its full significance: the One engenders essence, but in no sense is the slave of essence. The One has no essence of its own, and is

¹³ See Beierwaltes, *op. cit.*

¹⁴ A searching examination of this phrase has been carried out by J. Whitaker, 'ΕΠΕΚΕΙΝΑ . . .', (*supra* n. 1) who notices a problem with regard to *οὐσία* and *νοῦς*. This does not seem to apply to Plotinus, who regarded them more or less consistently as equivalent.

¹⁵ δι' αἰνίξεως. The revised Liddell and Scott list only one case of the word αἰνίξις, and it is the reference under discussion here. αἰνίγμα in late Greek in general refers to symbolic or allegorical utterances, and it is reasonable to understand αἰνίξις in this manner: see my *Connaissance religieuse et herméneutique chez Clément d'Alexandrie* (Leiden 1973), Appendix II.

superior to and outside the essence it has created. That essence and the intelligible (*νοῦς / νόησις*) are on an identical level, and that the One transcends them both, is demonstrated in 1.7.54.1 where firstly the One is said to be beyond beings (*τῶν ὄντων*) and then beyond essence (*οὐσίας*). Further, it is stated that *because* the One is beyond essence (*ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας*), it is also beyond activity (*ἐνέργεια*) and the intelligible.¹⁶ The One is *ἐπέκεινα ὄντος* in 5.5.32.6, and here Plotinus notes that this is a description of a negative kind: it does not attempt to label the One, but merely asserts that it is not such-and-such. And in 5.6.24.6 it is stated that whatever is beyond essence is also beyond thought (*τοῦ νοεῖν*).

This being the case, the One becomes very difficult to handle in terms of thought and discourse. Its extreme transcendence renders inappropriate all the knowing apparatus associated with the intelligible, and the One is thus portrayed as fleeting and elusive. We must not pursue it, but wait, as for a sunrise (5.5.32.8): the vision will come suddenly, but once we seem to have grasped it it will escape us, or rather we will slip from this state of vision (5.5.32.10). The normal process of predication is impossible: the One is ineffable (*ἄρρητος*); we can talk about it (*περὶ αὐτοῦ*) but we cannot declare or state it (*οὐ μὴν αὐτὸ λέγομεν*), and we have neither knowledge nor notion of it. It is neither predicated (*κατηγοροῖτο*) of anything, and is therefore not a genus (6.2.43.9); nor is anything predicated of him (6.7.38.38). Since nothing can be predicated of the One, there can be no *λόγος οὔτε αἰσθησις οὔτε ἐπιστήμη*. Here we encounter the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides* 142a, from which these words are taken.

Plotinus proceeds by piling negative on negative—the name Apollo is considered to symbolise the transcendent state of the One since it is held to derive from *ἀ-πόλλων*—the negation of multiplicity (5.5.32.6). The One is without form, or individuali-

¹⁶ The Plotinian identification of essence and the intelligible is quite consistently maintained, except for 1.3.20.5 where it is said that wisdom is concerned with being, but intelligence with that which is beyond being (*νοῦν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος*). This is clearly inconsistent, unless we wish to maintain that *τοῦ ὄντος* is a lower grade of reality than *τῆς οὐσίας*, which is highly dubious: this passage can be added to Whittaker's list of difficulties expressed over the relation of essence and intelligence (op. cit., 104).

ty: it has neither movement nor rest. It is not finite, nor multiple, nor measurable, nor numerable (5.5.32.10-11). We cannot even say "it is," for it has no need of being; we cannot even use the copula by saying "it is good," since this would imply its existence, plus the attribute of goodness. All we can legitimately say is "the Good" (τἀγαθόν). Nor does he himself say "I am the Good," since he is prior to thought (6.7.38.38).

How then do we know the One? By the use of analogies¹⁷ and abstractions (ἀφαιρέσεις). The latter is one of three terms which could denote the negative method: negation (ἀπόφασις) is distinguished in 6.3.44.19 from στέρησις, but neither of these is given prominence. The term used by Plotinus is ἀφαιρέω: to abstract from.

Schlette (op. cit., 54) inadvisedly links privation (στέρησις) with the negative theology of Plotinus, considering that the idea of privation and the absence of the Good provide a metaphysical framework for the understanding of the force of negativity in Plotinus. This view is anachronistic (it makes Plotinus later than he is in fact) in two distinct ways. Firstly, as has been noted, the Plotinian formulation of negative theology is based on abstraction. The term privation has a long history in Greek philosophy; it is part of Aristotelian logic, in which context it is considered to be a form of negation (*Cat.* 11b17ff.; *Metaph.* 1011b). Chrysippus (*SVF* II.13) analyses the uses of the term, as does Sextus Empiricus (*Against the Physicists*, 1.406-8). Interestingly enough, the latter discusses it in the context of the geometrical idea of analysis: we are told that the geometers state that "the line is length without breadth" (1.390). It has already been noted that this notion of analysing and refining geometrical figures into their component parts until the ultimate abstraction of the point is reached, lies behind the negative theology formulated by the middle Platonists. Sextus rejects the geometers' method by urging that it rests on the use of privation (στέρησις) as a logical technique: but, he argues, privatives such as non-breadth have no existence. The sceptical view is therefore that length without breadth does not exist, and that consequently the line itself does not exist. This could of course count as an argument against the mathematical formulation of negative theology given by Al-

¹⁷ See Wolfson, op. cit.

binus, Clement of Alexandria, and Celsus/Origen,¹⁸ although Sextus Empiricus does not have this immediately in view.

The situation with Plotinus is quite different. He uses the word ἀφαίρεσις to explain his negative theology, and reserves privation (στέρησις) for a quite separate treatment, discussing it in the context of matter or the substrate, and not in conjunction with epistemological questions. In *Enn.* 1.8.51.11 and 2.4.12.14 the question of privation as a source of evil is raised, and it is considered whether privation is to be separated from matter definitionally, the two being considered one by nature (ἐν ἅμῳ, λόγῳ δὲ δύο; 2.4.12.14).¹⁹ In this latter passage Plotinus argues that such a position fails, on the ground that if the substrate and privation are so similarly conceived as to result in their being considered one nature, there is no longer any possibility of drawing a definitional distinction between them. Plotinus does not in fact proceed much further than this in his ideas on στέρησις, and in *Enn.* 6.7.38.37 there is a clear suggestion that the logic of privation is inappropriate to reasoning about the One. Privation of a function is here alleged to imply that the subject in fact possesses that function, though it is momentarily dormant: for example, to affirm of the One by privation (κατὰ στέρησιν) that the One "is not thinking," implies that the One does possess this function, but is not at present exercising it. It is as fallacious as predicating not practising medicine of (for example) a lawyer: practising medicine and not practising medicine, in the privative form of the negative, can only be predicated of a doctor. This is the specific logic of privation as a form of negation, and it is thus entirely inappropriate to the One. Such a mode of negating in discourse about the One would implicitly ascribe qualities which it does not possess.

For these reasons Schlette's attempt to link the negative process and privation are misconceived, as is his tendency to speak of Negativity as an alienating force (pp. 206 and 214, where multiplicity and otherness are said to provide the metaphysical ground for Negativity; see also p. 216). This view of Plotinus results from reading later developments in Neo-

¹⁸ See *Contra Celsum* 7.42. Celsus uses the word ἀνάλησις, but means what Sextus means by στέρησις and Albinus by ἀφαίρεσις. See Festugière's valuable discussion in *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, (Paris 1949-54) IV, 119-23.

¹⁹ See Aristotle, *Phys.* 1.9.

platonism and Christian Neoplatonism in particular, back into his writing. Negative theology and abstraction in Plotinus, it must be stressed, are epistemological problems, and are not related to an alienating force of otherness, or Negativity. There are references in Plotinus to an alienating power, or a "region of unlikeness," the "mud of darkness" (1.8.51.14): this seems to be the force of "the other" (τοῦ ἀλλοτριίου), also referred to as τῆς ἐτέρης φύσεως (1.6.1.5). But these ideas are not related to the problem of conceptualising the One through abstraction.

It is significant that it is the idea of abstraction which is selected by Plotinus as the vehicle for his negative theology: it is already familiar from Albinus,²⁰ who relates it to the method of mathematical abstraction: one derives the concept of the line from the concept of surface, and from the concept of line one abstracts all until only the point is left. Thus ἀφαίρεσις is a positive way of developing a concept of the highest principle, which is in fact negative in character.

The mathematical version goes back to Aristotle's discussion of the geometrical shapes being built up progressively from each other,²¹ but one should not overlook the fact that a general view of reality is implied in this discussion. Plato has an interesting passage in the *Laws* (894a1-5): "The condition under which coming-to-be universally takes place—what is it? Clearly it occurs when its starting point has received increment, and so come to its second stage of transition, and from this to the next, and so by three steps acquires perceptibility to percipients." The incremental view of reality thus expressed, whereby additions are successively made to an insubstantial starting point, lies at the heart of the abstraction version of negative theology: it justifies the process.

Whittaker has rightly denied²² that ἀφαίρεσις in Plotinus has anything to do with negation as such. Now it is indeed striking that the term ἀπόφασις is not used by Plotinus in relation to negative theology—he seeks a term which connotes stripping off. The term ἀπόφασις is discussed in 6.3.44.19, but Plotinus seems unable to settle the problem of how to relate it to the

²⁰ 10.5 (ed. Louis).

²¹ *De Caelo*, 299a6ff.; *Metaph.* 992a10ff.

²² *Neopythagoreanism* . . . , p. 123ff.

theory of categories; the interpretation he gives of Aristotle's categories is that they refer both to semantics and to the real objects thereby designated. But he seems to founder on the problem of finding an object for negation to refer to. Is "non-white" merely a noise, he asks: if not, what does it really designate?

The value of the notion of abstraction is that it is at once positive and negative—it is more an act of refinement or purification of a concept than an act of negation. Abstraction means the abandonment of one notion for a more subtle one: it thus represents an ascent, a step forward. To take the mathematical example which we have assumed to lie behind Plotinus' thinking, the negation of the concept "line" simply results in "non-line," but the abstraction results in "point." Abstraction also implies the belief in continuity between the One and the lower results of its emanation. The creative process, which is also a form of degeneration, involves nonetheless a continuing link from level to level: it is axiomatic in Neoplatonism that each stage is contained in a more perfect degree in the stage above it.²³ It is this identity between the One and what it has engendered that makes abstraction the more appropriate term, suggesting as it does the searching after the thin line that leads to the One and the technique of excising those substances and modes of being with which it is overlaid. The sheer negative would have emphasised the alien character of reality. Occasionally the process is represented as the total contradiction of ordinary concepts, as in 5.5.32.11 where we are advised to hold opinions opposite (*δόξαν ἀντιστρέπτειν*) to those of persons overly attached to sensible reality.

But the usual sense of abstraction should be understood to stand in relation to the purificatory process, and it is regarded as part of rationalism. Abstractions and analogies are said to "teach us," and these are coupled with knowledge of the beings which have issued from the One (6.7.38.36). These activities are classed as *μάθημα*. Hence one may infer that for Plotinus negative theology is not radically "apophatic": it is clear that where

²³ It may be noted that abstraction can function downwards: in 1.8.51.9, it is said that we can know evil by abstraction, since it is not virtue. Dismantling the concept of virtue can lead to a notion of evil: but here again abstraction presupposes identity.

negation in its strict sense is employed in the theological process, there can be no thought, and no progress. Negative theology becomes the stalemate of rational procedures, and this is not Plotinus' intention; he presents us with a method which is still moderate in character, and which is designed to be critical but productive.

One may conclude that the main problem in grasping the One is the avoidance of multiplicity: to conceive of the One as an object is to see him as one among many. The normal use of intellect involves predication, which introduces plurality since the logic of predication involves the multiple structure of the subject and the predicated quality. Abstraction has an opposite logic, since it involves subtracting from the subject rather than adding to it.

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OID, METAMORPHOSES 2.760-64

Protinus Invidiae nigro squalentia tabo
tectata petit. domus est imis in vallibus huius
abditata, sole carens, non ulli pervia vento,
tristis et ignavi plenissima frigoris, et quae
igne vacet semper, caligine semper abundet.

The purpose of this paper is twofold. My primary aim is to make a case for taking the description of the house of *Invidia* at *Metamorphoses* 2.760-64 as allegorical in nature.¹ My thesis will be that this description is composed of various images which in the ancient world were associated with the notion of envy. In support of that contention I shall point to the fact that Ovid makes use of these same images later in the same episode in recounting how Minerva knocks at *Invidia*'s door, rouses her and sends her off to punish Aglauros, the daughter of the Athenian king Cecrops, by infecting her with envy for her sister Herse, who had had the good fortune to attract the god Mercury as a suitor (765-832). The paper's secondary object is to elucidate and illustrate the connection between *inertia* and *invidia*, a connection which has not to my knowledge been dealt with.² The reason for this concern with *invidia* and *inertia* is that I believe that Ovid in describing *Invidia*'s abode as *ignavi plenissima frigoris* (763) is referring in an allegorical manner to the conviction that the idle and inactive are peculiarly prone to feelings of envy at the success of others.

¹ F. Bömer, *P. Ovidius Naso, Metamorphosen, Kommentar* 1-2 (Heidelberg 1969) 416 denies that this passage is allegorical. For the opposite view, see M. von Albrecht in the corrected impression of Haupt, Korn, Müller and Ehwald, *Die Metamorphosen des P. Ovidius Naso* (Zürich and Dublin, 1966), II³ on the abode of *Fama* at 12.40 citing H. G. Hölsken, *Beobachtungen zur Landschaftsgestaltung römischer Dichter* (Diss. Freiburg 1966) 184ff. I have not seen this work. Jacques Deland, "Deux allégories d'Ovide," *EtCl* 4 (1935) 227-85 treats the whole *Invidia* / Aglauros episode as allegorical but does not explain the allegory of the house of *Invidia*.

² Ernst Milobenski, *Der Neid in der griechischen Philosophie* (Wiesbaden 1964) 155 and 157, deals with the element of *mimēsis*, which is absent from *phthonos*, "envy," but present in *zēlos*, "emulation," but he does not deal with envy and inactivity as such.

There are two other passages in the *Metamorphoses* in which the homes of personifications are described, that of *Somnus* at 11.583ff. and that of *Fama* at 12.39ff., and there is a third passage in which *Fames* is portrayed plucking with her teeth the sparse grasses of a rocky field (8.796ff.). In all three cases Ovid places these beings in locations whose character is determined by the conditions which give rise to the states personified or with which they are commonly associated or which they themselves give rise to. It is therefore reasonable to infer that in depicting *Invidia's* abode Ovid has employed a similar technique.

The house to which Minerva makes her way is soiled by a black efflux (*nigro squalentia tabo* 760). What lies behind the presence of this black efflux on the walls of *Invidia's* house is the notion that envy resembles a disease which causes the bodies of its victims to waste away through a process of liquefaction or putrefaction. References to liquefaction, wasting and disease occur throughout Ovid's description of *Invidia*, her assault on Aglauros and the consequences of that assault. After Aglauros has been infected with envy by *Invidia*, the sight of her sister's good fortune makes her slowly waste away turning to liquid like ice melting under a fitful sun.

et anxia nocte
anxia luce gemit lentaque miserrima tabe
liquitur, ut glacies incerto saucia sole

(806-8)

The body of *Invidia* herself is described at 775 as entirely wasted away (*macies in corpore toto*) and at 780f. the sight of human success is said to make her pine away (*intabescit . . . videndo successus hominum*).

Envy is first spoken of as a disease in extant Greek literature in the *Agamemnon* of Aeschylus.³ The same image recurs in Euripides⁴ and Isocrates.⁵ The association of envy with the idea of wasting away can be traced back to the fourth century B. C. Lucian reports that there was a painting by Apelles of *Diabolē*,

³ 831ff. For a list of instances of envy as disease see Milobenski, op. cit. (supra n. 2) p. 14 n. 6.

⁴ fr. 403 N².

⁵ 15.13

"Slander," accompanied by a male figure who was pale, misshapen and keen-eyed and who had the look of those who have become skeletal as the result of prolonged illness. This figure Lucian conjectures represented *Phthonos*, "Envy."⁶ There are two references in Theocritus to envy causing people to waste away.⁷ The same notion is to be found in the *Anthology*.⁸ Menander (fr. 538.6f. Körte³) combines both the notion of envy as a disease and envy as a cause of wasting in speaking of it as something which makes men consumptive.

οὐδὲ δὲ τὸ κάκιστον τῶν κακῶν πάντων φθόνος
φθισικὸν πεποίηκε καὶ ποιήσει καὶ ποεῖ.

In Latin, both Lucretius⁹ and Horace¹⁰ speak of wasting away with envy. Statius writes of the *livida tabes* of *invidia* afflicting even the dead.¹¹

Closely related to the figure of envy as a disease which causes wasting in its victims is the idea that envy is like rust eating away at something. *Invidia*'s teeth are discoloured by *rubigo* (*livent rubigine dentes* 776) and the hand with which she touches Aglauros is dyed with *ferrugo* (*manu ferrugine tincta* 778). In addition to corn-rust (*rubigo*)¹² and iron-rust (*ferrugo*)¹³ the rust which affects bronze (*aerugo*)¹⁴ is also a figure for envy. The figure of envy as rust is also found in Greek.¹⁵ Cyprian's liken-

⁶ Cal. 5.

⁷ 5.12f.; 6.26f.

⁸ Anth. Pal. 11.193; Anth. Plan. 265, 266.

⁹ 3.75 *macerat invidia ante oculos. illum esse potentem.*

¹⁰ Sat. 1.1.110f. *quodque aliena capella gerat distentius uber, / tabescat; Epist. 1.2.57 invidus alterius macrescit rebus opimis.*

¹¹ Theb. 2.14ff.

¹² Stat. Silv. 1.3.102f. *sive / liventem satiram nigra rubigine turbes; Mart. 5.28.7 robiginosis cuncta dentibus rodit, praef. 12 accedit his municipalium rubigo dentium et iudici loco livor.*

¹³ Laus Pisonis 107 *animusque mala ferrugine purus; Auson. 417.62f. livor ubi iste tuus ferrugineumque venenum / opportuna tuis inimicant pectora fucis.*

¹⁴ Hor. Sat. 1.4.100f. *hic nigrae sucus loliginis, haec est / aerugo mera; Mart. 2.61.5f. uteris ore aliter nimiaque aerugine captus / adlatras nomen quod tibi cumque datur, 10.33.5f. ut tu, si viridi tinctos aerugine versus / forte malus livor dixerit esse meos.*

¹⁵ Antisthen. fr. 19.22 Winckelman; Men. fr. 538 Körte³; Basil. *De Invid.* 1 = PG 31.373.41, 4 = PG 31.380.52.

ing of envy to a worm (*tinea*) within the spirit may be assigned to the same order of figures for envy as that of rust and disease.¹⁶

The efflux of the disease is black, the colour traditionally associated with envy in the Roman mind.¹⁷ I know of only one instance in Greek, and that late, of envy being associated with this colour.¹⁸ At 790 *Invidia* is said to be covered with black clouds (*adoperta nubibus atris*) and at 800f. the venom with which she infects Aglauros is described as pitch-like (*virus piceumque per ossa/dissipat*). Finally, when Aglauros turns into stone, her mind envenomed by envy discolours the whiteness of the stone (*nec lapis albus erat: sua mens infecerat illum* 832).

The house of *Invidia* lies hidden in a sunless spot at the bottom of a valley, touched by no breath of wind. There are, I think, two separate notions intertwined here. One is the idea that it is the humble, obscure and undistinguished who are prone to envy, while the other is the belief that envy is a hidden vice. In the ancient world the rich, the famous and the powerful were naturally thought to be especially the objects of envy. Their situation was compared to that of tall trees or mountain tops, both of which lightning is wont to strike.¹⁹ It is the tallest poppies which *Invidia* plucks as she journeys (*et summa papavera carpit* 792). Conversely, the envious may be compared to that which lies low on the ground. That, presumably, is the reason for Ovid's having *Invidia* rise from the ground at 770f. (*at illa / surgit humo*) when Minerva knocks at the door of her

¹⁶ De Zel. et Liv. 7 = PL 4.643 *qualis vero est animae tinea, quae cogitationum tabes, pectoris quanta rubigo zelare in altero vel virtutem eius vel felicitatem*. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Epist. I ad Cor.* 31.4 = PG 61.264 also speaks of envy as a worm.

¹⁷ Hor. *Epod.* 6.15 *an si quis atro dente me petiverit*; Sen. *Phaedr.* 492f. *haud illum niger / edaxque livor dente degeneri petit*; Stat. *Silv.* 1.3.102f. *sive / viventem satiram nigra rubigine turbes*, 4.18.16f. *procul atra recedat / Invidia atque alio liventia pectora flectat*; Sil. Ital. 8.290f. *nigro allatraverat ore / victorem Invidia*, 11.547f. *atra veneno / invidiae nigroque undantia pectora felle*.

¹⁸ [Ioh. Chrys.] PG 61.708. Here *phthonos* is compared to a pitch-coloured (*πυρροειδής*) boat.

¹⁹ Hdt. 7.10.5; Lucr. 5.1125f. *e summo, quasi fulmen, deicit ictos / invidia*; 1131 *invidia quoniam, ceu fulmine, summa vaporant*; Liv. 8.31.7 *etenim invidiam tamquam ignem summa petere; in caput consilii, in ducem incurrere*, 45.35.5 *intacta invidia media sunt; ad summa ferme tendit*; Vell. Pat. 1.9.6 *quam sit adsiduus eminentis fortunae comes invidia altissimisque adhaereat*.

house. Lucretius (3.75ff.) makes use of this imagery when he writes that envy makes men who complain that they are enveloped in darkness and mire waste away when they see that a man is powerful, is exposed to public view and proceeds with bright renown.

macerat invidia ante oculos illum esse potentem,
illum aspectari, claro qui invadit honore,
qui se in tenebris volvi caenoque queruntur.

Ovid (*Epistulae ex Ponto* 3.3.101f.) compares *livor* to a snake which creeps over the lowest ground.

livor, iners vitium, mores non exit in altos
atque latens ima vipera serpit humo.

No wind blows through the house of *Invidia* because it is low-lying. Those who are envied are compared to that which stands high and is exposed to the wind. Thus Cicero (*In Verrem* 2.98) speaks of the Senate occupying a high and exposed position where all of the winds of envy seem to be able to blow around it (*sic est hic ordo quasi propositus atque editus in altum ut ab omnibus ventis invidiae circumflari posse videatur*). Horace (*Carmina* 2.10.5ff.) compares envy's attacks on the great and the mighty to a great pine tree's being buffeted by the wind.

auream quisquis mediocritatem
diligat, tutus caret obsoleti
sordibus tecti, caret invidenda
sobrius aula.
saepius ventis agitur ingens
pinus et celsae graviore casu
decidunt turre feriantque summos
fulgura montis.

Ovid (*Remedia Amoris* 369f.) also uses the figure of the wind's blowing that which is highest in dealing with envy's attacks on those who are distinguished.

summa petit livor; perflant altissima venti,
summa petunt dextra fulmina missa Iovis.

In having *Invidia* live in a house which is hidden and sunless Ovid seems to be making reference to the notion that envy is a

hidden vice. So too at *Epistulae ex Ponto* 3.3.101f. Ovid speaks of *Livor* as a snake which lies hidden. Envy is a hidden vice because the person who suffers from it is ashamed to admit to the vice and does his or her best to conceal it.²⁰ It is a hidden pain which gnaws at Aglauros after she has been infected by envy and after *Invidia* has set her sister, the cause of her envy, before her eyes (*dolore / Cecropis occulto mordetur* 805f.). Cyprian (*De Zelo et Livore* 9 = *PL* 3.644f.) writes that the wounds of envy are concealed and that they shut themselves up in dark anguish within the hidden recesses of the conscience (*zeli vulnera abstrusa sunt et occulta, nec remedium cura medentis admittunt quae se intra conscientiae latebram caeco dolore cluserunt*). After describing the hidden anguish which her envy causes Aglauros, Ovid goes on to compare Aglauros' situation as she burns at the sight of her sister's good fortune to a fire which smoulders beneath some prickly vegetation without bursting into flame (*quam cum spinosis ignis subponitur herbis, / quae neque dant flammās lenique tepore crementur* 810f.). The point of the simile is that envy is something hidden which does not burst forth into public view like a flame. This is made very clear in Gregory of Nyssa, who in discussing the hidden nature of envy compares it to a fire which smoulders in a heap of chaff but which does not burst forth into open flame.²¹ That, according to Gregory, is the situation of the envious man who out of shame conceals his disease. Basil in describing the way in which the envious man tries to hide his vice because he is ashamed to make it public writes of that man's holding his disease down in the depths where it scorches and consumes his innards.²²

There is a further aspect to the covert nature of envy. The envious man does not give open expression to his hatred. He engages in secretive and furtive denigration of those whom he envies. Whispering, murmuring and muttering are his trademarks. As *Invidia* watches with sidelong glance Minerva's departure she murmurs softly and grieves that Minerva will succeed in her enterprise (*illa deam obliquo fugientem lumine cernens / murmura parva dedit successurumque Minervae /*

²⁰ Cf. Basil. *De Invid.* 1 = *PG* 31.373; Greg. Nyss. *PG* 44.1288b.

²¹ *PG* 44.1288af.

²² *De Invid.* 1 = *PG* 31.373.

indoluit 787-89). The secretive talk of the envious is a frequent topic in Pindar.²³ Herodotus has Xerxes speak of the silent hostility of the man who envies his fellow citizen some good fortune.²⁴ Callimachus has *Phthonos* speak secretly into the ear of Apollo as he denigrates Callimachus' poetic achievement.²⁵ Terence²⁶, Cicero²⁷ and Horace²⁸ all write of the covert nature of the hostility of the envious. At *Satire* 1.4.96ff. Horace illustrates the way in which the envious attack by insinuation while pretending to be friendly. Jerome (*In Isaiam* 9 *praefatio* = *PL* 24.313) writes of the mutterings of his envious detractors and invokes God's aid against them (*quorum livorem et musitationem garrulam contemnentes Dei poscamus auxilium*). Sidonius Apollinaris (*Epistulae* 9.16.9ff.) too speaks of the muttering chorus of the envious who say nothing openly (*mussitans quamquam chorus invidorum / prodat hirritu rabiem canino, / nil palam sane loquitur pavetque / publica puncta*).

The sad aspect of the house (*tristis*) derives from the unhappiness which the envious man experiences as he contemplates the success which others enjoy.²⁹

The *ignavum frigus* with which the house is filled symbolizes the sluggish inactivity which marks the envious man in the mind

²³ *Ol.* 1.47ff., *Pyth.* 1.81ff., 2.74ff., 11.28ff., *Nem.* 4.37ff., 7.61ff.

²⁴ 7.237.2.

²⁵ *Hym.* 2.105ff.

²⁶ *Eun.* 410f. *invidere omnes mihi / mordere clanculum*.

²⁷ *Att.* 1.13.4 *tuus ille amicus . . . nos, ut ostendit, admodum diligit, amplectitur, amat, aperte laudat, occulte, sed ita ut perspicuum sit, invidet*.

²⁸ *Epist.* 1.14.37f. *non istic obliquo oculo mea commoda quisquam / limat, non odio obscuro morsuque venenat*.

²⁹ Cf. the description of *Invidia* herself at 733f. *atque deam vidit formamque armisque decoram, / ingemuit vultumque deae ad suspiria duxit*, and at 778 *risus abest, nisi quem visi movere dolores*. In Hes. *Erg.* 196 envy is *στυγερώπις*, "grim-visaged." Unhappiness and envy are associated at Plaut. *Capit.* 583 *est miserorum ut malevolentes sint atque invideant bonis*. Cf. *Truc.* 743ff.; *Ter. Eun.* 412 *illi invidere misere*; *Verg. G.* 3.37 *Invidia infelix*; [Sen.] *Oct.* 485 *invidia tristis*; *Stat. Silv.* 2.6.69 *Invidia infelix*. The envious are also said to make themselves unhappy and to torture themselves because of their envy. Cf. *Aesch. Ag.* 834ff.; *Democr. DK* 68 B 88; *Aesop.* 163 Perry; *Hor. Epist.* 1.2.58f. *invidia Siculi non invenere tyranni / maius tormentum*; *Curt.* 8.12.8 *invidos homines nihil aliud quam ipsorum esse tormenta*; *Sil. Ital.* 13.584 *hinc angens utraque manu sua guttura Livor*; *Anth. Lat.* 485b *iustus invidia nihil est, quae protinus ipsum / auctorem rodit excruciatque animum*, 636.18-22 *torquet viscera (sc. Livoris) carnifex cruentus. / vesanos tacite movet furores / intentans*

of the Greeks and Romans. The success of others does not spur such a man to action. He feels that he is unable, for one reason or another, to emulate those whom he envies and, in consequence, he languishes in despondent lethargy, filled with spite and malice.³⁰

Ignavus and the terms *iners* and *piger*, whose meaning differs little from that of *ignavus*, are employed in this episode of the *Metamorphoses* to describe *Invidia* herself and Aglauros after *Invidia* has infected her. *Invidia* at 771 is said to rise *pigra* from the floor and at 772 to advance *passu inerti*. Aglauros, after trying to keep Mercury from entering the house to see her sister, finds that she cannot move her limbs because of an *ignava gravitas* (821).

Frigeo, *frigesco*, *frigidus* and *frigus* are all used metaphorically in Latin for inactivity.³¹ That is why Aglauros in her envy gradually freezes into immobility before finally turning into a seated stone statue. *Frigus* creeps down to her nails (823f.).

In Greek literature the first explicit association of envy and inactivity is to be found in Plutarch. In *De Capienda ex Inimicis Utilitate* (*Moralia* 92a-d) that author counsels men to use their enemies' successes to whet their sense of emulation and to strive to surpass their enemies. For, he says, the man who thinks that his enemy's superiority in some sphere of activity is owed to good fortune sinks from action and emulation into jealousy and despondency and consorts with idle and inactive envy (ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐτυχία διαφέρειν αὐτοῦ τὸν ἐχθρὸν ἡγούμενος ἐν ἀρχαῖς ἢ συνηγορίαις ἢ πολιτείαις ἢ παρὰ φίλοις καὶ ἡγεμόσιν ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν τι καὶ ζηλοῦν εἰς τὸ βασκαίνειν

animo faces Erinys; / est ales Tityi usque vultus intus, / qui semper lacerat comestque mentem; Carm. Epigr. 1929 imple, quid laceras illos quos crescere sentis? 'tu tibi tortor, tu tecum tua vulnera portas. See Milobenski, op. cit. (supra n. 2) p. 4 n. 16 for further examples.

³⁰ Sen. *Dial.* 9.2.10f. gives the most detailed analysis that we have from antiquity of the manner in which *inertia* was thought to give rise to envy. *inde ille adfectus otium suum detestantium querentiumque nihil ipsos habere, quod agant, et alienis incrementis inimicissima invidia: alit enim livorem infelix inertia et omnes destrui cupiunt, quia se non potuere provehere; ex hac deinde aversione alienorum processum, et suorum desperatione obrascens fortunae animus et de saeculo querens et in angulos se retrahens et poenae incubans suae, dum illum taedet sui pigetque.*

³¹ *Thes. Li. L.* vol. vi. i coll. 1322, 1323f., 1331, 1339.



παντάπασι καὶ ἀθυμεῖν καταδύμενος ἀργῶ τῷ φθόνῳ καὶ ἀπράκτῳ σύνεστιν 92b). In *Quomodo Quis Suos In Virtute Sentiat Profectus* (*Moralia* 84c) Plutarch contrasts emulation (*zēlos*) with envy (*phthonos*), the former being associated with action and the latter not.

Two centuries afterwards Iohannes Chrysostomus provides us with two vivid images for the idleness and the sluggishness of the envious man (*PG* 61.263). He first likens the envious man as he views the success of another to a drone which destroys the works of others but which does not itself strive to rise up into the air though it weeps to see another rise up and does everything that it can to pull him down. Iohannes then goes on to compare the relationship between the envious man and the successful man who is the object of his envy to that of a sluggish donkey burdened by an excess of flesh yoked to a winged horse. The donkey itself does not wish to rise up but it uses its weight to attempt to keep the winged horse from ascending (ὁ δὲ φθονερός οὐχ οὕτως ἀλλ' ὅταν ἕτερον εὖ πράττοντα ἴδῃ καὶ καθάπερ κηφήν τις ἐστὶ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις λυμαινόμενος πόνοις, καὶ αὐτός μὲν οὐδέποτε ἀναστῆναι σπουδάζων, δακρύων δὲ ὅταν ἕτερον ἀναστάντα ἴδῃ, καὶ πάντα ποιῶν ὥστε αὐτὸν καταβαλεῖν. τίτι οὖν ἂν τις τοῦτο παραβάλῃ τὸ πάθος; ὁμοιον εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο, οἷον ἂν εἰ νωθῆς ὄνος καὶ πολυσαρκία βεβαρημένος ἵππῳ πτηνῷ συνεζευγμένος, μήτε αὐτὸς διανίστασθαι βούλοιο, καὶ ἐκεῖνον τῷ βάρει τῶν σαρκῶν καθέλκειν ἐπιχειροίη.).

Although Plutarch is the earliest Greek author in whose work inactivity is explicitly associated with envy, envy and inactivity had long been implicitly linked.³² The reason for this association is to be found in the nature of the concept of *phthonos*. *Phthonos* is normally sharply distinguished from *zēlos*, “emulation.” A man who is roused to action by the sight of another’s success is said to feel *zēlos*. The man who feels *phthonos*, on the other hand, does not seek to emulate and is therefore inactive, though

³² Hes. *Erg.* 303-13 in exhorting Perses to work compares idle men to drones who consume the work of bees and says that if Perses works, the idle will soon feel *zēlos* for his wealth. *Zēlos* here seems to mean *phthonos*. Hes. so uses it at *Erg.* 195f. We may well have in this passage our first example of the association of idleness and envy. It is curious that Ioh. Chrys. (cited above) should use drones as a figure for the envious and the idle.

he may be active in seeking to destroy that which arouses his envy. Isocrates distinguishes between those who strive for supremacy and those who merely feel *phthonos*.³³ Here it is assumed that the envious man does nothing. The same assumption governs Aristotle's distinction between *phthonos* and *zēlos*. *Zēlos* is marked by the desire to emulate, while *phthonos* only wishes to prevent another acquiring the envied object.³⁴

In Latin the earliest instance of envy and inactivity conjoined is the characterisation of false friends at Plautus, *Bacchides* 540-44.³⁵ They are said to envy another his good fortune but by their being *ignavi* to see to it that there is nothing about themselves to be envied.

multi more isto atque exemplo vivont, quos quom censeas
esse amicos, reperiuntur falsi falsimoniis,
lingua factiosi, inertes opera, sublesta fide.
nullus est quoi non invideant rem secundam optingere;
sibi ne invideatur, ipsi ignavi recte cavent.

Cicero in *Ad Quirites post Reditum* says that there are four classes of persons who have harmed him. One of these classes are those who envy him his reputation and position since they themselves on account of *inertia* are unable to achieve these things (*tertium, qui cum propter inertiam suam eadem adsequi non possent, inviderunt laudi et dignitati meae*. 21).³⁶ In the second of the two letters which purport to have been written by Sallust to Caesar, Caesar is told that the *factio* of the *nobiles* can be easily be dealt with (*Epistulae* 2.8.6f.). If they were virtuous they would be emulous rather than envious of what is good. Because they are filled with sluggishness, idleness and lethargy they mutter disparagingly (*quouis si dolum caveris alia omnia in proclivi erunt. nam ii, si virtute satis valerent, magis aemuli bonorum quam invidi essent. quia desidia et inertia, stupor eos atque torpedo invasit, strepunt, obtrectant.*). Ovid, (*Epistulae*

³³ 3.60.

³⁴ *Rhet.* 1386b39-1387a3.

³⁵ F. Leo, *Plautinische Forschungen*² (Berlin 1912) 131 believes that this characterisation derives from Menander.

³⁶ Cf. Cic. *Fam.* 12.5.3 *Ser. Sulpicii morte magnum praesidium amisimus; reliqui partim inertes, partim improbi; non nulli invident eorum laudi quos in re p. probari vident*, Att. 4.3.5 *numquam enim cuiusquam invidi et perfidi consilio est us(ur)us nec inerti nobili crediturus (nobilitati Shackleton Bailey).*

ex Ponto 3.3.101f.) in a passage we have already quoted to illustrate envy as low-lying and hidden, speaks of it as an *iners vitium*.³⁷

Seneca analyses at some length the mental anguish which *inertia* causes those who are afflicted by it. One of its consequences is an envy which is hostile to the achievements of others. The reason for this envious hostility, according to Seneca, is that *inertia* fosters envy, the *inertes* wishing the destruction of all because they themselves can make no headway.³⁸ Tacitus at *Annals* 13.42.4 writes that Seneca was himself devoted to *studia inertia* and envied those who exercised their eloquence to some purpose (*simul studiis inertibus et iuvenum imperitiae suetum vivere iis qui vividam et incorruptam eloquentiam tuendis civibus exercerent*). Sulpicius Severus says that the envious persons who had denied that his friend and teacher, Martin of Tours, possessed the virtues that Sulpicius attributes to him were embarrassed that someone should be able to do what they could not do and preferred to deny Martin his virtues rather than to admit to their own *inertia* (*sed infelices, degeneres, somnolenti, quae ipsi facere non possunt, facta ab illo erubescunt: et malunt illius negare virtutes quam suam inertiam confiteri*. *Dialogus* 1.26 = PL 20.200).

The combination of *inertia* and *invidia* seems especially to have been associated with those who remained inactively at home while others were out in the field fighting and with those who did not carry out their military duties in a vigorous fashion. Such persons were thought to look with envy on those who

³⁷ For *invidia* as *iners vitium* cf. Sen. *Dial.* 9.5.3 *licet scias et in adflicta re publica esse occasionem sapienti viro ad se proferendum et in florenti ac beata pecuniam (petulantiam Lipsius), invidiam, mille alia inertia vitia regnare*. For *invidia* as *vitium* cf. Nep. 12.3.3 *est enim hoc commune vitium in magnis liberisque civitatibus, ut invidia gloriae comes sit et libenter de iis detrahant, quos eminere videant altius; neque animo aequo pauperes alienam opulentiam intuentur fortunam*; Quint. 11.1.17 *inde invident humiliores (hoc vitium est eorum qui nec cedere volunt nec possunt contendere)*; Tac. *Agr.* 1.1 *clarorum virorum facta moresque posteris tradere, antiquitus usitatum, ne nostris quidem temporibus quamquam incuriosa suorum aetas omisit, quotiens magna aliqua ac nobilis virtus vicit ac supergressa est vitium parvis magnisque civitatibus commune, ignorantiam recti et invidiam*; *Dial.* 25.6 *nam et Calvum et Asinium et ipsum Ciceronem credo solitos et invidere et vivere et ceteris humanae infirmitatis vitiis affici*.

³⁸ *Dial.* 9.2.6-11 esp. 10f., cited supra n. 30.

displayed martial prowess. Livy has T. Manlius Torquatus in addressing the Senate give as a reason for not ransoming those who had failed to escape from the Carthaginians at Cannae the envy that these men would feel for the glory and safety begotten by valour of those who had escaped. The reason that Torquatus gives for this envy is a consciousness that fear and *ignavia* are responsible for their disgraceful enslavement (*nisi quis credere potest aut adfuisse erumpentibus qui, ne erumperent, obsistere conati sunt, aut non invidere eos cum incolumitati, tum gloriae illorum per virtutem partae, cum sibi timorem ignaviamque servitutis ignominiosae causam esse sciant*, 22.60.21). The same author writes of men in the field reflecting on the slothfulness of those remaining at home allied with envy and detraction of those serving (*segnitiam, invidiam et obtrectationem domi manentium adversus militantes*, 34.34.7). Velleius Paterculus attributes the failure of M. Iunius, the governor of Asia, to punish the pirates whom Julius Caesar had captured to *invidia*, which he explains is a consequence of *inertia* (*quippe sequebatur inertiam*, 2.42.3). Pliny in his *Panegyricus* in praising Trajan's exploits under Domitian speaks of that emperor as *iners* and envious of the virtues of others (*iners ipse alienisque virtutibus tunc quoque invidus imperator* 14.5).

As an example of the association of *frigus* in the metaphorical sense of "inactivity" with *invidia* the description of Drances at *Aeneid* 11.336-39 may be cited.

tum Drances idem infensus, quem gloria Turni
obliqua invidia stimulisque agitabat amaris
largus opum et lingua melior, sed frigida bello
dextera,

In the light of the passages which have just been quoted to

³⁹ Cf. Apul. *Flor.* 9 *si quis forte in hoc pulcherrimo coetu ex il(l)is invisioribus meis malignus sedet, quoniam ut in magna civitate hoc quoque genus invenitur, qui meliores obtrectare malint quam imitari et, quorum similitudinem desperent, eorundem adfectent similitatem, scilicet uti, qui suo nomine obscuri sunt, meo innotescant*; Hieron. *Comment. in Epist. ad Eph. praef.* = PL 26.440 *qui (sc. maledici et invidi) cum bona imitari non queant, quod solum facere possunt, invident: et in eo se doctos eruditosque arbitrantur, si de aliis detrahant*; Sulp. Sev. *Mart.* 27 = PL 20.176 *et vere nonnullos experti sumus invidos virtutibus vitaeque eius, qui in illo oderant quod in se non videbant, et quod imitari non valebant.*

SILIUS ITALICUS: THE SHIELD OF HANNIBAL

While discussing the implications of Silius Italicus' account of the fall of Saguntum in *Punica* 2, the present writer touched upon the significance of the richly decorated shield that is presented to Hannibal by the people of Spain ('Silius Italicus on the fall of Saguntum,' *CP* 69 (1974) 28-36 at 28-29). The details provided by Silius about the scenes represented on it predictably reveal a connection with the central themes of his epic, just as do those on the shield of Aeneas. The symbolic and associative depth is considerable. This paper is intended to examine and to elucidate some aspects of Silius' ecphrasis.

Ecce autem clipeum saevo fulgore micantem
Oceani gentes ductori dona ferebant

(2.395-96)

The shield is introduced with dramatic abruptness. The donors are the 'peoples of Ocean,' the *gentes* who dwelt at the extreme edge of the inhabited world in the direction where the sun sets (cf. 1.145). Under the empire, the principal enemies of Rome were by convention the Parthians and the supposed threat was from the East. Hannibal, who so nearly triumphed over the Romans, formally inaugurated his campaign from the West: but the movement was, like Alexander's, eastwards. His obscure death was to occur in Bithynia, an event outside the scope of the *Punica* but not irrelevant to it. At this moment Hannibal stands at the beginning of a career that is to make him throughout sixteen years "primus humani generis," as Jupiter expresses it (17.353-54): yet, despite the zenith that he attains in Italy, his path ultimately follows a course opposite to that of the Unconquered Sun: rising in the West, he sets in the East. It is Scipio, too, who meets the ghost of Alexander and is instructed by him (13.763-66).

The shield, glittering *saevo fulgore*, is a fitting gift for the blood-thirsty Hannibal, suggestive of sinister menace. The Spaniards also provide him with other accoutrements of war: helmet, sword, spear and corselet (397-402). He is, in short, armed anew. Just as Thetis' gift to Achilles and Venus' to Aeneas mark a turning point in destiny, so Hannibal is now

prepared to assume his fateful role in history. Upon the gilded surface of the shield is emblematically displayed a definition of that role, in terms of the past with which Hannibal is inextricably enmeshed and, by inference, of the future which he cannot avoid.

The description of the decorations on the *clipeus* falls into four unequal parts: (1) the right-hand side (405-31); (2) the left-hand (432-45); (3) Saguntum, perhaps intended to be envisaged at the central point over the boss (446-49); (4) the outer rim (449-52), where Hannibal is shown crossing the Ebro. The major division into right and left implies the idea of good and bad omens: and it should be borne in mind that what is favorable to the Carthaginians is automatically unfavorable to the Romans.

On the right appear the chief incidents from the story of Dido and Aeneas as recounted in the *Aeneid* (406-25), together with representations of Hannibal himself (426-28) and of his father Hamilcar (429-31). Silius is equating the present with the past, tracing back the Punic Wars to the origin which made them inevitable. The conflict between Hannibal and Rome is not merely the result of Aeneas' abandonment of Dido: it is also, at a profounder level, a recapitulation of it (cf. *CP* 69.28). The mythological etiology of the conflict forms a basis for many of Silius' philosophical and historical perspectives in the *Punica*. The doctrine of predestination, of an unending chain of cause and effect, fundamental in the Stoicism which Silius espoused and, at least in the manner of his death, practised (cf. Vessey, 'Pliny, Martial and Silius Italicus,' *Hermes* 101 (1974) 109-16), underlies the tragedy of Hannibal and aptly receives confirmation from it: for the rise and fall of Hannibal is in the strict sense tragic, an illustration of the caprice of Fortune with her ever turning wheel. For all his prowess and valor, the Carthaginian leader, like Virgil's Turnus, is helpless, a victim as much as an agent of forces greater than himself.

For Hannibal, embodiment on earth of *perfidia*, is himself the dupe of heaven. In book 1 Silius traced back the causes of Romano-Punic rivalry to Juno's inordinate love for Carthage:

hic Iuno ante Argos (sic credidit alta vetustas)
ante Agamemnoniam, gratissima tecta, Mycenae
optavit profugis aeternam condere gentem.

(26-28)

Juno sought to make Carthage the *gens aeterna* in place of Rome (cf. Lucia Ramaglia, 'La figura di Giunone nelle Puniche di Silio Italico,' *RSC* 1 [1952] 35-46 at 36-37). Both were founded by exiles but to one only did Fate assign the pre-eminence. The favor of Juno was not Carthage's blessing but its curse, bringing in its train disaster and finally extinction. For this reason, Hannibal has from the beginning no real hope of more than transient victory:

Iamque deae cunctas sibi belliger induit iras
Hannibal; hunc audet solum componere fatis.
(38-39)

One man, even if imbued with all the passions of Juno, even if supported by her aid, cannot pit himself against the decrees of Fate. In the speech with which the goddess stimulates the young Hannibal *facta ad Mavortia* (55), she gloats over the bloody massacres that are to accompany his triumphs but makes no allusion to his final defeat (42-54). Again, when Hannibal has taken an oath, at his father's behest, to wage war on Rome (114-19), Juno intervenes for her own purposes. The priestess of Elissa predicts the glorious moments of Hannibal's campaign (126-35) but ends on an ambiguous note:

magna parant superi: tonat alti regia caeli,
bellantemque Iovem cerno. venientia fata
scire ultra vetuit Iuno, fibraeque repente
conticuere. latent casus longique labores.
(136-39)

The motif in 137-39 is, as Ramaglia points out (loc. cit., 37), taken from *Aeneid* 3.379-80: "prohibent nam cetera Parcae/scire Helenum farique vetat Saturnia Iuno." Juno is a deceiver—both of her enemies and her friends. Her action towards Hannibal is an act of calculated and cynical suppression. Juno emerges as a divine practitioner of *Punica fides*. Constantly throughout the epic we see Hannibal living with empty dreams. It is largely for this reason that, whatever his *vitia*, his *virtutes* must arouse in any reader a sympathy for him (cf. E. L. Bassett, 'Hercules and the Hero of the *Punica*,' *The Classical Tradition: Essays in Honor of Harry Caplan*, ed L. Wallach [Ithaca 1966] 258-73 at 267).

It is convenient to analyse each scene on the shield in se-

quence before considering the whole. Silius first pictures the foundation of Carthage:

condebat primae Dido Carthagini arces,
instabatque operi subducta classe iuventus.
molibus hi claudunt portus, his tecta domosque
partiris, iustae Bitia venerande senectae.
ostentant caput effossa tellure repertum
bellatoris equi atque omen clamore salutant.

(406-11)

There is no overt expression of hostility in these lines to the new city which was to become the implacable enemy of Rome. The two people specified by name, Dido and Bitias, are engaged in those essential functions that must accompany the establishment of a human community. Dido is the foundress, who has led her exiles across the sea to a new home. The intimate connection between queen and city is suggested by the word order in 406. In 407 the verb *instabat* stresses the enthusiasm with which the task of building is undertaken. Bitias, aged, just and venerable, assigns to the colonists their dwellings: his age links him with the past which they have relinquished, his moral uprightness reveals the continuity of values between that past and the present. Yet, at the same time, there is discovered the buried horse's head which was thereafter an emblem of the Carthaginian nation. It is a *bellator equus*; it looks ahead to the military might that the infant city will possess and which, in times a long way distant, Hannibal is to lead to Italy. In the *equus* it is possible to trace a glance towards the Wooden Horse, by which Troy had been taken. The Carthaginians are successors to the Greeks; they will be the hereditary foes of the New Troy: in their case the omen of victory presages also their eventual humiliation. That it is found buried, that it lacks a body, confirm the ambivalence of the *caput equi*, the finding of which the colonists hail. Roman writers often term Rome the *caput orbis*: what is a head without a body? Silius had in mind the lines of Virgil, in which the same event is mentioned:

lucus in urbe fuit media, laetissimus umbrae,
quo primum iactati undis et turbine Poeni
effodere loco signum, quod regia Iuno
monstrarat, caput acris equi; sic nam fore bello
egregiam et facilem victu per saecula gentem.

(1.441-45)

In his exhaustive analysis of line 445, James Henry (*Aeneidea*, [Dublin 1878] I, 675-86) convincingly demonstrated that, for Virgil, the *caput equi* was "the emblem both of war and of a simple pastoral life." That the whole of Silius' *Punica* reflects the first aspect is obvious; the importance of the second will be discussed below.

This essentially straightforward and factual evocation of the founding of Carthage is succeeded by the arrival of Aeneas:

has inter species orbatum classe suisque
 Aenean pulsum pelago dextraque precantem
 cernere erat. fronte hunc avide regina serena
 infelix ac iam vultu spectabat amico.
 hinc et speluncam furtivaque foedera amantum
 Callaicae fecere manus; it clamor ad auras
 latratusque canum, subitoque exterrita nimbo
 occultant alae venantum corpora silvis.
 nec procul Aeneadum vacuo iam litore classis
 aequora nequiquam revocante petebat Elissa.
 ipsa, pyram super ingentem stans, saucia Dido
 mandabat Tyriis ultricia bella futuris;
 ardentemque rogam media spectabat ab unda
 Dardanus et magnis pandebat carbasa fatis.

(412-25)

This succinct review of the central events of books 1 and 4 of the *Aeneid* presents the original *causa belli*. The circular movement which shows Aeneas first as a destitute suppliant at Carthage and finally as the Roman hero sailing to seize his 'great destiny' is a memorable epitome of the Virgilian narrative. Between the two points—the arrival and departure of Aeneas—is enclosed the destruction of Dido. The queen who, in 406, was surrounded by the *primae Carthaginiis arces* is now detached from her public concerns and trapped in a net of private emotion. But private woe spills over into international and protracted strife.

Silius—as the ecphrastic form to a large extent predicated—has refrained from passing any explicit judgment on the relative guilt or innocence of Dido and Aeneas. Someone examining the shield would have to reach his own conclusion: so too does the reader. Only the words used provide a clue to the dominant color. 412-14 emphasize the loneliness and vulnerability of Aeneas when he is deprived of his fleet (cf. *subducta classe* in 407) and his men: he is *orbatus*, *pulsus pelago*—that is,

a homeless wanderer. At present he is in a far more desperate strait than was Dido when she landed in Africa. He is dependent on her, *dextra precans*. We may compare the two images of Dido and Aeneas in solitude:

primae Dido Carthaginis arces (406)

orbatum classe suisque
Aenean pulsum pelago

(412-13)

Dido's support is tangible, real, growing. Aeneas has lost all; he has reached a nadir. If the shield is visualized as a real work of art, it may be seen that only Aeneas' supplicatory gesture could have been actually shown on it. The rest is supplied from our knowledge of the situation. But, although at this point Dido is in a positive and Aeneas a negative position, this is soon reversed. Aeneas is stripped of everything—but himself; it is to be he alone who encompasses Dido in ruin. In 414-15 Silius neatly encapsulates, with what amounts to paradox, the attitude of Dido at her first encounter with Aeneas. *Avide, serena, infelix, amico*: the 'calm' cannot survive the 'eagerness'—'friendship' involves 'misfortune.' The catastrophe that overwhelms Dido after the arrival of Aeneas, definitively presented in the *Aeneid*, is contained by these four words. The queen gazes at the suppliant, his right arm raised towards her: and immediately she is enslaved by him. It is an emotional peripeteia.

The next stage in the tragedy is given four lines (415-19), which recall, with purposeful starkness, *Aeneid* 4.160-72. As so often in Silius, single words serve to evoke a response by virtue of their Virgilian associations: *speluncam*, taken from *Aeneid* 4.165, describes the setting, *furtiva foedera amantum* from 4.171 and 520, the nature of the bond into which Aeneas and Dido enter. A *spelunca* is not a well-omened background for a union of lovers. In Virgil it is reminiscent of the cave in which the nuptials of Jason and Medea were celebrated according to Apollonius Rhodius 4.1141ff. (cf. R. Heinze, *Virgils epische Technik* [Leipzig 1903] 127-28); it responds too with the *spelunca* which is the entrance to the Underworld (6.236). The 'secret' or 'stolen' nature of the *foedera* is no less inauspicious, for a relationship which implies mutual *fides* should be entered into publicly, without deceit. The echo of *Aeneid* 4.520 recalls

one of the grimmest moments in the whole tragedy of Dido, when she is making the final, horrific preparations for her suicide: "tum, si quod non aequo foedere amantis/curae numen habet iustumque memorque, precatur." A Roman reader, seeing Silius' words, would remember those preceding their parallel in Virgil: *non aequo*—and would notice too that *amantum*, plural, makes it plain that Aeneas was no less than Dido at the time of their union in the cave, filled by *amor*. The *Punica* sets out the harvest of horror reaped by both Romans and Carthaginians because of this *furtivum foedus*. We may rightly detect in it a foreshadowing of the *foedus* broken by Hannibal.

Virgil had described the storm and its effect on those taking part in the hunt in the following lines:

interea magno misceri murmure caelum
incipit, insequitur commixta grandine nimbus,
et Tyrii comites passim et Troiana iuventus
Dardaniusque nepos Veneris diversa per agros
tectata metu petiere; ruunt de montibus amnes.
speluncam Dido dux et Troianus eandem
deveniunt. prima et Tellus et pronuba Iuno
dant signum; fulsere ignes et conscius aether
conubiis summoque ulularunt vertice Nymphae.
(4.160-68)

Silius summarizes in two and a half verses:

it clamor ad auras
latratusque canum, subitoque exterrita nimbo
occultant alae venantum corpora silvis.
(417-19)

Gone is the cosmic and supernatural element in Virgil. The *Callaicae manus* (417), that is, the hands of Hannibal's allies, depicted no figure of Tellus, no Juno as *pronuba*, no shrieking nymphs. Shouting, the barking of hounds, the hunters in terror seeking shelter; these are the Silian accompaniments. Harsh noise and disruptive panic: a human scene, realistically pictured. For, it is crucial to remember, this shield is the work of human, not divine, artificers; it is given to a mortal general and is in a sense an emblem of his mortality, of the gulf that separates him from Achilles, Hercules and Aeneas (cf. *CP* 69.28). Yet in his triumphant hours he becomes a simulacrum of a god.

"Ille dies primus leti primusque malorum/causa fuit" (Virgil, *Aen.* 4.169-70). In Virgil the misfortunes following the day of the hunt are primarily Dido's. Silius presents them as more than personal; they continue throughout future ages, a heritage of doom. This is made plain in the following lines:

nec procul Aeneadum vacuo iam litore classis
 aequora nequiquam revocante petebat Elissa.
 ipsa pyram super ingentem stans, saucia Dido
 mandabat Tyriis ultricia bella futuris.

(420-24)

Aeneas has regained his fleet and his men (*Aeneadum*. . . *classis*); his dependence on Dido's goodwill is finished. The shore stands empty (*vacuo iam litore*); Dido calls the Trojans back 'in vain' (*nequiquam*). The onward voyage of Aeneas, the final stage in the fated course that takes him to Italy, contrasts with the barren emptiness that alone remains for Dido. Death is her only choice, perhaps: but its form endows her with a power and historical influence that transcends what she would have possessed only as foundress of Carthage. The phrase *pyram super ingentem* (with its epithet here suggestive of more-than-human proportions) followed by the monosyllabic *stans* creates a forceful image of the isolation of Dido, far more complete than was that of Aeneas at 412-14. Whereas he, after losing all, became a suppliant, Dido at the verge of death is able to ordain (*mandabat*) wars of revenge for the future. The words *ultricia bella* respond with Dido's imprecation in *Aeneid* 4.624-29:

exoriare aliquis nostris ex ossibus ultor,
 qui face Dardanios ferroque sequere colonos,
 nunc, olim, quocumque dabunt se tempore vires.
 litora litoribus contraria, fluctibus undas
 imprecor, arma armis; pugnent ipsique nepotesque.

Hannibal is the *ultor* and on his shield appears the event which was responsible for his mission of waging war on Rome. When he swore to do so (in the temple of Elissa) he did so in words that are taken from Dido's curse (*face* . . . *ferroque*): "Romanos terra atque undis, ubi competet aetas,/ferro ignique sequar . . ." (1.114-15). Hannibal has, therefore, come into being so that the *mandatum* of Dido may be further fulfilled. His

present is rooted in the past. When Aeneas received his shield from his mother he accepted the burden of the future (*Aen.* 8, 729-31), the weight of an empire that his descendants were to possess. Hannibal assumes the burden of history, the duty of revenge (cf. *CP* 69.29).

While Dido's pyre is burning, Aeneas sails away: "ardentemque rogom media spectabat ad unda/Dardanus et magnis pandebat carbasa fatis." The verb *spectabat* has occurred already, in line 415, of Dido gazing at Aeneas. The repetition is not accidental. As we have seen, the sight of Aeneas was a fatal moment for Dido—the first step that was to lead to the pyre. But when Aeneas looks back towards Africa, it is with a detachment that is reflected in Silius' language. The *ardens rogos* is divided from Aeneas by an ever-lengthening expanse of sea. The Trojan (*Dardanus*) who had once left his native city burning behind him is now abandoning a temporary haven in quest of his ultimate destiny. Whereas Dido looked at him *avide* (414), Aeneas seems to watch the flames of her pyre like a spectator: in the words *pandebat carbasa* we feel an awareness of the infinite vistas that are opening for him and his people, while the life of *infelix Dido* draws to a close in the kingdom she had established. When, in a flashback in book 8, Silius provides Aeneas' defense of his conduct, it is no more convincing than that given in *Aeneid* 4: he had no wish to leave but Mercury compelled him (105-13).

The other figures on the right hand of the shield are Hannibal and Hamilcar:

parte alia supplex infernis Hannibal aris
arcanum Stygia libat cum vate cruorem
et primo bella Aeneadum iurabat ab aevo.
at senior Siculis exsultat Hamilcar in arvis,
spirantem credas certamina anhela movere,
ardor inest oculis, torvumque minatur imago.

(426-31)

The device of ecphrasis enables Silius to epitomize vital facets of his historical program in a brief compass. By juxtaposing Hannibal and Hamilcar with Dido and Aeneas he illustrates with effective precision not only the general principle that the history of mankind is not the product of blind chance, but also the pendent notion that the acts of individuals are controlled by

a superimposed pattern: in short, that effects become causes. It follows that those men and women who are born to be leaders, to enjoy the dubious privilege of sovereignty, fame and glory, are also, more than the obscure, liable to crushing reversals brought about by supra-human agencies. Hannibal fails because he is a Carthaginian and Carthage is predestined to defeat. This is implicit in the lines that occur in book 17 prior to the battle of Zama:

quin etiam, favor ut subigit plerosque metusve,
 Scipio si Libycis esset generatus in oris,
 sceptrum ad Agenoreos credunt ventura nepotes:
 Hannibal Ausonia genitus si sede fuisset,
 haud dubitant terras Italia in dicione futuras.

(401-5)

It is true that Hannibal's character contains much that is corrupt, evil: but the evil and the corruption has been endemic among Carthaginians—*saevis gens laeta* (1.170)—ever since the suicide of Dido. On the other hand, the Romans are successful in so far as they manifest, individually and as a race the qualities—*fides, pietas, virtus*—which are the moral foundation of their hegemony. For this reason the choice of Scipio, in 15.18-28, between Virtus and Voluptas (on which, see Bassett, loc. cit., 259-60) is a decision between accepting and rejecting his *Romanitas* and its duties: a choice which had been forced upon Aeneas in Africa. Scipio's choice is, of course, like Aeneas', an illusion: he cannot in reality avoid or escape his lot: but that reason prompts him to accept it willingly is the mark of a *sapiens*, of a being truly free in a predetermined and unchangeable cosmos. For to the Stoics, as A. A. Long has well expressed it, "a man can be free, can act as a man, if and only if the external movements of his body follow from a decision which reconciles his own will and moral choice to what is necessarily the case" ('Freedom and determinism in the Stoic theory of human action,' *Problems in Stoicism*, ed. Long [London 1971] 173-99 at 94).

Hannibal's fundamental impotence in the face of fore-ordained events is exemplified in the oath imposed upon him as a child, which is briefly mentioned here (426-28) and fully elaborated in book 1. At that time the young Hannibal swore by the Punic War-god and by the *manes* of Dido not to cease from hostilities

against Rome whatever the obstacles in his path (113-19). On the shield he is shown during this solemn act which Silius presents—as in 1—as a dedication (or a *devotio*) offered to and sanctified by the malign and magical deities of the Underworld. In this way his 'moral choice' with regard to destiny is virtually eliminated. Hannibal's career is over-determined and so deprived of much of its possible greatness. Scipio's choice can be seen as truly his: that of Hannibal was made for him.

But is it not possible to trace, within the confines of the shield, a parallel between Aeneas *dextra precans* and *supplex* Hannibal? Between Aeneas, forging *furtiva foedera* in the cave, and Hannibal offering *arcanum cruorem* at the altars of the chthonic gods? Aeneas begged aid from the living Dido; Hannibal vowed vengeance on the Aeneadae in a shrine *sacrum genetricis Elissae manibus* (1.81-82). The power of the queen's *mandatum* (which is at one with the plan of Fate) produces this terrible equivalence. Help and love offered, and accepted, bring in train hatred and war. The *spelunca* leads inexorably to the *templum*; the blood of Dido to *arcanum cruorem* sealing an oath; but whereas Aeneas broke his *foedus* in accord with the dictates of *Fatum*, Hannibal held fast to his vow—for that was his destiny. Aeneas founded Rome; but he also engendered Hannibal, who attempts, like a ghastly parody or hellish Doppelgänger of Aeneas, to conquer Italy and to subject it to Carthage. In the single figure of Hannibal on the *clipeus* we may detect a perverse reflection of Aeneas: Juno's Aeneas, *impius* but nonetheless *insignis in armis* (cf. 1.243ff.).

The presence of Hamilcar symbolizes at one level the continuity of the enmity between Carthage and Rome. At another, he balances Bitias (408-9). The contrast between the two is dramatic. Bitias, *iustae venerandus senectae*, was engaged in the peaceful distribution of homes in the new city. Senior Hamilcar breathes war and delights in battle. There is an *ardor* in his eyes: lit where else than from Dido's *ardens rogos*. It may be added that the father of Hannibal triumphs in Sicily—where, according to Virgil, the father of Aeneas died.

The left-hand side of the shield is occupied with two themes: first, an allusion to the first Punic War, which forms a natural sequel to the description of Hamilcar (432-36), and second, a *laetior facies* of traditional life in North Africa (437-45). The

choices seem at first sight appropriate for Hannibal; he would be flattered to be reminded of his father's achievements which were, though he cannot at this stage be sure of it, foreshadowings of his own; he would be pleased too to see a depiction of the customs and pursuits of his *patria*. That the symbols are double-edged is apparent to an alert reader; they occur, to be sure, on the adverse half of the shield.

necnon et laevum clipei latus aspera signis
implebat Spartana cohors; hanc ducit ovantem
Ledaëis veniens victor Xanthippus Amyclis.
iuxta triste decus pendet sub imagine poenae
Regulus et fidei dat magna exempla Sagunto.

(432-36)

The hired band of Spartan warriors were mentioned earlier in the same book by Hanno in a speech before the senate of Carthage (305) where they were cited as proof of the difficulty the Carthaginians had experienced in defeating Regulus. On the shield, one purpose intended by Silius was to confirm that the Poeni were nothing other than successors to the Greeks as foes of Troy-Rome. Sparta like Mycene and Argos is in the Peloponnese: Xanthippus and the Spartans are analogues of Agamemnon and his army and so natural allies for the Carthaginians. It was believed that Xanthippus had captured Regulus by *insidiae* (cf. Cicero *Off.* 3.99), just as had Troy been by the Greeks. Between Greek treachery and *Punica fides* there is a clear generic similarity. But it was also commonly held that Xanthippus himself had been perfidiously murdered by the Carthaginians on his voyage back to Greece (cf. H. Schaefer, *RE* IX A2.1350). He had, therefore, perished in a fashion reminiscent of Agamemnon. There is no *fides* among *perfidi*.

The day of Greece had passed away, as too would that of Carthage. Regulus stands as a paradigm of why this was inevitable. Despite the *insidiae* of Xanthippus, his *fides* and his unflinching heroism in the face of torture, narrated and eulogized at length in 6.101-551, exemplify and epitomize the moral qualities which set Rome apart from, and above, Carthage. Silius here allows himself to insert a definite interpretation of the symbol: Regulus offers *magna exempla* to Saguntum. Whereas Hannibal would have seen in Regulus' death a proof of Punic military superiority, it was in fact a *decus*, though *triste*.

Saguntum, now under siege, does not sacrifice its loyalty to Rome but earns, like Regulus, immortal luster (cf. *CP* 69.29 with n. 11). It may be seen that Regulus is the antithesis of Xanthippus, who, treacherous himself, fell victim to a *perfidia* even greater than his own.

What of the 'happier picture' which follows? It too is not so simple as it appears:

laetior at circa facies, agitata ferarum
agmina venatu et caelata mapalia fulgent.
nec procul usta cutem nigri soror horrida Mauri
adsuetas mulcet patrio sermone leaenas.
it liber campi pastor, cui fine sine ullo
invetitus saltus penetrat pecus; omnia Poenum
armenti vigilem patrio de more sequuntur;
gaesaque latratorque Cydon tectumque focique
in silicis venis et fistula nota iuvencis.

(437-45)

This is Punic pastoral. As such it serves to point the total discrepancy in the life styles of Carthaginians and Romans. The former are hunters; they dwell in *mapalia* (Silius carefully uses the technical word); near them live the dark-skinned Moors, skilled to calm lionesses by their 'native tongue'. The Poeni are essentially nomadic, dwelling on the borders of limitless plains. The whole passage is redolent of an alien and exotic world utterly strange to the Aeneadae, the men of Rome and of Italy. But the epithet *laetior* is not inapt. Superficially the impression is idyllic, even though it is a foreign idyll with little in common with the Arcady of Virgil or Calpurnius. The scene is a reminder of that 'simple pastoral life' which Henry argued was the second promise contained in the omen of the *caput equi*.

The message is continued into the verses with which the ecphrasis ends:

eminet excelso consurgens colle Saguntos,
quam circa immensi populi condensaque cingunt
agmina certantum pulsanque trementibus hastis.
extrema clipei stagnabat Hiberus in ora,
curvatis claudens ingentem flexibus orbem.
Hannibal, abrupto transgressus foedere ripas,
Poenorum populos Romana in bella vocabat.

(446-52)

Saguntum, the ally of Rome, the city of *fides*, presents the antinomy to the world of the Punic shepherd. It is a symbol of moral grandeur, hedged and threatened by the champions of lawless violence (cf. *CP* 69.28); the *agmina* of the besiegers recall the *agmina* of the hunters in 438. Hannibal is shown as he crosses the river Ebro: that is, as he proves his *perfidia*, his scorn for *foedera*.¹ The river, which frames the shield and encloses the design, reminds us of the fact that Oceanus appeared round the outer edge of Achilles' shield (*Iliad* 18.607-8). By comparison with Oceanus, Ebro implies limitation and restriction, not universality. The world into which Hannibal is passing in despite of treaty obligations is in reality a narrow one: his mission is enmeshed inextricably with the past; it has no true future. When he crosses the river, Hannibal leaves behind him the land of his fathers and returns to it only to face defeat. Both he and Carthage are doomed. Roman blood will flow. But all that is a mere prelude to his elimination and the razing of his city. Hannibal's greatness and achievements are bound within a world restricted by space and time. Rome will live for ever, sovrän over an empire *sine fine* in its truest sense.

When Hannibal receives the *clipeus* he looks on it with joy: "per singula laetis / lustrat ovans oculis et gaudet origine regni" (405-6). How justified was this exhilaration? As we have seen, the scenes embossed on the shield are by no means optimistic for the Carthaginian cause. On the right-hand side, that of good omen, we are shown the noble beginnings of the city, the tragedy of Dido (which appeared to provide a cause and pretext for the detestation with which the Carthaginians viewed Rome), as well as Hannibal and Hamilcar, both able leaders in the age-long struggle. Yet these seemingly hopeful images prove, on analysis, to be themselves treacherous and unhappy guides for the future. On the left, the signs are even less auspicious, prescient of defeat. In them, the Romans might have found hope and comfort in her impending adversities. For Hannibal's shield is a *fraus*, its surface implications delusive. But Hannibal is unconscious of this, just as, in the *Aeneid*, Turnus "does not fully understand" the significance of the emblems on his arms

¹ For the parallel between Hannibal's crossing the Ebro and Caesar's crossing the Rubicon, cf. Vessey, *CP* 69.29 with n. 6.

(cf. S. G. P. Small, 'The Arms of Turnus: *Aeneid* 7.783-92,' *TAPA* 90 [1959] 243-52, esp. at 252).

The shield as a whole fixes the Punic Wars in the perspective of eternity. It objectifies the whole problem of *fides* and *perfidia* one of the epic's central themes (cf. M. von Albrecht, *Silius Italicus: Freiheit und Gebundenheit römischer Epik* [Amsterdam 1964], esp. at 55ff.); it poses moral dilemmas. Was Aeneas' betrayal of his *foedus* with Dido any more defensible than Hannibal's breaking of the treaty with Rome—which after all he had sworn his ancestral gods to do? If not, then there is a clear parallel between Aeneas' crossing of the Mediterranean and Hannibal's of the Ebro. Dido died on a flaming pyre, as do the Saguntines later in book 2: was she more deserving of her fate than they? Or are both equally victims of a cruel destiny? The queen perishes because of her *fides* to Aeneas, the people of Saguntum through their fidelity and (misplaced) trust in Rome, city of the Aeneadae (cf. *CP* 69.30). Once again Hannibal and Aeneas are confronted. The moral enigmas are disturbing. Within the specialized world of the *clipeus* no answer is given for them, unless the will of Fate be an answer. For on the shield we have a summation of the salient features of the whole history of Carthage as it affected Rome, from its foundation by Dido until the time of its last triumphs under Hannibal. That history prompts speculation on the true meaning of *fides*, on the relativity of spiritual values in a deterministic universe, on the caprice and amorality of *Fatum*. It is fitting that Hannibal should start his campaign bearing so ambiguous an emblem.

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REVIEWS

ANDREAS I. VOSKOS, *ΜΕΛΕΑΓΡΟΣ—ΑΧΙΛΛΕΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΟΙΝΙΞ*: Συμβολή εἰς τὴν ἔρευναν τῆς ἐνότητος τῆς Ἰλιάδος. Association of Greek Philologists of Cyprus "Stasinos." Nicosia, Cyprus, 1974. Pp. xx + 97. (*Series of Scholarly Dissertations*, 1)

Certainly notice should be taken of this new series of published doctoral dissertations inaugurated by the Association of Greek Philologists of Cyprus "Stasinos." Whether the series can continue uninterrupted remains to be seen. At any rate, the first volume in the series was originally presented as a doctoral dissertation at the University of Athens in June of 1974. It suffers from all the deficiencies and has all the advantages of a doctoral dissertation. The bibliography and notes demonstrate a first-rate acquaintance with the scholarly literature on the problem but the presentation is quite repetitious, though all possible sides of the issue are presented with much annotation and detail. In every way the author is fair to the critics, though he has his own position to develop which stresses the unity and uniqueness of Homer.

Dr. Voskos is much taken and concerned with the Greek role and function of Phoenix in Book 9, the so-called "Embassy Book" in the *Iliad* and the relation that this all has to the *paradeigma* of Meleager and the behavior of Achilles. He believes that what we have in this regard forms an organic part of the *Iliad*, one that "reconciles the irreconcilable," and that leads to the introduction of the *Patrocleia* in the *Iliad* and to the whole development and unity of the epic. Though Achilles rejects the Embassy, thus making the introduction of the *Patrocleia* inevitable, he nevertheless remains at Troy, awaiting renewal of proposals of the Achaeans and Agamemnon and new and more sincere supplications. Such supplications cannot follow and do not follow but are fulfilled in Book 9 by Odysseus and Ajax and the heralds who correspond to the priests and comrades of the *paradeigma* with Phoenix representing the unsuccessfully supplicating members of Meleager's family.

The organization of the book consists of three basic chapters: "The 'Paradeigma' of Meleager" (11-46); "The Homeric Form of Phoenix" (47-69); and "Meleager-Achilles and Phoenix" (71-88). The first chapter deals with construction, style and language, the *cholos* of Meleager, and Problem A; the second with the powerful presence of Phoenix in the *Iliad*, the duals in 9.182-98 and Phoenix, and Problem B; and the third with Homer in the face of difficult problems, the exemplification of Achilles, and the Mission of Phoenix. Problem A involves the relation of the "*paradeigmatismos*" of the Meleager story (The "Meleagrid") to Achilles; Problem B relates to the role of Phoenix and

his appearance in the scene with Agamemnon and "the contradictions concerning Phoenix which are not simply apparent but also intentional, intentionally apparent."

Dr. Voskos distinguishes carefully between what he believes existed in a pre-Homeric "Meleagrid" and the ways in which Homer used the material creatively and selectively in terms of the overall purpose of the *Iliad*; Achilles' wrath and his rejection of the embassy he sees as original with Homer and he carefully distinguishes between the *menis* of Achilles [embassy fails] and the *cholos* of Meleager [embassy succeeds]. Phoenix's speech is viewed as an integral part of Book 9 and of the total *Iliad* and though Dr. Voskos argues that Odysseus is clearly the leader of the Embassy, Phoenix plays a special personal role of paternal friend and tutor of Achilles. Phoenix left first because of his narrow connection with Achilles' family to avoid coming as a representative of Agamemnon (hence the use of the dual is restricted by Homer to Ajax and Odysseus). Achilles must reject the proposals of Agamemnon and the Achaeans but he must needs remain at Troy in the expectation of future supplications which could not be fulfilled. Hence the introduction of the protreptic and apotreptic *paradeigma* of Meleager with the original version of his death in battle suppressed and his punishment emphasized. So that Achilles will not act and suffer as Meleager did, the allegory of *Ate* and the *Litai* takes on special force.

Students of Homer should be aware of Dr. Voskos's *Meleager-Achilles and Phoenix*, both because of what it particularly has to contribute to the discussion of a critical problem in the *Iliad*, and for its review and synthesis of the scholarship of the subject up to this date.

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STAFFAN FOGELMARK. *Studies in Pindar with particular reference to Paean VI and Nemean VII*. Lund, CWK Gleerup, 1972. Pp. 156.

This book comprises five chapters and two notes, loosely connected by the author's concern for the date and interrelation of *Nem. 7* and *Paean 6*. In the first two chapters the generally accepted chronology of the odes is tested against two variables, the use of color-words (hue not intensity) and ornamental references to Apollo (i.e. not simple "Apollo"). A positive relationship is found between absence of color-words and 'simple' Apollo and odes written before 476 B.C. (*Ol. 14, Pyth. 6, 7, 10, 12, Nem. 2, 5, Isthm. 5, 6, 8*). *Nem. 7* and *Paean 6* are therefore late. Similarly, *ὄν* is replaced by *μετά* in the later odes (a phenomenon paralleled in fifth century prose generally), but there are too few occurrences to make *μετά* a useful criterion for dating and the discussion is confined to a note at the end of the book. The final three

chapters discuss various recent articles concerned with *Nem.* 7 and *Paeon* 6. W. Theiler's attempt to formulate objective criteria for dating the odes (*Schr. Königsb. Gel. Ges.* 17 [1941] 255-90) is shown to be inaccurate, arbitrary, and naïve. W. J. Slater's explanation of *Nem.* 7.102ff. as a conventional statement by the poet with no reference to *Paeon* 6 (*CQ* 19 [1969] 86-94) is discussed at length but without clear or decisive refutation. A. Hoekstra's strange explanation of the "Aegina stanza" in *Paeon* 6 (*Mnemosyne* 15 [1961] 1-14) is rightly exploded. The book ends with another note, showing that Pindar talks of "mother" only in reference to Thebes, Aegina and Delphi and, since the first two references are late, the third, in *Paeon* 6, should be also. The book, then, makes two distinct points: *Nem.* 7 and *Paeon* 6 are to be dated late; they are interconnected.

The proof adduced for the late dating of *Nem.* 7 and *Paeon* 6, even if it is not valid, is important both for its grappling with a definition of color-words and for its painstaking and thorough methodology. Not only has Fogelmark considered all the evidence (only to reject some of it, rightly, and more, e.g., *χρῦσεος*, just to be safe) but he has tested his findings. He spends twelve pages discussing the epithets of Zeus, which turn out not to be significant except as a control for Apollo's epithets, and he discusses not only how the god is named but in what cases and in what contexts. Five pages prove conclusively that *Ζηνός/-ί/-α* and *Διός/-ί/-α* are not equivalent. On the other hand, if Fogelmark is correct (and the existence of *two* supporting variables makes this probable), the gains are all the greater: we will have two objective dating criteria (and hopes for more) and also the assurance that the traditional dating is at least generally correct.

Two objections might be raised: (1) The definition of a color-word is (necessarily) subjective. Fogelmark has spent the first twenty pages discussing each word and his reasons for listing it among "indisputable colour-epithets," "epithets conveying an impression of visual darkness" or "epithets on occasions denoting colour or brilliance and brightness." He is usually convincing (but is *ἰόπλοκος* colorful? is *κελαινέφης* colorful when used of Zeus in spite of the overwhelming Homeric precedent?). His safeguards are such that these quibbles make little difference: there is at most one color word in the early odes (*ξανθαῖς Nem.* 5.54) against at least fifty in the later odes (the ratio of lines, on the other hand, is 1-6). (2) There are too few examples of 'simple' Apollo in the early odes. Here Fogelmark applies a simple statistical test which shows that the distribution is "almost significant," that is, the likelihood of this distribution occurring by chance is very small. A further problem, which would undermine the statistics somewhat, is that Fogelmark does not consider *θεός* when it means Apollo. In any event, there is no chance that he is subject to the devastating criticisms he levels against Theiler.

Fogelmark's second point, that *Nem.* 7 and *Paeon* 6 are related, is much more subjective and therefore much less susceptible to proof. He

concentrates on Slater's article, agreeing, it seems, with the first part (the poet by convention speaks of his task in the future), providing a "simpler" argument for the second (*Ol.* 6.87ff. is a conventional utterance), and yet totally disagreeing with Slater's final point that the past reference in *Nem.* 7.102ff. is also conventional. More important than Fogelmark's specific counter-arguments, which are sometimes repetitive and unconvincing, are the perceptive observations scattered throughout the chapter, for instance his analysis of unfulfilled poetic futures as "a kind of final, poetical applause which never ends."

The primary value of this book is its objectivity and precision; a number of acute, though more subjective impressions can be found in the refutations of other scholars.

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RICHARD CARDEN. *The Papyrus Fragments of Sophocles: An Edition with Prolegomena and Commentary*. Berlin/New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1974. Pp. xvi + 264. \$66.70. (*Texte und Kommentare: Eine altertumswissenschaftliche Reihe*, Band 7)

Wilamowitz (*KS* 1.461-63) thought less of A. C. Pearson's *O.C.T.* than Pearson's friend Housman did (*CR* 39 [1925] 76-80); but Pearson's *Fragments* were of an excellence that discouraged further work. Carden, a student of Hugh Lloyd-Jones, has provided, with the help of W. S. Barrett, what may best be called a supplement volume to Pearson. He edits and comments upon all papyrological additions to Sophocles except *Ich*, those preserved in other authors on papyrus, and the very small bits familiar to *POxy.* subscribers. There are no photographs in spite of an enormous price and no translations. The papyri themselves, if not in America, were carefully examined. Bibliographies are thorough but ought to have been alphabetical and not chronological. Large portions of exegetical material are from Pearson. Attribution remains the crucial problem.

First *Eurypylus* (1-51). Wilamowitz (*KS* 1.351) joined Soph. fr. 768N² with fr. 210.9P on the coincidence of $\chi\lambda\alpha\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\omega\nu$ $\delta\pi\lambda\omega\nu$. Style and affinity of *POxy.* 1175 to *Ich* support Sophocles. The title was known from Aristotle, *Poetics* 1459b6; Plutarch *Mor.* 458d attests Eurypylus and Neoptolemos described by Sophocles. The only certain character is Eurypylus (title). His death and mourning by Astyoche and Priam provided the action. Their recognition of their betrayal and loss rather than the youth's fate would seem more conducive to tragic treatment. There is no reason to assume "that Eurypylus was the central character in this play" (16). The long fragment provides an anomaly, a messenger speech divided by a kommos, "absolutely sure and really surprising and important" (Wilamowitz, *KS* 1.352). The value of the new edition is to remind us how vulnerable earlier conclusions are. Three details:

one might recall at I. 5.9. (17) that Neoptolemos' shield was golden (Quint. Smyrn. 8.165-66). At I.5.53 (25) I should compare the disfiguring of Hector's body at *Il.* 22.371ff. Priam's lament for Eurypylus "boy and man and elder" (I.5.73[27]) recalls Andromache's words to Hector at *Il.* 6.429-30 (father, mother, brother, husband).

Inachus (52-93) entails two major difficulties: attribution and genre. Neither Aeschylus nor Euripides composed a known Io-tragedy, hence *Inachus*. *PTebt.* 692 is too frivolous for tragedy, hence a satyr-play. Wilamowitz (*Herakles* I³.89 n. 53) suggested that like *Alcestis*, *Inachus* replaced a satyr-play. I advanced supporting arguments twenty years ago at *G(R)BS* 1 (1958) 137-55. D. F. Sutton has recently provided the best satyric case at *Eos* 62 (1974) 213-26, but ignores many tragic arguments. Sutton has proven to me that *PTebt.* 692 is satyric, although his argument (213) that *PTebt.* 692.7 violates Porson's Law falls flat, for surely (Carden, 79) the verse is lyric. But the book fragments indubitably indicate tragedy. *δράματι* at Dion. Hal. *AR* 1.25 can only signify a tragedy. There is no reference in 26 fragments to satyrs. Fr. 270P is from a tragic parodos; cf. *Aj.* 134-45. *Inachus* is the obvious source of Accius, *Io. δόμοις* (277P) implies a palace front; and the number of rôles is suspicious for a satyr-play. Carden supplies the sword to cut the knot (55): "*POxy.* 2369 may be the *Inachus* of Sophocles but not satyric, *PTebt.* 692 satyric but from a different play about Io." *Io vaga* was a tragic staple (Hor. *ArsP.* 124); and A. Körte, *APF* 11 (1935) 252-57, long ago doubted Sophoclean attribution. *POxy.* 2369 is secured by coincidence with fr. 290P. With *PTebt.* gone, satyric doubts yield to the tragic nature of the book fragments, while Sutton's exegesis of the discarded text survives. One thinks of *TGF* 20F 19. I am convinced by Carden (66-68) that fr. 279P better refers to hooves than horns. I cannot believe (70-71) in a "negro Zeus." Surely, as I long ago argued, Hermes; cf. the Egyptian of Aesch. *Supp.* and the negro chorus of Eur. *Phth.* and contrast Sutton (215): Zeus is "axiomatically unthinkable."

POxy. 2077 is secured for *Skyrioi* (94-109) by fr. 555P. Nothing is known of the action. Carden's blithe contention (94) that "the play dealt in general with the fetching of Neoptolemos from Skyros by Odysseus and Phoinix" will not do. Phoinix' inclusion is based on a naive acceptance of Soph. *Phil.* 344 and tendentious interpretation of fr. 557P, addressed surely by Neoptolemos to Lykomedes: see *G(R)BS* 12 (1971) 158 n. 20 against Pfeiffer, *Ausgewählte Schriften*, 89. Diomedes is possible. There is a bold defense of MSS *θεῶν* at fr. 555.2P against Pearson and Page and lucid excursus (106-9) on QS' use of S. (only *Aj.* certain). "But a prose summary which gave information about *ἦθος* would be unparalleled" (107). Dio Chrys. 59 is just that.

E. G. Turner prematurely proclaimed (*POxy.* 27.2): "Sophoclean authorship beyond reasonable doubt" and assigned *POxy.* 2452 to S. *Theseus*, a play which—if Welcker is right—never existed. Carden (110-34) adds the question mark required by his master at *Gnomon* 35 (1963) 436. I prefer Webster's contention (*Euripides*, 106) that the play

is E. *Theseus* (frs. 381-90N²), parodied by Aristophanes and famous in later antiquity. When there is doubt about a II A.D. tragic papyrus, Euripides always is the safer choice. Carden (125) argues a chorus of Cretan males.

Attribution of *POxy.* 1083, the splendid satyric parody of omniscient sophistry, "is merest guesswork" (Page, *GLP*, 169). Carden (141-46) provides thoughtful exegesis with cogent criticism of Maas (*KS* 50-53) and the best linguistic arguments for Sophocles. In details Sophoclean, the whole rings Euripidean. For fighting with teeth (143) add Plut. *Alc.* 2.2. *Polyidos* (frs. 390-400P) was a play of interest but attribution of the scraps *POxy.* 2453 frs. 44, 45 (153-60) can never be certain. Wilamowitz' note (*KS* 1.455 n. 1) has long supported *PHib* 8 = fr. 649P for *Tyro*, the original Romulus and Remus story. But evidence (see Pearson ad loc.) "is very weak" (Page, *GLP*, 153). Carden in his edition (161-69) is skeptical and concludes that Blass' crucial *Πελίας* at 649.52P has "almost no ground" (168). *POxy.* 213 = fr. 574P Carden (236-43) tentatively ascribes to *Andromeda* or *Tantalus* but wisely concludes "a Wartetext" (237). He prefers a reference to Medusa rather than Niobe. Carden last edits (244-50) as *Wartetext POxy.* 2804, probably not Sophocles. Useful indices and a *conspectus papyrorum* close the volume.

Of a different order is W. S. Barrett on *Niobe* (171-235). He is ponderous and prolix. There are translations familiar from *Hippolytus*. "I can see here in a plurality of females a quarry for your third shooting" (196). But I doubt if there are three people alive who know tragic Greek as well as Barrett and his exegesis elucidates tragic diction generally. There are new texts of *POxy.* 2805, *PGrenf.* ii.6(a), and *PHib.* 11. The alarming result of Barrett's work is the gross inaccuracies revealed in the transcriptions of Blass, Grenfell-Hunt, and Pearson (175 n.9). *Quis custodiet?* Barrett has reconstructed a memorable scene (third epeisodion?) of *Niobe*. The chorus is in the orchestra, Apollo and Artemis (*persona muta*) on the roof of the *skene*. The goddess picks off the girls within one by one at the directions of Apollo. Is Niobe within too? This would provide an anomaly (203), a scene with two speaking actors, Niobe and kore, within the stage building. The crux is *τί μ' ἐξελαύνεις δωμάτων;* (201). The tense of the verb proves: "The speaker is inside the house" (203). The parallels (Eur. *Med.* 707, *Phoen.* 607) are not decisive. They concern cities not a building. Medea still in Corinth says: "Kreon drives me an exile from his realm." I do not believe that Niobe on her verandah would admit she had already been driven from her home. The kore prays within to be spared; but the protagonist for his greatest moment must be on stage before the audience, in a scene paralleled at Soph. *El.* 1398ff. Niobe is ruined ἄλωλα, driven like Oedipus from her home. Barrett argues (220, 231ff.) that one daughter survives. I incline to Pearson's view (II.95) that mitigated suffering is "hardly credible". The crux is: *πῶλος ὥς ὑπὸ ζυγοῦ* (219). With difficulty Niobe (or even a nurse) is a filly but is it less ridiculous than Deianeira a boxer at *Trach.* 442? There is single Homeric rele-

vance to abbreviated similes. Or else the youngest daughter—Ovid hints at execution by age (*M* 6.224-25)—reaches her mother on stage to drop dead in her embrace (cf. *occidit* at *Ov. Met.* 6.301). The aetiological tale of a surviving girl probably arose from misunderstanding of a statue group or wall painting (e.g. Uffizi Niobe: *MythLex* III.1.411 fig. 8). I should revive Welcker's view *GrTr* I.290 that a paidagogos was in the cast (cf. *El.*). Epic and lyric require no "Messenger." Aesch. *Niobe* took place after the killings and would allow choral exposition. This explains the artistic tradition: e.g. Uffizi Paidagogos, BM shield, Louvre Niobid and Paidagogos. Barrett suggests a *deus ex machina* (226 n. 123). I should think Leto rather than the re-emergence of Apollo.

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OTTO STEEN DUE. *Changing Forms: Studies in the Metamorphoses of Ovid*. Copenhagen, Gyldendal, 1974. Pp. 212. Kr. 115 (paper). (*Classica et Mediaevalia. Dissertationes*, 10)

It would be easy to underestimate this work. Its dust cover consists of a weirdly cut and angled photograph of Bernini's famous statue of Apollo and Daphne that manages to suggest erotic, not philological, possibilities in the book. Instead of writing in his native Danish or the German which probably would have been easier, Due chose to work out his ideas in English that, even after friends' corrections, produces occasional surprise; and after the printer contributed his portion of errors, the much-corrected page might affront a fussy reader. Even the short introductory chapter, called "Poem and Reader," wanders vaguely and unpromisingly. It proclaims in the first sentence that the book aims "to establish certain historical facts," and that purpose is eventually explained as defining the experience of those Romans who read the *Met.* just after it was published. Or, to simplify the problem, Due attempts to discover why people did read the *Met.* I for my part am not excited by those questions, and I am doubtful, after finishing the book, that Due answered them adequately. Nevertheless, for what he does achieve, a sympathetic and perceptive reading of the *Met.* which we can use *today*, I warmly recommend this study.

Due divides his research into two roughly equal sections of three chapters each. Using terminology of some modern critics, he takes an extrinsic approach in the first section, intrinsic in the second; or he concentrates on context in Part I, text in Part II. Since many of us tend to use the word "context" to refer to grammatical and verbal, rhetorical and metaphorical details of a literary passage which help to fix the meaning of words, sentences, and scenes, I hasten to add that Due

means the "historical context" in which Ovid wrote. He selects for discussion: 1. the literary sources and models which Ovid used and his readers could appreciate; 2. the impression of Ovid the poet which readers had derived from his other works, hence their expectations as they approached the *Met.*; 3. the significance of Augustus and Augustanism for Ovid and his audience. Having defined a particular reader at a particular time, Due then in Part II attempts to show how this reader read three representative portions of the *Met.*, namely, Book 1, the stories recounted by the Minyaeides in relation to their frame, and the section on Troy (11.194-13.622).

Due knows that extensive studies have been devoted to the sources, especially Greek sources, of the *Met.*; he has read them, and he does not go over that familiar ground. He is far more concerned with the literary models to whom Ovid alludes: Homer, Callimachus, Lucretius, Catullus, the elegists, Horace, and Vergil. His points are sensible but not earth-shaking: that Ovid did not depend blindly on one model or on models from one era or even of one genre; that Ovid's allusions commonly exhibited appreciable differences from his models in detail and tone. The first readers of the *Met.*, then, would have quickly seen that the poem was not the conventional epic, was not exclusively modeled on Callimachus or the Neoterics or Roman Elegy, and that allusions to earlier, familiar literature, Greek and Latin, were considerably more than strict imitations.

What Due calls the "Ovidian Context" has two aspects: the character of Ovid's poetry prior to the *Met.* and—assuming that final publication of the *Met.* occurred after Ovid's death and that few Romans saw the unfinished version—the effect produced by Ovid's exile and his poetry from exile. On the basis of the playfulness and irony, elusiveness and ambiguity of Ovid's prior work, Due sensibly suggests that Roman readers of the *Met.* would not have expected to find in it "an epic poem which could easily be placed in one of the known categories of that genre." Less successful, in my opinion, is the attempt to fix the attitude of readers from a politically partisan interpretation of the exile poetry and a monolithic view of exiled Ovid as a victim of despotism, symbol of resistance to totalitarianism. In the first place, there were certainly diverse attitudes towards the exiled poet, and the dominant impressions left by the *Tristia* and *ex Ponto* should have been correspondingly divergent then as they are now. Secondly, the absence from the *Met.* of demonstrable references to the exile, the paucity of likely revisions inserted after A.D. 8, and the generally apolitical and impersonal nature of the poem all combine to resist efforts, as much then as they do now, to make the poem topical or to make Ovid's exile especially relevant to the reading of the *Met.*

It is in subsequent chapters that Due makes his most valuable contributions, and that is because he focuses his arguments through significant disagreement with Otis primarily, but secondarily with Wilkin-

son, Ludwig, and Bernbeck, in short, with the major interpreters of the *Met.* over the past two decades. Otis, as is well known, published his first edition of *Ovid as an Epic Poet* in 1966; then, in 1970, rethinking his ideas in response to criticism, he came out with a second edition, for which he wrote a brief new Preface and a very extensive new Conclusion. Otherwise, he left the book unchanged, even its misprints, with the result that, if one does not heed the warning of the new Preface, one now reads eight chapters and 300 pages toward a Conclusion which Otis has rejected and removed without altering those chapters. Faced with this anomaly, Due decided to deal primarily with Otis' first edition (noting the places where Otis' new theories come into play). Thus, he first challenges Otis on one of the dominant theses of 1966 (subsequently rejected, though not very satisfactorily): that Ovid intended to write and did write a kind of Augustan epic. Due rightly, I think, believes that Ovid intended no such thing and that contemporary readers expected nothing of the sort. Otis now admits that Ovid did not achieve it, but eight chapters of the original book still remain arguing for the Augustan plan. Since Otis isolates a series of "epic panels" (Creation, Phaethon, Perseus, Meleager and Hercules), which, he claims, cumulatively prepare for the Augustan finale, the apotheoses of Romulus and Aeneas, Due examines each "panel" and finds that key elements are either non-Augustan or unsympathetic to Augustanism and thus concludes that no Augustan structural scheme dominates the *Met.*

Continuing his criticism of Otis in Part II of the study, Due proceeds to analyze in detail the text in order to question the existence of a single plan of the *Met.* as true to the experience of Ovid's audience then (or now, for that matter). A very able reading of Book 1, in the order the stories appear, emphasizes the artfully intricate but elusive way in which the poem moves from story to story, rarely realized by the audience except after the event. Due insists that Ovid's narratives function with autonomy (by themselves) as much as by heteronomy (interrelated with plan or plans). He also criticizes as too limited Wilkinson's claim that Ovid's purposes were essentially like Calimachus'.

After a short chapter on the multiple interrelations of the stories in Book 4 of the *Minyaeides*, among each other and with the dramatic frame, from which Due derives the cogent point that caprice is an ordering principle of the *Met.*, he deals with the section on Troy, 11.194-13.622. Here, he combats Wilkinson and Otis for their respective views of the final "historical" portion of the poem, Ludwig for his limited reading of these books (Parts 9 and 10 of Ludwig's structural scheme), and once again Otis for his highly serious reading of Ceyx and Alcyone, but also Bernbeck for over-emphasis on playfulness.

Thus, Due proposes a healthy corrective to those who for too long have defined our critical view of the *Met.* in "either-or" terms: either epic or elegiac, serious or playful, Augustan or anti-Augustan, structured or unstructured. By his readings of the text, if not by his historical

investigation into context, he successfully demonstrates that the informed audience of Ovid did, and should still, experience the *Met.* with delight as "both-and."

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J. C. BRAMBLE. *Persius and the Programmatic Satire. A Study in Form and Imagery.* Cambridge [Engl.], Cambridge University Press, 1974. Pp. xiv + 224. \$12.50. (*Cambridge Classical Studies*)

This chaotic book can best be described as a series of notes clustering around the central chapter 4, *Persius' First Satire: Analysis* (67-155). The author's purpose becomes clear on the first page: "most of the following pages are devoted . . . to a study of the way [Persius] takes the concepts and metaphors of literary criticism back to their physical origins, so concretely dramatising an analysis of the causes of decadence in contemporary letters." To get to this point, B. leads us through a labyrinthine series of chapters: *Style and Expression in Persius' Fifth Satire; The Programmatic Satire and the Method of Persius I; The Nature and Sources of Persius' Imagery* (with the subdivisions: Ears, 'Asinus,' 'Euge and Belle,' The Heroic Past, Disease, Dress and Appearance, Homosexuality And Effeminacy, Food And Drink). After the central chapter, we are treated to eighteen pages on *Grandeur And Humility: Juvenal And The High Style*. All this is backed up with numerous excursuses and four appendices.

Much of this is quite unnecessary, and adds nothing to our knowledge of Persius or Satire in general. A few examples will suffice: p. 12 Excursus 1 *The rejection of mythology* tells us nothing; p. 13 Exc. 2 starts with the sentence (on Persius 5.19) "The reading *bullatis* is manifestly inferior" and proceeds to labor the obvious; p. 62 Exc. 2 '*Digentia*' in *Horace's Epistles* merits a footnote at most; p. 153 Exc. 6 *Attractive surface and internal corruption* again adds nothing. One gets the feeling that these are all remnants of an aborted commentary.

The central point of this study arises from the theme touched upon by Seneca *Ep.* 114.1 *talis hominibus fuit oratio qualis vita*. This inspires B. to take the obviously sexual imagery, which occurs occasionally in Persius 1, and relentlessly apply this mold to the most unlikely lines. As early as line 4, B. takes the Homeric reference to *Troïades* as a foreshadowing of the homosexuality which he insists on seeing as the key to our understanding. From this line on, all restraint disappears, and we are told the following astonishing things: p. 73 "The image of the bloated lung [line 14] infects the whole undertaking with an air of perversity" (with the comic footnote "But given *grande aliquid* and *pulmo animae praelargus*, the sexual overtone can at most be vestigial. P. builds up to his climax only gradually."); p. 75 "alternatively, we

might explain the allusion [line 17 *sede leges celsa*] with reference to prostitution." At pp. 76-77, predictably B. clutches at the scholiast's interpretation of *patrare* (line 18) as *rei Venereae consummatio*, but gets into trouble by insisting that *fractus* has a "suggestion of impotence." The clearly sexual tone of lines 20-21 is blurred by the comment "for *carmina* we expect something like *membrum virile*, for *versu*, *digito*, or perhaps *manu*." What can the last suggestion possibly mean? The long discussion on *cute perditus* (line 23) comes to the inevitable conclusion (p. 148) that here *cutis* means "either *praeputium*, or, after Korzeniewski, *pars pro toto* for *penis*." It would be helpful if B. explained how his first suggestion is to be understood; in the other passage in P. where *cutis* appears in a similar context (3.63 *cutis aegra tumebit*), it clearly refers to physical disease. At line 25 we are told (p. 91) that "*rupto iecore* refers to the production of orgasm" (despite the claims to impotence in *fractus*). Of *fermentum* (line 24), B. says (p. 92) "Though final proof is impossible [a startling admission after what has preceded!] the image of tumidity may have been intended as an ingredient of the dominant sexual *double entendre*." B. is at his worst in imagining puns. Thus line 25 *innata est* provokes the speculation that it "might be a pun on *in nate est*"; on line 22 "another punning division, of *auriculis* into *auri-culis*, is possible"; line 52 "There may be a pun on *calidum/callidum*. Admittedly, *callidum* would be unmetrical, but P. may have chosen to be clever rather than correct." Needless to say, *digito monstrari* (line 28) is taken as "an obscene gesture," and the triple use of *scire* (line 27) is said to be used of "literary (and possibly sexual) 'know-how'." Clearly B. has to accept (line 87) Korzeniewski's suggestion of "a sexual *double-entendre* in *doctas posuisse figuras*." To all of this, one can but repeat Gellius's words, used on a similar occasion, (NA 9.10.5) *insulsa nimis et odiosa scrutatione violavit*.

Some observations outside the main theme follow. The note (p. 8) on *fauces* (Persius 5.26) as "the more realistic word, employed in a less than traditional manner" seems to ignore passages like *Aen.* 2.774, where no lack of elevation shows. The remarks (pp. 21-22) on *ante cibum* at Hor. *Sat.* 1.10.61 as "conceivably . . . moral" make no sense. The firm belief (p. 27) in K. J. Reckford's idea that the diminutive *auricula* is contemptuous, may be valid for P.'s first Satire, but seems impossible to maintain at 2.21 and 30, where *aurem* and *auriculas* convey the same tone. The suggestion (p. 65) that Horace *Sat.* 2.5.41 in his criticism of Furius uses an image of vomiting in *cana nive conspuet Alpes* is refuted by the simple meaning of the verb. The remarks (p. 105) on Persius 1.43 "interposition of a mere *nec* is insufficient to separate this type of poetry from the fate due to it" are lamentably fanciful, as are the words on *oculo . . . uno* (line 66) "perhaps an instance of eyesight symbolising mental state, may imply that the poet is not fully aware of what he is doing." (p. 117).

One final complaint: why was it necessary to print the text of the First Satire at the end of the book (pp. 205-8)? Other than a few

inconsistent orthographical changes, the text varies from Clausen's *O.C.T.* only at the punctuation in line 12, and the removal of the question mark after line 78 (with unconvincing argumentation given pp. 174-79). However, the *apparatus criticus* is taken (with no acknowledgement) entirely from Clausen's *O.C.T.* (which is nowhere mentioned in this book). In the process, B. manages to introduce three misprints of his own.

It would be wrong to imagine that this book is all bad. Problems are honestly faced, and evidence is presented fairly and massively. No doubt future commentators have been saved much toil. The main theme of the book, however, is hardly likely to win many adherents.

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Claudian, *Panegyricus de Consulatu Manlii Theodori* (Carm. 16 und 17). Eingeleitet, herausgegeben, übersetzt und erklärt von WERNER SIMON. Berlin, Richard Seitz & Co., 1975. 292 Seiten, 3 Abb., kartoniert DM 44.-

To compose a genuinely helpful commentary on any of Claudian's panegyrics demands both a fine sensitivity to the poet's language and a thorough familiarity with the historical context. This is perhaps especially the case with the poem which Claudian delivered at Milan in January 399 to celebrate the consulate of Mallius Theodorus, since it furnishes the principal evidence for its subject's career before he became praetorian prefect of Italy in 397 (*PLRE* 1. 900-2).

The author of the book under review (a dissertation from the Freie Universität Berlin) has attempted a task which is beyond his knowledge and capabilities. The work presents the appearance of scholarship: Simon parades an enormous bibliography (7-44); he has collated the main manuscripts afresh; he offers a text and translation (75-117) with a lengthy commentary (118-281); and he discourses learnedly on Theodorus' career (60-71). But Simon has little or nothing new to offer, and he frequently betrays his unfamiliarity with the background of the poem. He has missed Theodorus' epitaph on his sister, Manlia Daedalia (*CIL* V. 6240), and P. Courcelle's discussion of it (*REA* 46 [1944] 65ff.), even though the inscription supports his preference for the spelling *Manlius* over *Mallius* (60/61) and illuminates Theodorus' philosophical interests. The conspectus of readings (58/59) reveals how little his text differs from those of Birt, Jeep and Koch, and in the one place where he prints a reading not in any previous edition, his conjecture (*Libyam* in line 201) is almost certainly wrong.

The commentary often comprises bare references which can be found in dictionaries available to all, and it tends to avoid explanation precisely where it is needed. A typical example is the note on *Ligurum se moenibus infert* (line 124). Simon cites Birt's index for Claudian's use of *moenia* or *muri* with a genitive to designate a city, adds "Zu Mailand vgl. Lippold, *Theod. d. Gr.* S. 145, Anm. 156" and adduces two Virgilian examples of *se infert* from *TLL* 7. 1378. But he translates "in die Stadt der Ligurer" and declines to document Claudian's use of *Ligurum* to mean "of Milan." (For this usage, compare *IV Cons. Hon.* 567, where *per Ligurum populos* means simply "among the people of Milan": Claudian is describing the consular procession of Honorius.) More serious is Simon's failure to appreciate and explain some of Claudian's allusions to Theodorus' official posts. Thus *culmen utrumque tenes* (line 16) is glossed "sc. *virtutis et honoris*" (134) and the note on *summum cacumen* (line 61) states merely "In übertragener Bedeutung: *Lucr.* 2, 1130; 4, 1457" (157); in fact, the "highest peak" is Theodorus' praetorian prefecture of Gaul and "both pinnacles" are his praetorian prefecture of Italy and consulate (for the association of the two, cf. *Phoenix* 28 [1974] 445ff.). Most serious of all, however, is Simon's carelessness over important historical details. He confuses Theodorus with his son (70/71) and states that Claudian began "his activity at the court" with his panegyric on the consuls of 395 (49). This poem was delivered at Rome, and Claudian specifically states that his later poem on the third consulate of Honorius was the first which he delivered at court (*III Cons. Hon.*, praef. 15ff.).

Two passages which concern Theodorus' career pose particular problems. In the first (38-41), virtually all modern scholars believe that Claudian's language describes the functions of a *comes sacrarum largitionum*. But Theodorus is attested as *comes rei privatae* on 18 March 380 (*CTh* 11. 16.12). Hence a contradiction, which leads Simon to conjecture that Theodorus held both offices (64/65), even though on this hypothesis Claudian must have omitted one of them. (The stages of the career are defined by explicit transitions in lines 21, 24, 28, 33, 38, 47-50.) However, Claudian's words can be applied to the attested post of *comes rei privatae*: he alludes to Theodorus' administration of the emperor's own wealth and estates (the words *orbis tributa possessi* are surely mere hyperbole for "the revenue of world-wide estates") and the production of gold from rivers and mines. The second passage enumerates two of the four parts of Theodorus' jurisdiction as praetorian prefect of Italy:

†Lydos† Poenosque secunda (i.e. rein of the prefect's carriage)
temperat; Illyrico se tertia porrigit orbi (201/2).

Lydos is impossible, and Heinsius' *Numidas* gives the correct sense. Simon rejects Scaliger's *Libyas* as "sonst nicht belegt" and

Numidas as "paläographisch kaum erklärbar" (218/9) and prints *Libyam*, citing passages where Claudian uses the word "in Verbindung mit *Italia*". That misses the point: what is needed here is not a word to designate the whole of Africa (as *Libya* normally does in Claudian: e.g. in lines 24/25), but one which will complement *Poenos* as a description of the African diocese of the Western Empire. The sense thus requires either *Numidas* or *Mauros*, whatever palaeographical plausibility may dictate. The following clause is of some historical importance, for it constitutes the earliest evidence that part of Illyricum had been transferred from the Eastern to the Western Empire. Simon follows others in deducing from a comparison of this passage with *In Rufinum* 2. 154/5 that the transfer occurred after 395 but before Theodorus was appointed praetorian prefect of Italy in January 397 (219/220). But that deduction proceeds from the dramatic dates of the two passages. It would surely be more prudent to treat Claudian solely and strictly as evidence for the time of composition, and hence to infer a date between summer 397 and January 399. It then becomes possible to connect the transfer with Stilicho's expedition to Pannonia (*Cons. Stil.* 2. 191-207); Claudian records it after the suppression of Gildo (spring 398) and states that Stilicho restored to the Empire territory which had long been lost. Western Illyricum (I conclude) was attached to the Western Empire in 398.

A final point. According to Claudian, all Theodorus' offices before his retirement c. 382 were held *iuvenilibus annis* (line 60). Simon duly makes Theodorus born c. 350 (62, 154f.). But Claudian may have exaggerated. Since two sons of Theodorus held prefectures in 397/8, I suspect that Theodorus was really born some years before 350—say c. 340.

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RICHARD HAMILTON. *Epinikion. General Form in the Odes of Pindar.* Mouton: The Hague, Paris, 1974. Pp. viii + 126. Gld. 24.

This is not an easy book to read, and is made less easy by its formal presentation. The author's thesis is that the epinician ode reveals a general and consistent structure and that this conclusion is valuable not only for the understanding of Greek lyric but also possibly for such poetry as the Homeric hymns.

Clearly the argument must stand or fall by the accuracy of the structural analysis it offers. This analysis is based upon six "parts".

(1) *Myth and Mythic Example* (pp. 14-15): Hamilton asserts that mythic material is to be divided into *Myth* (at least 14 lines in length)

and Mythic Example (8 lines or less). But *Ol.* 2.22-30, *Ol.* 2.38-45, *Ol.* 9.29-35, *Pyth.* 9.79-88, *Nem.* 1.13-18, *Nem.* 3.22-26, *Nem.* 4.25-30 and *Nem.* 8.23-32, all less than 14 lines, are called "Myth" in appendix I (pp. 90-92). In any case, these passages in *Ol.* 2, *Ol.* 9, *Nem.* 3, *Nem.* 4 and *Nem.* 8 cannot be considered part of the main myth (see pp. 18-19) merely to substantiate the argument presented on page 36. The author states further that if mythic material occurs in the first stanza it will be Myth (but see *Isthm.* 8 as well as *Ol.* 9), and that, if Myth is found in the first stanza, it is always found in the End as well (but see *Pyth.* 4 where five stanzas follow the myth). One ode cited is *Pyth.* 12. But this ode has one *continuous* myth placed between its introduction (vv. 1-6) and conclusion (vv. 28-33). A chart of mythic material stands at the end of chapter 2 (pp. 18-19). Here the divisions of the ode into first quarter (1), intervening material (2) and final quarter (3) result in poor arithmetic, especially for *Pyth.* 4 where (1) = vv. 4-63 and (3) = vv. 70-259! The shorter myth of *Nem.* 1 is placed in (2) although confined to the first quarter of the ode (vv. 13-18), while the longer myth, comprising more than half the ode's length (vv. 33-72), appears in (3). Two distinct myths recounted in *Nem.* 4 are lumped together as a single, continuous myth on page 18. Further discrepancies are found in the coding of *Nem.* 10, *Pyth.* 9 and *Nem.* 9.

(2) Naming Complex (p. 15): This part, the author's own invention, consists of the name of the victor and the name of the place of victory. He claims that it occurs only once, "in the Beginning" (p. 15). As a matter of fact, the two elements of the "complex" are often separated by four or more verses (*Ol.* 1, *Ol.* 6, *Ol.* 11, *Ol.* 13, *Pyth.* 3, *Pyth.* 5, *Pyth.* 7, *Pyth.* 11, *Nem.* 2, *Nem.* 3, *Nem.* 6, *Nem.* 10, *Isthm.* 1), even by as many as 22 or 27 verses (*Nem.* 10, *Ol.* 13) if we take the first mention of either. "Beginning" is also an ambiguous term. In some of the shorter odes, the Naming Complex is not completed until the second half (*Ol.* 11, *Pyth.* 7, *Nem.* 2, *Isthm.* 3), and it is difficult to think of vv. 73 and 80 of *Pyth.* 3 as "Beginning". Nor is it true that the Naming Complex occurs only once (e.g. there are second mentions of the name of the victor and place of victory at *Ol.* 1.94, 107; *Ol.* 5.21, 23; *Ol.* 7.80, 88; *Ol.* 8.65, 83; *Ol.* 10.92, 101; *Pyth.* 4.65, 66; *Pyth.* 5.103, 105; *Pyth.* 8.80, 84; *Pyth.* 11.44, 49; *Nem.* 4.75, 78; *Nem.* 5.43, 44; *Nem.* 9.52, 53; *Isthm.* 6.57, 61). The name of the event is excluded by Hamilton from the Naming Complex since it is "often widely separated from the other two names" (p. 15). But of the eleven examples cited one is irrelevant (*Pyth.* 12), and the three terms (name of victor, place of victory, name of the event) are found together *later* in the ode in *Pyth.* 4.65-67, *Pyth.* 8.80-84, *Pyth.* 11.44-50 and *Isthm.* 6.57-61. In two, the name of the driver (?) is linked with the place and the event (*Ol.* 6.22-26; *Pyth.* 6.15-17), and in two the name and the *victory* are closely linked (*Isthm.* 4.44; *Isthm.* 8.66). In *Ol.* 1 an unmistakable periphrasis for Hiero is linked with the place of victory and the event (vv. 18-23).

(3) Praise (pp. 15-16): This term includes praise of the victor, praise of his homeland and other praise. Hamilton maintains that the Naming

Complex is separated from Praise "considerably over half the time" (p. 16). Of four examples offered to show how the Myth stands between the Naming Complex and Praise, three are forced, since the victor and place of victory (Hamilton's Naming Complex) are actually part of the Praise (*Pyth.* 4.59-67; *Pyth.* 11.44-50; *Isthm.* 1.61-67). In all three of these odes, the two constituents of the Naming Complex are combined with Praise, but Hamilton's schematism compels him to discount them since they do not occur at the Beginning of the ode. Many further examples presented in this same paragraph on page 16 are inexact.

(4) Gnome (p. 16): Hamilton sees no gnomic utterance in *Nem.* 2 (what about vv. 10-12?) but finds at least one in all the other odes (even in *Pyth.* 6). He finds one gnome in *Isthm.* 2: are there not two (v. 11, vv. 33-34)? He argues that a Gnomic Cluster (three or more gnomai) occurs "only at the beginning or end of the Myth and of the ode" (p. 16). But in *Ol.* 1 Pindar has already started his myth (vv. 25-27) before his gnomic passage (vv. 28-35); *Ol.* 9, *Pyth.* 1 and *Nem.* 7 are further exceptions. The term "Myth" makes it appear that Hamilton means the only myth or at least the main mythical narrative. But what about *Isthm.* 4? *Ol.* 12, a short ode without a myth, contains a gnomic cluster (vv. 5-12a) which is neither at the beginning nor end of the ode.

(5) Poet's Task (pp. 16-17): This term is stretched to include far more than "the poet introducing himself into the poem to talk about his obligations" (p. 16); e.g. *Ol.* 3.45, *Ol.* 6.1ff., 17-21, *Ol.* 8.81ff., *Ol.* 9.1-4, *Ol.* 10.60ff., *Pyth.* 7.5ff., *Pyth.* 9.76ff., *Nem.* 4.93ff., *Nem.* 10.31. In his Poet's Task Break, which is defined as "those statements by the poet of his obligation that do not introduce a part but break off one" (pp. 16-17), he includes such passages as *Ol.* 1.28ff., *Ol.* 13.91ff., *Nem.* 3.74ff., *Nem.* 10.46. *Abbruchsformel* seems to be a better description of the device. Footnote 22, accompanying this discussion (p. 23) speaks of 32 PT breaks, while appendix I, pp. 90-92, cites over 40.

(6) Prayer (p. 17): Hamilton distinguishes between Poetic Invocation and Future Prayer. The former is said to occur in the opening of an ode (but contrast fn. 25, p. 23, where Echo at the end of *Ol.* 14 is included. In the same note "song" of *Nem.* 5 is included under Poetic Invocation, but omitted under the entry for this ode in appendix I).

The weaknesses here indicated are found throughout the book. Time after time a general statement about structure is made only to be qualified and undermined in the fine print of end notes. Chapter 4 discusses what Hamilton terms "the Beginning" or "X section". On page 36 we learn that "the normal order of the constantly occurring parts in the X section is: Poet's Task, Naming Complex, Victor Praise and Poet's Task again." But according to appendix I (pp. 90-92) all four parts occur in this order (provided much else is excluded for the sake of the schematism) in only 11 of the 45 odes! In "Length of Section" on page 36, in order to accommodate his theory concerning the place of the Myth, Hamilton seems ready to discard the first triad of *Ol.* 13 and *Pyth.* 8 as "extra material," "not part of the X section," yet in his

appendix, for *Pyth.* 8 at least, the Naming Complex occurs precisely within the first triad. In actual fact, his statement that "in twenty-three of the twenty-six odes the Myth begins at the triad break or in the fifth stanza" (p. 36) is quite inaccurate.

The author concludes (chapter 8) that all odes come under one of three types: non-myth, myth and peripheral myth (p. 85). We find that the "peripheral myth odes" are included in the "variant odes" of chapter 6. But on page 30 we are told that the "peripheral myth odes" contain "non-myth rather than myth material in the center." Of the eleven "variant odes" listed (pp. 100-1) eight *do* have "myth material" in the central stanza(s) (*Pyth.* 3, *Pyth.* 4, *Pyth.* 9, *Pyth.* 12, *Isthm.* 7, *Pyth.* 1, *Nem.* 1, *Isthm.* 4). One has no myth at all (*Isthm.* 2), and one has a very short myth (*Nem.* 11). *Nem.* 10 is the only ode which substantiates Hamilton's statement.

Mr. Hamilton is right in his belief that Pindar wrote his epinicians with some sort of pattern in mind. He is to be congratulated for his close examination of all the extant victory odes of Pindar and Bacchylides. He brings out a number of interesting details, such as that, though invocation is so commonly found at the opening of the poems, it is seldom addressed to major deities (p. 17). His conclusion that the Aeginetan odes of Pindar show a particular kinship (pp. 56ff.) is noteworthy. The bibliography is useful and modern. It is clear that valuable insights have already been gained in this short book. They will be enhanced, we may hope, in a further, more detailed application of the author's theories to the elucidation of problems in particular odes.

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A.-J. FESTUGIÈRE, O. P. Observations stylistiques sur l'Évangile de S. Jean. Paris, Éditions Klincksieck, 1974. Pp. 147. (*Études et Commentaires*, 84) Fr. 68.

Père Festugière's latest book is of interest both to classical philologists and to New Testament scholars. (*Quel dommage* that this unnecessary dichotomy seems inevitable in our times! George Goold's complaint is not wide of the mark: "The greatest book written in Greek is the New Testament, though a Chinese who studied Greek in the classics departments of Occidental universities might well become an old man without ever discovering the fact." [*HSCP* 67, 1963, 296]) The work is divided into four chapters: I. *Composition de l'Évangile*; II. *Le style des récits*; III. *Le style des discours* (subdivided into I. *Choix de textes*, II. *Analyse des textes*, III. *Caractère du style*); IV. *Le Prologue*. In the *Avertissement* (p. 7) F. states that he is interested neither in the question of the authorship of the *Fourth Gospel* nor in the *système théologique* of the work (but theologians will disregard at their

peril the perceptive *obiter dicta* on the thought of this gospel). Rather, he defines as the proper object of his study the composition of the work, and, more specifically, the structure and style of the narrative and discourses (p. 7). His method is explicitly stated to be modelled on Eduard Norden's pioneer work in *Antike Kunstprosa* and *Agnostos Theos*. (p. 8).

F.'s procedure is to cite the Greek texts copiously and then analyze and comment upon them in detail to illustrate the fundamentally "strophic" structure of much of the gospel. The characteristic features of parallelism and antithesis are stressed. As with Norden, the use of connective particles and their omission (asyndeton) receive special attention. (I was reminded also of van Groningen's approach in his *La composition littéraire archaïque grecque*.) Such a procedure can be fruitful, but is difficult to review in a limited space. Suffice to say that F.'s analyses are characterized by common sense, a sound *Stilgefühl* and many penetrating observations.

What are the results? Already on p. 7 F. describes the author of the *Fourth Gospel* as "un homme qui n'est pas Grec et qui n'a pas été élevé à la grecque." At the same time, F. stresses that the author is *not* "un débutant . . . il sait ce qu'il dit et comment il faut dire." This judgment is repeated and reinforced throughout the volume, e.g. "Rien n'est moins naïf, n'est moins d'un illettré, je le répète, que ce mode de composition" (p. 30); "Ainsi a-t-on de nouveau l'impression d'un écrivain conscient de son art, de ses procédés" (p. 40); "Celui qui compose ainsi peut-il être un illettré?" (p. 46). The most important conclusion of these stylistic researches must be stated in full: "Le résultat le plus net de l'enquête que je vais mener en ce livre sera qu'il est impossible de distinguer entre «source des discours» et le texte actuel de Jean, car Jean *réécrit les discours* et, qu'il parle lui-même (Prologue), ou fasse parler Jean-Baptiste (texte II), ou fasse parler Jésus, c'est toujours le même langage, le même style, les mêmes procédés de style (parallélisme, antithèse, etc.)" (p. 68). I note that this conclusion agrees with the passing observation which Wilamowitz once made: "Der Verfasser des Johannesevangeliums hat Jesu auch die *μεγαληγορία* gegeben, die ihm bei den Synoptikern fehlt." (*Hermes* 32, 1897, 102 n. 2. = *Kleine Schriften* III, 181, n. 2).

One important consequence of these researches is that F. is able to refute certain interpretations made by Bultmann in his commentary on the *Fourth Gospel*. The strictures (*passim*) on various exaggerations of this eminent theologian are judiciously expressed and convincing.

For many readers the most interesting part of this book will be the discussion (introduced almost as an afterthought at the end) of the origins of the famous *Logos* in the Prologue to the *Fourth Gospel*. Briefly, F. denies that this *Logos* comes either from Greek philosophy or from Hermetic gnosticism. The criticism is welcome. I have long doubted the existence of any real evidence for such dogmatic handbook pronouncements as "That [the author of the *Fourth Gospel*'s] interpretation of Jesus as the Word shows the influence of Philo needs no

argument . . . [the *Fourth Gospel* consists of] the reflections of an Alexandrian philosopher, who was familiar with Philonic thought . . ." (F. G. Bratton, *A History of the Bible*, pp. 178-79). F. legitimately points out that he has devoted thirty years of his life to the study of *l'hermétisme* and observes "Peut-être ai-je donc le droit de formuler un jugement" (p. 133). The chronological difficulties involved in deriving the *Logos* of the *Fourth Gospel* from Hermetism are set forth with a sure hand and here, for once, Bultmann is not merely refuted, but given harsh treatment. Quoting Bultmann, F. writes ". . . Un flot de grands mots, d'ailleurs peu clairs (qu'entend-on par *Mythologie*? qu'entend-on par *religionsphilosophische Literatur des Hellenismus*?) . . . l'allemand a le secret de ces composés sonores et creux . . . Soyons sérieux. Laissons les grands mots. Tenons-nous a des textes précis" (pp. 134-35). A very useful summary of the fundamental hermetic doctrines follows on pp. 135-37; these are then shown to be incompatible with the teaching of the *Fourth Gospel*. F. concludes that the *Logos* of John comes directly from the *Old Testament*; passages are adduced from *Psalms* and *Wisdom*. I would add that it seems to me significant, and quite deliberate, that the *Fourth Gospel* begins with the opening words of the *Old Testament*—ἐν ἀρχῇ. The similarity does not end with a verbal echo. The style of the first verses of *Genesis* and of the opening of the *Fourth Gospel* is the same; it is characterized by the accumulation of καί connectives and by what F. calls '*liaison en chaîne*' (p. 130). That is, the word or words ending one clause begin the next clause in conjunction with a connective. The feature is distinctive and therefore significant. Compare:

ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν
καὶ τὴν γῆν · ἡ δὲ γῆ ἦν ἄβρατος

(Gen. 1.1-2)

ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν
πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος

(John 1.1-2)

So also Gen. 1.3 καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς γενηθήτω φῶς. καὶ ἐγένετο φῶς. Moreover this "ἐγένετο — theme" of Gen. 1 could easily be the model for John's πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο (1.3). Nor, in view of these other parallels, do I think it accident that the Light-Darkness contrast appears in both passages (Gen. 1.4-5; John 1.4-5); that the contrast is literal in *Genesis* and symbolic in *John* need not exclude direct influence of one on the other.

All in all, Père Festugière has written a valuable study; we should be grateful for it.

I offer now a few differences of opinion on particular points. On p. 106 F. quotes *Matthew* 7.14 in the form ὅτι στενὴ ἡ πύλη καὶ κτλ. — obviously because of the parallelism with 7.13 ὅτι πλατεῖα ἡ πύλη. Despite the parallelism, in 7.14 the variant τί στενὴ ἡ πύλη (not even mentioned by F.) may be correct; it is printed, e.g., by Vogel and

the recent United Bible Society Greek *NT* (edited by Aland, Black, Martini, Metzger, and Wikgren). For a defence of $\tau\acute{\iota}$ in 7.14 see B. Metzger, *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament*, p. 19. Metzger points out that $\tau\acute{\iota}$ here reproduces a "Semitic exclamation." He notes that $\tau\acute{\iota}$ has "wide external support" and that "copyists who did not perceive the underlying Semitism would have been tempted to assimilate $\tau\acute{\iota}$ to the preceding $\delta\tau\iota$ of v. 13." Similarly, on p. 124 F. prints *John* 1.16 in the form $\kappa\alpha\iota \acute{\epsilon}\kappa \tau\omicron\upsilon \pi\lambda\eta\rho\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon \eta\mu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\alpha}\beta\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$; on p. 131 he gives this $\kappa\alpha\iota$ a pregnant meaning = "*et en conséquence nous avons reçu de sa plénitude.*" No mention of the fact that for $\kappa\alpha\iota$ there is a variant $\delta\tau\iota$ —and that editors of the *NT* regularly print $\delta\tau\iota$. On p. 129 n. 1 F. argues forcefully for the reading $\delta \mu\omicron\nu\omicron\gamma\epsilon\nu\eta\varsigma \nu\acute{\iota}\omicron\varsigma$ in *John* 1.18, adopting a rather contemptuous tone for those who accept the variant $\mu\omicron\nu\omicron\gamma\epsilon\nu\eta\varsigma \theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ *sine articulo* (and these include both Nestle and the United Bible Society editors; also Vogel, who prints $\delta \mu.\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$). For a defence of this reading see Metzger, *op. cit.*, 198. I do not pretend to decide this difficult question, but when F., in the course of his discussion here, describes the principle of the *lectio difficilior* as "un principe purement mécanique et faux", he is wrong. Occasional, or even frequent, abuse of a valid principle ought not induce us to throw out the baby with the bath water. On p. 122 Empedocles *Fr.* 134 is quoted; the basic idea of the fragment is described as "l'absolue incorporéité de Dieu." This seems to me both exaggeration and anachronism. It is very doubtful that the concept of $\acute{\alpha}\sigma\omega\mu\alpha\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha$, with all its implications, had been fully thought out in Empedocles' lifetime. After all, in this very fragment the name for the divine Mind is the "somatic" word $\varphi\rho\eta\acute{\nu}$. See in general W. K. C. Guthrie, *History of Greek Philosophy* II.110-13, G. S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 188-89, and, for Empedocles in particular, Guthrie II.259-60, Kirk and Raven, 330. On p. 127 n. 3, F. discusses the *Fourth Gospel* 1.11-12: $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma \tau\grave{\alpha} \acute{\iota}\delta\iota\alpha \eta\lambda\theta\epsilon\nu, \kappa\alpha\iota \omicron\acute{\iota} \acute{\iota}\delta\iota\omicron\iota \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu \sigma\upsilon \pi\alpha\rho\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha\beta\omicron\nu. \omicron\sigma\omicron\iota \delta\acute{\epsilon} \acute{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha\beta\omicron\nu \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu, \acute{\epsilon}\delta\omega\kappa\epsilon\nu \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\xi\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu \kappa\tau\lambda.$ He correctly observes that $\pi\alpha\rho\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha\beta\omicron\nu$ and $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha\beta\omicron\nu$ have the same meaning here, and adds "C'est d'ailleurs une tendance du grec tardif d'user volontiers des verbes composés au moyen d'une préposition pour donner plus de force à l'idée, sans rien changer d'ailleurs au sens." It is true enough that there is such a tendency in later Greek, but it is not the real explanation here. $\pi\alpha\rho\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha\beta\omicron\nu$ has its proper compound force (= "take to one self") and the following $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha\beta\omicron\nu$ bears the same sense; note that the Vulgate correctly renders both by the compound *recepérunt*. What is involved here is the very old construction (probably Indo-European), whereby a compound verb may be followed by a simplex with the meaning of the compound. On this construction see my *Greek Textual Criticism*, 77-85, and chapter one of my forthcoming *Studies in Greek Texts*. The construction survived into the Roman period; for examples from early Christian authors see *Romans* 8.26-27; *Hebrews* 7.5-6; 1 *Clement* 43.6; *Martyrdom of Polycarp* 5.2, 12.3. On p. 130 n. 1 F. compares the formula $\kappa\alpha\iota \acute{\epsilon}\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\tau\omicron$ in support of his interpretation of

καί in John 1.19 ('καί au début d'une sentence peut marquer un nouveau départ, et ne pas se rapporter nécessairement à ce qui précède'). The comparison is invalid, since καί ἐγένετο is a well-established Semitism, in which ἐγένετο makes all the difference and which does not even occur in John. See Bauer-Arndt-Gingrich, *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament* s.v. γίνομαι 1.3.f. Similarly, on p. 131 Pl. *Tim.* 29E1 should not have been compared with John 1.13 for the accumulation of negatives. In Plato, loc. cit., the negatives are strictly accumulative (they would be redundant in English) and have reference to one and the same clause; in John, loc. cit., the negatives are connective and have separate references.

In some places, considering the mixed audience which will presumably read the book, F. could perhaps have been a little more explicit in his comments. I give one example. On p. 35 he analyzes the Hermetic *Kore Kosmou* 13, where there occur the words ὁ θεὸς ἐχαρίσατο . . . καὶ χαρισάμενος . . . He describes this type of 'liaison,' whereby the aorist indicative is picked up by a following participle from the same verb, as 'tout à fait primitive.' It is, but not every classical scholar, to say nothing of New Testament scholars, will be familiar with this old usage (already in *Iliad* 1.595-96 μείδωσεν . . . μειδήσασα δὲ . . .). A reference to Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, 368-70 would have been helpful for some readers at least; I would add also Hermann Fränkel, *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens* p. 65 n. 2.

There are numerous misprints of the Greek; in some cases the sense is affected (indeed, some appear to be slips of the author, not the typesetter). In the hope that it may be useful to readers of the book (especially to theological students whose Greek may be somewhat imperfect), I list here the correct forms: p. 9, 1.25 οὐδέν; 10 n. 1, 1.1 ἐξήτουν; 11 n. 2 (of p. 10), 11 ἦ; 32, 19 οὐς; 38, 8 ἡρώτησαν; 39, 35 πνεῦμα; 39, 38 θεοῦ; 40, 29 ἐξυπνίσω; 41, 1 ἐληλύθεισαν; 41, 18 αὐτῶ; 41, 18 ἄν (not ἄν); 41, 34 περιεδέδετο; 45, 35 ἔστησεν; 51, 1 ἄλλομένον; 54, 10 Ἐκεῖνος; 56, 6 ἐμοῦ; 56 n. 2, 1.3 οὐκ; 57, 34 τίς; 58, 7 εἴπω; 58 n. 2.1.3 ἀμαρτίας; 59, bottom line καὶ; 65, 17 οὐ; 78, 23 ἐλάλησεν; 78, 25 ἀφ'; 80, 29 ἀκούση; 82, 31 ἐλάλει; 85, 2 κτλ.; 85.30 δύναται; 87, 22 τετήρηκε; 87, 27 χαρά; 88, 14 χαρά; 93, 35 εἰσέλθῃ; 94, 1 μένη; 94, 2 οὐτε; 94, 15 αἰώνιον; 94, 22 ἡ κρίσις ἡ ἐμὴ δικαία ἐστίν; 96, 10 ἔσφαξεν; 97, 31 περισσεύει; 100, 4 συνετῇ; 100, 6 ὅς; 102, 26 θησαυρίζετε; 103, 29 καταποντισθῇ; 108, 31 εὐδῶν; 108, bottom line ἐπαναπαύσεται; 109, 20 ἀγαπῶντας; 111, n. 2 τι καὶ ἔμμετρον; 116, 22 ἰδρῶτα; 116, 36 δίκαι; 116, 38 μαρτυρήσιν; 118, 8 φρένας; 118, 10 ἀποειπὼν; 118, 11 ἀμφαδίην; 119, 1 ὑπερκορέσαις; 119, 10 τε; 119, 11 οὐ τι; 119, 24 εὐφρανῶ τί σ'; 119 n. 2, 1.7 delete comma after οἶτον; 119, n. 2, 1.10 ἐθέλῃ; 120, 17 διαφρομένον; 121, 14 τετιμένος; 122, 6 κεφαλῇ; 127, 2 ἡνίκα; 129 n. 1, 1.17 ὦν; 130, bottom line ἦν; 132, 16 delete δ' after ἦ; 136, 35 ἡνώθη; 139, 8 τῆς; 140, 1 αἰδίου.

Several false references have gone undetected: 118, bottom line, for 1157-1161 read 1157-1160; on p. 119 the citation given as Agathon *Fr.* 10 N.² is actually *Fr.* 11 N.²; 139, 33 the reference to LXX. *Sap.* 17.21

should be to 7.21; 140, 30 *Sap.* 16.2 should be *Sap.* 16.12. On p. 137 the *Corp. Herm.* 1.19 is cited as containing a literal quotation of LXX. *Gen.* 1.19. The allusion seems to be to *Corp. Herm.* 1.18 ἀξάνεσθε . . . καὶ πληθύνεσθε = *Gen.* 1.22, 28; 8.17; 9.7 (though ἐπληθύνθη κατὰ γένος in *Corp. Herm.* 1.19 may also come from *Gen.*: compare κατὰ γένος in *Gen.* 1.11, 12, 21, 24, 25).

There are occasional misprints of German and French: For those interested in textual criticism there is on p. 69 a good example of a corruption: "Entre qui croit et qui ne croit pas se produit une κρίσις, à la foi discernement et jugement—condamnation." Here faith, *foi*, is being discussed (the word *foi* occurs both in the preceding sentence and in this one), but read *à la fois* (as below, p. 103: On a à la fois opposition et parallélisme; p. 105: . . . nous trouverons tout à la fois asyndèse et liaison . . .). For the thought see p. 27: "Et du même coup, cette κρίσις discernement sera une κρίσις jugement."

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FRANÇOISE BADER. Suffixes grecs en -m-: Recherches comparatives sur l'hétéroclisie nominale. Geneva, Librairie Droz, and Paris, Librairie Minard and Librairie Champion, 1974. Pp. x + 146. Fr. 34.-

Émile Benveniste's *Origines de la formation des noms en Indoeuropéen* (Paris 1935) is almost equally important for its theory of the Indo-European root (CeC/CCE) and for its account of the nominal formations derived through addition of -i, -r/n, -ser/sen, -ter/ten, -wer/wen, -mer/men, etc. to the root. Françoise Bader in the preface to the present work (which is dedicated to the memory of the late Pierre Chantraine) declares it her sole intention to demonstrate the fruitfulness of Benveniste's teaching, and it should be stated at once that she has been eminently successful in her objective. Although her work is limited to *m*-suffixes in Greek (naturally with supporting evidence from other languages at many points), when we consider questions of gender, animate and inanimate meaning, simplex and compound stems, nominal versus adjectival function, as well as the combination of *m* with other consonants in the formation of suffixes, and also the vocalism of such suffixes, it soon becomes evident that the possible ramifications are very considerable.

Suffixes occurred in which *m* was followed by the thematic vowel *o* or by (vowel plus) *i*, *r*, *l*, or *n*, but there was no suffix in which *m* was a stem-final to be followed immediately by the case-ending. In this respect *m* differed from *n* and the difference is discussed (pp. 111-13) in connection with speculation on the possibility that *m* and *n* both belonged to an archiphoneme *N* and that the selection of one or the other was, at least in certain forms, automatically conditioned; so, for exam-

ple, in final position or before *t* (the accusative endings in masculine and feminine forms would also make a good case in point: singular *-m* but plural *-ns* presumably from *-m-s*). It is not directly suggested, however, that *m* and *n* were originally one phoneme, and indeed if this were assumed to be the case, it would be very difficult to identify the cause of the split. To return to the question of *m* as a suffix, we appear to have an instance of it in Lat. *hiems* if derived, according to Benveniste's doctrine, from **ghye-m-s*; p. 113 contains a discussion of its relation to Greek *χίων*, which generalized the *-n* from *-m* throughout the paradigm. From a synchronic standpoint, however, it might be viewed merely as a root-stem.

Formations with *-μi*, especially **θεμι-*, an old neuter later remodeled into *θέμις*, the actually recorded form, have a particularly important place in the general argument of the book. Pp. 22-23 contain discussion of the maintenance of substantive use of stems in *-mi-* in Greek and Indo-Iranian and of their development of adjectival function in Luwian and Latin; pp. 52-53 treat the alternation of *m*-suffixes in simplex formations with *t*-suffixes (*-ti-* and *-to-*) in either simplex formations or in the second member of compounds; while the suffixes *-i-* (at end of first member of compound) and *-ro-* (at end of simplex stem), which alternate under the rule formulated by Caland and Wackernagel, appear on page 2 and again on 88-89. It is a well-known fact of Latin morphology, with parallels in Irish, Greek and Vedic, that if *o-* or *ā-* stems become second members of compound adjectives a change to *i*-stem inflection (*iδ-* in Greek) is very likely to occur. This topic is discussed at a number of points (pp. 13, 21, 27, 31), and at some points one might gain the impression that the *-o/ā/i-* alternation was essentially a *-mo/mā/mi-* alternation, though there is no direct claim to this effect and the impression merely arises from the preoccupation of the book with *m*-suffixes. Actually there is no restriction on the consonant before the final stem-vowel: *barbalimberbis*, *bellum/rebellis*, *lingual/bilinguis*, *nodus/trinodis*, etc. Moreover the change to *i*-stem inflection was very largely limited to forms with a long penult (admitting forms like those listed just above and excluding those of the rhythmical type of *commodus*, *consonus*, *biugus*) and very largely also to compounds of the bahuvrihi type (excluding, for example, *delirus* and *securus*, which may have arisen through hypostasis of prepositional phrases). Where *-is* was the rule it did not gradually tend to be replaced by *-us/ā*. On the contrary forms like *inermus* occur mainly in texts of the early republic and survived in the empire, if at all, only as a feature of archaizing style. The whole subject is discussed, with a not fully convincing attempt at explanation, in *AJP* 74 (1953) 367-82. A process which in some respects is the converse of that just discussed is the extensive spread of *o*-stem inflection in adjectives which coexist with forms of other stem-classes (as in Skt. *mahā-rāja-* beside *rājan-*). Bader (pp. 34-36) attributes this to the advantage possessed by adjectives with masculines in *-o-* contrasting with feminine in *-ā-* over *i*-stem adjectives, which were incapable of marking gender. Here she is no doubt

essentially correct, though the frequency both of *i*-stem adjectives in Latin and of adjectives of the type of masc.-fem. ἄδικος, neut. ἄδικον in Greek suggests that lack of formal distinction between masculine and feminine was far from intolerable.

One matter which sometimes presents a problem is the proper identification of morphemes, or more specifically the analysis of forms like ἀρχμηρός, ἀρχμηρός etc.: is the proper division ἀρχ-μη-ρός, ἀρχμη-νός or ἀρχ-μηρ-ός, ἀρχ-μην-ός? Bader in general prefers the latter (pp. 70, 95, 101-5), rightly no doubt, since this latter analysis brings the forms into closer relation with the system of heteroclitic suffixes, ἀρχ-μηρ-ός etc. being then simply analyzed as arising through thematization of lengthened-grade forms of these suffixes.

There are a Greek index, an index of other forms, including Mycenaean Greek forms, and a table of contents. Misprints appear to be remarkably few; on p. 113 the sense is clear only if the *n* at the end of line 5 is taken to be a mistake for *m*.

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ROGER ALAIN DE LAIX. *Probouleusis at Athens. A Study of Political Decision-Making*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1973. Pp. 223. \$6.00. (*University of California Publications in History*, 83)

Despite its subtitle, this book will disappoint the reader who consults it in the expectation of finding a detailed discussion of the daily operation of practical politics, of the identification of factions or political programs, or of the molding of public opinion. Instead, de Laix has limited his study to an exhaustive and comprehensive examination of the ancient evidence bearing on *προβούλευσις* in classical Athens, the process whereby legislation was passed and public decisions formulated through interaction of *βουλή* and *ἐκκλησία*. The emphasis throughout is on the formal and technical aspects of this process, and in this respect the author succeeds in his attempt to provide a fresh analysis of the relationship between the two bodies in Athenian government charged with the responsibility of enacting governmental decisions. The crux of the book is really the issue of whether the *βουλή* or the *ἐκκλησία* was more powerful in *προβούλευσις*, a question generated by the differing judgments of modern scholars. De Laix's analysis firmly establishes the conclusion that in both the fifth and the fourth century the *β.* was the chief organ of government in initiating and formulating foreign and domestic policy, although the *ἐ.* always retained full and final sovereignty in these matters.

The scope of the study is the classical period, from the time of Cleisthenes to the Macedonian victory in 338, but there is a brief discussion of the nature of *πρ.* before Solon and also of the disputed

Solonian Council of Four Hundred (whose existence de Laix accepts). The first part of the book consists of a historical analysis which systematically treats the development of the basic institutions bearing on $\pi\rho.$, largely based on the literary testimony. The second part is a rather technical but extremely important evaluation of the epigraphical evidence on the subject; and the third, entitled Parliamentary Organization and Procedure, describes the organization and operation of both $\beta.$ and $\epsilon.$ The first two parts are further subdivided chronologically into sections, treating the periods before and after the restoration and reorganization of the democracy in 403/02 respectively. De Laix necessarily cites a good deal of Greek, but he has provided translations in Parts I and III; Part II, the most technical, reproduces the inscriptions without modification or translation, as this section is for the specialist with some knowledge of epigraphy.

The work provides therefore a comprehensive account of the workings of the $\beta.$ and $\epsilon.$ from their earliest attested activity to 338. The examination of the ancient evidence is thorough, and in general de Laix reflects the appropriate specialist literature on the various aspects of his study, collected and reviewed in a useful fashion. (Apparently he does not know D. Bradeen, "The Trittyes in Cleisthenes' Reforms," *TAPA* 86 (1955), which bears on several questions raised about the $\beta.$.) The approach is sound, cautious and moderate, and very few new conclusions of note emerge from the analysis. The book has merit, however, even when its treatment duplicates that of other recent works. For example, the coverage of the fourth century provides an excellent supplement to Hignett's *History of the Athenian Constitution*, and the discussion of the role and function of the $\epsilon.$ in relation to the $\beta.$ distinguishes it from Rhodes' *The Athenian Boule*. It is to be regretted that de Laix did not write more widely on Athenian politics: he tells us everything about the how of political decision-making, but virtually nothing of the why, and very little of the who; he suggests that the right of automatic ingress of the $\sigma\tau\rho\alpha\tau\eta\gamma\omicron\iota$ into the $\beta.$ may have been a significant factor in their political importance in the fifth century, but pursues the matter no further; and he discusses the secret sessions of the $\beta.$ and its $\kappa\rho\iota\alpha$ powers, a vital area for foreign policy, but again fails to push the question far enough; where he does treat questions of political activity, he is on safe ground in relying on modern scholars like Perlman and Connor. To understand the nature of political decision-making and the structure of politics in ancient Athens, de Laix's book is necessary, but not sufficient.

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LUISA BANTI. *The Etruscan Cities and their Culture*. Translated by Erika Bizzari. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1973. Pp. 322, 96 plates, 13 maps. \$14.50.

This is the first English translation of one of the contemporary classics of Etruscan studies. Miss Banti's *Il mondo degli Etruschi*, first published by Primato in 1960, with a second edition published by the Biblioteca di Storia Patria in 1968, has informed and profoundly modified scholarly opinion for the past fifteen years. Its appearance in English, at last, is a matter for much joy.

At the beginning of chapter 6 there is a paragraph that sums up Miss Banti's approach to the study of Etruscan civilization—"the safest historical source for Etruria is the objects found in tombs, as long as they are studied impartially without preconceived theories and without neglecting artistically uninteresting objects in favor of the finer, more striking examples. They are the only true Etruscan sources—safer and more credible than the scant information handed down by ancient Greek and Latin historians, for, as far as Etruria is concerned, the Greek or Latin author was never contemporary with or even close to the events he describes—" She makes use of literary references, of Livy in particular; she recognizes the importance of the continuing effort to decipher Etruscan texts; but the picture she gives us of the civilization of Etruria is based entirely on material evidence, the results of archaeological discovery and interpretation.

Perhaps the most valuable result of this strictly archaeological approach is the re-drawing of the boundary lines of the individual Etruscan city-states. For example, Populonia which, according to Servius, was not as old as other Etruscan cities, and had been founded either by people from Corsica or by the inland city of Volterra, appears as one of the oldest sites in northern Etruria, not in the least Corsican and quite independent of Volterra. That city, in turn, proves to have extended its territory and influence to the northeast rather than toward the coast, to the Arno and the Val di Chiana. Indeed, inscriptions show that at least two members of a Volterranean family, the Caecina, had settled at Bologna, the Etruscan Felsina, in the late fifth century.

Miss Banti divides the land of Etruria into three regions. Southern Etruria, including Caere, Veii, the Faliscan region, Tarquinii, Vulci and the valleys of the Marta and the Fiora, is characterized by big cities, close together and surrounded by smaller centers; its wealth was chiefly commercial. Northern Etruria, which includes Vetulonia, Rusellae, Populonia, Volterra, Chiusi, Arezzo, Cortona, Perugia and the territory north of the Arno, Florence and Fiesole, was agricultural; its cities were widely separated and not often in contact with the Mediterranean world. Central Etruria, the valleys of the Albegna and the upper Fiora (Saturnia), Lake Bolsena, and Orvieto, was a region of transition, with some characteristics of southern and others of northern Etruria. The circle tombs of Marsiliana, for example, are like those of Vetulonia, but much of their tomb goods, far more than at Vetulonia, is

southern, from Caere. Southern Etruria is a land of rock-cut tombs, an old volcanic region where the local stone is soft tufa, easily cut. Northern Etruria, on recalcitrant limestone hills, specialized in masonry tombs, and so did central Etruria, though Orvieto is built on a tufa plateau and Lake Bolsena is a volcanic crater. It was not geology that divided the regions nor, as Miss Banti observes, was it natural boundaries or even political units, but economic and artistic development. Greek goods came directly to the cities of Southern Etruria, to Caere above all, but even to inland Falerii, by way of the Tiber. Northern Etruria received Greek imports usually by way of Southern Etruria, though Chiusi, that most enterprising of inland Etruscan cities, got her Attic vases direct, up the Tiber and the Chiana, and Populonia on the coast has the distinction of producing the latest Attic R. F. vases found in Etruria, two from the second half of the fifth century, when the rest of Etruria had long since stopped importing vases from Athens.

Even within a single region the cities were artistically distinct. Caere, for example, had a tradition of terracotta sculpture dating from the mid seventh century, whose style was consistently "Ionian," with a softness of modelling and an avoidance of angles found nowhere else in Etruria. Veii, at no great distance from Caere, produced in the late archaic period terracotta statuary of very high quality indeed but not in the least like Caere's, while Tarquinii, Caere's nearest neighbor on the coast, produced no terracotta statues at all. At Tarquinii the sequence of painted tombs, from the archaic to the Hellenistic period, provides evidence for an evolution of style and motifs unique in Etruria. Vulci, north of Tarquinia, specialized in bronzes.

Much of Etruria's wealth was in her mines. Here Miss Banti suggests several interesting possibilities: that the wealth of bronze in the early tombs at Tarquinia indicates that that city had control of the ore-producing territory of La Tolfa and Allumiere in the eighth century, and lost control of it to Caere in the first half of the seventh, when the Tarquinian tombs contained few bronzes while those at Caere were stuffed with them; also that the richness of Vulci, already notable in the second half of the seventh century may indicate that Vulci had control of the mines of Monte Amiata. The copper of Campiglia made the wealth of Populonia in the seventh century, the mines of Massa Marittima did the same for Vetulonia. Volterra's indifference to the copper deposits of the Cecina valley "is completely incomprehensible."

One of Miss Banti's convictions is that local, provincial workshops, while imitating an imported object or adopting its style, do so with a considerable time-lag: "This stele (of Larth Ninie, from Fiesole) was dated at around 520-510 B.C. on the basis of comparisons with Caere-tan and Greek works. The date will have to be lowered to around 500 B.C.: the whole series of the so-called 'Fiesole stelae' are the work of a local school which used local materials. There must have been a considerable time-lag—" Again: "these so-called Etrusco-Corinthian vases may, and often do, lag behind the Greek vases whose form they

imitate by more than a century." This is true enough, but the first imitation of an imported style or object cannot lag so much. Trade objects move fast; the first Etrusco-Corinthian vases must have been nearly contemporary with their Greek prototypes; the hearty "Ionian" bulges of Larth Ninie may surely have been inspired by a Caeretan hydria of the third quarter of the sixth century.

There are certain new references in this edition that are not included in the 1968 Italian text. The new excavations at Poggio Civitate (Murlo) and at Aquarossa are described briefly. Murlo Miss Banti takes to have been in Clusine territory; Aquarossa, in the region of the rock-cut tombs of Southern Etruria, is, so far, a city without a necropolis. Both sites have produced important early archaic material. Miss Banti also mentions the earthquake of 1971 which damaged Tuscania severely, but did less damage to her antiquities than might have been expected.

The translation is taken from the second edition of Miss Banti's book. Curiously, and unfortunately, the plate references in the first fifty pages cite the plate numbers of the first, and more fully illustrated, edition of 1960. The translation itself is generally clear and workmanlike, and sometimes flashes with a lyric phrase, as when the translator talks of "the real lords of the tomb—" the dolphins and flying birds of the Tomb of Hunting and Fishing at Tarquinii.

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E. BADIAN. *Publicans and Sinners: Private Enterprise in the Service of the Roman Republic*. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1972. Pp. 170. \$6.00.

Keen interest will greet the most extended of Professor Badian's works since *Foreign Clientelae* (1958), and his public will not be disappointed. All will admire the author's command of his subject and his ability to build up a cogent historical account from unpromising evidence. *Publicans and Sinners* will become the authoritative study of its subject — the *publicani* of the Roman Republic in their relationships with the government and the ruling class — for some time to come. Therefore it is all the more necessary that reviewers should assess it critically.

The book began life as a series of lectures, and it has not completed the conversion into a monograph. One should welcome the author's more or less political asides, however much one may disagree with them. But some points difficult to handle in public lectures deserved to be discussed thoroughly in the book, for example the term *publicanus* itself. Those who contracted to erect public buildings are throughout treated as *publicani* just as much as those who contracted to collect

public revenues or to supply armies. This logical meaning of *publicanus* gets some support from Ulpian (*D.* 39.4.1.1—but there is obscurity here, and cf. *D.* 39.4.12.3). Is it, however, exactly what republican writers or Livy meant by the word? In his *RE* article on the *publicani* Örögdi listed many passages concerning their supposed building activities (Supplementband 11 [1968] cols. 1186–1188); he omitted to mention that in only one of them is the term *publicanus* used, and even there (Livy 39.44.7–8) the precise involvement of those whom Livy calls *publicani* with building contracts is not clear. Nicolet was perhaps right to exclude those who contracted for public works from the *publicani* 'par excellence' (*L'ordre équestre*, I, p. 321), and in any case the problem is of some importance.

The first chapter presents the evidence for the activities of the *publicani* during the Hannibalic War, and draws some conclusions: that the contracting system worked well, that there were only 'odd cases of dishonesty' (25) and that 'profits were, on the whole, probably not excessive' (ib.). The evidence hardly justifies such judgements. We know of three incidents concerning the *publicani* during the war, only one of which tells us anything about their honesty, namely the famous 'insurance' fraud of 215–213, carried out in the midst of a national crisis. Badian attempts to minimize the significance of this fraud and the extent of the disturbance created by the *publicani* on behalf of one of the offenders (Livy 25.3.18–19), but without much success. Who can tell what lesser acts of dishonesty the *publicani* committed? As for profits, he does not tell us what to count as 'excessive', and one can hardly guess what the margins were. Badian tries to extract some information about this from Livy's statement (27.10.13) that the Senate on a certain occasion in 209 assigned 1,150 or 1,400 lbs. of gold (the text is uncertain) *ad vestimenta locanda* for the army in Spain; but our only other evidence for the cost of clothing in this general period is Cato's claim to have been so frugal that he never wore clothes worth more than 100 drachmas (Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 4). To mention only one of the difficulties in the way of this 'rough check', Cato's best clothes (there is no implication, as Badian states (22), that Cato was referring to a legionary uniform) may have been more costly than the no doubt economical garb of a soldier.

Chapter 2, which takes us to the 160's, is more often convincing. Badian argues, with Brunt and against Frank, that the *publicani* were heavily involved in supplying the army. The increase in public building and the acquisition of the Spanish mines also increased their business, which the author tries to quantify as far as possible. The problem of profits and the strictness of the censors' supervision arises again. Badian's view is that in this period 'control could be successfully asserted — but perhaps . . . really firm control was exceptional' (34); yet he also implies that 'even under censors less strict than Cato' profits were held down to a fairly low level (36). What we are told by Livy (39.44.7–8) is that when Cato and Valerius Flaccus were so strict as to accept the bids most profitable to the state, the *publicani* complained to

the Senate with prayers and tears, and their complaints were accepted (T. Flamininus naturally playing a leading role, Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 19). It is true that the censors persevered, but Livy seems to have thought that normal censors agreed to let the contractors on terms that were not, for the state, the best available. In 169 the censors successfully excluded the contractors of 174 from the bidding (43.16.2). Badian infers that the *publicani* were 'still firmly under public control' (40), but this too is unduly optimistic — the exceptional action by the censors led to a charge of *perduellio* brought against one of them by a representative of the *publicani*, a charge from which the centuriate assembly only narrowly acquitted him, 'the nearest any censor in Roman history ever came to being condemned', as Badian says. Most censors probably preferred to avoid such risks.

The next chapter gives an account of the 'rise to power' of the *publicani* in the time of the Gracchi. Previously they had had no collective interest beyond their contracts, but in 129, according to Badian's view, an unidentified tribune, by successfully proposing the *plebiscitum reddendorum equorum* (known to us only from Cic. *Rep.* 4.2), split the upper class and gave the *equites* political consciousness and aims. C. Gracchus then extended the term *eques* to all citizens with the 400,000 HS property qualification and gave the new class an important political function, which, however, it did not put to full use until the trial of P. Rutilius Rufus a generation later. These of course are controversial matters. The main value of this account lies in the attempt to give the right importance to the *plebiscitum* *r.e.*, a difficult task, especially if it was really passed in 129, as Badian cogently argues, and not in the period 123-115. Too much importance is perhaps attributed to it when we are told that 'a new class was to be created', a claim that has been analyzed by T. P. Wiseman, *Phoenix* 27 (1973) 191-98. It is worth adding that the year 129 may well have been chosen as the dramatic date for the *De Republica* not because Cicero thought that it was a critical year, as Badian proposes (59-60: however *Rep.* 1.31 only explains why the general period after 133 was chosen, and *Ad Att.* 13.32 is irrelevant), but for more literary reasons (on which see A. D. E. Cameron, *CQ* 17 (1967) 258-59).

Chapter 4 ('The Public Companies') is Badian at his best, exploiting the Lex Puteolana as well as the literary and legal texts to discover how the companies worked. He makes the suggestion (73-75) that the *decumani* of *II Verr.* 2.173-5 and 3.166 may have been the governing body not of a single *societas* but of the whole *ordo publicanorum*. This would make it easier to understand how Cicero could call them 'principes et quasi senatores publicanorum', and of course it would tend to show that the *publicani* of this date were even more cartel-like than we should otherwise suppose.

In a long final chapter the author describes the history of the *publicani* in politics from the death of C. Gracchus to 44. The Senate, in his view, retained political power unthreatened by the Gracchan juries until the case of P. Rutilius. After Sulla, the *equites* regained the power

they had exercised in 92 only in the year 70; this was not, says Badian (in line with his general interpretation), because they then demanded political power, rather because the senatorial juries 'had disgraced themselves' (96). In the 70's and 60's the division between the economic activities of senators and *equites* was disappearing, as senators more and more evaded the rule prohibiting them from participation in most public contracts. Cic. *In Vat.* 29 ('eripuerisne partis illo tempore carissimas partim a Caesare, partim a publicanis?') reveals, so he argues, following Rostovtzeff, that both Caesar and Vatinius possessed shares in a company or companies of *publicani* though they were probably not *socii*; and 'we are fully entitled to conclude' (admittedly there is no other evidence) that shares of this kind 'were widely held by senators at this time, as indeed by other classes' (103). Badian goes so far as to say that 'the cartel now, after a fashion, must have included the whole upper order of society and of the State, except for a few traditional aristocrats' (107). The activities of L. Piso in raising taxes for his own benefit in Macedonia (as alleged in *In Pis.* 87) were part of the same development. Thus, for Badian, magistrates ruled the provinces in the last years of the Republic in co-operation with the *publicani*, and at similar levels of honesty.

This highly individual account invites further discussion on many points. For example, against the author's view that the Senate felt no political threat from the Gracchan juries before 92 one should set the evident passion of L. Crassus' *magistra oratio* in favour of Caepio's jury law (sources in *ORF*³ 243-45). A more important question concerns the allegedly wide ownership of shares. It is quite a jump from *In Vat.* 29 to the view that virtually all senators had investments in the *societates publicanorum*, and as for investment by large numbers of sub-equestrian citizens (what number of them is really meant?), Polybius 6.17 does not establish it, and Cicero significantly claims no such thing in *De Imp. Cn. Pomp.* 17-19. Badian envisages a very large number of powerless shareholders, but for whatever reason they are not to be found in the sources.

Publicans and Sinners, it will be clear, is stimulating on every page, and its ideas require the closest attention. Its scholarship is in many ways exemplary: Badian misses very little in the sources or the literature, and he has an ability to get everything out of a piece of evidence.

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E. S. GRUEN. *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974. Pp. xiv + 596. \$18.50.

This massive, erudite, and challenging treatise is both an argument and a survey. Its primary thesis is thus neatly summed up: 'Civil war

caused the fall of the Republic—not vice versa.' To view the post-Sullan body politic as a system in decay, ripe for inevitable extinction, is a distortion of hindsight, G. contends; for three decades it functioned tolerably well on traditional lines and might have so continued indefinitely but for the accident of a war which neither side planned or wanted.

I do not think that G.'s extensive onslaught will capture the citadel of *communis opinio*, though it will certainly leave its mark on parts of the perimeter. How discount the fact that in the middle fifties, without any war, the system did break down? Three out of four successive years started without magistrates because disorders in the City made it impossible to elect them. The solution was found outside the constitution in a temporary autocracy—Pompey's Sole Consulship. The inauspicious significance of these events is not removed by an appeal to ancient precedent ('the antique institution of the Dictator had existed for just such purposes').

'The men who belonged to [the last generation of the free state] did not behave as if it stood under the shadow of impending doom. The era that produced Pompey, Caesar, Cato, Cicero, Catullus, Lucretius can hardly be reckoned merely as the prelude to disaster.' How are men expected to behave under the shadow? Can they not write fine verse in a sinking polity? 'It is hazardous to place faith in the tortured exaggerations of Cicero.' 'These statements [i.e. of political pessimism] belong almost exclusively to the years 59 and 54, and they reflect the orator's personal plight at these times.' There is some truth in this. Cicero was not always equally despondent and he did have axes to grind. But there are other (partly mechanical) reasons for the concentration of pessimistic statements in the correspondence of 59 and 54—not that anything could be gloomier than certain remarks to Curio in 53. 'When he was secure and confident in his personal position the letters brim with confidence and the Republic is sound.' Nine supporting references scarcely implement this claim.

Three lines of argument complementary (in G.'s eyes at least) to the main contention run through the book. (a) The ruling aristocracy at this period has been maligned. Here G. has a strong case. From Mommsen down, less than justice has been done to the nobility of the seventies, which produced quite a galaxy of distinguished soldiers and civilians (it was otherwise in the fifties). An excellent chapter on Legislative Activity demonstrates that senatorial leaders were no less to the fore than 'activist' tribunes in attacking current abuses; though G. admits that a 'staggering number of measures' which 'dwarfs by comparison all previous eras of Roman history' (but could not this be a matter of documentation?) may be a sign of disease rather than health. (b) Roman political institutions continued on the whole to operate in their customary fashion, voters and magistrates behaving much as they had always behaved. Even the 'First Triumvirate' is presented, not without some special pleading, as little more than an exercise in traditional political *amicitia*, with less control over events than is generally supposed.

Again there is something in this, but continued breathing does not guarantee longevity. (c) Nobody wanted to destroy or fundamentally change the existing order; not the mob which burned the senate house nor Caesar's men when they crossed the Rubicon (nor Caesar himself—a point on which I feel less confident than G.). But was it not a general incapacity to achieve, or even desire, constructive change that made the condition hopeless—a crisis, in Christian Meier's phrase, without an alternative?

Whatever doubt or disagreement may be provoked by G.'s historical interpretation, his detailed studies of political institutions and phenomena will have lasting value. The composition of the senate, legislation, trials, the proletariat, and the army (but not provincial administration) are generously covered. And these sections are relatively free from errors of haste and bias.

Inevitably there is a good deal of prosopography. Unfortunately, G. clings to the belief in clan politics so properly discountenanced by Meier. His terminology is muddled and misleading. '*Gens*,' 'clan,' and 'family' are tossed about without definition or discrimination. Clans, it seems, had heads. Q. Metellus Pius appears as 'head of the powerful Metellan clan' (p. 18) and passed on that dignity to his adopted son (p. 151). Contemporaries bearing the same *nomen* and *cognomen* are "cousins," no matter how distant the relationship. G. does indeed admit and produce abundant evidence of political 'fragmentation' among 'clans.' Where is the evidence for solidarity? 'It is clear that the Pisones formed no cohesive group. But . . . antipathy toward Pompey provided common ground. The family, certainly as individuals if not as a unit, resisted the ambitions of the general' (p. 60, M. Pupius Piso's loyalty to Pompey, which 'isolated him from the other Pisones,' is not mentioned until the next page). 'The Lentuli, despite political vicissitudes, all possessed *Lentulitas* in common.' Such pronouncements are really unworthy of the author of chapters 6-10.

G. obviously enjoyed writing this book, and it is never dull. If I have already suggested that in strictness of thought and statement it often compares unfavourably with the work of eminent contemporaries in the area, such as Badian, Brunt, Meier, and Sumner—that is what the rest of this review will mainly illustrate.

An interesting analysis of the social background of Caesar's officers in Gaul reveals, not surprisingly, that they came from all levels, from patrician and plebeian *nobiles* to ex-provincials. That is not enough for G. 'The contrast with Pompey's officers in the pirate and Mithridatic wars could not be greater. Pompey brought with him the cream of Rome's aristocracy . . . Caesar's company possessed much broader dimensions.' There is exaggeration in this; Pompey's appointments were by no means confined to *nobiles*. But in so far as the contrast is valid it need not reflect any difference of outlook between the two commanders. It is rather to be accounted for by Caesar's unpopularity with a large section of the nobility and the inferior attractiveness of the

jobs he had to offer; campaigning in Gaul was a hard and dangerous business.

In a chapter on 'the Aftermath of Sulla' G. maintains that the restoration of tribunician powers opened no major breach in the Sullan constitution. Perhaps so, but his argument that 'the tribunate was an arm of the aristocracy' surely has little application to the first century B.C. 'Whatever Sulla's fears . . . the tribunate as an institution represented no threat to the established order.' Sulla looked back on the Gracchi, Saturninus, and Sulpicius Rufus. Could he have looked forward to Vatinius, Clodius, and Curio (whose tribunate was on G.'s particular showing a major factor in producing the Civil War), he would hardly have been reassured. 'And, most revealing, Q. Catulus . . . delivered a pivotal judgment in the senate. His speech showed small enthusiasm but seems to have acknowledged the inevitability of reform (p. 28).' The authority is Cic. *Verr.* 1. 44, quoted only by reference: 'When . . . Cn. Pompeius introduced his measure to restore the powers of the tribunes, Catulus . . . began his speech with a most impressive declaration, that the members of that House were proving ineffective and immoral guardians of our courts of justice; and that, had they only chosen, in their capacity as judges, to maintain the honour of Rome, people would not have felt so acutely their loss of the tribunes' powers' (tr. Greenwood). With no better justification the same passage is adduced (p. 35) as evidence that 'Q. Catulus, among others, conceded that there was no point in unnecessarily arousing public antipathy' (against the *lex Aurelia*; cf. p. 50 'It was doubtless Catulus' acquiescence, above all, which permitted smooth restoration of tribunician powers and reform of the courts'). The true effect of the Verrine passage is to drive a coach-and-four through G.'s position that the disrepute of senatorial juries in the seventies is mainly a Ciceronian fiction. Cicero cannot reasonably be supposed to have put the words into Catulus' mouth in addressing a senatorial jury, or even in the subsequent edition of his speech.

The final chapter on the Coming of the Civil War is a powerful, indeed brilliant, performance. G.'s handling of the *Rechtsfrage* seems to me admirable. I think him probably right about Pompey and the Law of the Ten Tribunes and certainly in his dismissal (with due acknowledgements to a prior discussion) of the *fable convenue* that Caesar faced trial and condemnation if he returned to Rome as a *privatus*. But here too zeal sometimes outruns discretion. Pompey's remark *omnis oportere senatui dicto audientes esse*, softened in the rendering 'all men must render respect to the judgments of the senate,' was far from a 'harmless platitude' (p. 467). A note on the same page quotes *Fam.* 8. 9.5 with a 'plausible emendation' which is not the one favoured by recent editors. 'Discussions with Pompey at Tarentum in May convinced Cicero that the general would be a vigilant and steadfast defender of the public order' (p. 464). The two supporting citations show more than that, but the most significant words in one of them are not

cited: 'Pompey now sees good citizens and bad exactly where we are wont to see them.' In the context the reference to Caesar is unmistakable. Perhaps G. is not much to be blamed for accepting (p. 469 n. 70), Stevens' and Baldson's interpretation of *negotium* in *Fam.* 8.8.9 as 'bargain' or 'deal'. Others have made that mistake. But it was imprudent to add that this is the usual meaning of the word. That *Pompeio cum Caesare esse negotium* means what it always used to be taken to mean is evident from passages like *Fam.* 10.28.1 *nunc cum iis tantum est negoti ut*, sqq. and *ad Brut.* 2.3 *ego cum homine furioso satis habeo negoti*.

To proceed *seriatim*: p. 11 'Factional differences were overridden; as they had been in previous emergencies against the Gracchi or against Marius.' For 'Marius' read 'Saturninus'? P. 41 'At some unknown date Crassus was prosecuted for illicit relations with a certain Licinia, one of the Vestal Virgins.' Not so; see my note on *Att.* 1.16.9. On the following page G. accepts without question Orosius' statement that Catiline was prosecuted on a similar charge, which is implicitly belied by Cicero (see *ibid.*). On p. 271 n. 39 he adds that the evidence on the *incestum* trial is scattered but consistent. His article in *Athenaeum*, 1971, p. 62 n. 28, however, contains the statement: 'that Catiline was formally charged is not clear.' P. 51, of L. Lucullus: 'a devotee of philosophic discussion, a student of philosophy.' So Cicero told the public; for the truth see *Att.* 13.11.3, 13.16.1, 13.19.5. On p. 57 Favonius is twice described as an aristocrat (an error tacitly corrected on pp. 173 and 176), as are Sallust and Caelius Rufus on p. 355. Like some others, G. seems to have misunderstood Ps.-Sall. *Ep. ad Caes.* 2.9.4 (the L. Postumius coupled with Favonius in that passage, who according to G. 'is, unfortunately, otherwise unknown,' is commonly and securely identified with the Postumius mentioned on p. 166 n. 8 and elsewhere; despite a different *praenomen* in the MSS). P. 75 'Caesar's father had not held the consulship. Nor had the family been a significant power in previous generations.' Surely L. Caesar (consul and censor) and Sex. Caesar (consul) were men of importance in the nineties? Or does 'family' this time refer to direct ancestors? P. 78 'Yet he [Caesar] found it not at all incongruous . . . to take as his third wife, in 67, the granddaughter of Sulla himself.' It may be relevant that the lady's brother, Q. Pompeius Rufus, later emerged as a follower of Clodius. P. 94 'By 57 Pompey had to face also the hostility of Lentulus Spinther' (cf. p. 145). No quarrel took place between Pompey and this devoted adherent. There may have been some resentment on Lentulus' side in the first half of 56 to do with the matter of Ptolemy Auletes' restoration, but a letter from Lentulus to Pompey in July (the former being in Cilicia at the time) put everything to rights (*Fam.* 1.7.3). P. 100 'Advocates of Pompey in 57 and 56 seem limited to political small fry.' The six names that follow do not include the consulars L. Vulcatius Tullus and M. Valerius Messalla Niger. Messalla should also be added to the four consulars named on p. 106 as promoters of Pompey's ends in the fifties (*Att.* 4.1.6). P. 106 'Afranius' origins were lowly' (cf. p. 133). On p. 172 Afranius is

credited with senatorial progenitors and his lowly origins are said to have been exaggerated by hostile propaganda. P. 115, Caesar's Legate P. Sulpicius Rufus is numbered among representatives of new senatorial houses (cf. p. 200), and on p. 199 we read of 'the plebeian side of that house which produced the notorious tribune . . . of 88.' Why should not the tribune's plebeian status have been self-acquired, like that of Clodius and Dolabella? P. 118 'It will come as no surprise to learn that Balbus and Octavius were the first of their families to attain Roman magistracies and senatorial rank.' As to Atilius Balbus, however ('an entrepreneur and nabob of Aricia'), cf. Suet. *Aug.* 4 *multis in familia senatoriis imaginibus*. P. 119, Caesar's marriage connexion L. Pinarius is described as of equestrian family. May he not have belonged to the patrician gens? P. 124 'Caius.' Better 'Gaius.' P. 148 n. 115. As in an earlier article G. will have it, with varying degrees of positivity, that Ap. Claudius Pulcher was no friend of Pompey's in 54 and that their marriage connexion was formed later. Yet Pompey reconciled Appius with Cicero early that year (Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.41). G.'s assumption that Quintilian referred to a second reconciliation is not warranted by Cicero's mention of 'Greeks' in *QFr.* 2.11.3; see *JRS*, 1955, p. 36. G. is particularly unlucky with Appius Claudius. The colourful characterization on p. 352 is deficient in firm evidential backing. In a note on the same page G.'s argument against connecting Appius' trial for *ambitus* in 50 with his candidature for the censorship rests on false chronology. On the next page Pompey is called Appius' son-in-law. The same error in an article of 1969 is corrected on p. 454 n. 21. P. 146 'Two more *nobiles* entered office in 56, Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus and L. Marcius Philippus. The dynasts could not have been pleased.' Why not? They could not foresee that in office Marcellinus would turn against his old friend and *imperator*. Philippus was the husband of Caesar's niece as well as Cato's father-in-law. P. 149 'Caesar stamped about in helpless anger.' Indeed. P. 157 n. 152. Recognizing that the cryptic references in *Att.* 5.19.3 and 6.8.3 are not to Lucilius Hirrus, G. refuses to accept the case for Calpidius. I find it hard to believe that he has weighed it carefully. His counterarguments that Cicero had no reason to hope for Calpidius' defeat in 51 because (a) Calpidius had supported his recall six years previously and (b) had appeared along with him for Milo (as did Clodius for Scaurus!) are irresponsible. P. 165 'There is no reason to doubt that the Varrones of Cicero's era stemmed from the *consularis*.' Cicero's letter to M. Brutus on behalf of Varro Gibba does not suggest noble ancestry. P. 168. The Cornelia Sisennae (cf. p. 196) and Quintilia Vari are reckoned among praetorian families (but the Vari appear as *nobiles* on p. 194). The former may have been, and the latter certainly were, patrician and consular. The Aelia Tiberones, also reckoned as praetorian, will have stemmed from the consular Aelii, cf. Cic. *Mur.* 75 *et honestus homo et nobilis, Q. Tubero*. P. 182. The unknown tribune Cassius of *QFr.* 2.1.2 is stated to have been a Longinus and a proposed emendation *Caninius* summarily dismissed. On pp. 296f. the statement is qualified by a 'perhaps' and the

emendation mentioned without disapproval. P. 183 n. 74. G. favours the identification of Cn. Lentulus, tribune in 68, with Marcellinus. A viable case has been made for Cn. Lentulus Vatia (see my note on *Att.* 12.28.3). P. 187. The Caesarian tribune of 51, C. Caelius (whose *nomen* was more probably Coelius), should not (with Wiseman) be given the *cognomen* Rufus. Of that more elsewhere. P. 193. C. Popillius confused with P. Popillius. P. 201 n. 154. Concerning M. Servilius of *Fam.* 8.8: 'certainly not of the consular Servilii among whom the *praenomen* "Marcus" is attested only once.' Once would be enough; but Münzer's stemma in *RE* includes four M. Servilii. P. 206 'T. Furfanius Postumus.' Better 'Furfanius.' P. 275 n. 58. The *communis opinio* that Crassus' cash was behind Clodius' acquittal in 61 has not, in my judgement, been disproved by Wiseman. That scholar's identification of 'Decimus' with D. Brutus Albinus does not deserve what countenance it gets on p. 296. Cicero would not have publicly called him by *praenomen*, nor is the description 'undertaker' (*dissignator*) likely to have suited him. P. 278 'The aged and obscure Roman *eques*.' Rabirius was probably a senator. P. 279 n. 70 'The threatened charge [against Catiline in 63] was, perhaps, *ambitus*. Shackleton Bailey . . . confidently asserts it; the sources do not specify.' An assertion which outruns the evidence is fairly stigmatized. Mine was probably at second hand, from Gelzer's article on Catiline in *RE*. G's citation of Plut. *Cic.* 14.3 seems irrelevant. P. 285 n. 94 'The same passage [*Fam.* 5.17.2] records an actual trial of Sittius, in which Cicero served as defence counsel.' This is a misunderstanding of Cicero's words. P. 305 n. 167 'Given the political association [of Servius Pola and the 'Servius' of *QFr.* 2.4.6], the two individuals are very likely related. That is all that can be said with confidence.' More than all. The MSS of the letter have 'Sevius,' as read by Watt; see also *JRS*, 1955, 35ff. The relationship is assumed on p. 331. P. 308 'Caelius had taken gold from her in order to hand it over to L. Lucceius, who would then arrange for the assassination.' Not to Lucceius, but to certain of his slaves. Cicero does not say that Lucceius was implicated. P. 315 n. 25. This note is open to exception on several points, which I lack space to argue here. P. 319 'M. Juventius Laterensis . . . a youth of distinguished consular family.' Laterensis was in his middle thirties (cf. p. 354 'another opportunistic youth, M. Caelius Rufus'), and among consular families the Juventii were by no means distinguished. P. 333 n. 107 'Asconius notes that the Pacuvii bore the *cognomen* *Claudii*; some have emended to *Caldi*, unnecessarily.' Clark (p. 19.7) reads *Claudi* (from Claudus), after Manutius. Can G. really believe in a *cognomen* Claudius? P. 335 'L. Aemilius Burca' (so in Index). The *cognomen* was Buca. P. 347 'The relatives of Milo's lieutenant M. Saufeius rejoiced in Cicero's onslaught on Plancus Bursa.' Very likely they did, but *Att.* 6.1.10 does not say so. P. 355 'The haughty *nobilis* and ex-consul did not take defeat [at the augural elections in 50] by a rank newcomer lightly.' The winner was also *nobilis*, and had the important advantage, which his opponent lacked, of belonging to an augural family. P. 368 n. 32 'Phil.

7.9'. Read 'Phil. 10.22'? P. 372. A reference to Appius' mutinous troops in Cilicia (*Fam.* 15.4.2) would have been pertinent. P. 384 n. 104 'The so-called (by moderns) *optimates*, such as Lucullus, Cato and Hortensius.' There is considerable ancient warrant for the modern usage of *optimates*, but none for G.'s repeated application of *boni* to Caesar's senatorial enemies in 50-49. 'Cicero reveals [in *Fam.* 7.5.3] that the proconsul of Gaul had once ridiculed his excessive protestations on Milo's behalf.' There is no such revelation. P. 488 n. 133. As to Pompey's attitude on the eve of the war note should be taken of *Fam.* 6.6.6.

G.'s fellow experts will find a great deal of interest and value in this work, but it cannot be recommended unreservedly to a wider public. Something more of circumspection and intellectual discipline was needed to make another Roman Revolution.

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Le Culte des Souverains dans l'Empire Romain. Sept exposés suivis de discussions par Elias Bickerman . . . [e.a.]. Entretiens préparés et présidés par Willem den Boer. Vandoeuvres-Genève, Fondation Hardt, 1973. Pp. viii + 332. 42.00 F. (*Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique*, t. 19)

The already high reputation of the *Entretiens Hardt* will be enhanced by its nineteenth volume, which contains seven papers presented in the summer of 1972: E. Bickerman on the *consecratio* of Roman emperors (3-25); Chr. Habicht on the imperial cult under Augustus and during the first century A.D. (41-88); J. Beaujeu on Christian apologists' treatment of the imperial cult (103-36); F. Millar on 'The Imperial Cult and the Persecutions' (145-65); G. W. Bowersock on the attitude of Greek intellectuals in the second century (179-206); S. Calderone on political theology, dynastic succession and *consecratio* in the age of Constantine (215-61); and K. Thraede on the imperial cult in Latin poetry (273-303). In addition, as is normal with the *Entretiens*, there are carefully manicured versions of the discussions which followed each paper, and which include observations from another four scholars. These verbal exchanges often reveal the contrasting approaches to antiquity adopted in different national and cultural traditions: note, for example, the divergence of opinion on whether one should proceed from the general proposition that "das *Imperium Romanum* war ein Rechtsstaat" (172) or seek either verification or disproof of the general proposition by examining individual items of evidence (174).

The papers maintain a consistently high level of both technical profil-

ciency and incisive analysis, with two exceptions. Beaujeu's contribution suffers both from the parochialism which sometimes afflicts French scholarship and from a mistaken formulation of his central problem. Neglect (or disregard) of scholarly work in other languages produces several specific errors, some serious, when Beaujeu discusses Tertullian (115ff.). Thus he speaks of Tertullian's "conclusion radicale: *exeundum de saeculo erit*" (124), whereas, in its context, this pungent phrase seems to state a position which Tertullian ridicules and repudiates: "Nemo dicat; quis tam tuto praecavebit? *exeundum de saeculo erit. quasi non tanti sit exire, quam idololatren in saeculo stare. nihil esse facilius potest, quam cautio idololatriae, si timor eius in capite sit*" (*Idol.* 24.2: for Tertullian's use of *quasi* to introduce the rebuttal of an objection, cf. *De Spect.* 14.2; *Ad Nat.* 2.14.14; *Apol.* 48.2 [Fuld.]). More seriously, the whole paper is somewhat out of focus. It seeks to explain why the Greek apologists say so little about the imperial cult, when the real problem is rather why Tertullian says so much—a fact which Beaujeu acknowledges in a postscript (136). The change of mind attests Beaujeu's honesty and candour, but the reader of the volume would have been better served by a new version of the paper which took the change of perspective into account. Tertullian's emphasis on the worship of emperors might indicate that he expected pagans to regard the practice as absurd or embarrassing.

Calderone's paper persuasively expounds the consistency and novelty of the way in which Constantine and Eusebius viewed the emperor's function in the world. But he devotes a large proportion of his ample treatment to an exegesis of the *Triakontaeterikos* (220-40) based on the assumption that it is a single speech which Eusebius delivered twice (220). The work must surely be divided into two separate pieces: chapters 1-10 are a panegyric which Eusebius delivered before the emperor in Constantinople, while chapters 11-18 were addressed to Constantine on the occasion of the dedication of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem and are primarily an apology for Christianity which reproduces material from the *Theophany* (see, e.g., J. Quasten, *Patrology* 3 [Utrecht/Antwerp 1960] 326-28). Although Calderone's actual arguments are not much affected by this mistaken hypothesis, since in practice he only discusses the first ten chapters, it has caused him to miss something of great interest. A pagan orator could celebrate the ruling emperor and his subjects as enjoying the greatest conceivable bliss (e.g. Aristides, *Orat.* 35.36ff. Keil; *Pan. Lat.* 8(5). 20), and could pray that the emperor might live forever and enjoy felicity in this world (e.g. *Pan. Lat.* 12(9). 26.4: "fac igitur ut, quod optimum humano generi dedisti, permaneat aeternum, omnesque Constantinus in terris degat aetates"). Eusebius ended his speech with the prospect of Constantine's death: God will give the emperor greater benefits in heaven than even he has enjoyed on earth (*Triak.* 10, p. 223, 13-22 Heikel). Calderone appears nowhere even to mention this significant sentence, which is germane to his whole theme and surely merited a full discussion.

Calderone also devotes more than twenty pages to events after Constantine's death (240-61), but never mentions the crucial fact that his eldest son was in Gaul when he died (Athanasius, *Apol. c. Arianos* 87). Moreover, the suggestion that Constantine intended that he should be the last Augustus ever, and that his successors should continue to hold the rank of Caesar only (255: "unico Augusto sarebbe rimasto sempre lui, nelle 'absidi del cielo'"), is not only implausible in itself, but appears to result from an inadequate appreciation of the fact that one of Eusebius' main concerns in describing the events of 337 (*V. Const.* 4.65-75) was to gloss over the way in which Constantine's apparent plans for the succession were disregarded and all the adult dynastic rivals of his sons were killed.

The other five papers may be considered together and briefly, for all are accomplished and all point towards the same conclusion. From their different but complementary viewpoints, all five effectively undermine the significance which many modern students of antiquity have accorded to "the imperial cult." Habicht analyses with care and in detail the varied historical contexts in which specific cults of emperors were instituted. Bowersock and Thraede demonstrate that the imperial cult was a matter of central concern neither to Greek intellectuals nor to Latin poets, and Millar that it did not play an important role even in the persecution of the Christians. Indeed, in the course of a clear exposition of the dangerous ambiguities and confusions which the phrase "the imperial cult" enshrines or implies, Bickerman utters a crisp denial: "a universal cult of the ruler did not exist in the Roman Empire" (9). These five excellent papers make clear how multifarious are the phenomena which the words "the imperial cult" or "le culte des souverains" tend to assimilate to one another.

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J. M. C. TOYNBEE. *Animals in Roman Life and Art*. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1973. Pp. 431, illus. \$7.50. (*Aspects of Greek and Roman life*)

In her brief introduction, Professor Toynbee proffers her thanks to many who have aided her, particularly to two 'predecessors,' Keller's invaluable *Antike Tierwelt* and a book called *Animals for Show and Pleasure in Ancient Rome* by G. Jennison (1937). This reader would add a third: Norman Douglas' *Birds and Beasts of the Greek Anthology*, which is just as charming today as it was when it first appeared (1929). She also here points out that her book is intended for the non-classicist as well as for those who read Greek and Latin; for the

latter she has supplied fairly copious notes at the back, which often include the original texts, cited in the body of the work in translation. Since then she wrote with the amateur in mind, one wonders at her frequent (and gratuitous) use of the phrase "of course," e.g. "They (pheasants) owe their name, of course, to . . . Colchis, Land of the River Phasis."

Since the works of Greek and Latin writers have been pretty well combed through in the past for references to beasts, the present work is chiefly valuable for its extensive citing of archaeological evidence from all over the empire, some quite recently discovered. Readers will be especially grateful to both author and publishers for the prodigal offering of clear and well-printed photographs. Would that the publishers had been equally careful in proof-reading the Greek here quoted, which too often is either wrongly accentuated or not accentuated at all (though distributed in this country by Cornell U. P., the volume was actually printed by Messrs. Thames and Hudson).

For a few other curiosities in the text both author and publisher must share the blame. I cite a few examples. In a comment on the absence of cats at Pompeii, we read (p. 89) "no skeletons of cats or larva-formed molds . . . have as yet been reported." Pompeii was not buried by lava; yet had it been, larva (a purist would prefer larvae) is a simple yet inspired step. The publishers are, one supposes, responsible for such examples of Olympian *hybris* as (151) "Dirce, punished for being trampled to death by an infuriated bull." But what of this? (233): "a snake that Aeneas thought might well be his father's 'familiar' (*famulus*). Valerius Flaccus also writes of 'snakes, the shades' familiars' . . . Familiar, too, are the Pompeian paintings of snakes. . . ." To cite one other such cavil, it is somewhat surprising to learn (293) that in the Piazza Armerina mosaic is depicted an armadillo. The appearance of this New World creature in Sicily, c. A.D. 300, surely occasions a wild surmise, rather than the bare mention it is here accorded.

These are minor flaws which can be overlooked. But a major question is also bound to occur to and disturb the reader: just what reason was there for compiling this volume, and what gap was it designed to fill? In her preface, the author notes that Keller's *Tierwelt* included both Greek and Near Eastern, as well as Roman, material, "leaving the specifically Roman contribution . . . sometimes difficult to evaluate." Yet the ancient world is not so easily divided and the present author bears witness to this; for example, she frequently cites evidence from the courts of the Ptolemies and Attalids as though it were somehow Roman. And while Roman poets and artists often portrayed animals with sensitivity, we also remember the mobs in the amphitheaters, howling with glee as they watched thousands of wild beasts slaughtered for their delectation.

Professor Toynbee comments on this discrepancy, but we must remember that her book is intended to 'evaluate the specifically Roman contribution.' Although she has gathered a great deal of information together, the question will be, to some readers, "Contribution to

what?" It is a question to which this reader found no really satisfactory answer.

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ALEXANDER P. D. MOURELATOS, ed. *The Pre-Socratics; A Collection of Critical Essays*. Garden City, N.Y., Anchor Press, 1974. Pp. xiv + 559. Paperback, \$5.95 (*Modern Studies in Philosophy*, APO-21)

Students of the Presocratics must be grateful to Mourelatos and his publishers for making these essays available to a wider public. Some are newly translated from German; two (by Kahn and by Long) have not been previously published. The book includes a fairly full and well-arranged bibliography and useful indices. (There are some curious gaps in the bibliography. Among well-known English works omitted are Burnet's *Greek Philosophy, Part I* and Bailey's *Greek Atomists and Epicurus*; and articles as useful as Balme's 'Greek Science and Mechanism' [*CQ* 1939 and 1941]—to mention just one example—are unnoticed). I will not attempt to discuss the contents of this rich and stimulating volume, but simply raise one or two questions about the editor's policy.

The readers of this volume should know already not only Hussey (*The Presocratics*, London, 1972) and Robinson (*Introduction to Early Greek Philosophy*, Boston, 1968), but also those books which go deeper into scholarly controversies (e.g. Burnet, Kirk and Raven, Guthrie), since these essays presuppose a fairly strong interest in the Presocratics, and fairly close acquaintance with issues in their interpretation. Many of the fundamental articles in this area have already been collected in Furley and Allen's *Studies in Presocratic Philosophy* (vol. 1, London, 1970; vol. 2, 1975); and these should be read before tackling Mourelatos' collection.

Most of the essays deserve to be included. Kahn's piece on Pythagoras is particularly successful in explaining the relevant controversies to non-specialists, as well as arguing with the specialists. Long's discussion of Empedocles' cosmic cycle is a useful contribution to the debate, but less useful as an introduction. Mourelatos' own 37-page study of Parmenides' *Doxa* is out of place in this collection; whatever its intrinsic merits, it is an elaborate philological study which cannot be followed without knowledge of Greek; its proper place is in the specialized book from which it is taken. On the other hand, the inclusion of a small part of Guthrie's *History* betrays further confusion about the intended audience. A student should certainly have read all of Guthrie before he approaches any of these essays (though unfortunately the first two volumes are still not in paperback).

Mourelatos follows most textbooks on 'the Presocratics' in confining himself to those whom Aristotle called *phusikoi*, ignoring the sophists,

the historians and the medical writers. This policy would be legitimate if the book were aimed at readers who already know these other texts. Unfortunately this book does not deal with the philosophical issues raised in Herodotus, Thucydides, or some of the Hippocratic treatises. If you protest that these are not, after all, philosophical authors, one might reply that they are not necessarily less philosophical than some of the *phusikoi*. If the *historia* of Xenophanes is relevant, why not the *historia* of Herodotus? The main disadvantage of these writers seems to be that they do not survive in fragments.

What can be learned from this collection about the relation of Presocratic philosophy to questions of more general interest? We hear very little (except for some bibliographical references) of its contribution to the study of human nature. A reader will look in vain for any discussion of the contributions of *phusiologia* to those views on the universe and human society which disturb Plato so profoundly in *Laws* X. Perhaps the editor believes that these questions can be studied elsewhere, and that his business is 'straight' philosophy; perhaps any attempt to cover these areas would have made the book unmanageably large, or else too superficial. But students need to know that the Presocratics did not philosophize in a vacuum; their doctrines did make some difference to Greek intellectual history, however hard it may be to trace the details; and space could surely have been found in this volume by omitting some of the more heavily specialized pieces. Here Mourelatos follows the bad example of Kirk and Raven, and ignores the good examples of Hussey and Robinson. To take one obvious example—a reader of the Presocratics might fairly ask how one or another of their doctrines contributed to the debates about *nomos* and *physis*.

Again, someone may protest that this is all intellectual history, not philosophy. But this dichotomy is even less relevant to the Presocratics than to other philosophers, and the questions I have mentioned are as philosophical as many of the questions treated in this book. Students will find these papers helpful for understanding some of what the philosophers say; they will find less help than they should in seeing the significance of what they say for wider issues. Except for one or two essays (e.g. those of Fränkel and Cornford) the contributors are concerned with philological, exegetical problems, sometimes with questions in logic and metaphysics (see the essays of Owen and Furth); but a rigid departmental division between the study and teaching of Presocratic philosophy and the study and teaching of Greek views of nature, man, and society will do harm to both pursuits.

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OWSEI TEMKIN. *Galenism: Rise and Decline of a Medical Philosophy*. Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1973. Pp. xvii + 240. \$15.00.

The fox, you will remember, knows many things: the hedgehog, one big one. If we may follow Sir Isaiah Berlin in exploiting this archetypal thought, here we have Professor Temkin, a fox if ever there was one, playing the hedgehog. The hedgehog writes Cornell University's four Messenger Lectures, and prints a somewhat expanded version of them as the text of this book. The fox writes the enormously rich and valuable footnotes, one-third of a page on average, and compiles the thirty-five pages of bibliography.

The fox-work, stretching through the centuries from Hippocrates to Daremberg and through the medical literature of Greeks, Arabs and European Latin and vernacular, provides endless insights, new perspectives, promising avenues to be explored, and quantities of fact—literary fact—hard to obtain elsewhere. For example, try footnotes 30-34 on pp. 145ff., on Telesius and Campanella, where there is much tempting material on the difference between 'spirit' and the immortal soul—a good controversy on mainly Aristotelian material. The very careful and full documentation is admirably presented, and will stimulate many readers to further investigation, as well as serving itself as a handy work of reference.

When Dr. Temkin becomes a hedgehog and writes on "Galenism," the reader may become more critical. What is "Galenism"? The question gets a clear-cut answer in the last lecture, when Galenism is seen in contrast with various aspects of the growing "mechanical philosophy." But earlier?

The difficulty of giving a general account of "Galenism" can be seen clearly in chapter 3, "Authority and Challenge." Galenism is challenged by Paracelsus among others. But the text, at its chosen level of generality, is almost entirely vacuous on the contrast between these two. Dr. Temkin writes: "Where Galen had reasoned and deduced, Paracelsus appealed to an as yet uncharted search of nature and to parables of macrocosm and microcosm." Neither the text nor the footnotes fill out this unhelpful sketch.

"Galen represented himself as a model for the physician and philosopher: a simple life, with piety toward the Creator . . ." (51). *The Creator?* "Galen was a confessed skeptic who disclaimed knowledge of whether the world had been created or was eternal . . ." (79). Galenism seems to be a somewhat muddled philosophy.

One might suppose that Galenism in its first appearance could be identified by locating it among the classical "sects" in medicine—the Empiricists, Methodists, and various subsets of Dogmatists. But in truth this classification is never very revealing, and it is particularly unhelpful in the case of Galen, whose work transcended these divisions. It would have been possible to achieve much more clarity of definition, at least in a limited area, by contrasting Galen with his

favorite theoretical target—Erasistratus. With the followers of Erasistratus Galen had some clear-cut controversies: for example, on the basic structure of the bodily tissues, on the mechanical principles of physiology, and on the function of the arterial system. It is a little surprising that Dr. Temkin hardly mentions Erasistratus.

Conscious of the difficulty of framing a general description of Galen's "philosophy," Dr. Temkin assembles a "portrait of an ideal," the lines of which are drawn from Galen's own descriptions of himself and his work. This was worth trying, but turns out to be disappointing. Galen aimed at knowledge of truth; he used observational data, and thought it important to verify the data by dissection, by traveling to look for himself, and so on, but he recognized the need for a good theoretical background too; he venerated the "ancients," especially Hippocrates, but was conscious of cumulative progress in medical science. Do these virtuous attitudes define Galenism? Galen himself claimed that they did indeed distinguish him from all his contemporaries—greedy charlatans to a man—but it seems unlikely. In any case, it is not such general pieties that make him a great writer, but the energy and power of his research, his demonstrations and his arguments.

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
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